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
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The eternal values

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THE ETERNAL VALUES



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THE ETERNAL VALUES

BY

HUGO MÜNSTERBERG



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To
JOSIAH ROYCE

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PREFACE

THIS is the first time that I have ventured to write a book in both English and German. So far the author in me has presented a case of double personality. For many years the one person has written English, but has published only light books and essays; all that time the other person has written in German, but has insisted on writing scholarly papers and systematic works. The one tried to address a wider public; the other sought only the ear of the scholar. Neither knew what the other was doing.

In this way my publications of the last year were again divided. When I wanted to discuss popularly the relations of psychology to law and to medicine, the American in me came to the front and wrote in light vein "On the Witness Stand" and "Psychotherapy." But when the philosophical striving of my whole life had led me to a new idealistic standpoint from which I saw the ultimate problems of the world in a new light, it seemed only natural that the German in me should say it in his mother tongue and with the seriousness of scholarly formulation. The product was my "*Philosophie der Werte*."

Yet the hardly expected warmth of welcome which the volume found in wide spheres soon suggested to me that after all the task of the book was not only to address scholars who do not care in what language a book is written. Far beyond the circle of philosophers it was greeted as an expression of the new desires of our time, which seeks its own understanding of life and world, and is tired of the mere naturalism and positivism and skepticism and pragmatism of the past decades. The ethical idealism of the book seemed to touch the most widely different layers of the community. That suggested

the hope that the book might fulfil a similar mission in the world of American thought and here too might help to liberate from the ghosts of the past. Therefore I undertook for the first time the translation of a book of mine.

Yet this volume can hardly be called a translation. Much in this English version is newly added and much is omitted from the previous text. Many side issues, especially such as connected the work with particular German movements, are entirely left out, and not a few additions refer to recent American discussions. Other parts are greatly condensed.

While in this way the book has become almost a new one, I have not altered its external shape: the form of a philosophical system. It would not have been difficult to remove these sharp boundary-lines and to resolve systematic separations into looser forms, more attractive to the casual reader. I have not yielded to this temptation because I sincerely believe that too much in the American method of philosophizing has become antagonistic to the real character of philosophy. More and more the aim seems to be the writing of philosophy in brilliant epigrams and clever discussions. Especially our younger philosophers dash down their thoughts in an impressionistic style which captivates and does not need the slightest effort to follow. Who will doubt that such picturesqueness is stimulating and attractive? Yet after all it is serving the ultimate purpose of knowledge no better than a picturesque and epigrammatic mathematics or chemistry. Philosophy is a movement of thought which demands the thoroughness of the expert, and which can be followed only with concentrated attention. Everything depends upon inner consistency, and only a closely knit system can secure it. In all times only such systems have marked the great periods of philosophical insight.

This must not be misunderstood. First it does not mean that the philosophical understanding of the world should lead us away from the reality of life and should rely on meta-

physical speculations. On the contrary, this world of our real life is the material of our philosophical effort. In the following volume the last chapter alone faces metaphysical problems. The discussion on truth and beauty, on happiness and love, on science and art, on development and progress, on industry and law, on morality and religion, fills the bulk of the book and is not at all metaphysical. It aims to grasp our real experience in its original fulness and in its true significance. Every line of those chapters might be accepted even by those who see other ways of solving the metaphysical problem.

Moreover my insisting on the difficulty of the philosophical task must not be misunderstood as if it pleaded for a philosophical "art for art's sake." On the contrary, everybody's life is controlled by some kind of philosophy, however haphazard and inconsistent and fragmentary it may be, and every true philosophy aims finally to reach the conviction of the masses. But just as the physicist must work out his formulæ, in a way which the average reader would hardly understand, before his calculations can harness nature in the service of the millions, so the philosopher too will build up and reform and serve human progress only if he makes no concession to "common sense." Common sense, with reference to the problems of world and life, always means only the echo of the scholarly philosophy of preceding centuries. If serious, thorough thought has distilled some truth, it will be distributed quickly enough through thousands of popular channels.

Yet while the formulæ of philosophical calculation ought not even to tempt the reader who simply wants to sip the wisdom of the world, no philosophy will really lead forward which is not after all the expression of the deepest striving of its time. The sincere conviction that this holds true for the idealistic philosophy of "The Eternal Values," from the start gave the real aim and meaning to this work. Throughout our

life a new wave is rising, a new seeking and a new longing, a new feeling and a new certainty: may this book now help in the New World too to bring these young and yet so old ideals to clear self-consciousness and through it to inner strength and power! I cannot symbolize this hope better than by dedicating this work, in friendship of heart and thought, to the same man whose name it carried when it went forth on its first voyage.

HUGO MÜNSTERBERG.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY,
May, 1909.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
Skepticism and Relativism, 1; Idealism, 3; The Need of a New Philosophy, 4.	
PART I. THE MEANING OF VALUES	
I. PHYSICAL NATURE	9
The World as Material Mechanism, 9; Man and the Universe, 12.	
II. THE PSYCHICAL NATURE	15
The Aim of Psychology, 15; Voluntaristic Psychology, 17; Content of Consciousness, 19; Pleasure and Pain, 20; The One-sidedness of Psychology, 22; Immediate Reality, 23.	
III. THE PERSONALITIES	27
The Individual Will, 27; Economic Values, 29; Highest Values, 31; Modern Relativism, 34; Unconditioned Values, 37; Pragmatism and Idealism, 41.	
IV. THE OBLIGATIONS	46
The Validity of Absolute Values, 46; A Misinterpretation of the Absolute, 48; The Necessity of Action, 50; The Social Norms, 51; The Values and the Ought, 54; The Obligation of Knowledge, 58; The Obligation of Morality, 60; Self-consistency, 63; The Obligations and the Pure Will, 64.	
V. THE SATISFACTION OF THE WILL	65
Satisfaction and Pleasure, 65; Satisfaction and Fulfilment, 69; Pure Will Actions, 71; The Meaning of Realization, 72.	
VI. THE ETERNAL VALUES	75
The Demand for a World, 75; The Self-assertion of Experience, 77; The System of Values, 78; The Prejudices against Systematic Philosophy, 80; Philosophy and Life, 81.	

PART II. THE LOGICAL VALUES

VII. THE VALUES OF EXISTENCE	87
The Identity of Experience, 87; Judgment and Reality, 88; The Life Experience and Real Existence, 90.	
A. <i>Things</i>	94
The Practical Test of Existence, 94; The Postulate of Existence, 96; The Space-Time Form, 97; The Existence of Mental Things, 100.	
B. <i>Persons</i>	100
The Naturalistic Idea of Persons, 102; The Real Knowledge of Others, 104; The Practical Test, 106.	
C. <i>Valuations</i>	112
The Over-personal Will Acts, 112; The Absoluteness of the Valuation, 114.	
VIII. THE VALUES OF CONNECTION	116
Identity as Principle of Connection, 116; The Ideal of Science, 119.	
A. <i>Nature</i>	121
The Totality of Things in their Connection, 121; The Single Facts and the General Laws, 122; The Conception of Causality, 126; The Causal Laws and the Recognition of Identities, 129; The Description and Explanation, 130; The Natural Sciences and Psychology, 134; The Absolute Value of Science, 136.	
B. <i>History</i>	138
The Connection of Will Acts, 138; History and the Objective Time, 142; History and Causality, 144; The Understanding of Persons, 149; The New Will Acts, 151; History and Things, 152.	
C. <i>Reason</i>	155
The Connection of Evaluations, 155; The Connection of Judgments, 159.	

PART III. THE ÆSTHETIC VALUES

IX. THE VALUES OF UNITY	165
Unity and Beauty, 165; The Psychological Aspect of Æsthetics, 167; The Æsthetic Introjection, 170; The	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xiii

Æsthetic Unity, 172; The Will of Nature, 175; Æsthetic Reality, 176; Æsthetic Manifoldness, 177; Æsthetic and Logical Values, 180.

A. *Harmony* 183

The Sensuous Enjoyment, 183; The Beauty of Nature, 185; Natural Beauty and Art, 187.

B. *Love* 188

Harmony of Wills, 188; Love and the Moral Values, 190; Love and Pleasure, 193.

C. *Happiness* 195

Happiness and Morality, 195; Happiness and Pleasure, 197; The Unity of Will, 198; The Will Character of Happiness, 200; The Propagation of Happiness, 202.

X. THE VALUES OF BEAUTY 204

The Inner Agreement of the Manifold, 204; The Applied Arts, 205; Beauty and Reality, 207; The Unreality of Art, 208; Self-deception, 211; The Freedom of the Artist, 212; The Artistic Form, 217.

A. *Fine Arts* 218

The Content of the Picture, 218; Art and Science, 220; The Form of the Picture, 223; The Lines and Colors, 224.

B. *Literature* 227

The Field of Literature, 227; The Meaning of Life, 228; Historical Reality, 230; The Three Types of Literature, 233; The Meaning of the Drama, 234; The Form of Literature, 237; Rhythm and Sound, 238.

C. *Music* 241

The Psychology and Æsthetics of Music, 241; Rhythms and Sounds, 243; Melody, 246; The Meaning of Musical Beauty, 249; Music and the Inner World, 251.

PART IV. THE ETHICAL VALUES

XI. THE VALUES OF DEVELOPMENT 257

Being and Becoming, 257; Purpose and Realization, 260.

A. *Growth* 263

Teleology in Natural Science, 263; The Intentions of Nature, 267; The Pseudo-intentions of Nature, 270; The Material of Human Deed, 273.

<i>B. Progress</i>	277
History and Progress, 277; The Naturalistic View of Society, 281; The Will of the Community, 285; The Individual Standpoint and the Group Standpoint, 286; The Stages of Civilization, 289; Progress and Regress, 293.	
<i>C. Self-Development</i>	294
The Unfolding of the Will, 294; The Fundamental Will, 298.	
 XII. THE VALUES OF ACHIEVEMENT	 301
The Intentional Securing of the Development, 301.	
<i>A. Industry</i>	304
Economy, 304; The Spirit of the Economic Life, 306; Nature and the Purposes of Man, 310; The Technical Development, 314.	
<i>B. Law</i>	317
The Historic Relativity of Law, 317; Law and Morality, 321; The Coercive Measures of Law, 323; Law and the Economic Life, 325; The Absolute Value of Law, 328.	
<i>C. Morality</i>	329
Morality and Law, 329; The Content of the Moral Action, 331; Morality and Development, 333; The Self as Value, 337; The Immoral Action, 340; The Moral Obligation, 342.	
 PART V. THE METAPHYSICAL VALUES	
 XIII. THE VALUES OF HOLINESS	 347
The Manifoldness of Values, 347; The Conflict of Values, 350; The Identification of Values, 352; Religion and Philosophy, 354; Development and Religion, 357.	
<i>A. Creation</i>	359
God and Natural Science, 359; The Oriental Religions, 363; Christianity, 367.	
<i>B. Revelation</i>	370
Revelation and History, 370; The Divine Order, 372; Revelation in the Historical Religions, 373.	
<i>C. Salvation</i>	376
The Life after Death, 376; Buddhism, 378; Christianity and Salvation, 380; Immortality and Time, 382.	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xv

XIV. THE VALUES OF ABSOLUTENESS	385
The Presupposition of the Values, 385; The Unification of the Values, 387; Knowledge and Conviction, 392; The Over-experience, 395; The Over-will, 398.	
A. <i>World</i>	402
The World and the Will, 402; The Material of the World, 405; Time and Space, 407; The World and the Deed of the Over-self, 410.	
B. <i>Mankind</i>	412
The Individual and the Over-self, 412; The Individual and the Body, 415; The Metaphysical Meaning of Mankind, 416; The Upbuilding of Values, 418.	
C. <i>Over-self</i>	420
The Contradictions in the Self, 420; The Meaning of the World, 422; The Meaning of Life, 426.	



THE ETERNAL VALUES

INTRODUCTION

Is there anything in the world valuable in itself? That is our question. Of course there are many things which we value because you or I like them, or because they are useful for a certain purpose; they are helpful to us. But such values depend upon our special standpoint. A thing may be useful to me and useless to my neighbor. It may be agreeable to our social group, but disagreeable to other nations or to other ages. Even the truths of to-day were not the truths of yesterday and may not be valued as truths to-morrow. The beauties of one school may mean ugliness to another. The moral laws of one tribe may demand what is forbidden in the next. Religious values have always been objects of dispute. Everything seems dependent upon individual standpoints, dependent upon individual desires. Truth is nothing but that which helps us to fulfil our purposes; beauty is nothing but that which appeals agreeably to our senses; morality is nothing but useful prescriptions which secure comfort for our particular social group; religion is nothing but suggestions which give us hope. In short, our so-called values seem to be merely means of personal gratification, changing from age to age, from people to people, from group to group, from man to man.

Outspoken or not, that is the philosophical creed of the overwhelming majority of thinking persons to-day. The faithful believer, to be sure, feels that his religion really brings him in contact with something which is absolutely valuable. The moral man who sacrifices his life to follow the call of duty believes in his deepest heart that the moral deed is of absolute value. The artist who creates a thing of

beauty imagines that his inspiration, too, opens to him a world of absolute value. The social reformer and the statesman, the pioneer and the captain of industry, when they work and fight for the progress of mankind, feel that the human advance is something absolutely valuable. The judge when he serves on the bench is filled with the belief that it is absolutely valuable to have justice prevail among men. And in the midst of his scholarly research the seeker for truth is indeed uplifted by the conviction that the full truth is something eternally valuable. But all these convictions and beliefs, these faiths and inspirations, must fade away, it seems, as soon as the philosopher begins to examine them. He shows that they are nothing but illusions which pleasantly deceive the striving men, and that in reality no absolute values can exist. Everything is relative, everything is good only for a certain purpose, for a certain time, for a certain social group, for a certain individual. Goodness and beauty and progress and peace and religion and truth merely have pragmatic value. They help us to our personal ends. Our ideals and our lives are of no value in themselves. What we dream of eternal values should simply be explained psychologically like the fancies of a fairy-tale. Philosophical skepticism and relativism are thus the last word, and their answer harmonizes with a thousand disorganizing tendencies of our time.

To examine whether their answer is really true and the whole truth, is the purpose of this philosophical volume. It will show that it is the relativism and the skepticism which move from misunderstanding to misunderstanding; it will show that idealism is justified, nay, is demanded, by true science and true philosophy, that the believers are right and the pragmatists wrong, and that we may stand firmly with both feet on the rock of facts, and may yet hold to the absolute values as eternally belonging to the structure of the world. Such an end can never be reached by simply affirming once more a faithful belief and an enthusiastic conviction. To

profess idealism never means to prove its right. The popular way of the sentimental appeal, the enthusiasm of the minister or of the reformer, of the scholar or of the artist, of the pioneer or of the moralist, cannot defend our cause. We have to take the way of dispassionate logical argument; it is the way of sober philosophy. But this way may divide itself and reach its end by two different methods. We may simply enter into a critical discussion of the positivism and pragmatism and skepticism of our time. We may show where their error begins and why they must lead to failure. This has often been done, and successfully done; and yet it never has led and never can lead to a new view of the world. It is negative; it destroys the opposing argument, but has nothing better to offer; and while we may become convinced that this or that relativistic philosophy is wrong and hollow, we listen willingly again to every new effort in the same spirit.

But there is another way open. The philosopher might try, not only to destroy, but to build up; not only to criticise, but to open new perspectives. Our time needs a new philosophy. The mere heaping up of facts no longer satisfies us; the world is tired of the pose of a mere triumphal march from discovery to discovery without ever asking what it all means. We have come to feel that life is not more worth living by the mere accumulation of collected facts. But our time is tired, too, of the skeptical and relativistic philosophy which always follows the periods of technical progress and the advance of naturalistic knowledge. The world longs for a new expression of the meaning of life and reality. Our age begins to feel anew that the true riddles of the universe are after all not those which the naturalist declared to be such, and that we do not understand the world we live in by simply decomposing it into its physical and psychical elements. Our time again feels instinctively that it is not sufficient to renew the old system of the sophists; they taught, indeed, like the sophists of to-day, that there is no value in any ideals,

and that the individual man is the measure of all things. Our time certainly welcomes every achievement of the sciences, — the physical and the mental ones, — and does not want to lose any of their conquests, but it begins to reject the superficiality with which such physical and psychological knowledge is raised to the dignity of a philosophy. The sciences themselves begin to urge a critical examination of their foundations, and that means that they ask about the real value of truth. And in practical life, also, everywhere an uncanny feeling prevails that our hasty, busy life has lost its aim, that our efficiency has grown, but that the meaning of our life is in danger, that everything is scattered, and that we need a new unity. Clearer and clearer shine the values through the world of facts.

We need a philosophy which will do justice to all the knowledge and all the aspirations of the twentieth century, and yet avoid the shallowness of modern skepticism. The time may not be ripe for such a new unity of its self-expression, but the time for it will never come if the effort is not made again and again, seriously and consistently. Mere preaching and mere enthusiasm are utterly insufficient. Hard, thorough, patient labor is needed, and no one ought to believe that easy-going epigrammatic philosophy can relieve us from the burden of such difficult work. Nor is it sufficient simply to renew the historic systems of classical idealists from the days of Plato to those of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel. The knowledge of science has become new since those days, especially through psychology, which has opened the widest vistas. New fields of practical tasks have been secured for us. We have become new types of human beings. All that must be included and developed by a laborious thought, abstract and apparently removed from practical life; it must be anchored in the depths of conviction. And it is certain, if our time is to have a new philosophy which may give meaning to life and reality, and liberate us from the pseudo-philosophic doubt

of our ideals, that the problem of values must stand in the centre of the inquiry. The meaning of what is valuable must decide our view of the world. Of course others may have their full share in the study of what mankind accredits as value. Sociologists and psychologists, historians and biologists, economists and theologians, may and must approach the problem of values from new and ever new sides. They have to describe and classify, and especially to explain, the whole manifoldness of that which men value in the world. They have to make us understand how this endless variety of valuations has grown and how it originated. They may enter into the fight and favor some groups of values and disclaim other groups; they may try to make a change in the valuations of our time and stamp new values for mankind; and yet the fundamental problem remains untouched by all of them. The philosopher alone is called to answer it.

The philosophical inquiry into values is not planned to give or to deny value to anything in heaven or earth, or to create new values, or to reshape or to transvalue the acknowledged values. Still less can its goal be to explain the mental process of preference by means of natural science or psychology. Philosophy has rather to seek an answer to the one question, how far we have a right to give to our values an objective character. Philosophy needs to understand what the fundamental meaning of any valuation is, and to examine whether and in what sense absolute valuation is possible at all. Philosophy never has to do with the problems of special experiences, but always has to ask how and in what sense such experience is possible. The philosopher leaves it to the naturalists and to the historians to discover the special facts of reality, and to bring them into systematic connection. He keeps for his own inquiry only the deeper problem of the theory of knowledge, what the real meaning of such facts can be, and what it means to have such knowledge of the world at all. It is the same in the domain of values. The special

sciences have to study what has been valued or has been rejected, here or there, or now or then, and specialists have to consider whether it would be right or wrong, useful or dangerous, to accept or reject certain valuations. But the philosophic theory of values seeks only what it means to have values. In what sense can they be really valuable? In what sense are they dependent upon our personal standpoint? Is there anything in the world valuable except our personal likings and pleasures, anything worthless but the sources of our personal discomfort? Is there any value which we ought to acknowledge without reference to our personality? Is there any moral or logical or æsthetic or religious sin which we ought to reject without reference to our personal disliking?

PART I

THE MEANING OF VALUES

CHAPTER I

THE PHYSICAL NATURE

OUR question is, whether we have to acknowledge anything in our world as absolutely valuable. Yet if we formulate our problem in this way, we should at once make clear who the "we" are who are to value the world, and still more which "world" is meant of which the worth or worthlessness is to be weighed. The world can be defined in so many ways. The theologian means something different by the "world" from the physicist, and with every interpretation of the world of course the question concerning its values changes. The same holds true of ourselves. We too are something entirely different for the historian and for the biologist, for the chemist and for the moralist, and our attitude must always get a new meaning. A special way of looking on us as individuals, moreover, belongs together with a special way of looking on the world. The world in which we live our lives as historical personalities is not the same world in which we react as biological organisms. That first world in which we fight the struggles of our practical life, the world which we experience in every pulse-beat of our real aiming and working, indeed, lies far from the world of the scientist with its atoms and its causal laws. We must therefore discriminate carefully of which world we are to speak. It would seem most natural to begin with that world of immediate subjective experience, which has not been revised by scientific conceptions, but which we find naïvely in us and with us. Yet the modern man is hardly prepared to begin his outlook with a view of such immediate reality. We all stand so fully in the grasp of our school knowledge, and we have been so completely

trained to see things with the eyes of natural science, that it appears much more in harmony with our habits of thought if instead we start with a picture of the world which physics draws for us. That may be our first step. It is indeed quite unimportant with which view of the world we begin, so long as we take care to be consistent and not to mix the various aspects of reality. Thus we ask as our first preparatory question: What is valuable in the world which the scientist explores and explains, in the world of the causal laws?

Then we deliberately take at first the standpoint of the naturalist, and look on the world as if reality itself were nothing but this system of objects in space and time and in causal connection. The scientist does not ask, and has no right to ask, whether space and time and causality exist without exception. He simply presupposes them. If he is an astronomer, he knows that he would not deepen his astronomy but distort it, if he were to look out with his telescope to ascertain whether there is somewhere no space, or if he were to make calculations whether there is somewhere an effect without cause. The scientist studies only the details of this world, but the fundamental forms and the fundamental scheme of that world he accepts beforehand. There cannot be anything in his world which is not included in the forms of time and space and causality. Such a ground plan of a causal world, however vague, is somehow in the mind of even the most naïve person as soon as he seeks a cause for any happening, or tries to foresee an effect which is to be expected. The progress of science means only the further elaboration and detailed discovery of this causal world. And now we ask what there is valuable in this world of the scientist.

The ideal of such a world is a material mechanism. If we pad it out into a philosophy, it gives us a logically impossible materialism; but if we take it simply as the foundation of physical sciences, it is invulnerable. Even the demand to substitute energies for the material substances only appar-

ently changes such a view of the world, and is without consequences for our problem. In the language of three thousand years, we should therefore have to say that every occurrence in the universe is ultimately only a change of position of smallest indivisible bodily particles, of which each is completely determined in its movement by preceding movements in the whole system. Even all the life-processes are only physical and chemical occurrences, and every chemical and physical change resolves itself finally into mechanical movements of atoms. It is quite indifferent for us how far natural science is still removed to-day from the solution of this task. Important only for us is the fact that natural science is bound by its presuppositions never to acknowledge any unmechanical life-energies, any over-natural influences, any mystical agencies. These demands would remain even if the history of its successes had not so completely affirmed the right of its presuppositions.

What can be good or bad in such a turmoil of atoms? There are combinations of particles which are fugitive and which crumble, or which are lasting in their connections. Some are simple and others are complex, some are similar to one another and some are dissimilar, but nothing gives us the slightest hold for the claim that the complex is better than the simple, that the lasting is more valuable than the fugitive, that the repeated is more worthy than the unique. The natural scientist speaks of progress and of development when he follows up the transition from the infusor to the vertebrate, or from the acorn to the tree; but such conceptions, which like development and progress involve a certain evaluation, are after all disloyal to his real intention. If he is really consistent with his mechanical view of the world, he has to acknowledge that there would be nothing worse and nothing better if the transition should lead from the mammal to the amoeba, from the organism to the lifeless, from the formed to the shapeless, from the cosmos to the chaos. Our own po-

sition in the universe cannot change this, as we ourselves are, in such a system of nature, nothing but organisms. As little as the astronomer has the right to think of our earth as the centre of the universe, has the biologist a right to make any concessions in favor of the human organism. In the consistent system of nature, the existence of man is in itself not more desirable than that of pebbles on the beach. Whether the earth with all the teeming organisms on its surface will sink into the sun, or whether the human organism will develop itself into a much more complex being with a still more complicated brain, are two hypotheses concerning the future which the naturalist has to consider with equal neutrality. Whether one will occur or the other, whether man will be destroyed or will climb on, is from such a point of view equally without any value. Either would be simply a fact and nothing but a fact.

Of course that would at once be completely changed if the one product of nature, man, should stand as something absolutely valuable in the mechanical universe. From this point of view, then, everything would become illuminated, and the rays would be reflected on other things, and finally everything in the universe would be shaded in accordance with its relation to man. In that case, evidently, the growth of the race from the simplest animal to the most complex would indeed deserve to be called a development, that is, a change from the worse to the better, from the less valuable to the more valuable. In the same way, the cooling of the earth's surface would have represented a real progress. But we undermine the whole system of nature, if we destroy its equilibrium at any one place by such an arbitrary valuation. Just as it would be indifferent for the system of nature whether the law of causality should be broken at a few or at many points, in the same way it makes no difference whether we give value to a few or to many molecular bodies. Nature is no longer nature when the chain of causality is

broken at any point, and nature is no longer nature when any causal process in it is acknowledged as more valuable than any other. Man's life cannot make an exception there.

Every evaluation and every preference evidently presupposes a will which takes an attitude and which finds its satisfaction. But in the conception of the causal system of nature lies included the complete independence of any attitude and any will. The things of the world enter into the mechanical system only in so far as they are conceived in relation to one another, and without relation to the will of the spectator. Surely that is a one-sidedness of the naturalistic view; it is an aspect which is foreign to our immediate reality of life. In our practical experience things have their meaning just through our attitude; their existence is bound up with our interest in them. But the whole significance of the naturalistic view of the world lies in this one-sidedness by principle; the naturalist cannot know anything, and does not want to know anything, but the objects in their causal relations among themselves. To look on things as parts of nature means to reconstruct and to remodel them in our conceptions, until they come in question only as causes and effects. The consciousness which knows the mechanical universe is thus no longer the individual with his will and his purposes, but merely a passive spectator, a consciousness which without any interest simply becomes aware of the interplay of energies in this world. Such a personality of course is not a real man. The standpoint of the naturalist is an artificial one; it involves certain abstractions. The world is in a way cut off from our real life-attitudes, and has been made a mere object of awareness; but in this abstraction lies at the same time its incomparable strength. It allows us to understand the processes in the world as results of laws, and thus to bring them into mathematical relations and finally to master them and to put nature in harness. We can go even further. The standpoint of the naturalist differs from that of real man

with his life-interests, not only by abstracting from his will and preference, but by extinguishing his individuality. Nature as such does not exist for this spectator or that spectator, for you or for me. It is conceived as being the same for every one. The knower of nature is ultimately an impersonal consciousness, which has not only no influence on the processes of nature, but which has not even any individual place in its system. In short, nature is conceived as if it exists in itself, independent of the subjects who know it. Nature is simply another name for the totality of things which are by principle independent of any subject, and therefore without relation to any will, and therefore without any value.

To be sure, that does not at all exclude the fact that the relation to man may play an important rôle also in natural science; but in that case man is himself considered as such a part of nature. For instance, the chemist may consider certain chemical substances in their effect on the human organism, and classify them as food, or as drugs, or as poisons; and from that point of view he is justified in calling the foods valuable and the poisons harmful. But if we take it rigorously, we must say that in the chemical system as such the substances which feed man and the substances which kill man are equally neutral, inasmuch as man himself is in that system only a chemical substance, and the assimilation or destruction of that chemical complex offers from the chemical standpoint no reason to leave the neutral position of mere description. Of course, nothing is changed if, instead of the single human being, perhaps the whole human race is evaluated. As part of nature even all mankind is nothing but an object of explanation.

CHAPTER II

THE PSYCHICAL NATURE

WE have so far spoken of only one half of nature. We have narrowed the conception in such a way that it contained only the system of physical objects and excluded the mental objects. Such a simplification makes it easier to grasp the idea of a system which is free from values. As soon as the contents of the psychical experience are added to that physical experience, new and unaccustomed difficulties arise. And yet it is evident that a description of all the objects of experience which we find in the world must include also the mental contents, the ideas and thoughts, the feelings and emotions. The naturalist may interpret them as products of the organism, and the psycho-physicist may consider their occurrence as determined by processes in the brain, but in every case they remain, after all, something different from the space-filling material objects. A sensation is never a nerve-cell and is never mechanical energy, and yet no one denies that such sensations have just as much real existence in the world as the nerves, and that psychology has therefore the right to exist as well as physics. Of course, if we are really to consider the mental world as part of the causal system of nature, we must treat it also as a series of objects which we find, and which are to be described, to be classified, and to be explained. The analysis of the elements, and the causal explanation of the processes, is then the true aim of psychology.

This aim of psychology is nowadays under a discussion which has often confused the issues. The popular literature is always inclined to think of psychological study as going on where inner life is interpreted in its meaning, or analyzed in

its intentions, or understood in its internal relations of purpose. In the popular use of the word, perhaps, we call the poet, or the skilful lawyer, or the clever politician a great psychologist. But we must be clear from the start that there we give to psychology a meaning which is fundamentally different from that which it has in the realm of science. The situation is this. In our immediate life-reality, which the poet expresses, which the historian interprets, and in which our legal or political or moral or social interests lie, we feel ourselves as personalities, and as such characterized by our unity, by our freedom, and by our purposiveness. In every act of ours, in every feeling and every volition and every thought, we are conscious as a self which expresses its aims and meanings. Every idea of ours points beyond itself, every volition binds us in our decisions, and every experience gets meaning by our attitudes. The most immediate task which life demands from us in the understanding of ourselves and of others is therefore to interpret our ideas, to draw the consequences of our will, to appreciate the attitudes, to measure them by higher standards. We do that in our practical life all the time, and there are many scholarly pursuits which carry out just this aim in a most systematic fashion. The jurist, for instance, systematically interprets in such a way certain will-acts, or the mathematician develops consistently the consequences of certain ideas in our minds. The historian speaks of man in the full reality of his purposive self. As a matter of course, all that is most important and most necessary, if we want to understand man and his inner life, and yet it is absolutely no psychology in the technical sense of the word. Psychology has no other aim but, like any natural science, to describe and to explain its material, while every interpretation and appreciation of mental life belongs to entirely different spheres of human interest. It is true, psychology has not had the good fortune to reach, even in scientific quarters, that complete clearness about its own task which, for

instance, astronomy or chemistry has. Silently those two different ways of looking on mental life are mixed together. While no astronomer nowadays would any longer confuse the appreciation of the stars with the description and explanation of their movements, as they still did in the seventeenth century, in psychology the descriptive and the explanatory account of mental life are still too often intertwined with an effort to examine the ideas in their meaning and the inner purposive relations of the will.

Whoever insists that both groups of endeavors belong to psychology ought to feel obliged to recognize two fundamentally different kinds of psychology. We have first the causal psychology, which considers all inner experiences as material for description and explanation. That means that it treats the inner experience like objects. They are then simply contents of consciousness, which must be analyzed into their elements in the same way in which the anatomist dissects the body into its tissues and the tissues into their cells. And, finally, those contents of consciousness are to be explained as the physicist explains the changes in the contents of space. But we should have in the second place another kind of psychology, which some like to call voluntaristic psychology, which interprets the meaning of the self and follows up the inner will-relations. There is no harm in the double use of the word so long as in this way the two methods are cleanly and clearly separated. A danger for intellectual straightforwardness sets in only when both are carelessly mixed, as too often happens. The result is a multi-colored pseudo-psychology, which tries to suit every one and therefore does not really suit any one. The truth, however, is, that if we look deeper into those two tasks, we can easily recognize that voluntaristic psychology has essentially to answer questions which find their natural place in the field of logic, ethics, æsthetics, philosophy of history and religion, and that the name of psychology ought to be left simply to

that other group which deals in a descriptive and explanatory way with the inner experience.

To us here only the one fact is essential, namely, that such a scientific causal objective treatment of mental life is a possible view of inner experience. We can abstract from the question whether other aspects are also rightly or wrongly called psychology. We certainly have to consider at the present stage of our discussion only that descriptive psychology, if we really want to answer the question whether there is anything valuable in the world which the naturalist can find. The naturalist is for us any one who looks on the world as material of description and explanation only. Mental life is a part of his world only in so far as it is considered also as a system of describable and explainable objects, and not as expression of a will and of a self.

Hence, the true psychologist sees the whole manifoldness of perceptions and thoughts, of feelings and emotions, of judgments and volitions, lying before him as the physicist sees the manifoldness of bodily things. There in the outer world it rains and it snows, here in the inner world joy arises or anger, a volition appears, a judgment comes in, ideas enter and depart; it is a piece of unbodily nature controlled by laws, and the spectator is the mere consciousness. It does not influence them and does not interfere with them; it simply becomes aware of them. The idea of the own "I" is then only one special content among other contents of consciousness, and every inner activity and act of attention and every decision must be understood as a mere change in the elements. The atoms of the physical universe alter their positions, and produce in this way the unlimited manifoldness of forms in the outer world. The psychical elements alter their strength and their vividness, and the resulting play produces the unlimited manifoldness of those psychical contents. Such a psychological view is again entirely unfit to be proclaimed a philosophy. It would be a superficial positivism, which

indeed has too often been honored as a philosophical view of the world, and yet is not more fit for it than the materialism of the physicist. But while both positivism and materialism are entirely insufficient to give us an ultimate view of reality, both are necessary means for the concrete scientific task. The materialistic view is essential as presupposition of natural science, and the positivistic view is essential as foundation of scientific psychology. Psychologists and physicists are not responsible for the fact that their special scientific aspects are misunderstood as complete views of the world. They know that they have to deal with abstractions, but that those abstractions are essential for the solution of their particular problems, which serve the tasks of life.

We now return to our starting-point. If we consider the inner life from a psychological point of view, that is, as part of nature, is there in our contents of consciousness anything which has value? The temptation to answer that question affirmatively lies near. For instance, we find feelings of pleasure which we like to keep. Does not that mean that we treat them as valuable, as against, for instance, feelings of pain which we dislike? But now we must look more carefully into this fact. Our presupposition was that we consider our inner life as mere content of consciousness. We experience it only as passive spectators. The "we" which tries to keep the pleasure and tries to reject the pain is therefore not really the same "we" which experiences that whole process. The "we" which experiences is simply the consciousness. But this consciousness does not reject or attract anything, this consciousness only becomes aware of what is going on. Now, in the midst of the contents which consciousness finds, there occurs the idea of our self, and there also occurs the pain or the pleasure, and we become aware that this self reënforces the pleasure and suppresses the pain; but all that goes on in the midst of the content. The pleasure is therefore in harmony with another content of our consciousness, namely, with the

idea of ourselves, and the pain is in disharmony with that idea which we find in our consciousness. But pain and pleasure are neither in harmony nor in disharmony with us, the spectators. For us as spectators, the idea of ourselves, and that other content which we call pleasure or pain, are equally nothing but objects of awareness. Like spectators, we note how this idea of our "I," which is crystallized about the sensations of our body, contains those efforts to reject the pain and to continue the pleasure. For us as spectators, pain and pleasure stand only in line with the rank and file of the other contents of consciousness. They have an effect on certain other contents, but they are neither pleasurable nor displeasurable, neither valuable nor worthless, for the spectator. That is, from a strictly psychological point of view, pleasure and pain are as indifferent as the molecules of the universe are indifferent in the system of physics. No atom is more valuable than another atom for the physicist, no feeling is more valuable than another feeling for the psychologist. In the procession of the passing contents of consciousness, a state of rejection follows the feeling of pain and a state of desire follows the feeling of pleasure, but that is interesting only for the description of the psychical connections, it has no significance for the value of pleasure and pain. It is never the consciousness itself which desires or which rejects. The desire and the rejection are only parts of that idea of the self which is itself nothing but one of the neutral contents of consciousness.

Of course it is evident that all that would be entirely changed, if we acknowledged that pleasure is in itself a valuable content of consciousness. The whole mental content, and through it the whole human life, and through it the whole process of the universe, could then easily be shaded in accordance with its worth and worthlessness. Everything would become valuable in accordance with the degree with which it caused psychical pleasures in consciousness. We

might then only quietly agree that the pleasure of two persons is a still more valuable content of consciousness than the pleasure-feeling of only one, and at once we should be prepared to pass judgment upon history and the whole cosmos. Indeed, that is the method with which superficial thought proceeds every day, and the biological and "monistic" ethics takes its life from such thoughtlessness. All that would be very simple indeed, if in the framework of such biological-sociological-monistic view of the world there existed any reason to give more value to one content of consciousness than to another, to consider pleasure and joy and ecstasy more valuable than hunger or toothache. Whoever has once seriously said, "Nature!" must know that he has entered a world of physical and psychical objects in which everything is equally neutral. All exhaust their whole existence by the mere fact that they are parts of the causal system. In their relations of cause and effect are expressed all the relations which are thinkable for them. As parts of physical or psychical nature they cannot also enter into relation with the will of the spectator, and thus get value by his like and dislike. But that certainly does not mean simply that the physicist or psychologist as such has to ignore the values of nature, and that therefore some one else from another point of view may still recognize values in the natural system. No; wherever an evaluation begins, the object is no longer conceived as part of the physical-psychological universe. If we say good or bad, the physical or mental objects which are meant to be causes and effects only are transformed into something new which has no place in the system of nature. As soon as we acknowledge that the living man is more valuable than the grain of sand, and that the feeling of pleasure is more valuable than a foul-smell sensation, everything is sacrificed. The equilibrium is then destroyed, the Archimedic point is found from which nature can be thrown off its balance. But we do know only that man is more complex than a grain of

sand, and that the joy-feeling connects itself with one kind of effort-feelings and the foul-smell sensation with another kind. We do not know that one is better than the other. If the crank of the world-machine were turned backward, and every change were to go on in such a way that the complex would become simpler and simpler and that pain would become permanent, we should have no right to consider that worse than the accustomed series of natural events, which only inconsistent naturalists call a development, and which only inconsistent psychologists call a progress. In the world of physics and psychology this is the last word.

But is it possible that physics and psychology are ever the last word for the thinking spirit? Can we ever acknowledge the world which is conceived as mere nature, as the totality in which our real life is moving? Yes, would it even be possible to have the science of physics and the science of psychology as such, if the physical universe and the psychical content of consciousness were the totality of the real, that is, if there were only objects for a passive spectator? Are not these judgments of the physicist and psychologist themselves demonstration of the one-sidedness of such an aspect? Of course, it might be replied that the thoughts of the naturalist and of the psychologist are then themselves to be considered as psychical objects, which as such would be neutral contents of consciousness. But that is impossible. The mere existence of psychical contents is not a psychological description and explanation any more than the existence of the stars is astronomy. The thoughts of the physicist and psychologist can be considered as psychical objects, and thus can be made material of psychology, only in case a psychologist of a higher order stands behind them and compares, analyzes, describes, connects, explains them like all other contents of consciousness. The science of causal processes which are given to a passive spectator is itself possible only because the scientist as such is no passive spectator. He takes his attitude, se-

lects and connects his material, and his very act of abstraction is such a purposive activity. The scientist has to think the world as content of an inactive consciousness, for the purpose of grasping it as a causal system, but his thinking itself is activity.

Correspondingly we can say, in general, that the mass of physical and psychological contents must be thought as free from every value, as we have seen, but this thought itself has the character of an evaluation. The objects of the scientific judgments are without value, but the scientific judgments themselves are affirmations of value. Thus the simple fact of a scientific statement proves that reality is more than a system of natural objects. The question whether there exist real values is therefore in no way denied so long as we have only found that there are no values in the system of physical and psychical objects. Those systems have resulted from the reconstructing thought of the scientist who thinks the world without value for the purpose of thinking it in causal connection; but this work itself moves in a reality which logically precedes the reconstructing system, and in which the thinking itself demonstrates the relation to values as it aims towards the value of truth.

From the system of nature which the abstracting thought of the thinker reconstructs, we find in such a way the bridge to the immediate reality in which his scholarly thought proceeds. But as soon as we have reached that reality, we easily recognize that it is not only the sphere in which our scientific thought goes on, but that it is the sphere of our whole practical life. Whenever in the changing days I follow my desires and am obedient to my duties, when I use things and understand men, when I am in joy or in grief, when I praise or blame, at first I do not know anything of things or men or aims in the way in which the scientist or the psychologist knows them and treats them. My feeling and willing, my hope and my regret, are for me not a content of consciousness

which is simply found like an object. They have lost their original meaning when they are confronted with consciousness like objects. In reality we are to ourselves not created nature, but free creators; our self is not found, but with immediate certainty it is felt and asserted in the act of our attitude.

Together with the "I," we know the "thou." There, too, an immediate experience is transformed into a result of artificial thought, if a piece of psychological nature is substituted for the other man. Such naturalistic transformation may be necessary for certain purposes, but surely it is no longer the fresh pulsating life which speaks to us in the "thou"-experience of immediate reality. The psychologist may explain to us that we perceive in nature only physical organisms, and that the similarity of their movements to our own leads us to the conclusion that those other bodies have consciousness like ourselves. That is perfectly true in the system of natural science, but the life-experience of every hour tells us that our immediate relation to friend and foe has after all an entirely different meaning. When we meet in conversation, we do not come in question for each other as objects. The other person with whose plans I agree or disagree is to me primarily no object of perception, but a subject which I acknowledge. He is no thing which I find, but a will which I support or fight; in short, he is a piece of reality which as such does not belong in the system of nature. As I feel myself as the subject of attitude and will, my friends, too, are to me first personalities which take attitudes, and which as such want to be understood and interpreted and appreciated.

Finally, the things. They, too, are in the immediate reality not physical and psychical objects without values, seen behind the conception-gate of the causal sciences. The physicist tells me that those blossoming trees before my window stand there independent of me as physical things; the psychologist adds that all that I know of those trees are my perceptions, and that those trees as such perceptive ideas are my content

of consciousness. Thus they show me two groups of objects, the psychical and the physical; the psychical with its richness of color included within my consciousness, the physical composed of uniform atoms. But when I turn my eyes to the trees and their glorious beauty, I do not know anything of that doubleness of which the sciences speak. In reality, I do not find there any perceptive idea in me; but there without the window I have the branches and the blossoms, there without is the perceived thing, and no reality puts any special image of it into my own person. Again, the demand for causality may lead me to that separation. I may for certain purposes feel obliged to split the real object into that which is common to all and which I call physical, and into that which is related to me alone and which I call psychical. But no immediate reality suggests to me that these two separated systems of objects exist from the beginning.

There is no limit. If the perceived world is undivided, the same must be true for all which memory brings to us or which imagination creates. The artificial doubleness is nowhere content of reality. In my memory, for instance, I really grasp the past object, and at first do not know anything of the doubleness which separates the physical external thing of past days from my present memory-idea. Finally, in that immediate reality in which the things are neither atoms without nor psychical contents within me, but are still unbroken, really experienced things, in that reality I myself am never merely a passive spectator of the things. I am always a self for which the things are means and ends, objects of fear and hope, of desire and dislike.

Here we do not have to ask whether it is our duty to reconstruct the subjectively experienced world for certain purposes as a physical-psychical system of nature. This question will come to us as soon as we examine the value of science. But it is evident, indeed, that we have left the immediate life behind us, when we look around in the system of nature. In

life we and the others with us are subjects of will and of attitude, and the things are not objects of a passive spectator, but aims and means of a purposive will. We have seen fully that the causally conceived nature must be thought as without any values, but that cannot lead us to any materialistic or positivistic denial of values. It only leads us to the more important question, in what sense we can acknowledge values in the world of immediate life, in that world in which the thought of a nature without value itself arises only as a mental deed in the service of a valuable purpose.

CHAPTER III

THE PERSONALITIES

IN the realm of nature, the bodily and the mental nature, we could not find any values because nature as such has no relation to will. Now we enter the realm of immediate life-experience. Here we are subjects of will. Here our decision is no longer the effect of foregoing causes, but comes in question with reference to our purposes and to our aims. Have we now a firm anchorage for the values of the world? Can we understand the value in its pure validity from the will of individuals? But this question evidently has no meaning so long as we simply identify value with that which is the goal of our will. In that case we could not desire anything which would not by this mere fact of our desire be raised to the dignity of a value. For certain human interests we are accustomed to such terms. The political economist, for instance, is in the habit of calling the things which are desired, values. If the philosopher follows in this path, he needs of course, every time, qualifying additions, if his inquiry into values is to have any meaning. If he studies the character of values, he does not intend to discuss the value of butter and eggs. The philosopher in his sphere of thought might even hesitate to call food valuable at all, in spite of the fact that the hungry man longs for it, that the consumer enjoys it, and that the grocer in buying and selling measures it by the standard of other desired things. If the philosopher is ready to use the word "value" in such a colorless way, and to concede to the economist that everything is valuable which is object of desire, he has simply to divide the values at once into two large groups. He must make from the start a sharp demarcation

line between relative values and absolute values. Whether in reality two such kinds of values exist has to be examined. It would be thinkable that only the relative values have existence, that is, that everything would be valuable only for this or that individual, in this or that position, under this or that condition. But even if the reality of absolute values is denied, this separation remains necessary. In the spirit of critical philosophy, value always means an absolute value. But if we use the word in its wider sense, our question is now clear. That there exist relative values in the world of immediate life is then a matter of course to us. As it is a world in which the personalities are subjects of will, everything which is object of their will must have such conditional value. Our real question remains. It is the question whether, in this sphere of individual desires, there exist also unconditional absolute values, values which are valuable in themselves without reference to this or that individual and his wishes. So long as we were speaking of nature, the separation into relative and absolute values was superfluous, as a world in which there is no will can have no values whatever.

If all values in the world are based on the fact that individuals as individuals desire and prefer for themselves certain things, evidently we have only the one class of values, the relative ones. Every one who wants to acknowledge only the absolute values as true values would have to claim in this case that the world has merely pseudo-values. Indeed, it is impossible ever to deduce an absolute value from the world of individual personal desires. There exists no bridge from the individual pleasure and displeasure to the absolute value. So long as we start from the selfish desire of individuals, — and there may be unlimited millions of them, — we shall always come only to social and economic values which have relative validity. A value which without reference to individual pleasures and displeasures belongs to the world of reality itself, and which thus stands above all individual de-

sires, remains out of the question there. Nature did not know any unconditional values, because nature had no relation at all to will; but the world of personal desires has no unconditional values, because in it every relation to will lacks the general necessary unconditional character. Whoever is convinced that all values in the world can be, and ultimately must be, based on the desire for pleasure in individuals, is certainly more consistent if he denies every absolute value than if, as frequently happens, he bolsters up the conditional values into eternal ones.

Indeed, there never has been a lack of efforts to proclaim unconditional values in the sphere of personal desires. The speculations about value in political economy have shown the way. Everybody agreed that the value of things referred to the needs of personalities, but the mutual relations of such individual desires allow the building up of certain systems of goods. In these systems everything may have its definite position, which thus becomes independent of the chance desires of a particular individual. For instance, we may determine the value by the relation of the human needs to the available amount. That which exists in an unlimited quantity, then, has no economic value in spite of its use, and that which does not satisfy any need has no economic value either. Or we may determine the value by its relation to the mutual exchange of things. But whatever our principle may be, in every case we aim towards a scale of things which has social and thus individual character. That alone allows us to speak of the economic value of certain goods without asking whether they merely please Tom, Dick, and Harry. Diamonds are objectively more valuable than pebbles, and this value is independent of the caprice of any individual. If, nevertheless, the economist sometimes says that such an evaluation refers to subjective and not to objective conditions, he takes the word "objective" in the sense of physical as against psychological. He only wants to say by that, that it is not the physical

quality of the mineral which makes diamonds more desirable than pebbles, but that it is the mental desire of human beings in their vanity and their longing for self-adornment which makes the value. Yet if we mean by objective that which is independent of subjective arbitrariness, we have to acknowledge that the pebbles are objectively less valuable. In the money-system these objective values are brought to their simplest expression, and the individual has to accept the fact that in the world in which he moves the one thing is cheap, the other expensive.

Nevertheless, there ought not to be any lack of clearness about the fact that such economic evaluations represent merely relative goods. Their economic value remains, after all, determined by their power to satisfy the demands of individuals as such. Under definite social conditions, where definite needs and desires are prevalent, we can build up such an economic pyramid of values, in which a few things are at the top and many things at the bottom. But as soon as the needs of the groups change, and the conditions of production and distribution and consumption are altered, this whole pyramid falls to pieces. It certainly does not belong to the meaning of the universe, nor to the foundation of reality, that the one thing stands high and the other low in the scale of market-values. If nature were to regulate our needs in such a way that the means for their satisfaction were at the disposal of every one in an unlimited supply, the economic values would disappear altogether; and yet nothing would be changed in the meaning of reality. Hence it is clear that that kind of objectivity of values which is expressed by the market price still lies entirely in the circle of relative values which are determined by the needs of individuals.

Ultimately we are not led to any higher point by those theoretical speculations which try to determine the values by the character of the desires. Here it is no longer the question of mere objects of exchange and thus of marketable

things. Every possible content of our interests, every material of our impressions and thoughts, can be considered from the point of view of its desirability. If we take such an attitude of appreciation as a standard, we can say that everything is valuable in accordance with its desirability, or, in the language of other theories, in accordance with its pleasantness. Of course such systems demand from the start many supplementary restrictions. Not every value, for instance, presupposes an actual desire. Often it must be sufficient that we should have the desire, if the object were not already in our possession. That which we own remains valuable to us in spite of the fact that it is no longer an object of an actual desire. We can also easily enter into many subdivisions. These theories separate, for instance, those values which are in themselves pleasant and those which are only causes of pleasant effects. And from there we can go further on to the subtlest classification of the agreeable and of the useful. Such theories can now again easily advance to so-called objective values, which are superior to and independent of the chance desires and the haphazard pleasures. We can take as standard the intensity of the feeling or the expansion of the feeling, and so on. For instance, the desire for a fugitive stimulus is less intense than that for a source of lasting happiness. The drama and the symphony furnish a deeper satisfaction than the nursery-rhyme and the street-song; the noble deed of one's friend wakens a more vivid pleasure than the conventional politeness; the scholarly work secures a richer enjoyment than a superficial talk.

In this way I may be able ultimately to find the climax-values, perhaps even one which is highest of all and which, therefore, I prefer to all others. It may be the mild peace of a soul without desires, or it may be the completeness of a harmonious active life. As soon as I have acknowledged such highest value, it becomes necessarily the objective point of comparisons for all the other special values. And yet it can-

not be denied that even such supreme value gets its exceptional position, after all, only through comparison with the others. In itself it is in no way different from the remainder of the sources of pleasure. From the most fleeting pleasure of my tongue to the highest satisfaction in life leads a continuous path of small steps, and there is nowhere a decisive turn in the road from the personal to the over-personal. That apparently definite point of comparison has its own position only in the midst of a system which itself has no definite absolute position.

We do not reach any other result if we take as a standard the expansion of the field. The higher value then belongs to that which gives pleasure to many and not only to one. The greatest pleasure of the greatest possible number becomes the apparently independent background of every valuation. But even if a miracle occurred which satisfied every desire on earth and filled every heart with pleasure, would there exist any reason to acknowledge by principle a difference between such a pleasure and the pleasure of those who enjoy a feast? The illusion of absoluteness may arise still more vividly, if we abstract entirely from concrete individuals, and refer our evaluation to a not-existing ideal personality. Such an ideal person is indeed introduced into the world of conceptions as soon as the theories speak of a being whose feelings are determined by a complete knowledge of all the qualities and effects of things. Of course, no real man can boast such a perfect acquaintance, and every practical evaluation among men must accordingly have its sources of error. We may deceive ourselves as to the effects of a thing. The pleasure which we expected may not come up, or may be overshadowed by accompanying displeasures from the same source. Thus a real evaluation ought to be determined by an ideal man, who foresees exactly whether or not things really will give us pleasure.

But have we really gained anything new by principle in

such a way? Such an ideal being cannot accomplish anything except a certain supplementation and correction of that which the erring individual might have desired. But in its character and significance, its activity is not different from that of the average individual. The average physical man of the statistical tables may walk nowhere on the earth, and nevertheless his energies are in no way superhuman. In the same way the judgments of value at which the completely informed ideal men would arrive would be more reliable than those of the chance individual, but they would not show individual type any the less. There is no limit to such auxiliary constructions. We may abstract from any special sides of the personalities, and construct accordingly systems of goods with reference to any kind of abstract men. We may thus gain neat classifications of the sources of pleasure, perhaps for a certain group, or a certain nation, or a certain historical period. Yet it is clear that such a classification, with all its superordinations and subordinations, refers only to the desires of individual beings.

In still another direction the evaluation has sometimes been detached from the desires of individuals. It has been said that the significance of a real value lies in the steadiness of the desire. Only that can be acknowledged as value for which a lasting disposition of desire exists. The forming of values would then show a certain analogy to the forming of conceptions. The idea of a value would bring unity into the chaos of possible demands, just as our conceptions unify our ideas. All that has its truth. We may even acknowledge that a repeated desire may bring about a mental disposition by which the object appears as a value when no pleasure can be expected from it in the concrete situation, as is perhaps the case with the value of money for the miser. Our desire for pleasure may find its unified organization in values, or may be projected into them even when it has disappeared as desire. But none of these ways opens to us the view of a value which

is superior to individual desire. However we may try to escape the conclusion, we cannot come beyond the ultimate result that from personal pleasure and displeasure there is no path to values which mean more than that they are enjoyable to this or that man, or to many or to most people, now or then or usually. From individual desires we always can come merely to conditional values.

At all times the effort has been made to suit the demand for a general philosophy with such individualistic conceptions of value. Yes, modern relativism in all its forms, the American Pragmatism like the German Empirio-Criticism, glories in its nakedness. What these theories of knowledge try to argue with philosophical endeavor is reached without any toil by the naïveté of monistic and positivistic philosophy. These are satisfied in their poverty of thought as soon as it is demonstrated that the tastes and norms are different at various times and among various peoples, and that even the most important evaluations are frequently changing. They triumphantly show that even in the highest spheres of human valuation everything changes and fluctuates. In the sphere of art we see how often at the same time, in the same nation, sometimes the same works are adored and detested. The same grotesque contradictions appear in the values of wisdom; that which is true to one generation may be error to the next. What alarming contrasts appear in the religious values which are so often praised as over-personal, while science shows that in every part they have the stamp of passing civilizations. What chaos is found in the moral evaluation of the peoples; the one places as the highest of values what another tribe may condemn as heinous.

The sociologists have indeed accumulated such over-rich material of this kind, that the philosophic philistines of our time must look down only with condescension to those unscientific minds which still dare to doubt the relativity of all valuation. It may even be said that no anthropological voy-

ages to the Pacific islands are necessary for the discovery of such contrasts. Every one of us can find such flat contradictions in his narrowest circle only a little below the surface. And here comes the great chance for the Pragmatist and the Humanist and all their intellectual kin. They show us that all which we call truth is indeed only an organization of our experiences in the service of our changing purposes, and that the value of truth must thus by its own meaning be understood as a relative value only. Finally, that agrees splendidly with the favorite thought of evolutionistic philosophers. They have demonstrated long ago that only those brains could find the conditions for development, the ideas of which are useful for the survival of man, and that therefore everything which we call truth is only a product of selection in the phylogenetic development.

Such contributions to ethnology, to sociology, to biology, and to psychology are without doubt of high importance for the anthropological aspect of the process of evaluation. But that cannot possibly determine their significance for the ultimate problems of philosophy. In the circle of biological studies, of course we have to inquire how the processes of thinking came to their natural development in evolution. We ought not to overlook, however, that the meaning and the whole value of such an inquiry are entirely dependent upon the more fundamental question of whether or not we accredit to such biological arguments the value of truth. The value of truth thus ultimately depends, not upon the biological development, but our right to follow up a biological development depends upon the acknowledgment of the value of truth.

Those beginnings of the race from which the biologist starts are certainly not known to us as an immediate experience. In the service of causal explanation we have reached the idea of those beginnings by hypothetical speculations deduced from our really perceived world. To accept them means, therefore, to consider those thoughts and their search

or causes as true; and that means as valuable. Only if the value of truth is valid can we have a right to include those constructed beginnings in our view of reality; and only if we do that can we become able to deduce ultimately the life which surrounds us as the late product of those early beginnings. The idea that our thinking of truth is to be conceived as an evolutionary product of the past generations thus cannot itself derive its value of truth from its evolutionary origin. Its significance must be understood entirely out of our present logical purposes. Our thinking creates the thought of biological development with its selection and adjustment. How, after that, the thinking itself can be conceived as part of such a development remains a purely biological question. Any answer to this question, therefore, does not belong in the circle of philosophy, if philosophy is to inquire into the ultimate problems of thought.

This holds by principle for all the pragmatic relativistic theories. The value of truth is demonstrated as a relative value which is adjusted to changing experiences; its whole significance lies in its function of suiting individual needs. But all that becomes demonstrated with logical arguments and conclusions, and yet these conclusions and proofs have no power, and even no meaning, unless we have acknowledged beforehand the independent value of truth. If such a proof of the merely individual significance of truth has itself only individual importance, it cannot claim any general meaning; the possibility of its validity must therefore be acknowledged from the very start. On the other hand, if this relativistic proof demands for itself the right to be taken as generally valid, the possibility of a general truth is then acknowledged from the start, at least for this one assertion. As soon as this one exception is granted, it offers the firm point from which the whole illusory universe of relativism may be overthrown.

But at this moment we are not engaged in the proof that

there exist absolute values. All that we want to bring out here is that we really seek values; for instance, in the inquiry for truth, which cannot possibly be thought as mere relative ones. It may be an illusion that we presuppose the existence of unconditioned values. In our individual seeking and striving for the over-individual lies no proof of its validity. Here we have only to stop and to make sure that all that which we can deduce from the individual desires is not identical with that which we are really seeking and acknowledging. The truth which I seek in my search for knowledge is an unconditional one, as such truth has lost its meaning as goal for my inquiry as soon as I presuppose that the contrary may possibly have the same truth-value. That has nothing to do with the changing standpoint of individuals. There may be at my left what there is at the right of others; there may be past for me that which was future for others; I may put things into my picture of the world which were unknown in the previous periods; these are not contradictions in the truth itself which I am seeking. The question is not, anyhow, how far I can participate in the truth. The question is only whether I can refer my search for truth to any truth which is conceived as one of merely individual character. Do I really seek in truth simply something which is agreeable and helpful to me or my neighbors or millions of contemporaries? Do I not demand from any truth that its value be independent of the feelings of any majorities and temporal currents, and that we have to subordinate ourselves to the truth in a way which excludes every relation to individuals, however much they may agree in their needs? We may be satisfied with provisional formulations, but their purpose is after all determined by the demand that they approach a truth whose unconditional reality is presupposed. To deny every truth which is more than relative means to deprive every thought, including skeptical thought itself, of its own presuppositions.

Whoever believes that every thinking about the world is

only a personal grouping and shaping of the individual experiences, must become aware of his error as soon as he starts to communicate his views. The effort to convince others must be meaningless, if it is not acknowledged beforehand that we agree in the fundamental thought-forms. The world to which all our thoughts refer must thus be acknowledged beforehand as thought alike by every one. The view of the world which our exchange of thoughts aims at must therefore be presupposed as a truth of general value. Whoever denies that, ought to give up the effort to refer his thought to a world which he wants to share with others. He knows practically only a world of his dreams, with reference to which there cannot be any real thinking or any seeking of truth.

The possibility of knowledge would be the more excluded, as a skepticism which is directed against the other beings would be turned with the same right against the own mental acts which lie outside of the present moment. My present thought aims to make use of my earlier experiences, and yet that, too, has a meaning only if I presuppose that my previous acts and the present ones refer to the same objective world. Such transcending of the present moment to gain the unity of my personal experiences represents, indeed, at least the first germ of the thought of a real world and an objective truth. But the act by which I acknowledge my past act as connected with my present transcends my immediate reality not less than the further act by which I acknowledge the other subjects as logically coördinated. If I am afraid of the one act, I have no right to recklessly perform the other. In short, if I want to be a logical skeptic, even my own "I" crumbles, and all that remains is a flashing life-instant which, as such, cannot, indeed, admit any over-individual truth-value.

Self-destructive in the same way as the logical relativism is that skepticism which denies the over-individual value of the moral actions. The skeptic denies that there is any

duty which has absolute binding power. Every motive for action has then only a personal individual character. But whoever speaks so, wants to perform by such assertion a definite action and to reach a definite goal, namely, the acknowledgment of ethical denial on the part of his hearers. Yet the hearers who were inclined to trust the skeptic would have to doubt from the beginning whether the speaker really brings his true conviction to outer expression. Whoever is not bound by any duty may lie, may therefore deny his true view, and in spite of his words may be fully convinced that there exist over-individual duties. The skeptic, therefore, cannot expect any belief for his claim, and he thus undertakes an action by which, through his own efforts, he makes it impossible to reach his goal.

Here, too, it is not necessary to sharpen the contrasts in such an artificial way. The question is, at first, not whether our will frustrates itself, but what the will intends. Our moral consciousness affirms immediately that when we are carried by moral will, we do not aim at goals whose value is determined by our personal like or dislike. When we will the morally good, we do indeed wish that the good also give us joy, but we know that it is not the good simply because it gives us pleasure. Even if we acknowledge the pleasure in the minds of other beings as goal for our moral action, the moral itself is not therefore based on pleasure. The essential fact lies in our feeling of obligation. We feel it our duty to serve the pleasure of others, but this duty cannot itself come in question as a pleasure. We may submit to it with pleasure, but we do not submit to it because it gives us pleasure. Otherwise it would not be acknowledged as a duty.

Such a view cannot be changed by the discussions of explanatory science. The biologist may explain that the welfare of the whole to which the individual belongs has become the psychological motive for the impulse of the individuals. What we feel in our immediate experience is not changed in

its meaning and significance by such explanations. The experience is complete in itself and in its life-reality; it does not at all refer to preceding causes, but is to be interpreted and appreciated for itself. We will the right and the good and the just, and in this will lies a reference to a goal which in this act itself remains entirely independent of any conscious relation to our own welfare. The meaning of this purposive will is therefore not in the least changed when we consider it from another point of view as a process which can be causally connected with our personal pleasure. In the purposive will-connection itself the over-personal relation of the will remains valid. The action may refer to this or that neighbor, or to the nation, or to the totality of individuals; but in our moral aim we point towards a duty which as such stands above all merely personal interests. It has for us the validity of something which we acknowledge absolutely. The man who really thinks in the spirit of morality knows that his deepest longing is falsified if it becomes deprived of a relation to something which is independent of merely individual desires. Whoever says "duty" means a value which is not founded on individual pleasures.

Such an aspect reaches out far beyond truth and morality. The beautiful, too, may awake in us personal pleasure, the progress of mankind may yield us personal joy, even the religious fulfilment may awake in us agreeable expectations; and yet all that does not decide anything in our belief in the value of art and progress and eternity. Whatever biology and psychology may explain as to the pleasantness of æsthetic objects, everybody who has experienced the true meaning of high art knows there a relation to something absolute for which all explanatory questions remain insignificant. Our submission under the eternal laws of pure beauty must be grasped in its meaning and not in its causal effects. There is no life so poor that the thought of the progress of civilization has not brought light and warmth into it, and yet who has the right

to claim that the individual has gained from such progress, and that he would have suffered if history had moved backward? No one can assert that the advance of culture has added to the total amount of pleasure in the individuals, and has made them freer from displeasure. The real value of cultural development is acknowledged by us as valid, without our connecting its goal with the personal will of any individuals. The meaning of our life is broken, the world to which all our purposes refer must crumble, if our will cannot orientate itself with reference to ideals which are conceived as ultimately independent of all desires of special individuals, even if those individuals are billionfold. Those who consider the over-individual values as products of mere individual demands, — and that means who consider the eternal ideals as illusions, — stand indeed where the Sophists stood at all times. However much the modern relativists may try to convince us that there exists no conviction, it remains that old sophistry which Socrates has overpowered once for all.

Such criticism must not be misinterpreted as if it meant to say that this new movement of German Empirio-Criticism, or of American Pragmatism, is without any element of truth and without helpful suggestions for the philosophy which our time needs. Like the old Sophists they fight against the gods of the past, a fight in which Socrates was entirely in agreement with the Sophists. The new idealism, which has come to stay, is in the same way in full agreement with the relativists when they aim to subdue the pseudo-gods of our recent naturalistic past. They are welcome fellow-combatants in the battle against that clumsy naturalism which accepts the constructions of physics and psychology as ultimate fact, and which thus acknowledges atoms or sensations as a last reality. A philosophy which turns from such naturalism back to the immediate life-experience of the individual is certainly in the right there. Such a philosophy, then, recognizes easily that all physical and psychological things, the movements

of the molecules and the tissues of the associations, are reconstructions of immediate experience and have left life-reality behind. At last we reach again the true life with the pulse-beat of individuality. History again comes into its right, man's will and purpose become the decisive starting-point, and the psycho-physical mechanism disappears from metaphysics; positivism is succeeded by voluntarism.

No step should be retraced there, but whoever goes no farther has after all not gained anything decisive for a new view of the world. It is certainly necessary to return to the life-experience as a starting-point. The philosophers had to recognize that the way from such a starting-point towards naturalism is a blind alley. An ultimate lasting and fundamental reality can never be gained from immediate experience, if the thought moves in the direction of naturalism. But nothing better is secured, if the thinker simply returns to the immediate life-experience, and does not dare to leave the starting-point at all. What we found there is surely given with immediate vividness, but it is after all nothing more than life-impression, and not a real world. We have found the will in its immediacy, but we nowhere discover a goal towards which the will can be directed. Instead of withered conceptions we have again found the warm life, but no content which overcomes the life-instant, no content which makes the life worth living.

It is not easy to maintain the standpoint of immediate experience. Such a philosophy of immediacy too readily slips back into the berth of ordinary psychology. Yet the superficial arguments against it ought not to count. We often hear that in the immediate experience we do not know any other subjects; but it may readily be answered that we find the questions and replies, the suggestions and objections, of the other persons in our own experience with exactly the same immediacy with which we find the help and the resistance of things. Others claim that we perceive in immediate experi-

ence only the physical things, and that we ourselves clothe them with our thoughts, which themselves are no experience. But that again is certainly a misunderstanding. In our true life-experience we find thought and thing at first as a unity, and as equally immediate, and we separate the two only through secondary considerations. Out of this unity we elaborate the thing and deduce from it the remainder as thought, but we never experience the thing alone and cover it with thought afterwards. Finally, still others object by saying that we have an immediate experience only of our psychical sensations, and that we make conclusions as to the physical things merely from those psychical sensations. But those who argue in such a way are still deep in the confusion of naturalism, which naïvely puts our whole external experience into the capsule of an individual consciousness. In our real life we know nothing of this artificial doubleness, we do not separate the perceived thing without and the perceptual idea within. Our ideas, and their elements the sensations, are felt there without, where we see and hear and touch them, and only by abstractions we reach a new view in which we refer some aspect of the things to ourselves and thus project their image into ourselves.

No such arguments can disturb the philosophy of immediacy and its relativism. And yet it remains true that such a philosophy of immediate experience is a view of the world which lacks nothing but a world. Such a philosophy deals with a haphazard dream in which the chance desire is decisive. No will subordinates itself there before an absolute and eternally valuable will which must hold unconditionally for every possible subject. Therefore there can be no room for morality and beauty and truth in the ultimate meaning of these ideals. After all the errors and vagaries of the naturalistic period, which had no philosophy at all, it looks like the beginning of a better time to return to the will of the individual as a starting-point; but simply to stand still at

that which is meant ultimately as merely individual, even if millions of such individuals are in question, would mean nothing but to substitute nihilism for dogmatism. Hence in every relativistic philosophy, in all its many modern denominations, including Pragmatism and its kin, we have to separate two elements. We have on the one side the return to the immediate life-experience with man's will in its centre, as against a naturalistic pseudo-philosophy. And secondly, there is the claim that this will has merely individual character, and therefore no absolute value. The anti-naturalistic element and the anti-absolute element are most intimately intertwined. Moreover, that doubleness allows a convenient method of defence. Whenever the naturalists attack the anti-naturalism of such a philosophy, suddenly the emphasis is laid on the common fight against absolutism. But when the idealists attack its anti-idealism, they are set at rest by the common antipathy to naturalism. Now the return to the immediate life-experience is the thoroughly sound action of the relativists, but they can hardly claim that they deserve any credit there for a new movement. The idealists have never ceased to fight this battle, and have with much deeper arguments demonstrated that all physicism and psychologism, all atomism and all sensationalism, in short, all naturalism, is an artificial construction of experience necessary for certain purposes. That is the real life-element of idealism, and while it is true that in periods of shallow unphilosophy, even this philosophic commonplace was forgotten, the philosophers at least cannot forget that the great idealists, like Kant and Fichte, who preceded the recent naturalistic period, have made that a lasting part of philosophical insight. There is nothing whatever new in such an aspect.

Contrary to the spirit of such classical idealism is only that other claim, that our will, in aiming towards truth or morality or the other ideals, cannot transcend the individual desire and cannot reach anything absolute. It is this relativistic

and not the anti-naturalistic element of Pragmatism which demands stubborn resistance, and such a resistance has to be the more serious as those two elements form an almost unrecognizable mixture. The opposition to this anti-truth and anti-morality character is too easily charmed and brought to silence by the many strong points which such a philosophy makes against the naturalistic superficiality. We must insist that these two factors have nothing to do with each other. We must leave naturalism behind us, we must come back to immediate experience as a starting-point, we must recognize the human will as the centre of every search for reality, and yet we must acknowledge that this will is bound by absolute and necessary eternal values.

CHAPTER IV

THE OBLIGATIONS

WE have now gained a twofold insight. First, the causal system of nature contains no absolute values, because nature itself must by principle be conceived as without any relation to will and therefore without any value. Secondly, the system of the purposes of individuals contains no absolute values, because the reference to individual personalities can always lead only to relative values. That means that any unconditional general values of the world can be neither contents of the causal nature nor demands of historical origin. If they have existence at all, they must belong to an over-causal and over-individual reality of the world. But we have seen that we cannot doubt their validity. We recognized that there exist only two possibilities: we have a world with over-personal unconditional values, or we have no real world at all, but merely a worthless chance dream, in which to strive for truth and morality can have no meaning whatever. We recognized that we have not even a choice whether we want to refer our striving really to a world or to a meaningless haphazard chaos, without truth and morality, as our whole common task is here to seek the truth logically and to stand up for the truth morally. Whatever psychologists and biologists and historians may tell us of how all this thinking and aiming can be explained, does not matter. We know well that our particular idea of truth can be construed as the product of our brains; that our individual ideas are the effects of the social influences among which we have grown up; that our theories are the results of a historical development; and that our convictions are shaped by the traditions of our time. Yet in our effort to reach the truth and to defend the truth, we

do not refer our will to causes, but to ideals; we seek a truth which is meant as something which is absolutely valuable, and that means as something of which the opposite is impossible. In the same way, in upholding the truth we do not ask how our desire for truth-speaking originated. We believe in the absolute value of our duty, and in this our belief lies a reference for which no mere social request can be substituted. We seek a truth which we conceive in our search as independent of its possible useful consequences; and we submit to a duty which in our submission we conceive as independent of any practical effects. We saw that every doubt of absolute values ultimately destroys itself. As thought it contradicts itself, as doubt it denies itself, as belief it despairs of itself. No way leads from it to the reality of the own self beyond the immediate instant. All strife and effort has lost its goal. But we are striving here, we are in the midst of an effort, as we want to convince others; that means we have already chosen, and we are resolved to maintain the conviction that there is a world independent of chance individuals. Absolute values must therefore be presupposed by us as real, must have validity for us superior to the relativistic values which historical individuals create. We have therefore to ask what the real meaning and real significance of such unconditioned absolute values is. Natural science and history cannot find them. Where, after all, can they be found? What are they made of? How do they hang together? How do we individuals reach them? What do they contribute to the meaning of our personal life, and what is their own ultimate purpose?

But before we turn to these fundamental questions, we ought to eliminate at least one complete misunderstanding which is responsible for much in the relativistic vagaries. The values which we are seeking are to find their foundation in the unconditional character of the world, and are to maintain their absolute validity, however much or little we historical individuals may grasp them. Such a postulate is at once dis-

torted into pre-Kantian metaphysics as soon as it is misinterpreted, as if we assert the eternal existence of a world which is independent of the experiencing consciousness. The rationalistic philosophy and the empirical philosophy of a precritical age agreed in just such a metaphysical presupposition. Both the rationalists, like Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibnitz, and the empiricists from Bacon to the encyclopædists, claimed that there exists a reality which is independent of the mental conditions of knowledge. Their disagreement referred only to the question whether the thinking of reason or the experience of the senses would be the right method to gain access to that independent world and thus to win the truth. But the idea of such super-reality has been definitely removed from critical philosophy by Kant. The world of experience is the only world to which our knowledge can have reference, and the reality which we want to grasp in our truth is therefore completely bound up with the conditions of our mental experience. The true world is independent of the single individual as such, and therefore absolute with reference to the individual; but it is a world of which we can have knowledge at all only if its forms are determined by the conditions of consciousness. A world which is possible material for knowledge must be thought beforehand as a world which stands under the conditions of possible conscious experience. A reality of which the kind and form is not conceived as in relation to consciousness can never be understood as a possible object of knowledge. The absolute values must therefore completely lie in a world whose totality stands under the condition of being a possible object of experience. Even where the conviction transcends the world of experience and seeks an over-experience, such a last reality must still remain dependent upon the conditions of consciousness.

The absolute world with its eternal values, if it exists, is thus certainly not something which hangs in an own atmosphere, eternally separated from our consciousness. The

values which we seek in reality do not point from an experienced world to a sphere beyond experience. On the contrary, everything which can be acknowledged as unconditional must be conceived beforehand as belonging to the sphere of possible material of consciousness, and it is absolute only for the world in which every subject can participate. The values are absolute for the only world which we can know at all. This mutual relation goes so far that, on the other hand, we can acknowledge as subjects only those who can experience such a world. If there were a spirit directed towards a higher world than that of our possible experience, the exchange of thought with such a subject would lose all meaning for us, and nothing absolute could be brought over from there out of his incomprehensible special world into our world of experience. The absolute values have unexceptional validity because they are valid for every possible subject who shares the world with us, and who relates his thinking and striving to our world. In such thinking and striving the values remain independent of any particular individual will, and it makes no difference whether such individuals take their attitude individually or in the coöperation of millions. The values stand above the individual. But they would become meaningless if they were conceived as independent of the conditions of consciousness. All that ought to be common property since the days of Kant and Fichte, and every new time only demands a new adjustment of these fundamental insights to the changing knowledge of the period. But it ought no longer to be necessary to defend idealism against attacks which really are meant only against the caricatures of idealism. There is no true philosophical idealist who means by an absolute a gigantic monster which swims behind the clouds without relation to the subjects of experience. Only on this basis we ask once more for the meaning of such real absolute values.

We find our will bound by values. We cannot affirm a judgment in accordance with our caprice; we are bound by

the truth. We cannot act in accordance with every desire; we are bound by duties. What binds our will? The two replies which are most usual are either a necessity or an obligation. It almost sounds as if that is the antithesis of a solution beside which no third solution is possible. But it is clear from the start that the binding by a necessity in the sense of a natural law cannot be the solution for us at all. It would lead us back from the sphere of free personalities to the sphere of psychological processes. It ought to be a matter of course that in the sphere of causal connections, the psychical phenomena of will and value cannot represent an exception. The subordination of the will as a psychical process under the psychological idea of value must be explained by psychical and physiological causes. But such an explanation stands on the same level on which we explain that perhaps a pain sensation awakes an impulse of rejection. The fact that the idea of a value has a controlling effect on the will is simply a chapter of the psychology of suggestion, and as such stands in near neighborhood to the problems of attention, inhibition, and hypnosis.

Such a psycho-physical necessity has in no way the character of absoluteness. Like any other inherited or acquired reaction, it can be remodelled by new training and can be entirely suppressed by new conditions. Moreover, we saw beforehand that such a psychological explanation of our submission to the value cannot have any philosophical bearing at all. Its philosophical significance is eliminated by the fact that the truth of such a causal connection of psychological facts is itself a value. We must already have accepted this value if we want to explain the psychological phenomena of valuation by psychological laws. But we may add that the connection between the value and the will is not even one of causal necessity. We may have the idea of the moral value, for instance, in our mind, and yet our action may remain uninfluenced: we turn towards sin and crime. It is not true that we must act by necessity in accordance with a value.

Just here starts the much deeper reply which says that our will is bound not by necessity, but by obligation. We are not forced to act in accordance with a value, but we ought to act in accordance with it. The value is thus an obligation. To be sure, any "ought" can also be easily translated into the terms of natural science. The biological treatment of obligation appears almost as a necessary part of naturalistic sociology. Experience teaches us that the real effects may not always bring the expected pleasure. We connect the valuation, therefore, in our mind with those effects which are most frequent or most typical. That gives us certain rules for action which are crystallized in norms. The individual finally acts in his own well-understood interest in accordance with the prescriptions and norms, even when the special circumstances suggest the desire to escape the norms. The consciousness of obligation is from such a sociological point of view a kind of apparatus for the inhibition of desires which may be ultimately harmful. It is an impulse to do what has shown itself to be useful in the great average, and a warning not to do what may appear tempting for the moment, but has usually shown itself to be dangerous. The feeling of obligation is thus psychologically what the smell-sensation is for our appetite. If we had a full knowledge of the chemical constitution of a substance and of its physiological effects on the organism, it would be unnecessary to take any notice in eating of the feeling which connects itself with the preceding smell. But nature substitutes for this complete knowledge the feeling of smell. We rely on the general rule that that will agree with us which smells well, and that will not agree with us which smells badly, in spite of the fact that in the particular case the sweetly-smelling substance may be a poison.

It is evident that such a conception of obligation cannot bring us nearer to our goal. That which we ought to do is here again ultimately only that which we wish to do in the interests of our pleasure. The only difference is that the

expectation of pleasure is attached not to the immediate impression, but to a calculation of averages condensed in a prescriptive formula. The personal welfare again stands at the central point. Not to be obedient to the obligation means only to play a risky game. The possible gain may be tempting, but the probability is that one loses the game. The value which ought to be aimed at is, then, in no way unconditional. On the contrary, it differs from the opposite which we ought not to do, only through the greater probability of the resulting pleasure.

In the same circle of thought move the usual deductions of social norms. When the stronger forces the weaker to subordinate himself, and demands from him that he act against his own desire, the obeying actor does not do anything but simply weigh his personal pleasure and displeasure. He performs what is demanded from him, and what he "ought" to do, because the threatened punishment in case of his not doing it is anticipated with still greater displeasure than the undesirable action. There the will of the stronger has on the weaker exactly the same effect as a situation in nature which forces on us an uncomfortable effort for the purpose of escaping an injury. This subordination under the power has nothing to do with the acknowledgment of eternal norms. The one who threatens and the one who obeys are equally compelled by motives of pleasure and displeasure.

All social norms in the sense of social psychology can be reduced to this fundamental scheme, however manifold the forms of development and the abbreviations of the mental process may be. Thousandfold are the sources of power and authority, thousandfold the means of the stronger or of the majority to force their desires on the weaker and the fewer, and thousandfold the ideas of customs, morality, law, and religion in which the demands of the social majority are brought to expression. Ultimately, it always means that the members of an association, from the family to the nation and

civilized mankind, create values as a result of their own social desire for self-conservation which the individual is forced to acknowledge. In the mind of the individual the consciousness of this real connection disappears; the feeling of fear is transposed through a mental abbreviation from the threatened punishment over to the forbidden action itself. It is just as a child soon refers the dislike which belongs to the chastisement to the forbidden action, and expands the pleasure to everything which at first was artificially connected with reward. Even the highest social psychological norms thus remain by principle on the level of social hygiene. The hygienic prescriptions of the police, even if they were useful for all mankind, would yet remain in principle different from everything which in a philosophical sense has to be acknowledged as a valid obligation.

The right of such sociological constructions is not at all to be denied. If we are to study evaluation as a phenomenon of social psychology, the inquiry cannot move in any other lines. General and valid, then, indeed is every evaluation which serves the development of the psycho-physical society, and this utilitarian goal necessarily remains ultimate. The psychologist has no right to acknowledge any metaphysical ends. Even the thought of a metaphysical evaluation could mean nothing for the social psychologist, unless the thought itself is taken as the means to a utilitarian end. He might acknowledge that it is useful for the welfare of society that its members live in the illusion of the belief that there exist values which are independent of pleasure and welfare. And if the psychologist discovers that such an idealistic belief is after all not useful for society, he will simply relegate such metaphysics to the accidental, or perhaps even to the pathological, phenomena of the social psyche. From his utilitarian point of view such a belief then means for society what dreams mean for the individual consciousness.

But the "ought" can be found also on a much purer

height, where all relativism and all sophisticism are left far behind, and the critical philosophy is ready to reach out to its last consequences. Especially in the modern German philosophy the conviction is growing that the conception of being itself is founded on the conception of obligation. The existence of reality is given to us in judgments, and their affirmation ultimately has no other reason than the fact that our thought faces a rule, an "ought," which obliges our will to judge. There is no positive judgment of existence in which the will is not affirming, no negative judgment in which the will is not denying. Yet the will which affirms in the judgment the existence of a certain thing does not follow an individual caprice. The individual yields there to the pressure of facts. But is this pressure perhaps the effect of an independently existing reality which our judgment simply tries to copy? That would throw us back into the crudest metaphysics, the more as the existence of such an independent world would have the value of truth again only for the one who judges, and thus it would still leave open the question: What external power forces this metaphysical judgment? No, the will which affirms the existence of anything real is not determined by something which has an independent existence, but is determined by an "ought" which decides upon the value of the judgment. The judgment which ought to be affirmed is a valuable judgment, and that means a true judgment. Such an "ought" does not belong to the existing object, but belongs to the will of the subject as its deepest significance, by which alone experience becomes possible. To think the truth would then mean to subordinate the affirming will to an obligation.

In this way the difference between knowledge and morality disappears. He who seeks the truth and he who will perform his deed subordinates himself equally to an "ought" which is independent of his individual desires. It is the absolute validity of this "ought" which gives meaning to the

ideals of truth and morality. In the same way we should have to interpret the manifoldness of the æsthetic values. They tell us how we ought to interpret the world. The artist obeys his æsthetic conscience, an "ought" which appeals to his will to seek beauty. We think and feel and will in accordance with absolute values. We are loyal to the way in which we ought to think and ought to feel and ought to will. If we become disloyal to our obligations, we enter into error, into the ugly, into the immoral, into the sin. Here at least we have a view of the world which, endlessly superior to all naturalism and realism and pragmatism, really acknowledges the absolute values. The evaluation precedes the existence. All values are founded on the relations of will, and are super-ordinated to every possible individual will. The logical, ethical, æsthetic, and religious values are based on the same fundamental principle, and do not refer to a transcending existence, but to a fundamental determination of will. All this is never again to be lost. And yet we must raise the question whether the doctrine of the value as an "ought" can be really accepted as an ultimate goal. Is the conception of the obligation really fit to lead us into the ultimate depths of absolute validity? Certainly all philosophical right is on the side of the "ought," when this conception is brought into contrast with the realistic conception of the "must," or with the relativistic conception of the desire. But are the possibilities of will really exhausted in such a way?

One limitation is evident at once. The "ought" which is sought in the value contributes nothing to bring together the scattered values of our life. Truth is valuable and also beauty, justice is valuable and also morality, progress and development are valuable and also religious fulfilment, but no tie connects the diverging ideals. If knowledge and art and history and morality and religion each demands an obligation of a special kind, they remain separated grounds of reality. The philosophers of the "ought" point to history to show

how the consciousness of one obligation after another was developed, but that only suggests that we gather the historical elaboration of the values in an external way. For instance, we could not foresee whether or not entirely new values might arise to-morrow, and we could not understand why others have not come up before. The logical "ought" which binds the mathematician, the æsthetic "ought" which binds the sculptor, the ethical "ought" for which the martyr suffers, have nothing in common. We do not find a connected system of values, but a chaos of diverging valuations. Whoever really seeks a united view of the world must ultimately demand that the values can be understood as interrelated and as connected parts of a whole; we must be able to deduce them from one and the same principle.

Moreover, can we overlook that the conception of the "ought" does not really contribute anything to the deeper understanding of the validity of the values? Valuable is that which we ought to accept, and that which we ought to accept is valuable. Thus we do not add anything new to the conception of value if we reduce it to an obligation, or rather we do not reduce it, as we do not move forward at all. That does not mean that the treatment of values as forms of obligation is entirely superfluous. It is not only a new name for it. If we say "ought" instead of "value," if we say "obligation to think" instead of "value of truth," we do much more than to call the same thing by a different name. The characteristic features of the new conception indeed contribute something very significant to the understanding of the problem. Our only objection would be that the thing which is expressed by the idea of obligation is essentially something negative. To say, for instance, that the value of truth is based on obligation means in the first place that it does not result from a metaphysical existence. The old dogmatism said that a true judgment is valuable because it agreed with an existing reality which is independent of thinking. Such an unphilosophical

view is energetically rejected by the doctrine of the "ought." The doctrine emphasizes that there exists no other basis for our truth than the necessity of our judgment. And just as the "ought" rejects such dogmatic empiricism, it also turns with full clearness against any relativism which denies the absolute character of the truth. In both directions the conception of value would be at first powerless to suppress the wrong theories, but as soon as the conception of value is surrounded by the conception of obligation this negative task becomes completed. Every mixture of the philosophy of value with mere empiricism or with mere relativism then becomes excluded. The same holds for the ethical and æsthetic values. The conception of obligation brings to sharpest distinction the fact that the value of the moral deed is not based on its objective effect in the existing world, as utilitarianism would like to teach us. The value of the duty lies in the obligation itself and not in its usefulness. As far as we are anxious to fight against the usual falsification of the absolute values, there indeed exists no more effective means than to point to the difference between the "is" and the "ought." For such negative purposes in the service of idealism the conception of obligation is excellent.

But in contrast to this negative achievement, we must insist that the positive character of the conception of obligation is directly misleading. It brings into the conception of value certain characteristics which do not belong to it, and which hinder the grasping of its deepest meaning. As long as it is a question of fighting realism and utilitarianism and empiricism, the conception of "ought" may be unavoidable. As soon as we come to an ultimate theory, we must try to get rid of the conception of obligation, because we must recognize that in its ultimate meaning the value does not represent an "ought." The idea of an "ought" evidently lies before us most clearly, and comes first to the mind of every one in the field of moral obligation. What does it mean there?

We have before us a manifoldness of possibilities of action. Some are tempting. They promise pleasure, but only one action may be demanded by our duty. The obligation faces us here in our choice of action. We feel that we can do that which our duty forbids. We alone have to decide. This is evidently the commonplace meaning of obligation. We should not speak of obligation at all in such a case, if there were no opportunity for a choice, no decision, not at least the possibility to will that which we ought not to will.

Let us accept for the first moment this every-day idea of duty. Have we any right to say that it really holds for the value of truth or beauty or justice? When I want to judge, do I really stand before a decision whether I want the true judgment or its opposite? Is it not rather the case that, if I will to judge at all, I never desire to choose anything but the true valuable judgment? Of course, it may be that I am not especially interested in judging at all; I do not care for knowledge and for the seeking of the truth. Society may then remind me that it is my duty to seek the truth, but that is evidently an ethical duty, not a logical one. Society wants me to think in a way which makes me an agent of truth. But as soon as I want to think at all, I certainly do not feel any choice between my will for the truth and my will for the error; I always will only the true judgment and never the error. The truth does not come to me as an obligation which warns me against my opposite desire. Whenever I want to judge, I stand before a question which I am anxious to solve. I seek a solution which is valuable to me because it gratifies my desire for the removal of the difficulty. In this point the relativistic philosophers are perfectly right. The relativists put themselves in the wrong when they add that this gratification is dependent only upon the personal conditions and has no general necessity. There is necessity. We feel it. But here begins the mistake of the other side when the idealists claim that this necessity is an obligation. Not everything which

is necessary for every will — that is, which suits the will without reference to the individual desires — must be an obligation. If I seek truth, I seek a connection by which a particular difficulty is removed, a particular problem is solved. If I feel that the problem does not lie before me as an individual only, but must be common to all who share the world with me, I feel the complete solution as a satisfaction which refers to no merely personal need, but which has absolute validity. But no obligation enters into it. It is an over-personal satisfaction of the will.

Often an error may tempt me, but it can tempt me only so long as I take it for truth; that is, for a real solution of my problem. I never want the error as such. I never prefer a judgment unless it bears the value of truth for myself, and thus makes me believe that every other possible subject would feel it in the same way as gratification of his will. Of course that loses its meaning if I give it a psychological interpretation. It does not mean that my psycho-physical mechanism stands under the necessity of choosing the true judgments and of inhibiting the untrue ones. Most of the judgments which the brain produces are errors. It is not a question of a causal process any more than it is a question of obligation. To will the action is neither the result of a natural law nor of a rationalistic obligation. I will the truth because that which it offers is really a complete satisfaction of my will; and yet this value is unconditional because my will is ultimately not related to me or to anything individual, but to something absolute and over-personal. Here lies the real problem: How is it possible that I will something, and yet that I will it without any reference to myself and merely with reference to something which by principle is independent of me as an individual?

In the same way, we do not find any obligation in the field of æsthetics. There, too, society may suggest the practical request that he who has a talent ought to create beauty, but

that is a moral obligation. Such an ethical duty demands that you realize that which has æsthetic value, but the acknowledgment of the æsthetic value is already presupposed. Beauty is a completeness which our will wants, and if we grasp it at all, we can never will it otherwise. We never will the ugly. The obligation of an "ought" against which an opposite will is fighting does not exist there. We will the beautiful. Yet here, too, it is not only an individual desire like the will for the charming and pleasing. The individual in his devotion to beauty is not bound by an obligation, he wills it with his own longing; but his will raises him over the merely individual desires. It is again an over-personal and pure will. Always again the same problem: How can we will without reference to our own pleasure? But this alone is indeed the question which experience puts before us. If instead we simply say that we will because we ought, we cut off the significant question instead of answering it.

But there now remains at least the "ought" of the moral value. There we certainly have a real choice between the action which we ought to do in accordance with our duty and the action which we want to do because it promises us pleasure. Thus in the moral sphere the equation of value and obligation appears entirely justified. Yet as soon as we look somewhat carefully into the situation, we find here the same thing which we find in truth and beauty. The moral value, too, is in reality a value which we always will, and which is never fought by any not-willing. The moral value never stands in real contradiction to our own true will, and thus has no reference to an "ought." We have to consider carefully here the whole situation, which is very easily misinterpreted. It is not difficult to see why the usual interpretation misplaces the accent.

Whoever does harm to his neighbor acts against the moral value, and whoever gives his own to his neighbor acts in accordance with the moral value. We have the free choice

whether we want to follow the norm, or whether we want to transgress it in an immoral spirit. Yet even on the surface it is clear that the external effects of our actions do not characterize them as morally good or bad. The one who injures a neighbor is not acting immorally, if he as a physician causes the wound in the service of a surgical operation; and he who gives presents to his neighbor does not act morally, if he wants to bribe him to misuse his influence. The activity itself is therefore indifferent, the motive alone decides about the moral value of the action. Thus the moralist usually presents his doctrine of obligation in the nobler form that there is ultimately only one obligation. We ought to fulfil our duty, that is, we ought to perform that action which we ourselves conceive as the action which ought to be done. Which action we consider the right one in the particular case depends upon a thousand circumstances, and belongs to our traditions and education and our social surroundings. It has in itself nothing to do with the moral value. The moral value demands only that we remain loyal to our conviction, and that in spite of tempting pleasure and advantage we do what we with our best knowledge believe to be the right deed.

This is perfectly true. We have indeed no right to claim that any moral value is involved in considering one action rather than another as the action which we ought to do. If a man has not learned which actions ought to be done, he is not immoral but amoral. If he is practically unable to attach value to certain actions, we speak of moral insanity. We do not call a man a thief because he prefers the action of stealing to the honest action. On the contrary, if he had a view of life according to which stealing is the action which as action has a special value, and he lived up to his principles, we should try to protect society against such a dangerous individual and would put him in an asylum, but we should avoid any moral attitude. We call him a thief only if he feels that the honest action is the valuable action, and if he feels it as valuable,

it is the action which he himself really wants, while the stealing as action he does not want. If there were only the choice between the two actions as such, stealing and not stealing, he would never hesitate, he would always prefer the valuable honest action. His difficulty is only that, while he wills of the two actions only the one, the honest one, he wills and desires at the same time the booty, and to get it he has to steal. Stealing itself does not become desirable by it. And so the situation of the criminal is that he wavers between what as action he really wills, namely the honest one, and another action which he must perform if he is to reach a desired pleasurable result. On the one side, he has an action which is willed without reference to its result, and on the other, he has an action which he does not will at all as action, but which he does want in the service of the agreeable effect. Where this contrast does not exist, there we never have a moral situation. Now it is clear that in this part of the process there exists no obligation. That we have learned not to will this feeling and to will the honest action belongs to our past development, and to social traditions, and to the influences of our surroundings. It may be different in every nation and in every social group. No one is responsible as an individual for the preference for certain actions. We begin with any moral demand only as soon as these preferences have really taken hold of us. The child and the insane person, like the beast, have no moral obligation because they have not learned to give preference to certain special types of actions, and thus consider the possibilities of action only with reference to the effects. The social pressure which society exerts to impress the individual with the desirability of certain types of action, therefore, still lies outside of the ethical obligation.

But here begins the real "ought." The moral man ought under any circumstances to perform that action which he really prefers as action. No hope of pleasure and no fear of pain ought to tempt him to perform instead the opposite

action which he really does not want as action. The desire for the booty ought not to lead to stealing, if the individual feels that the opposite action is the action which he prefers as action. The starting-point for a moral decision is therefore always that there are in view two possible actions, of which the one is desired only as means to an effect, while the other is desired as action itself and for itself, and therefore without reference to any pleasurable effect. Such action is willed, then, only as an expression of the will, as a realization of the personality. He alone thinks morally who performs the action which he wants to perform, not for any result, but only as an expression of his whole real will. Moral merit belongs only to the one who brings to realization that particular action which he himself really wants as action. Hence moral value comes in question only where a man chooses what he really wants himself, and what expresses his own deepest will; in short, when he is loyal to himself. The moral value is therefore not attached to the resulting action, and not to the preceding will for an action, but is attached to the agreement between the two. Moral is the self-realization of the mind by which the kind of action which we really want is performed.

This self-consistency is the only thing in the world which is morally valuable. But in the face of that, have we still a right to speak of an obligation? Is this value not just like truth and beauty, a satisfaction of the will which is never opposed by an opposite will? As little as the thinking mind ever wants to think the error, does a thinking mind ever want to prostitute itself, ever want to become disloyal to itself, ever want to give up itself. Even the criminal prefers the carrying through of the honest action which he really values as action. His dishonest performance does not at all indicate that the disloyalty against his own will tempts him more than loyalty. On the contrary, if he is a criminal and not an insane person, the value of self-consistency remains steadily before his mind. Just because he values this loyalty, he feels sharply that he

himself lost in worth when, under the temptation of a pleasure, he realized that action which as action he did not will at all. He has never wavered between the will to moral self-consistency and the will to inconsistency; he never did not will the consistency; in other words, he never did not will the moral. He did fluctuate between his will for the moral and his will for a pleasure, and he chose the pleasure, but by that the moral never became something which he did not will. The only thing which is valuable in actions, namely, the self-consistency, needs no outside obligation, but is thoroughly based on the own will. No one cannot will it. But here, too, it must be acknowledged that it is a will which is ultimately over-personal, necessary, and general. I want to be consistent with myself in my actions, and thus want to be myself, not for the purpose of getting a personal pleasure from this consistency, but to satisfy a will in me which has no reference to my individual advantage. It is a will which, however much it concerns my personality, is ultimately not referring to my self but serving an eternal cause. It is a will which uses the consistency of my self as means for building up an absolutely valuable world.

Ultimately the real value of morality is then as little an obligation as the value of truth and of beauty. They are all objects of will only. The will never can prefer the untrue, the unbeautiful, the immoral, and the "ought" loses all meaning if a decision between different desires is excluded. But in every case the will which prefers a value is independent from the individual personality, that is, it is a pure will which is not touched by personal pleasure and displeasure. The problem which the conception of obligation has simply pushed aside instead of solving is now at last clearly before us. To understand the absolute values means to understand how our will can become an over-personal demand which, without reference to any one's personal pleasure or displeasure, finds its satisfaction in truth and beauty and morality and religion.

CHAPTER V

THE SATISFACTION OF THE WILL

Now at last we see our whole field before us. The path which we have travelled necessarily led us to this vista. We saw that it is meaningless to deny the reality of absolute values. It is necessary to seek and to understand them. Nature, the physical and the psychical, is without values because it cannot have any reference to the will, and every value must involve a satisfaction of the willing personality. On the other hand, every individual will is determined by pleasure and displeasure; it serves personal desires and can therefore never be general and absolute. Even if millions demand the same thing, it lies in the meaning of personal will that it cannot be necessary, and therefore that it cannot posit any absolute values. To explain the absoluteness of the value by a necessity is impossible, as the will would then become a part of causal nature. It seemed tempting to deduce this dependence of the individual will from an ought, but we saw that this solution also is unsatisfactory. The value is not an obligation, because there exists no not-willing of the value and therefore no choice and decision which would give meaning to an obligation. Thus we stand before the fundamental fact that there exists a will the fulfilment of which satisfies us, and that means is valuable for us, and which yet is without reference to any individual pleasure or displeasure, necessary for every possible subject, and therefore absolutely valid.

This brings us to two separate questions: Why do we feel satisfaction from something which has no reference to our pleasure or displeasure? And, secondly, Why does our will demand something which has nothing to do with our pleasure

or displeasure? We turn first to the former question, which is after all only a preparatory one. Can we feel satisfaction without awakening pleasure or the relief from displeasure, that is, without reference to our own personal states? Of course the popular psychological view is that our will is always directed by the pleasure or the displeasure which we expect. The will is satisfied when the expected pleasure arises, inasmuch as the pleasure is just the satisfaction which we seek. Whatever we strive for, it must contain some glimmer of pleasure, and as soon as we have reached the goal, the desired pleasure enters our consciousness and no further explanation of our satisfaction is needed. But the situation is not quite so simple. Its complexity begins with the fact that the word "feeling" has many meanings. If, for instance, we speak of a pain as a feeling, we do not say whether we mean the disagreeable pain content or the dislike with which we experience the content. Headache and toothache are two different contents of feeling, but the dislike in both cases is the same. In a corresponding way the tickling and the sexual excitements are agreeable contents of feeling, both of which may be separated from our attitude of liking towards them. These contents, however, are evidently nothing but sensations, just like blue and green; in a stricter sense, the psychologist ought not to call them feelings at all. The toothache or the sexual experience are sensations, and the displeasure of the ache, that is the real feeling, lies entirely in our attitude of disliking. We may dislike a foul smell more strongly than a slight pain. Wherever we speak of a feeling in the narrower sense of the word, we mean our liking and disliking, and not the content to which they refer. These contents, which are merely bodily sensations, are usually called feelings only because they are accompanied by especially vivid attitudes of liking and disliking.

As soon as we turn to the more complex objects of feeling, to our memory-ideas and so on, no bodily sensations are any longer involved. The satisfaction or dissatisfaction which

results from the fulfilling or not fulfilling of the will thus certainly has nothing to do with the pleasure-sensations or the pain-sensations. But what is our liking and disliking, our pleasure in the sweet and our displeasure in the bitter? We point to the only essential factor. Our feeling of pleasure in the stimulus is our striving for its continuation which fuses with our perception. Our displeasure in the stimulus is our striving for the removal of the stimulus which also blends with our perception. Such striving is not consciously chosen. From the standpoint of the biologist, we should say the removal of the disagreeable, for instance of the pain-sensation, is the general rebellion of the organism against the injury. Consciousness has not chosen it, consciousness simply experiences both the pain-sensation and the activity of defence as completed facts. And now sets in the process which is decisive for the experience of feeling. The sensation of rebellion fuses with the sensation of the stimulus into a unity. The defence becomes apparently an element of the impression itself, and the pain-sensation thus gains a new quality, its disagreeableness. Our own defence thus becomes somewhat a part of the impression itself, and that characterizes the dislike element.

Exactly the same process distinguishes all the other feeling-tones of external stimuli, only with the difference that the pain-sensation alone produces the reaction with such complete regularity. In the case of other stimuli, much depends upon the special preparedness or unpreparedness of the individual. But in every case where there is a feeling, the intruding stimulus produces reactions which work towards the continuation or towards the removal. The reaction results in every case without intellectual meddling, and is not felt as a special action. With the higher senses the process is more complex. The effort to continue or to discontinue the stimulus then becomes dependent upon a larger and larger number of conditions and is itself more ramified. The inhibitions

and resettings of the higher motor nervous system control the situation, but here, too, the reaction remains the basis of the feeling. It is always dependent upon the whole situation of the individual system. If we come to the world of our ideas and thoughts, the reacting apparatus is no longer the mere organism, but the whole personality with all its memories and expectations; and yet again the reaction is produced without conscious interference. Out of the whole composite of mental states there results in every particular case either a movement towards the continuity or a movement towards the removal of the content of consciousness. Pleasure or displeasure is thus the same in the highest as in the lowest case. Whether we like a life position or a smell sensation, our liking is nothing but a reaction of the whole personality. Our reaction becomes in a way the psychical over-tone for the fundamental tone of our perception. The reaction does not set in because the feeling precedes, but the feeling is given because the reaction has set in. The pleasure-experience is thus in itself not at all an especially agreeable content of consciousness. As content it is entirely indifferent; it is only a sum of sensations of activity, sensations of approach, shadings of attention, associations, and similar processes, which are held together only by the common purpose of reënforcing the stimulus. In the same way the displeasure-feeling as a content is not disagreeable, but neutral; it is a sum of tension-sensations, inhibitions, organic sensations, associations, and similar states serving as defence against the intrusion. In both cases everything becomes significant only as addition to the idea with which the various feeling-elements are now fusing. The pleasure is not agreeable and the displeasure is not disagreeable, but their existence indicates to us that the stimulus or the idea with which they are fusing is welcome or unwelcome to the psycho-physical system. It is thus the stimulus which is agreeable or disagreeable, and not the feeling. Of course we must not forget that we

recognized the pain or tickling as mere sensations; they are no feelings at all.

If that is the case, then it is evidently absurd to assert that our will works towards the creation of pleasure or towards the removal of displeasure. I will a stimulus, perhaps the taste of a fruit, or the view of a landscape; I bite into the fruit or I wander to the landscape, and my will is satisfied. We asked for the source of this satisfaction, and received the reply that we got it from the pleasure which we gain and which itself is the satisfaction. Now it is clear that cause and effect have been exchanged here. It is true the taste of the fruit is pleasurable, but it is not the pleasure which I was seeking; the pleasure is only expression of the fact that I desire the continuation of the taste of the fruit. The feeling connected itself with that taste-sensation before the juice reached my tongue, when it was only an anticipated idea in me. That means my psycho-physical system worked towards the reinforcement of that taste-sensation by giving me the impulse to bite into the fruit. My will desires not the pleasure which the fruit brings with it, and which as such has no agreeableness, but my will wants the fruit-taste which I wish to continue, and which therefore seems pleasurable. The goal of the will is thus not the pleasure but the realization of the stimulus which is welcome to my individual system, and which is therefore agreeable. The pleasure only brought it about that the will turned to this goal. Wherever there is pleasure we must will its object, inasmuch as pleasure corresponds to the inner movement towards the reinforcement of the object. What the will-activity desires and reaches is thus the realization of the anticipated stimulus. And if the fulfilment of the will brings satisfaction, it is evidently this realization which is satisfactory. That the realized stimulus is accompanied by pleasure does not contribute anything to the satisfaction, then. It only indicates that the stimulus harmonizes with the whole situation of the personality, and

that the individual thus favors its continuation. The satisfaction may exist no less when the anticipated excitement which becomes realized by the will is not accompanied by any pleasure. The absence of such a feeling-tone means only that the stimulus anticipated and realized stands in no definite relation to the particular personality. It neither threatens with a disturbance of the inner equilibrium nor does it promise to remove an existing disturbance.

Our unavoidable preliminary question is now answered. Satisfaction of the will is independent of pleasure and displeasure; satisfaction of the will results from the realization of the anticipated stimulus. Pleasure and displeasure express only the relation of the stimulus to the personality without being themselves sources of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. If the anticipated stimulus has a feeling-tone of pleasure or displeasure, it stimulates the will towards the particular action. But if the will arises without a particular relation of the stimulus to the equilibrium of the personality, the fulfilment of the will involves no less satisfaction. It must therefore be perfectly possible to get deepest satisfaction in a sphere in which no pleasure and displeasure exist. If we can show that the will, and that means the striving for realization, can exist without being stirred up by pleasure or displeasure, we understand that the fulfilment of such striving can satisfy. And the consequence is that values may be entirely over-personal, without any reference to the individual equilibrium, and that means without reference to pleasure or displeasure, and may yet be true values, sources of complete satisfaction.

We called all this a preliminary question because it does not answer our general question how values are possible. We have shown that experiences without any relation to personal pleasure and displeasure may give satisfaction, if they realize the end of a will. But we have not touched the deeper question: How can there be will-movements which are not

directed by reference to the own interest, that is, by pleasure and displeasure? If we call the will which is not controlled by pleasure or displeasure a pure will, we must ask: Can there exist at all pure will-actions? If such pure will-actions exist, we now understand at last that the pure will may bring us no less satisfaction than the will which creates pleasure and relieves displeasure. Even this may now be clear from the start, that if there exists a pure will at all, both kinds of will and therefore both kinds of satisfaction may be mixed in a single action. The pure will may drive towards a goal from its own motives, and yet that goal may have at the same time relation to the personal equilibrium. The realization may thus satisfy the pure will and represent a pure absolute value, and yet may at the same time remove a personal disturbance and may satisfy by it a selfish side-will. In this way the beautiful may perhaps at the same time cause pleasure by its agreeableness, the true may at the same time bring pleasure by its usefulness, the moral may secure in the world somewhere a happiness which reflects on us with enjoyment, and even the religious may at the same time give a pleasurable comfort. But all that remains, indeed, a double play, which at any time may also turn into counter-play; the pure will may and must often turn against the pleasure-will. As yet, however, we do not have to examine these complications; we do not yet know whether we have a right to acknowledge at all the beautiful, the true, the moral, as cases of pure will, inasmuch as we have not found out whether a pure will can exist at all. So far we only know that all those ideals can fulfil their meaning only if they are conceived without relation to personal pleasure and displeasure, and we now know further that the will which lacks such a relation can bring us complete satisfaction.

That which fulfils our will brings us satisfaction and is thus valuable for us. But what does it mean to fulfil our will? We say our will is fulfilled when the idea which we try

to maintain becomes realized. We must elaborate that statement further. What does this realization mean? We may say, in the first place, it means the identity of content between the preceding and the resulting experience. In the language of psychology, we should say that in every complete will-action the idea of the end must precede the perception of the end. If I long for the taste of the fruit and the result is that I taste chocolate, the sweet taste of chocolate may give me pleasure, but it does not give me satisfaction of my will. It is not a fulfilment of that which I long for. The satisfaction is left out because the taste of chocolate is not a realization of my anticipated idea of the taste of fruit. The one is not identical in its content with the other. It is evidently just this identical anticipation of the end which makes the will a function for which the personality is responsible. If we did not know the end beforehand, we should not be able to inhibit the action by associated ideas of undesirable consequences. The anticipated idea of the effect makes it possible to stir up associations which represent our whole life-experiences and our principles. Through them we can reënforce or suppress the action which is to realize the idea. If there were no identity between the anticipated and the realized experience, we should never feel responsible, and instead of a will-action, we should have merely a chance activity.

This identity does not involve that I must think the content from the start in the same material of sensations in which it is later to be realized. On the contrary, it may be that I do not know at all what I want to reach. It is then for my will at first an unknown *X*, which is defined only by its relations. I feel the satisfaction of the fulfilment of will as soon as the equation is solved and the unknown unveiled. If, for instance, I try to remember a name, my desire is fulfilled, if under the pressure of this will the name enters my consciousness. The sound of this name itself is evidently not in me beforehand. If the name itself had been there, I should not

have sought it, and yet that which I grasped beforehand, that idea of the forgotten name, was in its content identical with the name which I finally found. If this idea of the unknown name had not preceded my desire, the final appearance of the name would not have been felt at all as the result of my effort, and therefore not as the product of will. In this way the working of our imagination or our reason may lead us to results which certainly were not beforehand in consciousness. But the artistic creation or the scientific thought does not strike us as a chance result; it comes to us as a deed of our will because the goal which we reach is identical in content with that which we aimed at. The artist or the scholar had this end in his mind only in an indistinct way. The realization was given by his elaboration. The forms in which such a transmutation into a new but identical content goes on are of course numberless. We must not confuse this transition by thinking of the difference between psychical and physical; we do not have a will-action only if the first content is a psychical idea and its realization a physical process. Even in that case the final factor is not the physical process as such, but the psychical perception of it. It is always the transition from one content of consciousness to another content, from the idea to the perception. The reference to a reality outside of consciousness does not contribute anything essential. If I have a hazy and sketchy idea and disentangle it and develop it by logical thinking, and finally reach a clear consistent thought, this end is reached by my will, while the whole transmutation went on in my consciousness. The only essential thing always remains the identity between the starting-point and the end.

But finally, what is the difference between the starting-point and the end? They are identical in content. Why do we go over from one to the other? Why do we aim from the idea to its realization, and what do we mean by the realization? To point again at once to the centre, we seek the new

form because it allows us a new action. Every realization is the starting-point for a new possibility of action, which is impossible as long as the content exists only in the preceding form. Whether I take a tool in my hand, or bring the fruit to my lips, or recall a name, or think a thought consistently to its end, each time a certain action becomes possible by which the particular content expresses its meaning. I can make use of the tool, I can swallow the juice of the fruit, I can pronounce the name, I can carry out the development of thought. To realize always means to remodel a given experience in such a way that the content remains the same, except that it takes a form in which a special action becomes possible. The transition from the idea of the end to its realization is a transition from a vague, indefinite, unsatisfactory starting-point to a definite, satisfactory basis of action. Practical life leads us to will-actions because it constantly leads us into situations in which we can satisfy our desires only by transforming our ideas into realities, that is, by transforming our contents of consciousness in such a way that they allow us definite application while their content remains the same. We can now say in general that we have the satisfaction of fulfilment whenever we maintain the content-experience and secure the identical content in a new form as part of a new situation which allows a new activity. It is the identity in the transition which satisfies us, and whatever provides this identity is therefore valuable. And from here we can take our last step.

CHAPTER VI

THE ETERNAL VALUES

EVERY instant of our experience is in itself without any value; it is just a flash of life, a momentary thrill of consciousness. If life were nothing but such a momentary flash, if no instant referred beyond itself, if no content remained beyond the flying experience, life would have no meaning and we should have nothing which we might call a world. To hold this experience when a new pulse-beat of life comes with its new situation and its new needs, and to find in it once more the identical content, is the one fundamental demand which liberates us from the mere flashlike character of life. We seek the identical content once more, and if we find it, we have a bit of a world. And because to have a world means thus to secure in the new experience identical content with the old, such a world gives us exactly that which we have recognized as the condition for every satisfaction; that means, it is valuable. In short, whatever secures us a world, that is, whatever allows us to transcend the isolated flashlike experience, must be valuable to us. Here we have the deciding fact from which everything else will follow.

We seek the identity of experience. That is the one fundamental act which secures for us a world. It is the one act which we cannot give up, and yet which has nothing whatever to do with personal pleasure and pain. We demand that there be a world; that means that our experience be more than just the passing experience, that it assert itself in its identity in new experiences. Here is the one original deed which gives eternal meaning to our reality, and without which our life would be an empty dream, a chaos, a nothing. We

will that our experience is a world. We do not say that our experience points toward a world, or that our experience is an image of a world, as if there is still something beyond experience in an immutable transcendence. If we were to grasp such an over-world, it would again become an experience for us and would lead to the same problems. No, the experienced content itself becomes such a world for us by that one fundamental deed of seeking identities. Whoever does not want to perform this deed cannot have anything but mere flying experiences. Moon and stars are merely personal sensations to him; friends and foes, norms and sins, are merely personal impressions. Nothing has validity beyond its mere being experienced, nothing has independent content, nothing is of independent significance, nothing of independent life.

No one can be forced to perform that deciding deed. It has to be done in full freedom, and yet only for those who have performed it has it a meaning at all to speak about the world and its values. We did not start to prove that the values exist, and still less did we intend to preach that those who do not believe in them ought to submit to such a creed; we asked only what such values mean for those who know them. He who does not know them, and who therefore must deny even the value of reality for anything which transcends his immediate experience, must, of course, deny also the reality of any other subject. He stands, therefore, entirely outside the circle of those who combine for the common inquiry into values. Whoever wants to discuss and to examine with us must have acknowledged already the reality of other subjects, and must have affirmed the independent reality of these experiences. Only we who have taken this first decisive step, and who have thus affirmed the independent existence of the contents of our experience, that is, their identity in new and ever new experiences — we alone can examine and test anything together. If there are beings who do not will to perform this first act, they must be eliminated as possible

subjects of such a discussion. They do not want to have a world; they are satisfied with having merely instantaneous experiences of which no one is thought as the same in content with another. They may not be aware that they then lose even the possibility of their self-identity, and that their life cannot be anything but a meaningless chaotic dream. But certainly they are not bound together with us by a common interest, as our interest is to understand the world, and thus to presuppose the self-assertion of our experiences in their identities. But we who have taken the step and affirmed this self-assertion of our experience, and thus gained a world, now want carefully to examine throughout this book whether or not this one act of affirmation of an independent world necessarily determines all its pure values and gives to them an eternal absolute significance.

If every inner occurrence remained isolated and appeared only to disappear forever without trace, we should not have a world. The self-assertion of the occurrence, and that means the world-character of the experience, consists in the identical recurrence, and this recurrence constitutes the ground for our satisfaction, as we recognized that all satisfaction results from the finding of identities. If we approach the event with the will that it is not a dream but a self-asserting independent world, every recurrence, every self-identity in the experiences must be for us a fulfilment. But as this will to have a world has no relation to personal pleasure and pain, and must hold for every possible subject with whom we can discuss the world, this satisfaction must have validity for every consciousness which wills with us the reality of a world. A satisfaction which must hold for every one who wants to have a world at all is a pure value independent of personal pleasure. The assertion of identity among the changing experiences is thus the fundamental absolute valuation. On the other hand, only in so far as such identity offers itself is the experience at all a self-dependent real world. Hence the world of values

is the only true world, and for every one who wants to have a world at all, all the relations which result from the self-assertion of the experiences must be acknowledged as absolutely valid for the true world. The system of values must then be recognized as soon as we ask what has been really posited by this act of world-assertion. It will be the topic of all the following inquiries.

The fundamental directions of evaluation can now be recognized at once. If the experiences are to assert themselves as a self-dependent world, and are to realize themselves in new and ever new experiences, and are to remain identical with themselves, we must demand a fourfold relation. First, every part must remain identical with itself in the changing events; secondly, the various parts must show in a certain sense identity among themselves, and thus show that they agree with one another and that no one part of the world is entirely isolated; thirdly, that which changes itself in the experience must still present an identity in its change by showing that the change belongs to its own meaning and is only its own realization. This threefold identity in the chaos of life-events gives a threefold self-assertion, a threefold fulfilment of our demand for an independent world of our experiences, a threefold over-personal satisfaction of the subject, a threefold pure value. We may call them the value of conservation, the value of agreement, the value of realization. But if the world is completely to assert itself, that is, to hold its own identity, these three values must ultimately be identical with one another, one must realize itself in the other. Then only the pure will gains its absolute satisfaction; and then we gain the fourth value of completion.

Hence we have four postulates which supplement each other and which coöperate to make a world possible at all, and thus to overcome the mere chance events. Whoever affirms a world must demand this conservation and agreement and realization and completion of the world as guarantee

for the self-assertion of the experience. In each of these four forms life demonstrates itself as a piece of reality. Each single occurrence as such, each instantaneous experience as such, is without value. But it is of absolute value that it asserts itself and thus builds up a world. Wherever our will reaches the contact with this world-fulfilment, and finds an experience identical with itself in a new event, there the pure will is satisfied and a pure value is gained. The true world is therefore the world of our experiences in so far as they assert themselves. In their own independent self-assertion they become realized while they are for us only experiences. Our question as to the validity of pure values can have no other meaning except in reference to this true world, and it is now evident that it would be meaningless to deny the question. The true world must be filled with these pure values, inasmuch as it is just the world which we build up in affirming the independence of our experiences. The true world has validity only in so far as it does fulfil this demand, and thus satisfies the pure will, that is, in so far as it has absolute value. We single individuals may not be able to grasp the true world; but the world which we are seeking and the values which we want to recognize are a world for which the validity of these values is presupposed. We can say with a technical term: the satisfaction of our pure will for identities is the only "a-priori" for the true world which we are upbuilding. Our experience is nothing but just our experience, or else it belongs to a world which is absolutely valuable. There cannot be a third possibility. If it is a world at all, it must be absolutely valuable, that is, it must satisfy the pure will, because it becomes a world only by its self-assertion, that is, by its identical recurrence, and this identity means fulfilment, means satisfaction, means value.

This deed, which raises the experience to its independent selfhood, is performed by us naïvely. We have posited such an evaluation already whenever we give to things or to per-

sons an own value of existence. But out of these naïve evaluations of life arise the purposive efforts which serve the systematic upbuilding of such a self-asserting and therefore absolutely valuable world. Such purposive efforts in the service of the absolute values, we call the labor of civilization. Hence we must separate the values which naïve life posits from the values which civilization posits intentionally. In each of these two large groups, the life-values and the culture-values, we then have the four heads of the values of conservation, agreement, realization, and completion. Thus we have eight classes of values, but each must be divided three times, inasmuch as experiences which are to assert themselves can belong to three different fields, either to the experience of the outer world, or to the experience of our fellow-world, or to the experience of our inner world. Hence we have a system of eight times three groups of values, and yet all these twenty-four values are only ramifications of the one value which fulfils our will that our experience is to belong to a self-dependent, self-asserting world.

We have not avoided the word "system," and yet we know well that it awakens in many minds a deep-rooted aversion. They have the vision of dry, secluded pedants, who "cut up thought and knowledge into a scheme of neatly formulated and mutually exclusive departments." They see in such system-makers perhaps the successors of the mediæval scholastics who carried their Aristotelianism to a point where they lost contact with the concrete experience, and they would like to remind such modern scholastics that they ought rather to drink deeper from the well of Platonic philosophy. What is the use of the demarcation lines which such systems, far from the real world, demand, if the world itself comes to us in an inexhaustible manifoldness of transitions and intermediate regions of half-lights and mysteries? To build systems means to leave out the best that really exists. But those who speak in such a mood still stand outside of the temple of philosophy.

They still think with the man on the street, that the world of existence, which is object of our real knowledge, can be found as an immediate life-experience, and that all our inquiry into its traits and values is simply a discovering and exploring of that which really exists ready-made beforehand. As soon as he has left the street and has entered the temple, he becomes aware that the thought-form of existence itself presupposes a definite act and attitude of the will. We do not find an existing world, but we make it out of the raw material of immediate life. Existence is a goal, not a starting-point. Existence is a value which we assign to the things of life in the service of the aim of following up their identity. The whole world to which our knowledge refers is a world determined and shaped by such attitude of our will.

We make the world. That does not mean that we construct it arbitrarily like the game of chess. Our constructions do not speak of a world which we shape in order that we may have new problems about which to think while the true world goes on not caring for our constructions. No, we make the world, but the world which we make is the only one with regard to which any knowledge has meaning. It is the world of nature and of history and of norms, a world which we build up, but in which alone every possible truth lies. Mere life does not contain it; life is only the clay from which we have to mould the world which has the value of truth. And if we understand that, we see that the act of affirming the true world belongs together with the act of affirming the beautiful world and the moral world; and we have no right to give any more emphasis to the one act than to the other. The world which maintains itself in existence, and is therefore true, has no more reality than the world which realizes itself in morality and the world which agrees with itself in beauty. In short, to speak of the values of life means not to speak of that which is given, but of that which is to be performed. In that case, what remains of the blame against the system-maker? If the world

were really something completed, which we simply have to explore, then indeed he would be petty and narrow, if he believed that he could make out beforehand what may be found in the world. The next day might overrun his little system, and the big meshes of his conceptional net might prove themselves unfit to hold all which gayly swims in the ocean of reality. But if it is a world of tasks which we are to perform, and if the world of existence and of progress and of harmony and of completeness is to be a world by our own work, then nothing has reality which is not determined by the character of our task. We reach reality only in so far as we are loyal to our purpose, and we understand reality only in so far as we are clear about these, our purposes. And as to these purposes, we surely need not wait until we have brought in all the knowledge which a future may secure by its discoveries. All that future knowledge must itself stand in the service of our particular purposes. To divide the field of thought into a scheme of departments is thus not the presumptuousness of one who believes that he knows everything in the world, and that he can tell beforehand exactly how the separate sub-departments in the world really look, instead of modestly waiting until our knowledge is richer. To understand the task which we are to fulfil, to understand the duties to which we must live up if our life is to give us the meaning of a world, demands only a full expression of that which lives in us and a full clearness as to our own actual purposes.

Of course there remains a personal difference in man which is ultimately one of temperament. Not every one seeks an ultimate understanding of reality; many a mind may be rather fascinated by the one or the other aspect of the existing world. No one is obliged to take the mathematician's rôle, and we can deal with the things without counting them and measuring them. But no one has the right to blame the mathematician if he refers the manifoldness of our things to the system of numbers, and the manifoldness of our space

to the system of three dimensions. He does not have to wait until it is found out that three dimensions exist, because these three dimensions are forms of his truth-positing activity. He does not deny by it that you can move in any number of directions; his system has room for every possible direction. And still less the man on the street ought to accuse the philosopher of living removed from the world, from the reality of life, from the pulse-beat of immediate experience. On the contrary, common-sense which deals with the world of knowledge, that is, with the true constructions of science, as if it were the world of our immediate experience, is really far from the truth of life. The philosopher who recognizes that the world of existence is a world which the logical thought has shaped, and who therefore understands reality out of the manifoldness of our tasks and purposes, brings us back to the apprehension of the life which we really live. It has always been the true grandeur of philosophy that it has brought mankind nearer to life again, and has secured by it new life-energies. The more abstract its language, and the more technical its system, the more fully has it always performed its upbuilding work and fulfilled its duty. The history of mankind has shown that the more abstractly and consistently and systematically philosophy carried out her labor, the more influential her work has been for the true progress of striving mankind. Next to religions, rigid philosophical systems which the man on the street hardly understood in their original form have been the most powerful factors in the history of the last two thousand years; they have made revolutions and they have brought reforms. All popular compromises of thought have been historical sedatives. Only the laborious self-consistent systematic thought can give us the full truth, and only the full truth can make us free.

PART II

THE LOGICAL VALUES

CHAPTER VII

THE VALUES OF EXISTENCE

IN our first part we have reached a theory of pure values. The work which lies before us is to elaborate the system of values. We have recognized in what sense values are possible at all and how they must be apprehended. Now we must explore the whole universe of values and separate carefully its various parts. We recognized as absolutely valuable that which constitutes a world. On the other hand, that which is necessary for the constitution of a world must be acknowledged beforehand as belonging eternally to the only world which we seek and which we can know. The only thing which is fundamentally necessary for it and which gives to us the absolute satisfaction is the self-assertion of the world. It transforms our mere chance experience from a chaotic dream into a world. We find this self-assertion by the recognition of identities in the experience. The first demand is then natural, that any part of the experience can be found identical with itself in new experiences. Naïve life finds this identity and correspondingly values it. The resulting value is that of existence. But the history of knowledge is the great effort to elaborate this value and to assert the identities of the parts of experience where naïve life would not recognize them. This systematic effort leads us to a new group of values, the values of connection. Both the naïve values of existence and the cultural values of connection serve the same need, to recognize every element of experience as identical with itself in new experiences. This effort of civilization is called science. Both the naïve and the elaborate efforts, those simple acknowledgments of existence and those scientific recogni-

tions of connections, represent together the logical values, and we may turn first to them, beginning with the values of existence.

And so we are to speak of existence, of that real absolutely valid being which stands in contradiction to not-being. No other attitude is demanded from us there but the mere acknowledgment which expresses itself in the affirmative judgment. The being of a thing or of a person demands no appreciation such as we might give to an achievement, demands no joy such as we might have in the beautiful, demands no conviction such as we might have for the metaphysical values. The being simply wants to be accepted, to be recognized, to be affirmed, and demands that submission which calculates with the fact that this or that is given.

The value of existence becomes material of communication in the form of a judgment; for instance, "It rains." The first impression may be that we put the accent in the wrong place. It might be said that what is valuable is not the existence of the rain, but the judgment about its existence. The valuable is not that which is expressed by the judgment, but the valuable is the truth of the judgment. That means that the judgment which agrees with the real existence is valuable. Knowledge is valuable, but not the known. Yet let us discriminate carefully there. The popular confusion results from the dogmatic idea that our judgments refer to a world which is independent of our experience and which is to be deciphered in our judgments. Whoever wants to overcome such dogmatism and wants to carry through the critical attitude must not only demand that all knowledge have reference to the world of our experience, but that the world of experience build itself up only in our knowledge. We do not have a world of experience which is only object of awareness. Our only world is an acknowledged, an asserted, a judged, a logically formulated world. The objects of knowledge and the knowing judgments are not two, but are one. And only

the conceptional formulation in the interests of communication is something additional. At first the only logically significant thing is the acknowledgment of that which is given, and in itself this acknowledgment demands no conceptions and no formulations, but only the act of will which exists in the affirming an experience as being. The system of our acknowledgments as they find their expression in our judgments is at the same time the system of our real experiences. An experience which is not object of judgment exists for us as little as a reality which is hidden behind the experience. It is therefore impossible to seek the logical value in the fact that the judgment renders correctly the experience, inasmuch as experience comes in question only as object of judgment. The value of a judgment as act of acknowledgment coincides with the value of existence of that which is asserted in the judgment. The value of the judgment of existence means the same as the value of the existence of the world. We do not know as object of knowledge any other reality than the one which is shaped and acknowledged in our judgments. Consequently it is misleading to speak of an agreement between the two and of a value which belongs to this agreement.

Of course we all find difficulties in overcoming dogmatism. We are inclined to believe that the earth stands firm while the sun is moving. In the same way we always refer the value of our knowledge to the agreement between our judgments and a world which is independent of our judgments. We emancipate ourselves with the more difficulty from such habits of thought as we have all gone through the school of psychology. Certainly the psychologist treats the experiences as contents of our individual consciousness entirely separated from the physical things. For the psychologist the judgment is a combination of ideas in our consciousness, and its value consists in the harmony between those ideas in the capsule of our consciousness with the outer physical world. All that is perfectly true in the midst of psychology, but the true results

of scientific psychology are misinterpreted if they are taken as expressions of the pure reality of life. If our personality is to be interpreted in its real willing and acting, it must not be brought under the point of view of a science which works by principle with far-reaching artificial abstractions. Such psychologizing philosophy is ultimately the same misuse as that which in past days distorted the true teachings of physics into a wrong philosophy. At that time there arose a hastily built materialism, which met its downfall as soon as serious philosophy approached it. On its crumbling ruins psychologism has settled itself.

If we really want to find what the assertion of existence expresses, we must return to the immediate experience before it is transformed and reshaped by psychology or any other special science. What does it mean in the pure reality of life that we acknowledge anything as really existing? Everybody must start, of course, from his own self. Now I find myself in view of a manifoldness of contents as a self which takes attitude towards them. This difference of content and self I find in every experience of which I can give an account. But this contrast between content and self has nothing to do with the separation of physical and psychical. The content of my real experience is neither psychical nor physical because it is still both together; it is the still undifferentiated real thing there without which I grasp. On the other hand, the self in its attitude is neither psychical nor physical content because it cannot be content in any case. The real self as I find it in my true life-experiences is never a content which I perceive; I know myself in my attitude by becoming certain of my self through my activity and my effort. Whoever makes the concession that he finds his own self as a content of consciousness is lost in the artificiality of psychologism and cannot find his way back to true life-experience.

In contrast to this, my real self and its attitudes, I find the contents. They are not packed together in my self, but they

are scattered over the universe; they are not yet pulverized by the physicist into atoms and not yet transformed by the psychologist into sensations. There without in the sky I experience the stars, and I do not know anything of my consciousness which reflects them and still less of my brain which is to produce them as sensations. That true thing is everywhere, but never in me, the self, which takes attitudes. Further, just as my true objects are never spatially in me, but are there and there, in the same way the true objects are not pressed together into the present moment of experience. If I psychologize them, my ideas are all present in me now; the perceptions which refer to the present, the memory ideas which refer to the past, the expectation ideas which refer to the future, are all present in me in this instant. But in the true life-experience this double relation does not exist at all. My remembering does not involve a content which is present now; my self turns directly towards the past objects, and in my expectation my self turns directly towards the future content. To treat those contents as experiences which are experiences of the present moment involves the whole transformation which psychology introduces.

The contents which I know in my real life are further never given to a passive spectator, like those which natural science deals with. The physicist may and must abstract from every self which takes attitudes. The true things thus become merely perceivable objects. But in reality I know the things only as starting-points of my attitude, of my interest, of my acceptance, or of my rejection. The things are means and ends for me, tools of my will and of my attention, never merely content of an indifferent awareness. The true experience is thus a will directed towards goals, and only afterwards does the will separate itself as a felt attitude of the self from its goal as an experienced content. If I ask myself how in my real experience the will and the goal, that is, the self and the content, can be discriminated at all, I feel ultimately one last

simple fact: in the feeling of self I always experience an inner contrast which does not exist in the content. In this will of the self is always a certain inner relation to an opposite. I cannot agree without excluding the disagreement; I cannot disagree without refusing the agreement. In every liking and disliking, loving and hating, desiring and resisting, lies such an opposition. And only in this contrast I know myself as the subject of attitude, and that means as a real personality. After eliminating that which moves in such opposition, I call the remainder of the experience content. The real life can never overcome this fundamental relation. Experience may be developed towards the height of scholarly thought, and yet even the world of the scientist remains content for the will of a self which takes attitude. The physicist conceives the universe in such a way that it is thought as an object for a passive spectator. But in doing so he gains a system made up from the mechanical universe on the one side and that abstract, passive spectator on the other side, and this whole system is now itself not at all object for a passive spectator, but is content for the will of the purposive thinking physicist.

Yet the reality of life is still richer. As such a subject of will, I find myself not only in relation to the outer world, but from the start also in relation to the fellow-world. In the immediate life-act I take attitude to friend and foe, and work sympathizing or resisting in continuous reference to other subjects of will. The individual will thus finds itself always in relation to objective things and to subjective beings. But finally a third antithesis: the individual will finds its limitations not only in the outer world, and in the fellow-world, but also in its own inner world. The self finds itself bound by the structure of certain own will-acts. I find will-attitudes alive in me which I cannot change arbitrarily, will-acts which seem to be valid in me with an over-personal power, acts of logical, ethical, æsthetic valuation. The outer world, the fellow-world,

and the inner world have importance for my individual will. In each of the three realms, I must make my decision whether that which my will finds there is merely my individual experience which has exhausted its energy by its being experienced, or whether it has an independent reality. If the impression of the outer world, the suggestion of the fellow-world, the demand of the inner world, are merely that which they appear as experience, namely, just an impression, a suggestion, a demand, then they have no real independent existence, no right to the claim of absolute acknowledgment, in short, no absolute value. If impression, suggestion, and demand are merely our personal experience, our will may take attitude towards them entirely with reference to the personal desires and liking. The decision will not have any bearing beyond the particular act. On the other hand, if our will holds them with the postulate that they are real beyond the particular experience, and if they can be found identical again, they become parts of a real world, which as such satisfies our fundamental demand for a self-asserting reality. That which fulfils this absolute demand for a world, we recognized as a value. The particular value which must be acknowledged here is the value of existence.

Hence we must examine whether our will that the impressions, suggestions, and demands remain identical can really be fulfilled, that is, whether the value of existence has validity. From this standpoint everything is without value which does not belong to the world of really existing things, beings, and demands, and which is thus nothing but our personal experience. The question is therefore ultimately: What in the immediate experience is experience of the real? We separate the examination, as we shall always do, into the three realms of the outer world, the fellow-world, and the inner world, in spite of the fact that just in this group of values the three groups hang most closely together. We know existence of the things because we acknowledge other subjects, and the

acknowledgment of other subjects would not be valid if we did not know the things.

A. — THINGS

How does practical life proceed? The most trivial thing may teach us. I believe I remember that at the end of this forest path there stands a wooden bench. Do I deceive myself, or has the bench which I remember reality? If I walk on, I shall find out whether the thing had meaning only for my remembering, or whether it has an independent existence. If I can find again that which I seek, it is demonstrated that this remembered object had the value of existence. The case is the same with the perceived as with the remembered. There on the moss I believe I see a curious bird. Am I deceiving myself? Is it not perhaps a shadow or a stone? I go nearer to it to find out whether the thing which attracts my attention will offer itself also in the further experience as a bird, and will thus remain identical with that which I believe I perceive. In short, the recurrence in a new experience raises the perceived or remembered impression above the level of unreality. In a similar way we know another method which helps us in practical life perhaps still more frequently. I try to grasp and to touch the thing which at first I only saw, or I try to see that which at first I only heard. In short, that which I perceived at first in one form is sought in a new form and yet has an identical content. Every disappointment teaches me about the existence of the thing.

Such methods are thoroughly useful, and within certain limits reliable. Experience warns us constantly to respect those limits, and trains us in applying each method only where it is usually helpful. If I believe I hear a cry and I want to prove that it was no deception, that the cry had a real existence, it would be absurd to examine whether the cry still lasts in the way in which the bench still stands by the road. No other sense can teach me whether the moon which I see really

exists in the sky or is merely my hallucination. Even the bench in the forest may have been there at my last walk and may have been removed now. Certainly no principle of fundamental character is involved in this way of testing real existence. No one can claim by principle that the impressions represent a real existence only if they return unchanged in our later experience, or if they admit of perception by other senses, too. Yet even this scheme emphasizes the decisive point. The experience is sought as identical in a new experience; the recurrence in a new effect fulfils the desire of the subject and brings him satisfaction. The source of this satisfaction is the identity. Neither the original experience nor the finding by other senses or in a later occurrence is in itself valuable, but the fact that both are identical and the one fulfils the demand of the other for continuity is satisfactory; it is the value of existence.

As soon as we speak in a fundamental way about the existence of things, we postulate a much more extensive recurrence. Even in the circle of practical life, we rely preferably on a more systematic method of testing, namely, the affirmation by other observers. I can soon ascertain whether the cry which I believe I heard was a real sound. I ask my neighbors whether they heard the same cry, and if no one of them perceived anything, it was an illusion or a hallucination; the sound had no real existence. The external world is real to us when it can stand the social test and is a common object. But here, too, the principle is the same. The experience is found identical in a new realization, this time in the acknowledged experience of the neighbors, and this time, too, it is a recurrence of the identical which constitutes the true value of the existence. But even this social agreement has narrow limits. The other observers may err as well as I myself. They may stand under the same prejudices and suggestions under which I stand. Moreover, every one must perceive things from his own particular aspect, and that does

not refer only to space and time, but to the mental relations as well. Many things, probably, no one at all can share with me. The ultimate decision whether we recognize the real existence cannot remain dependent upon such external chances. The fundamental meaning of the value of existence is characterized by the practical agreement upon the part of some neighbors as little as by the affirmation of our own senses at a later time.

But we need progress only one step further in the same direction. It is not sufficient that other persons find by chance that identity in their experiences, if we want to elaborate the value of existence fundamentally. But everything is done if, instead of this, we say that the content of our experience is demanded as experience for every other being under the same circumstances. The mere experience is hereby transcended and a postulate is put in its place. We demand that our content of the outer world is possible object for every possible subject. Only now we have separated it from our personal situation and have made it independent. On the other hand, this independence of the content does not indicate, of course, that it has stopped being an object. If it ceased to have the character of an object, it would be annihilated. Our things become independent not by ceasing to be objects for the subjects of will, but by ceasing to be objects for one subject only. It has absolute existence as soon as it can be conceived as being by principle a possible object for every subject. Again we must say, the fact that the other subjects have the object is not more valuable than the fact that I have it myself. The value lies exclusively in the fact that it is identically the same object which the others and I demand. As now the recurrence is referred to every possible subject, the satisfaction transcends every personal wish and constitutes an absolutely valid valuation.

It is evident that such a valuation is really a deed of the postulating will, inasmuch as the experience of every possible

subject, of course, lies outside of any possible concrete life. Nevertheless, such a postulate is not independent of experience. Every contradiction of any other being interferes with the postulate. If, perhaps, I tried to conceive the playthings of my imagination or my dreams as real objects, I should find at once the opposition of my fellows, and I should be as powerless as if I wanted to settle in castles in the air. On the other hand, if I tried to annihilate my reminiscences as unreal, and tried to make them merely personal ideas, and thus denied the real existence of the remembered things, the social contradiction would set in. The value of existence is accordingly no fact of mere experience, nor is it a postulate which can be settled independently of experience. The existence-value of the things is indeed no physical discovery. Where there is no postulate of a will which seeks a world, no experience can force it on the subject. Whoever believes that the flame is unreal because he does not acknowledge real existence cannot be taught more by burning his fingers in it. The seeing of the flame and the pain in the hand are equally personal experiences. In the same way the heavy, the hard, the big, do not stand nearer to the consciousness of existence than the luminous and odorous and sounding. The plastic has no higher value of existence than the flat. It is absurd to think, as is often done, that the personal experience is a kind of surface view and the valuation of a real existence is in a way to add the third dimension. The imagined landscape which we conceive as not really existing has yet its full dimensions of depth.

In a quite different way, space and also time are indeed connected with the objective existence of the things. The value of existence presupposes that our experience of things can be found again identical in everybody's existence. The individual space-time perspective must on this account be replaced by an over-personal unalterable space-time system which makes it possible to eliminate the individual differences. What is at my right and yet at your left could not be con-

ceived as an identical object, if the leftness and rightness belonged to the character of the object. That which is past for one and present for the other and future again for still others could not be the same, if this personal time-aspect remained an element of the thing. In my immediate personal experience these space-values and these time-values are at first only subjective attitudes. The things are before me or behind me, right or left, above or below, near or far, and each direction and distance demands its particular way of action and attitude. In the same way past and present and future are related to my will. Present is that towards which my action is directed, future is that for which I prepare my action, past is that which is beyond my action. All these attitudes are effective in my personal system of experience without involving any objective space or objective time.

Still in quite a different way I find space-time determination in my real world of things. Every particular object may have its particular space-form, may be round or angular, star-shaped or tree-shaped or house-shaped. Everything may have its particular time-form, may be iambic or dactylic, may sound in waltz rhythm or in the rhythm of a funeral march, may flash regularly or irregularly, may touch me quickly or slowly. Here, too, the temporal and spatial forms remain qualities of the thing, just like tone or color. They do not contain any reference to a general space-time form. The things have their space shape, but they are not parts of one space; they have their time shape, but they do not lie in time. If a manifoldness of things comes together opposite each other or after each other, then new, more complex shapes are formed; but as long as I consider it all merely as my experience I have no reason to transcend this primary shape.

This whole situation is changed at once, if I try to conceive the object in such a way that it can be thought as identical with itself in everybody's experience. Now we have to rethink all spatial and temporal differences of direction and of

form in such a way that they become entirely independent of the personal standpoint and yet do not become eliminated. Various ways might be permissible. The simplest one, which has proved entirely satisfactory, is to detach these differences of directions which originally belong to our own attitude with reference to the things, and instead to refer them to the mutual relations of the things themselves. If I acknowledge the same right to the standpoint of every subject, I must acknowledge that everything may be right and left, may be above and below, may be near and far, may be past and present and future. In other words, those rays of direction which at first irradiate from me must be conceived as starting from every possible object. Things are now past and future, right and left, no longer with reference to subjects, but with reference to other things. Consequently we gain a system of relations between the objects themselves without reference to subjects of will. A thing is now past or future in relation to another thing; one object is near or far from other objects. Thus we gain a net of space-time relations, and with its help every space-time shape also can be translated into a series of distances and directions. As soon as that is carried through, the things are independent of the chance personal standpoints. What is round for one can no longer be elliptical for another, inasmuch as the form is now expressible in space measurements. Hence the thing can remain the same spatially and temporally for everybody's experience, even if every one looks into the street from a different window and the one comes later and the other earlier to his outlook. The independent existence of things demands in this way an independent form of space and time. But for this absolute space and this absolute time the same is true which showed itself for existence. It is a free postulate, which far transcends every possible actual experience, and yet it is everywhere controlled by experience and develops itself only where the experience suggests it.

The value of existence thus belongs to the objects distributed over space and time as soon as we perceive or remember or expect them with the conviction that these identical things can be objects of experience for every possible subject. Whatever we cannot hold with this conviction possesses for us no real value of existence and does not belong to the existing things in our world. At the first glance this seems to be contradicted by the fact that we are accustomed to attribute real existence also to ideas; for instance, to our imaginative ideas. They have their existence in a particular consciousness, but certainly the psychologist presupposes their full existence for his analytical studies. But such an argument is deceitful. From the standpoint of real experience in which we wanted to remain at first, the imaginative idea indeed has no reality; as a psychical content of consciousness enclosed within the personality, the imaginative ideas do not come in question here. We have to ask at first what such imagination means in real life. If my imagination erects beautiful castles in the fairy forest, they are in my real experience not ideas of castles with ideas of forests both enclosed in my brain, but they are for me the walls and towers at the place where I believe them to be, exactly as the landscape which I see here from my piazza is perceived there without and not in my brain. From this standpoint of real experience the landscape which I see has real existence and that fairy castle has not. That which by principle is found as an object of experience for me alone has as such not a kind of diminished or faded or transparent existence, but it has absolutely no part in the world which is maintained by the absolute value of real existence.

If the value of existence meant simply that an object is given to many subjects, we might perhaps think that the object which is given to one subject only has at least a small fraction of true existence. Such an imagined object then might have a kind of diluted value of existence which we

mean by psychical existence. But that is not the case at all. The value of existence did not result from the mere appearance in many subjects, but the fundamental point was always the consciousness of the identity among those various appearances. Wherever this recurrence of the original, this fulfilment of the thought, in short, this realization fails, no over-personal satisfaction can result, and therefore no value of existence. My castle in the fairy forest has no value of existence whatever. The meaning in which, later, the dreamed, the desired, the hoped, the expected, the imagined, may enter after all into the world of the really existing as a psychical fact is entirely different. We shall follow up this process as soon as we discuss the world of subjects. The subject as centre of will is as such never an existing object, but we shall see that it has nevertheless its existence. The subject is characterized and is to be understood by its activities, its acts of attitude, and these activities are related to objects, and these objects of activity of course may be now either the really existing objects or the merely individual experienced objects. To understand the real subjects it will thus become necessary to consider also those things which have only a personal relation. And in this way the mere illusions and imaginations become connected with the world of the real. We shall see later that the systematic science which connects the facts from this starting-point can develop a whole system, the system of psychology. But as long as we deal merely with the problem of existence and do not enter into the question of connection, the imaginative idea is no real process in us nor a real psychical object in our consciousness, but is merely and only that which has no reality.

Whether the valuation of existence in the particular case is justified or not, that is, whether the existential judgment is right or wrong, has of course nothing to do with our examination of the principle of existence. Philosophy does not have to discriminate which things are real and which are not. That is a problem of social importance, and society examines

it with all the means of its specialized sciences. If I say that I see there in the field a raven, my assertion of existence is not changed if the zoölogist can prove it to be a crow, or if I myself find upon nearer inspection that it was a piece of coal, or if the physician finds that I suffer from hallucinations. The only decisive factor was that it had for me and for every one a reasonable and necessary meaning when I claimed for the thing which I experienced an absolute value of existence. We had to examine what is meant by this absolute value, but whether my raven by chance possesses this value is without any fundamental significance. We know now that the affirmation which gives meaning to such existence-judgments demands that the experienced object can be maintained as identical in the experience of everybody. In the negative existential judgment, just this is denied in saying this thing does not exist. Whoever affirms or denies may be in error or may find contradiction; but what affirmation and denial mean must stand firm not only for himself, but must be beyond every possible contradiction, if his judgment is to have a meaning at all.

B. — PERSONS

When we discussed the existence of things, we were always turned to the experience of other beings. My experience of objects meant a real piece of the world because other subjects experienced it too. How do I know those other subjects, and in what sense do I acknowledge their absolute existence also? The natural sciences and the naturalistic psychology have a simple and convenient solution for the whole problem. The other living beings, we are assured, are for us at first only objects of external perception. But their characteristic series of movements remind us of our own movements and their form reminds us of our own form. On the other hand, we know from our inner experience that we ourselves represent not only a physical but also a psychical manifoldness. We

find in ourselves contents of consciousness. Thus it seems a justified conclusion of analogy that those other organisms are also supplied with such inner attachment, and that they also carry ideas and similar contents packed into their brains.

It is evident that our deduction of the existence of things would become impossible by such conclusions. We deduce the existence of things from the fact that they belong to the experience of other subjects. That would become a vicious circle if we really knew the other subjects at first as existing things. But does such a view correspond in the least to the true life-experience from which we have to start? Is not the whole meaning of our relation to our fellows, with its warmth and immediacy, destroyed by every effort to express the life-relation from man to man by the clumsy forms of the perception of things? Whoever acknowledges no other experience but the sensations of contents is surely obliged to confine the totality of experience to physical and psychical things, and thus to reduce all life-relations ultimately to relations of things. Inasmuch as this special way of treatment is the particular task of natural science and psychology, such views would demand that psychological and biological researches alone have to interpret what our fellow-man is. Certainly it is surprising what an overwhelming power belongs to the habit of naturalistic thought, and how difficult it is for all of us to return to the immediate experience of life. We all have learned too much from those smooth explanations in the sphere of the world of things. The effort to explain us and other men from foregoing causes pushes itself into the foreground even when we really start not to explain but to interpret and to understand ourselves and our relation to other men. Every effort to explain refers of course to the things, and reinforces the suggestions of the natural sciences that everything can be understood completely when it is conceived as an object.

Nevertheless, our view of the world must remain distorted if we cannot liberate ourselves from such suggestions. We

must be emancipated from them, if we are not to lose ourselves. We must emphasize here most strongly what we touched on once before, that we do not find ourselves in the present experience as objects. Of course I can at any time consider myself as such experienceable object after the pattern of describing and explaining psychology. In that case my bodily sensations stand in the centre; my actions are then expressed by the sensations which come from my muscles and joints and tendons and skin, together with associated ideas, and my I is the system of my psycho-physical processes of reaction, associations, and inhibitions. But when I move in the midst of life, I know my self in a way which has nothing in common with such objectification of my personality. Then I do not perceive myself, but I feel my self. My action is not a process which I find as a content in my consciousness, but I myself am the attitude and the decision and the will. I know myself in my will-event most immediately in a way which is fundamentally different from every knowledge of objects. If I tried to describe it, I should already deviate into the world of objects. But whoever would deny this uniqueness of the will has only to feel his own denying to become aware that his intention in such an act of denying is not something which can be found as an object, but is valid in its deed-character. As soon as we fixate our attitude and deed by conceptions for the purpose of communication and discussion, the conceptions by which we think them are of course objects for us, but that which is to be thought by those conceptions is not remodelled by it into an object itself. Such an act of attitude as we experience it in every pulse-beat of our self-certainty is fundamentally different from every possible experience of an object, and exactly of this kind is every other subject of will for us.

As we become conscious of ourselves in our will, our fellows, too, meet us in every act by their attitudes, and only by their attitudes does their will immediately reach us. Those who are inextricably entangled in the nets of naturalistic conceptions

fancy that such a relation of wills must be something mystical or "metaphysical." Perhaps they think of telepathy, in which the psychical in one organism has an unexplainable influence on the psychical in another body. But all this represents exactly the opposite. Telepathy is an unexplainable process in the system of bodily nature in which everything ought to be explained, and in which everything must be explainable by principle. But when my will meets your will, agrees with it or disagrees with it, there is nothing at all unexplainable, because it has no reference at all to a system which demands explanation. It belongs to a manifoldness for which the question of explanation, the question of cause and effect, would be just as absurd as the question whether the will is triangular or has the color of violet. The will in its life-reality is not to be explained, but is to be interpreted in its meaning, is to be understood in its bearing, is to be developed in its purposes and consequences. I do not experience the fellow-will as something which I think into the perceived body by a kind of analogy on the basis of external similarities. On the contrary, the will of the other man approaches me as the very first experience, and I know it in sympathizing with its intentions, in understanding its attitude, in imitating or rejecting its decision.

Whoever asks how I can experience the fellow-will otherwise than by starting from the perception of bodily movements is already on the track of naturalistic explanation. If my knowledge of the other will is to be explained causally, the whole system of relations must of course be expressed in the form of perceivable objects. But in reality the understanding of the foreign will is in every case the only true starting-point from which nothing refers at all to preceding causes. This life-event begins there, and the whole situation is completely elucidated as soon as it is completely interpreted in its meaning. That we can acknowledge another will is the first step; that we conceive this other will in its relation to

that object which is central for it, namely in relation to the other man's body, is the second step. This reference to the body has for us interest only because it gives to the will of the other man the characteristic space-time order of his objects and thus interprets his individual perspective of the world. But it is the will alone which binds together this world of the fellow-man, and which demands our interest in his individuality. All this ought not to be misinterpreted as if it were an artificial construction. On the contrary, the experience of every life-instant contains the whole truth here, and we have only to remove the artificial elaborations of the causal sciences to reach again the pure immediate experience. But this we must do because just at the starting-point everything must be perfectly cleared from reminiscences of scientific transformations. As soon as we have broken those chains which have become by far too convenient to most of us, as soon as we have reached once more the immediate certainty of ourselves and of our fellow-men in their original community of will, then alone we have the possibility of really reaching a consistent view of reality. Then the pseudo-necessity of the causal laws disappears for our will and we are free; the boundaries of time disappear and we are eternal; the relativity of our purpose is annihilated and our values grow to the height of absolute validity.

But at first we should not discuss here the last fulfilling of purposes. We start at the starting-point where everything essential must be given, not in ideal situations, but in the most trivial life-experiences. When I converse with friends and quarrel with opponents, when I help my neighbor and understand what he proposes, when I sympathize with his pain or try to convince him, when I praise or blame, in short, in the trivialities of every hour of life, the fellow-man is a subject of attitude and will to me. What he brings to me is a suggestion, a proposition, a decision, a question, a contradiction, long before it becomes a process. A meaning is understood before

a content is perceived. On this basis arises the question of what it means that I acknowledge the existence of such acts. In my personal experience it is only an excitement which I feel, a suggestion or a proposition, and thus it may be nothing but just this particular excitement of my will. Whether it is more than such a personal experience of mine I do not know at first, and as I may skeptically contend that the things are more than my impressions, I may also deny that the fellow-beings are more than suggestions which my will feels in itself as starting-points of attitudes.

In reality, however, we do not doubt that as there is existence in the things, certainly the other beings have an independent existence, too. We give the same reality to them which we give to ourselves. The importance of the problem is too easily overlooked. In the history of the theory of knowledge no question has been answered in such an unsatisfactory way as the question of the reality of other subjects. The poorest means of help borrowed from naturalistic thinking have been carelessly taken over into philosophies which by their principles directly contradict such pseudo-thoughts. Thus we ask, on the basis of the real immediate experience, what is meant when we give to the suggestion which arises for our will the value of a really existing subject. As in the case of the objects, here, too, practical experience may show us a way. In the case of the things, we found that I ascribe existence to the house which I perceive, but not to the fairy palace of my imagination, because only that house can be found by my neighbors, while my palace does not return in the experience of any one else. Now we have to deal with subjects instead of objects, and as subjective we acknowledged that act of attitude which we understand. But attitude is always attitude to an object. As there could not be a thing which is not an object for a subject, there cannot be an attitude which is not directed towards an object. If I agree with an attitude, it means that I take the same subjective will-

relation to a thing as that which has been proposed to me. The object had its real existence when it was experienceable also for other subjects. The subject has its real existence when it takes attitude also to other objects.

This is indeed the method by which we judge in our daily life. Suggestions approach our will continually, and at every moment we have to discriminate between those which we understand as expressions of real existing beings and those which are nothing but just suggestions behind which no existing subject stands. The neighbor who talks with me suggests to me in every sentence acts of attitude which I imitate or reject. In the same way the child who laughs or cries at my side wants my sympathy, the dog wants to be stroked, the flower wants to be picked, the fruit wants to be tasted, the beautiful curve of the line tempts me to follow its movement, the rhythmic sound suggests to me impulses in accordance with it. It is true the psychologist tells us at once that in the last cases we have to do only with objects; their perception realizes certain impulses to action only through associations. But that does not help us at all. Such explanatory comment might be applied with exactly the same right in the cases of the first kind, to the dog and to the child and to the neighbor. We do not stand here before a problem which can be solved by explanation of causes. The suggestion which comes from the rhythmic sound or from the swinging curve is just as original and unique an experience of will as the suggestion which approaches us from the sentences of the speaker or from a smiling face. If we refer only some suggestions to existing beings and others not, if we give the value of real existence to the neighbor, the child, the dog, perhaps also to the earthworm, but not to the flower, the melody, the curved line, a new principle of selection must have entered.

The soft waving of the flowering branch before me wakens my inner harmony with its mild rhythmical movement; what the branch wills and suggests finds a welcome in me just like

that which the laughing, playing child at my side wakens in me. I laugh with the child, and I surrender myself to the play of the rising and falling motion. What the child wills and what the branch wills are to me equally suggestions to will the same. But now I show the child a piece of candy and he grasps for it with vivid will; I take away his toy and his tears show his regret. The same will takes attitude toward new and ever new situations. The waving branch, on the other hand, the moving curve, even the flower, all will something, but their will never turns to a new goal. The one suggestion which we experience from them expresses their whole will. An attitude which transcends that first experience and relates to other objects is denied to them. Their will cannot adjust itself to any new purpose. On this, indeed, is based the decision with which our daily life is satisfied. We separate the suggestions in which the will turns towards other objects from those in which the will plays itself out in the one demand. The situation thus corresponds completely to the separation of objects. With the experienced impressions, we have to ask whether they are also objects for other subjects; with the experienced suggestions, we have to ask whether this will also takes attitude towards other objects. Where the latter is the case, where the will can be found again in a new attitude as the identical will, there we have again the condition for a true value of existence. Only the will which takes other attitudes towards other things means to us the will of really existing subjects. On the other hand, those suggestions which exhaust themselves in the one experience are as little real existing subjects as the objects of imagination are real existing things.

The demarcation line between real subjects and things which lack subjectivity has consequently no longer anything to do with an external similarity between the things and ourselves. If the naturalist really believes that we ascribe consciousness to the monkey or the earthworm or the jelly-fish

because they are so similar to us, his argument is as good and as bad as all the other biological demonstrations for the existence of consciousness in animals. Some biologists put the emphasis on the power to learn, others on the existence of memory, others on the ability to adjust the behavior. Whoever looks into the depths of the problem must see clearly that an investigation which comes from without can never bring any proofs for the existence of psychical processes either with the jelly-fish, or with the monkey, or with our neighbor. He who wants to explain must explain all the actions, including the actions apparently produced by memory, from strictly physical causes, and the exigencies of explanation never can determine whether psychical factors are accompanying the physical ones. The biologist finds a modifiability of behavior and not a psychical learning, he finds an after effect of earlier stimuli, but not a psychical memory. That there is consciousness must be presupposed and cannot be proved by demonstration. With animal as with man we simply have to acknowledge the other will before we can find the particular image of the world which belongs as object to that particular will. Where the demarcation line lies depends thus entirely upon our actual acknowledgment, which cannot be found out by a biological experiment. Whoever in sentimental mood feels in the expression of the flower not only the present suggestion of the flower's lovely desire, but goes so far as to believe that the same will may take attitude towards new situations, that it is the same will which resists the breaking of its stem or which longs to refresh itself on sweet dew — he indeed gives the value of real existence to the will of the flower.

If we observe in this way that a will takes attitude also towards other objects, it will be sufficient for our practical purposes. Yet such an empirical motive does not reach further than the corresponding one in the realm of things. We saw there, too, that we gave existence to the things when

one or the other neighbor divided the experience with us, or when we ourselves found the identical experience again. In the same way, we now give existence to the subject when the will turns towards this or that other object, or takes a changed attitude towards the same object. But to gain a firm ground, independent of chance experiences, we had to go further and to demand that a really existing thing must be experienceable for every possible subject. The subject reaches the same detachment from the chance experiences when it is conceived in its relation not to the one or the other object, but to every possible object. Only if a being is acknowledged as the possible subject for the total world of things is its selfhood completely detached from that chance attitude which it takes towards us; then alone it has an absolute real existence. This postulate can be fulfilled only if we posit in the place of the things a world of words, of conceptions; only by language does it become possible to bring the whole world of possible objects into the sphere of will for every being. Only by the conceptions does the subject complete its independence from the chance object. This corresponds exactly to the independence which the object found by our gaining the forms of absolute space and time. The objective system of conceptions becomes the place of absolute relation for the subject, as space and time are the place of absolute relation for the object. Again we have transcended the mere experience. It is a postulate with which we approach our fellow-men, if we demand from every being that he be able to take attitude towards everything which can be determined by conceptions; but again it is experience which has to guide our postulate. If, without motive of experience, we tried to give real existence to every suggestion which comes to our will, we should stand in a romantic world of dreams, just as if we were to give existence to the things of our imagination. And such a single suggestion has now gained not a kind of faint value of existence, but it has none at all, inasmuch as we saw that it is

just this recurrence of the identical which is the only condition of fulfilment, and that means of value.

Now we also understand what constitutes the existence of the subject for himself. We give value of existence to a subject as soon as we find his will in a new attitude towards new goals as the identical will. Consequently a really existing person must have the possibility of maintaining himself in every new act of will. This conservation of the same will cannot mean the temporal lasting of it, because such mere lasting in time we recognized as a trait of objects. We saw that objects alone are conceived in the absolute time. If a subject of will is to remain identical with itself, it cannot mean its temporal continuity, but it must mean a continual self-assertion by which the will knows itself as identical in every new act. It is a subjective self-continuity, which as such is untemporal, and which eternally binds all particular acts of the individual. This inner self-relation of the will is that which we have to call the soul.

C. — VALUATIONS

Our individual will is not only bound by the fellow-world and the outer world. We acknowledge not only the other persons and things as limitations to our individual willing and desiring. In the inner world, too, the will finds its boundaries which no individual desire has created. There is no need of returning to our fundamental argument that this inner world does not mean the psychical in the sense of psychology. We started from the immediate experience. In it everything which is object of our will, that which the psychologist would call our ideas, perceptions, or memories, belongs entirely to the outer world; only our acts of attitude, our personality, our soul as deed, is our original inner world. If this soul-world is to find in itself something binding, it must be again a will. Every part of experience which does not represent a will would have to be experienced as object; it would thus

belong to the world of impressions, but not to the self. In our inner world, any objective value like that of the things in the outer world or of the persons in the fellow-world can belong only to a will which is our will and yet which we do not will as individuals. In our experience the impressions and suggestions had real existence when they showed themselves as independent and self-asserting beyond the first occurrence. Their existence was absolute if they remained identical in every possible experience. In the same way our will must be acknowledged as having an independent absolute existence as soon as this will is thought as recurring identical every time in such a situation. Thus our will can be a part of the existing world, which is by principle independent of our individual personality. It is a world of the over-personal will, which gives the firm background to the wavering individuality in the same way that the world of the real things gives background to the play of our personal ideas.

Such over-personal will-acts are the absolute valuations. Compared with them, the will-acts from personal needs and from personal desires have only chance character. In the system of the absolute valuations these merely personal acts are as unreal and as non-existent as the things of imagination are in the realm of existing nature. But that which gives to the over-personal will-acts the absolute value of existence is again only the one fact that we will them with the consciousness that they are not willed only in this particular experience. Here, too, of course we have at first simply the motives of experience. We may have to-day a will with a vague feeling that we probably shall will that always. Yet this remains still in the limits of conditional value, however much it may become the starting-point for a complete development. Our will is anchored in the depths, and has become a valuation with absolute existence as soon as we will with the consciousness that we cannot possibly will otherwise as long as we will a world at all; that we would give away ourselves and

that our world would lose its meaning, if we were not to will this will.

The progress is evidently the same as with things and persons. Here, too, the original experience, the single volition, is maintained to be found identical in new experience and by postulate in every possible experience. As with things and persons, here again the value of existence is not based simply on the fact that the same event really occurs again, but that it is held in our experience with the demand that it remain identical and thus assert itself. The value of objective existence for the valuations differs from that for the things and persons only by the one important fact, that the latter point beyond themselves. The things demand the acknowledgment of other persons, the persons demand reference to other things, but the existence of the valuations always leads back to the self, to the inner world. The valuations for which we must thus acknowledge absolute existence have of course objects just like any other will. The objects of these overpersonal attitudes are the values. It is practically the same thing, whether we speak of the absolute existence of the valuations or of the absolute validity of the values. It is merely a difference of standpoint. The values belong to the world which we will, the valuation belongs to the will which forms a world. That the values are absolute cannot express anything else than that the valuation of the values is a will-act which is independent of any individual volition. Our will has absolute existence as soon as we will it with the consciousness that there exists no world at all, and thus no reality, if we do not maintain this will in every possible experience. On this foundation the whole absoluteness of the values is based. Accordingly it must be possible to deduce the totality of the absolute valuations, and that means the totality of the absolutely valid values, from this one fundamental principle. Those volitions posit absolute values which result from the demand that there exists at all a real world. The question

which values have to be acknowledged as really existing is of course not a new question for us, inasmuch as it is exactly and exclusively the problem of this whole book. The philosophy of the eternal values cannot be anything else but the systematic deduction of all possible absolutely valid values from one principle, and for us this one principle is now founded on the deepest rock of our inner world — on the will to have a world which is self-asserting.

CHAPTER VIII

THE VALUES OF CONNECTION

WE submit to the things, we acknowledge the persons, and we believe in the valuations without any efforts of thought. We feel that these values of mere existence are immediately given with the postulate of a real world. It is different with the connections which hold together the experiences. Moreover, our world of the connected things, persons, and valuations is endlessly larger than the mere circle of impressions, suggestions, and decisions which we find in our immediate experience. We transcend this circle by reflection and research, by explanation and exploration and reasoning, and thus by our own activity we reach new experiences. One thing leads to another, the present to the past and the future, the given to the calculated. From the single experience, we thus reach a connected independent reality which we acknowledge in the same way as the mere existence. But indeed, it is not given any more immediately; it must be discovered. The exploration of the connections is thus a purposive conscious effort, which is slowly performed in the historical life and is never completed; it is the task of science.

When I say: "It rains," I want to express that I affirm the independent existence of the present rain. But when I say: "It has rained, because the street is wet," I transcend the affirmation of the perceived wetness. I assert on the basis of reflection that there is a connection between the wetness and the not-perceived rain. This connection has for me as much existence as the perceived object itself. As soon as I have discriminated what there is really existing in my experience and what there is not, and as soon as I have found all the real

connections in which the experience stands, I have found everything which can be possible material of my knowledge. We have only to convince ourselves now that such connections also are not merely personal acts of thought, but have the over-personal reality value. We must ascribe such absolute value to the connections, if we can show that in the connections too the experience is maintained as self-identical. Indeed, this will be the goal of our demonstration. We shall recognize that to find connections always ultimately means to follow out the postulate of self-assertion of the things, of the persons, and of the valuations. Effort is needed to discover such further identities. The will to maintain the given must overcome hindrances here, and cannot be simply satisfied with the postulate only, as is the case of mere existence; but here, too, it is the fulfilment of this will for identity which gives the complete satisfaction, and which thus gives to the relation between the given and the recurrent that independent value which we call the value of connection.

If all connection is based on identity, things can hang together only with things, persons with persons, valuations with valuations. In this way we find the three large fields in which independent values of connection demand our acknowledgment. The connection of things is expressed in the relations of cause and effect. Their system is the system of nature, their ideal is the conception of natural processes as a complete identity of all given things in every possible new experience. This ideal is aimed at by the natural sciences. The natural scientist thus seeks fundamentally the same thing which the simple assertion of existence tries to reach, namely, the detachment and declaration of independence of the thing. But for the mere assertion of existence, it was sufficient to show that our thing occurs also in the experience of other subjects; for the connections which natural science seeks, it must further be demanded that the thing never ceases to be real object. The totality of the present things must then be identical with

the totality of the past and with the totality of the future. To make it possible to conceive the world accordingly, every single object must be transformed in our conceptions. Nature is accordingly the world of things conceived in such a way that it can be thought as identical with itself through all time. Nature is the world of things with reference to their identity.

The connection of persons stands under entirely different conditions. With nature everything results from the character of the object; the persons enter into the connection as subjects. The naïve assertion of mere existence demands from the person only that the will which he experienced as an attitude towards one thing must be able to direct itself also to other things. If the idea is to be carried further, we must here also maintain the given will with the demand that it may be found identical in other subjects. Only as far as the old will can be found again in a new will can we find real connection between the persons. The assertion of this connection of the subjects is the science of history. The world of history is the world of the subjects of will under the point of view of identity. The ideal is that every experience of will is conceived in its identity with the will of other subjects. Again only in this identity lies the reality of the historical connection.

The valuations, too, hang together. Historical acts are the acts of individuals which as such are free, and consequently one act of the historical personality does not bind any other act. If they were to bind each other, they would be independent of the free decision of the personality and therefore over-personal. Such over-personal relations we find in the valuations. The relations of identity between these valuations are therefore also independent of the particular beings, and the recurrence of the one valuation in the other again must give an absolutely valuable connection. It is a connection of teleological character. The system of reason is this world of valuations under the aspect of identity. Its ideal is the de-

duction of all logical, æsthetic, ethical, and metaphysical valuations as purposively identical with one fundamental will, the absoluteness of which is not accessible to any doubt.

The judgments in which the results of such connecting labor are communicated are the truths. We have therefore causal, historical, normative truths. They form the real sciences, and presuppose the judgments of existence with reference to the things, persons, and valuations. The scientific value lies accordingly in the transformation of the given in the interest of a system of identities, and that means in the interest of maintaining a self-asserting world. As a matter of course the complete system of nature, history, and reason is an unattainable ideal for the individual, as the manifoldness of things, persons, and valuations is unlimited, and as the experiences into which they may enter as identities lie before us unlimited, too. The connection of the total world, therefore, cannot be reached by any thinking and investigation, but it is constantly presupposed because the postulate of this connection alone makes the world itself possible. Something which is absolutely isolated cannot enter into the world of our knowledge at all. On the other hand, the real science has not at all a vague, unlimited task. There lie before it always new, but always definite concrete problems as the investigation is constantly guided by the real experience. Given motives must induce us to seek the identities just for a concrete section of the postulated world, a section which is determined by our own definite experiences. Every experience which interests us and which does not completely hang together with the given, and which is therefore not completely understood, is like an equation in which the unknown quantity is to be found, but it is experience which must propose the equations. The situation for which we seek the unknown identity must be suggested by our own next purposes and ends.

The transition from the given to the identical and new

realization is indeed the only factor which is common to all scientific inquiries, however often just this essential factor may seem hidden. If we seek the effect of a cause, at first we seem to connect two entirely unlike things. Yet the connection has the value of truth only because through it cause and effect can be conceived as parts of two whole situations of a system of things which is identical with itself. The overpersonal satisfaction in this transition is again based upon the fulfilment of the absolute demand to conceive the given as independent of our experience and as asserting itself and lasting. That which gives these satisfactions is always the connection itself between the two phases of the identical part of the system; it may be the system of nature, or of history, or of reason.

The value of existence had for us absolute character, but that had nothing whatever to do with the question whether the existing thing or person was valuable also in any other direction, perhaps ethically or æsthetically. In the same way the connections of science are valuable in themselves without reference to the further question whether the relation which we find represents, for instance, a progress or a regress. It is not the connected parts that are valuable, but the valuable thing is that the parts are connected, that every isolation is eliminated, that we have before us a world in which everything is determinable by other things, and in which, therefore, order and connection control the system in an absolutely valid way. That is after all the last word concerning all knowledge. These values of connection, painstakingly elaborated and never complete, arise from our desire for identity. And everything which satisfies this desire has not personal but absolute value, because the striving for identity results from the absolutely necessary postulate that our experience stands for a world. The absolute validity of everything which satisfies this, our demand for the self-assertion of the world, is consequently the necessary presupposition for all possible

knowledge of connections in the world of nature, of history, and of reason. Our task now is to illuminate the characteristic traits of these three realms. We have to study the special conditions to understand how in every particular case the given must be transformed to solve the problems of natural science, of historical science, and of normative science. But this we know now: every transformation that serves the purpose of connecting and that means the apprehension of identities is for us scientifically valuable and its affirmation is truth. The world which is transformed in our conceptions in such a way is therefore the only world which from the standpoint of scientific knowledge can be called real. In this sense the given world of experience, as it is given, is nothing but an illusion, and only science grasps the absolute reality of the things, of the persons, and of the values.

A. — NATURE

Nature is for us the totality of the existing things in their connection, in their order, in their self-assertion. Only those things which have real existence enter into nature, not those to which we deny the value of existence because they are object for one single experience only. On the other hand, the things alone enter into nature, not the persons, the subjects of will who take their attitude towards the things. And finally, the things enter into nature only as far as they are connected. Nothing which is isolated can be a part of nature. This alone is that nature the secrets of which the natural sciences try to explore.

When we examined the meaning of the conception of value, we began with the statement that there cannot be any values in the system of nature. It might appear as if we want to withdraw that assertion, inasmuch as we now ask for the value of nature. Yet there is no contradiction. In the system of natural objects as such there can indeed be no value. Every valuation, we asserted, demands the attitude of a sub-

ject, and subjects have no place in nature, where everything is conceived as object for a passive spectator. In nature man is conceived as an organic being, and the processes in such a man are again parts of nature, but not real attitudes. If reality were nothing but the sum of natural objects, there could not be any values at all. But here our question is an entirely different one. We ask here for the values which can be found when the objects of nature are conceived in relation to the judging scientist. Nature is now only a part of a much richer system, a system constituted from nature plus naturalist, and in this wider system values surely can exist. The naturalist takes real attitudes, and we all are such naturalists whenever we observe nature and expect its processes. We the observers and calculators then stand outside of nature. The most immediate value of such objects of the naturalist was that of existence. We now have to study the more complex value which results from the self-assertion of things through all times. It is the value of connection.

The ultimate purpose of natural science has often been distorted. The scientist himself is too easily inclined to think that his real aim is not the exploration of the concrete nature, but the discovery of the general laws which control it and the general conceptions under which we must think it. Philosophers have recently supported this interest in the law by acknowledging two different kinds of knowledge of nature. They claim that it is the task of history to report to us what happened once in the development of the universe, while to overcome this manifoldness of facts by bringing them together under laws and conceptions is indeed to be recognized as the only purpose of natural science. The leading thought, namely, that a separation between natural science and history is necessary, ought to be maintained. We must indeed understand that natural science cannot express the total reality, and can never do justice to the real life. We must maintain that our true personality, with its rights and duties

and morality and truth and beauty, can never be understood from the view of the natural scientist. This philosophical movement which emphasizes the difference between natural science and history was therefore the justified reaction against the immodesty of a triumphing natural science. Too long an unphilosophical age fancied that natural science is the only true way to knowledge. Psychologists and sociologists followed with eagerness. The whole inner life of the individual and of society became object of explanation and description after the naturalistic methods; the duties and ideals of mankind became the necessary effects of psycho-physical causes, and nothing seemed to remain in reality about which physics and psychology did not have to speak the last word. It is not surprising that such short-sightedness demanded a counter-movement.

That does not mean, however, that the only way to overcome the modern naturalism must be the discrimination between a science of general laws and a science of single facts. If we start with the presupposition that every experience must be of the object type, then we must seek the differentiating principles of the different sciences in the method of treatment. Under these conditions it is indeed convenient to say that we treat reality at one time under the point of view of the general occurrences and call it natural science, and at another time under the point of view of the single facts in their uniqueness and call it history. But we have declined from the start such a presupposition; we have seen that our will and the will of others are given to us in an entirely different way from the world of things. The original material of reality is of two kinds. We have from the beginning the material which is of the thing type and the material which is of the will type. If this separation is acknowledged and that of the thing type is recognized as the material of natural science, we at once reserve for another kind of science a large special field; then we have that which is of the will type as material of history.

Thus we do not need any separation by method in order to gain a new field of knowledge besides the natural science, inasmuch as the twoness is given by the contents themselves. History has not to deal with the things at all, but with the will. On the other hand, the natural science of the world of things has to deal with the single facts as well as with the general ones, has to describe the unique development of the totality as well as the general laws which control it.

Indeed, we are too much accustomed to consider the general in the natural sciences as the most important part and the law as the ideal of scientific inquiry. This habit has practical social reasons, not logical significance. The real goal of natural science remains the one unique nature conceived in its connection. Thus the real material is that which is unique, which has happened once, and it is only to be illuminated by the general law. The totality of naturalistic judgments represents nature in its unique givenness. On the other hand, the only world of things to which all our knowledge can be referred must really have all those characteristics which the general conceptions and the laws project into them. The laws and conceptions are artificial abstractions, but if those abstractions are demanded by the purposes of our search for a connected world, that is, if those conceptions and laws are true, they are the expression of the only reality, beside which no other reality can be conceived. If chemistry demands that I conceive a certain substance as a combination of atoms, this substance is really composed of those atoms as far as it is part of the only nature which is object of knowledge. The naturalist is entirely within his rights there. It is wrong to say in opposition that the atoms are nothing but a product of abstraction, and that they do not really belong to nature, as they are only conceived by thought to calculate certain regular occurrences. Yes, such abstract conceptions are projected into nature by thought, but the nature which is reconstructed through thought is the only real nature, the only

nature which can be object of knowledge. The general conception and the law are not the goal of the naturalist, but only his tool. The goal is the recognition of the one process of nature in its connection.

The general conception of the naturalist is as secondary there as the words of language. It has been claimed that Raphael would have become a great painter, even if he had been born without hands. In the same way surely Newton and Lavoisier and Helmholtz would have been great scientists, if they had been born without an organ for general conceptions and for causal laws. The great naturalist has to imagine the process of nature in new connections, has to bring the temporally separated content of nature into such relations that the one can be conceived by the identical continuation of the other. Whether this newly connected pair exists once, or has shown similar connections a million times, makes no decisive difference. The astronomical or the zoölogical or the pathological discovery is completed and may be epoch-making when the connection through identical continuity can be demonstrated in a single case, and it makes no difference that this cosmical event of the astronomer may never again repeat itself in our experience, while the biological may come back sometimes and the clinical very often. Even if the physicist formulates a general theory, he only demands that it shall be demonstrated on the individual case. There is the goal of all theoretical thought. We may go further, and may even claim that the laws themselves mean more than merely a general statement, but that they, too, get their true meaning in silently reporting a piece of concrete reality in its existence as part of our one unique world-experience. Chemical laws concerning the acids or pathological laws concerning sexual propagation would be valueless and entirely meaningless, if they did not intend to describe at the same time that acids and sexual organisms really exist in this one world of our experience.

The usual confusion concerning the true task of the naturalist and the central importance of the general law becomes worse through the conception of causality. What is involved in this idea? The assertion of causality may on the one side posit only the general fact that every process in the world has a cause, but that is evidently not a naturalistic discovery. It is a postulate which precedes all naturalistic thinking. We are to look on nature in such a way that we consider every process with reference to the preceding ones. The general character of this postulate does not say anything as to the general character of the causal connections which we find. The fact of causal connection may hold absolutely without exception, and yet no particular connection may be fit for any generalization in our given world. The assertion of causality may mean, on the other hand, that the same causes bring always the same effects, and that therefore whenever the same conditions are given, the same connections must arise. It seems as if this second postulate secures to every possible naturalistic observation an absolute general character, and that accordingly natural science indeed means the knowledge of the general only and not of the particular.

But if we inquire somewhat more carefully, we find that the situation is very different. The only presupposition which we have made there, namely that the same conditions are given again, is evidently never to be fulfilled with theoretical perfection. Who is to decide where the limits of the conditions lie? The little ball which I let fall to the ground can never again in the world of experience fall down under exactly the same totality of conditions. The conditions in my laboratory room may perhaps be repeated once more, but at first I cannot know whether it is not decisive that the next time the wind outside my room blows somewhat differently or that the moon has changed its place. All the conditions of the process can never return. Even if theoretically all the atoms of the universe arranged themselves once more in exactly the

same position, the series of the preceding conditions would be changed after all, inasmuch as the same world-process had existed once before in the chain of preceding causes. Every assertion that an observed or conceived connection will repeat itself presupposes that the important and decisive conditions are selected from the totality of the real processes before a generalization becomes possible. The general character is then theoretically removed. We observe a certain connection and demand that it always repeat itself, but we can never say with certainty whether the conditions for its repetition are given or not.

Of course, for practical purposes, we may be able to limit the conditions with sufficient probability, and thus may know where we can expect the same effects from a similar situation. Our daily life with its practical use of things is dependent on that scheme, but in such a case it is indeed only a practical generalization of that which we might expect, not a theoretical law without possible exception. The natural sciences certainly do habitually formulate the justified expectations on the basis of frequent observations, and can state in such a way the observed connections with a certain degree of confidence. We contend only that such generalizations give us truths of a special kind, laws which include the absoluteness of the validity, and that such absolute laws constitute the real content of natural sciences. Such absolute laws are impossible because the conditions of the observed processes are always varying. What remain are practically rules for expectations which facilitate our labor, and which theoretically point towards the real single connections. The understanding of these single connections in our given nature is the true task of science. And the only thing which leads towards it is the finding of identities. The mere law can never guarantee such an understanding. As soon as we have acknowledged a causal law as valid and have understood a special case as exactly falling under this law, the particular case is of course understood

by the law, but only in the sense of logical pertinence. A real understanding of the particular case would be given to us only if the general law under which it falls should itself be understood in its concrete connection. Yet just that is not in question at all, for those laws are nothing but generalizations of observed sequences of processes.

For some people, to be sure, the conception of causality has a kind of mystical power to bring together the separated facts in such a way that the connection itself becomes understood. Some think of the immediate effect which our will has on the organs of our body, others are satisfied with the idea that the causality is a thought-form of our understanding, without which we cannot apperceive at all the succeeding things, and which is therefore fundamental for every possible experience. But such theories are based on illusions. The will conceived as an object is in its effects exactly as little understood as any other content of nature. On the other hand, if the will is meant in its subjective reality, its internal influence can be felt and understood, but has nothing to do with the causal connection of things, and accordingly can never be a model for the explanation of nature. Even the reference to causality as thought-form of our understanding cannot help us at all. If such a form were to be more than a mere apperception of time succession, the form itself would have to choose which effect belongs with which cause. Just that, however, is possible to our understanding only in one single case, namely, in the case when the second experience can be conceived as identical conservation of the first. The imagined thought-form of causality must therefore be reduced to the real thought-form of identity.

Now we stand before our goal. Causal laws which are merely generalizations of observed regularities have not the power to give an understanding of nature, and are in no way end-points of natural science. They have their scientific importance exclusively as preparation for the only real know-

ledge of nature, namely, the recognition of identities. Causal laws are for the scientist what the rules of application are for the layman, helpful formulations which quickly and simply point to the essential factors. The real purpose is the apprehension of the world of things as self-asserting, as identical. In the chaotic change of experiences we have to connect the given with the identical in the new experience. The nearer the so-called law approaches the holding of the identical, the nearer it will approach the character of absoluteness. Where mathematical physics formulates laws which are no longer generalizations of observations at all, but simply expressions of identities, there the causal laws become real means of explanation.

The ideal of natural science is not a system of laws but a system of things, the self-assertion of which throughout time brings with it all the perceivable changes in the outer world. Every given status of the world can then be completely explained, but is really explained only if all its differences from the preceding status of the world can be understood through the perseverance of all parts of the world. Everything which brings us nearer to this ideal is scientifically true. To reach this ideal it is of course necessary to substitute for the perceived things others which are serviceable for the task. If these substituted parts fulfil their purpose, they have scientific reality. The original perception in that case has not shown us the scientifically real things, and in the place of the mere appearance we find the true object, which is perhaps accessible only to conceptions.

We easily see in what direction this remodelling must move, a remodelling which from another point of view is the discovery of the naturalistic reality. We recognized the value of existence of things in the fact that the experienced object can be conceived as object for every possible subject, and we therefore demanded that the existing thing must be detached from the chance standpoint of the individual. This

intellectual movement must be carried through to its ultimate point by the natural sciences, if the world is to be conceived as identical with itself through every possible experience. Everything must be removed which belongs to the space-time perspective of the chance personality, and everything must be eliminated which presupposes a relation of the thing to the individual organism and its senses; that ultimately means nothing else but that all sense-features, all qualities, must be excluded. Therefore the things have only the quantitative relations of space, time, and masses. In this quantitative determination the ideal is reached of absolutely detaching the thing from the individual. It is thought entirely in over-individual terms, as those quantities belong to a system the relations of which can never be perceivable to an individual; it is an abstract construction made with reference to all the other subjects. The objective space-time form is the absolutely over-personal field of relations for the things in nature. As soon as things are expressed in measurable terms in counting units of space, of time, and, deduced from them, of mass, they are absolutely free from that individual determination in which they stand in experience. Without any change, therefore, they can again enter into the calculation, as they can now remain identical with themselves through a limitless past and future. The history of science is indeed an unending endeavor to eliminate all qualitative features from nature and to replace them by quantities, until every luminous, sounding, warming, and odorous thing is transformed into the movements of smallest particles which can be determined only conceptionally.

The efforts of description and explanation coöperate towards this end. The description gives us the elements of the thing, the explanation connects the thing with preceding and following things. But the only connection which we seek by principle is that of identity. Hence if we want to explain, we must conceive the primary things in such a way that their

elements can enter identically into the final positions. The elements which in this way are put at the service of explanation in the place of the things are thus elements which the description enumerates. If we describe water by saying that it consists of hydrogen and oxygen, we mean by it that under certain conditions water produces effects which can be understood only if we think those two elements put in the place of the whole. Then alone we can understand the facts as the perseverance of those substances which existed at the beginning. All progress in the explanation of the world is therefore at the same time a progress in the description, and vice versa. It is an illusion to believe that there can exist descriptions which are independent from the seeking of explanation, and that means from the understanding of the identities.

Accordingly natural science tries to replace the thing by those elements which persevere in the succeeding experiences, and to think these elements themselves ultimately as objects with qualities determinable strictly by over-individual relations. Nevertheless, there still remain insuperable difficulties when we try to understand the natural process by mere identical perseverance of the smallest particles and their movements. Science therefore goes still further and tries to introduce the deviations from this conservation of movement into the calculation. They are brought back to conditions which can be conceived as identically persevering. For this purpose natural science introduces the conception of force, a quality which belongs to the thing only with reference to other things, and which accelerates or retards its movements. As by such forces everything can stand in relation to an unlimited number of other things, it becomes possible to deduce every movement or every rest from the interplay of the forces, and yet to conceive all the old forces as identically remaining in every change. The ideal task of science is hereby characterized. It would be perfectly fulfilled, if the totality of the processes of nature from the given

present status of the world backward and forward could be followed up and yet always conceived as an identical system of things which persevered with their substances and their energies. It would be a fulfilment of the ideal task of natural sciences, and yet all that would not contain any reference to laws.

The solution of this task is practically, of course, impossible. The endless manifoldness of things makes it inconceivable that the scientist can pursue every ether atom of the universe in its identity through all the cosmical periods in its curve. Probably all that science can do to come as near as possible to the solution is to create tools by which with the least effort every particular situation can be subordinated to the point of view of identity. Ways and means must be secured by which a given group of things can quickly and simply be re-thought in such a way that they may be conceived as identical with the preceding and succeeding experiences. Rules for the abstract remodelling must be developed in which the whole previous observations of science are condensed in order that every one may profit from the historical knowledge. Here belong, first of all, the classifications and general conceptions based on the similarities and differences, here belong the descriptions of the elements, and here also belong the causal laws.

The laws themselves usually do not express any identity, but they connect two processes which are of decisive importance for the identity of two total situations. The causal law selects from two groups of succeeding processes the cause and the effect. That does not indicate that the relation of this effect with that cause becomes intelligible. It means rather that the whole group in which the cause occurs can be transformed by identities into that other group in which the effect occurs. The emphasis on cause and effect is therefore not in itself an explanation of a connection, but only a practical indication of two total situations, of which the one includes

the cause and the other includes the effect. The identity connects the total situations. Just as in the economic life the money in itself is without value for us and has significance only as the means of exchange for market values, the naturalistic law has in itself no connecting value. It is only a convenient means of exchange between different succeeding situations, which find their real connection not by cause and effects, but by the identities. But as by a shifting of values the money finally appears valuable and to the miser seems a most glorious possession, in spite of the fact that he cannot satisfy by it any one of his true needs, to the naturalist, too, the causal law itself appears valuable in spite of the fact that it does not satisfy any real need of explanation. The law always turns our attention to that which belongs together, and without class conceptions and causal laws we should stand hopeless before the overwhelming abundance of things. Yet all causal laws of the world in themselves offer not the least real explanation of a necessary connection. On the other hand, as soon as two processes are connected in such a way that the second is understood from the identical continuation of the first, everything is completely understood without any laws whatever. All the really great advances of natural science have consisted in a new vision of perseverance. Each such new insight into the identities has then demanded a remodelling of the elements of the things.

However far or near we may be to the ideal of such naturalistic knowledge, everywhere an absolutely valid value is reached where science succeeds in apprehending the changes in the universe by the maintenance of the given. It cannot be otherwise if the realization of a content in a new experience is really the only possible source of pure satisfaction. The experienced objects seem to disappear and to be replaced by new ones. In our life the things pass by, appear from nothing, disappear into nothing. Natural science opens our eyes and shows us that if we only look into the depths

of nature, the things which seem to disappear really remain unchanged, and the things which seem to originate from nothing really always existed beforehand. The candle burns down, and yet the chemist shows us that no atom of it is lost. That which we sought, the self-assertion of the first thing, has then been found in the form of the second. Our will is satisfied; complete satisfaction comes to us. But the value does not then belong to the first thing or to the second, but exclusively to the fact that the first can be refound in the second, and that accordingly a real connection exists between the two.

We still have before us one theoretically important question. If it is the task of all natural science to transform the world of processes into identities, then where is the place of psychology? It is a science which analyzes its objects, the psychical contents, into elements, describes them, classifies them, arranges them, and finally explains them, in its method proceeding decidedly like the natural sciences. The presuppositions and rights of psychology as science offer very difficult problems, which have recently come into the foreground of theoretical discussion; they had been too long neglected. As we have the objects of psychology in our inner immediately accessible experience, it seemed too long permissible to consider the psychological work as an activity which needs no presuppositions. Only slowly we had to learn that the study of a psychological fact already involves a complex transformation of the real experience and is full of presuppositions. For our special circle of problems one of these questions is of a special significance. The natural sciences explain the connections by the identities. How is it possible that psychical connections can be made explainable, inasmuch as the psychical as such can never return identical in a second experience? Here indeed lies the nodal point of the difficulties. We have seen that in our real experience the objects have value of real existence only in so far as they are

common property, and that is what we call the physical objects. In so far as they belong to the individual only, for instance, the objects of imagination have no real existence. The psychical object is nothing but that which remains as residue as soon as the whole reality is subtracted from the totality of the experience. Thus the psychical object can never be common object of various experiences and can never recur identical. My perception, my memory idea, my imaginative idea, my expectation, are my individual property; others may agree with me, but then they have only corresponding ideas, they cannot have my ideas themselves. We all have the same physical moon, but each of us has his own psychical perception of the moon. And even if I returned to the object of my previous idea, I must create a new idea. The previous idea has gone never to return. An immediate connection by identity is thus by principle impossible for the psychical contents.

How, then, is psychology possible at all? How can it have meaning to ask for the connection of objects which in an absolute sense have no reality? Those psychical objects are given only in their relation to the will of the subject; they have no place in a naturalistic system. They would belong only to a historical account where the subject has its reality just as subject, and where the psychical objects represent material to which the will of the subject refers. But it is different as soon as the true subject of will is replaced by the perceivable bodily individual. As soon as the other man is for us an organism, his individual contents must somehow be in his body, and as accompaniments of such bodily processes the psychical objects get their own relative existence in the real physical world. The imaginative ideas of my friend, his air castles, have as objects of his personal attitude their reality only in that will-world of which history speaks, but not natural science. As objects of perception they cannot claim any value of existence, as they are only imaginative

objects and thus not perceivable for any one else. But as soon as I consider my friend in his bodily existence, his individual objects must somehow be contained in him. The psychologist carries this introjection through in a systematic way. The subject of will, the real personality, is replaced by the individual organism, and this is done just under the pressure of the demand to produce a connection between those individual psychical objects. As soon as such introjection into the body is brought about, there remains no difficulty when we try to reduce the psychical series also to necessary connections which are ultimately based on identities. We cannot do it directly, but can at least indirectly succeed. If the ideas are in definite dependence upon certain bodily processes in the brain, the necessary connection of two brain states at the same time becomes the necessary connection of the accompanying conscious contents. Through this method modern psychology with its psycho-physical parallelism has become a true causal science.

But whether we explain psychical or physical stars or dreams, the purpose is always to grasp the existing things in our one universe as persevering, as absolutely self-asserting. That involves that science must transform everything into one single connected system. But as it anticipates its ideal goal as the reality which ought to be discovered, science treats its work as if it were merely the exploration of an existing system. The naturalist who feels the obligation of deciding nothing by his own caprice, and who modestly submits to nature and its eternal laws, may possibly ask how it would be, if our postulate of perseverance could not be realized. Could it not be that nature act quite differently, that the things arise and disappear, and that a connection by self-assertion really would not offer itself? Have we naturalists not to subordinate ourselves to it, then, and is not natural science endlessly far from such a postulated goal? Whoever argues in such a way still overlooks the essential point. We as search-

ing individuals have to submit ourselves, but that to which we submit is our own over-individual deed. The demand of perseverance is of that kind. It does not originate from your wishes or from mine, but from a fundamental deed without which a reality would not be possible at all. Such a will is indeed stronger than the universe, and the universe must submit to it, and the possibility of its complete fulfilment must be presupposed as the ideal goal. It is of no fundamental importance that the actual science which is composed of the thought-work of individual scientists is still endlessly far from its goal. The only decisive factor is that we count as progress in science, as discovery, as new knowledge, only that which brings us nearer to this goal. The experienced manifoldness does not take any regard of our demands. Certainly not. In our real experience the things continually disappear into nothing and continually arise from nothing, but that is not the nature which we try to explore in our scientific knowledge.

That nature which has value of existence and connection must be sought, and in seeking must be created, and this seeking goes on everywhere where man tries to gain connection and explanation even in the most modest sense. The soul of the child and of the savage seeks it tentatively. But if science succeeds in remodelling the world of experienced things in such a way that they can be detached from all individual experience, and that they can be maintained without change as atoms and energies without qualities through new experiences, then nature no longer can disappoint the investigator. Only that which results from the perseverance of such absolutely existing over-personal objects then belongs to the real nature. On the other hand, if it were impossible to transform the experienced things into such persevering ones, nature would not disappoint us, but we should have no nature at all. The world would be a dream and a personal experience of ourselves in which no other subject would take part. It would thus be meaningless and without value in the changing

coming and going to ask about a valuable connection of the world.

B. — HISTORY

If nature is the connection of things, history is the connection of persons. The problems which offer themselves are fundamentally the same here and there, controlled by the conception of connection. Yet every question must demand new forms and new solutions on account of the difference of the material. The world of history will have to interest us in many ways, as it is a world in which value is joining value. Especially the value which the development and the progress of historical mankind offers will bring us back to history and its meaning. Here, exactly as in the system of nature, we have to deal only with the one value which makes history the material of knowledge, the value of the connection between the individual beings. History, too, becomes history only by a logical transformation; to secure a connection subjects must be remodelled in many ways. But here, too, the system which is finally reached has to be considered as the true reality, and all the means of presentation and communication of this system then appear only as external tools. It is valuable that no subject of will stands alone, that every personality works in a connection, and that each volition thus perseveres in the changing events of history. This self-asserting continuity of the will is the true object of the logical valuation in the science of history. To find this identity of will means to discover the historical truth which we value. We saw how in the field of natural science, in the midst of the research, the necessary means appeared to the student often more valuable than the solution of the true problem. The general conception and laws seemed more important than the perseverance of the objects. In a similar way, in the historical investigation, too, the means attract the attention more than the ultimate aims for which they

exist, and the demand for identity of will may thus be subdued in the consciousness of the individual historian. And yet that which brings us nearer to this fundamental aim is alone historically true. To discover connections means to elaborate identities of will, and our fundamental satisfaction in the seeking of the identities creates the value of the historical process.

That sounds quite different from the usual account. However much the views about the meaning of history may vary, they usually agree in the one thought that the material of history belongs to the same world of causally connected things of which the natural sciences speak. We even sometimes hear that the historian, if he wants to proceed scientifically, has to accept the methods of the natural scientist, and that his particular task is characterized only by the particular object. He has to select from all the possible parts of nature only the human societies; his task is the microscopical and macroscopical description and explanation of this society process with its political and economic and intellectual products. If such a science is logically different from physics, and if its laws are less general, it is claimed that that results merely from the particularity of the material.

We must disagree there completely. We are not afraid that the causally thinking science of natural objects would necessarily be unable to proceed from the chemical structures to the political ones. Whatever fills space and time in the universe must be fit to be ranged into the causal connections of nature; otherwise the presuppositions of natural science would be given up. If we consider a nation as the sum of psycho-physical organisms, nothing can arise in its midst for which the postulate of complete natural explanation would not remain applicable without exception. No hero and no poet can live his life there for whom every deed and every word does not necessarily result from the foregoing causes, and it makes no difference that by the unlimited man-

ifoldness of conditions the effect can never be predicted with practical certainty. The wave in the midst of the ocean also cannot be calculated, and yet we do not doubt that it is a necessary product of the preceding conditions. We could not take any step in human society without peril, if we could not rely on a fair and practically satisfactory foresight of the actions of others. There is also no objection in the fact that the sociological naturalist usually calculates with the whole human being as a unit. That does not contradict the spirit of the natural sciences at all. In the same way the biologist uses the cell, the astronomer the whole globe as a unit, and yet they remain loyal to their naturalistic presuppositions and purposes. It also has no fundamental importance that the sociological science is still endlessly far from its goal, and thus perhaps still unable to start any psycho-physical calculation for the historical events. It may be easier to calculate the next solar eclipse than the next important novel, but in so far as the world is a causal system of objects, the brain excitement which discharges itself in the writing of a novel must by principle be accessible to naturalistic science. The absolute value of connection in nature would be destroyed, if at any place and at any time something should go on in the world of objects without a cause, and unless every growth and every apparently creative innovation could be conceived as the identity of the elements of nature. And yet any one whose mind is schooled by the masterpieces of great historians will abhor the thought of considering such astronomical causal calculation and deduction of human events as the true task of history.

The fundamental mistake lies in the presupposition that all knowledge has to deal with objects. The most essential part of our pure experience is eliminated if we are to acknowledge only things and not subjects which we meet, by the suggestions of their attitudes. When we spoke of the existence of subjects, we fully discussed this fundamental differ-

ence. We now have to make use of it. Even if such a selection among the causal objects could offer us everything which historical science needed, we would yet have to demand most seriously that there must still exist some other kind of knowledge which deals with ourselves and with all other men really as subjects in our will-reality, and which teaches us to understand our will-relations. But the truth is, that this alone is the most productive way to make historical science possible at all. Only under this aspect the historical valuations of man come to their true meaning and man in his responsible and purposive character enters into history.

The subjects of will affect us in unlimited manifoldness. We have seen that their suggestions are not only our experiences, but that they have as subjects a real existence. But if the manifoldness of those fellow-beings is really to mean to us a world, then this ideal of their self-assertion and independence must be carried further, just as it was with the things in the world of nature. The subjects must not only have their real existence, but their attitude must persevere in the will of others. It must remain identical with other attitudes in the true realm of beings, and so must make it possible to create the only true connection between subjects. Only as far as we have such identity of will, we have connection between beings, and only as far as we can shape connections of beings, we have history. The isolated existence of beings never makes history, just as the isolated existence of things never makes nature. The task of the historian is to understand the subjects in such a way that a closer connection of all beings by identity of will becomes possible. Whatever serves this task has historical truth. Let us recognize first that no other real connection between subjects of will can exist at all. Every application of causality which connects the things of the outer world including the psycho-physical human beings is excluded for the subjects in their attitude character. Neither the subjects with the things nor the

subjects themselves can be yoked together by natural causality. If natural science had reached its ideal goal and had explained causally all processes in the world, including the contents of consciousness as functions of the organism, nevertheless no subjective attitude of will as such would have been touched by it. The impracticability of the conception of causality for the subjects may be recognized even from the fundamental fact that the reality of history does not lie in that time in which the processes of nature go on.

At first that sounds strange. The tables of historical dates are the familiar background of all historical reports for us. Yet no easy-going concession must distort the boundary lines here. We saw that the conception of the objective time to which all physical measurements are referred has been developed from two different qualities of our experience. On the one hand, the things have temporal qualities of form; for instance, different rhythm or different duration. On the other hand, they lie for ourselves, for our will, in different directions; they are past or present or future. Both are traits of the immediate life-experience. We aim towards the connection of the things for the purpose of eliminating every personal aspect. We construct, therefore, a continuous time, in which every possible point can be taken as a present with reference to which there is a past and a future. All temporal forms of the experienced world can now be represented objectively by reference to this one over-individual time. But there can never be an opening by which the will itself can find entrance into the objective time. The will posits the time, but it does not itself fill it. From the start, the attitude of the will towards the things gives to them the personal value of past, present, and future, and in the objective time this relation is detached from the individual and is elaborated into a system which is carried by the will-attitudes of all thinkable personalities; but the attitude itself always remains outside of time. Every fellow-being who can

be apperceived in life as a subject and not as a thing is for us atemporal, and in such atemporal reality we experience also our own will.

That is in no way in contradiction to the other fact that everybody can yet be put into the temporal frame. Every attitude refers to objects. The material of the will is given with the will, and it must be described in order to understand the will. If the attitude of the will determines the temporal character of the objects, it seems natural and is without objection for the ordinary usage, if we conceive the will itself as simultaneous with the present objects. Hence the will is later than the past objects. Accordingly the will is simultaneous with the sense-impressions of the body, and therefore lasting from the birth to the death of the organism. It is the same process of thought by which we give to the will also its place in space somewhere in the brain. On this general foundation the naturalistic psychology has to work, and it is not only the right but also the duty of psychology to take this standpoint, and to consider every mental experience as a phenomenon in time; the psychologist may measure it in his laboratory in thousandths of a second. But history has not the right to do the same, if the subjects are really to be maintained in their subjectivity. The historian must resist there at the very beginning, and must even refuse as logical transgressions the popular projection of the real will into physical time.

If we speak of Napoleon, it is justifiable to refer his will to certain gyri of his brain. It seems a matter of course that Napoleon's will was enclosed in his skull, as it evidently was nowhere else in space; and yet we feel clearly that it is absurd even to ask whether his will in the brain was three centimeters long, or longer or shorter, or whether it had a triangular form or any other space form. It is as absurd as if we were to ask whether his will was green or red. We feel immediately that all such questions can refer only to objects, and that the will of Napoleon, if we want to understand it in its historical

meaning, the will which conquered Europe, does not come to us as an object. But if that is so, it has no more meaning to ask how many units of time his will was long. His wars lasted for years, his bodily movements lasted for seconds, but his attitudes had no part in the physical time. The act is completely grasped when it is understood in the meaning of its attitude. If Napoleon's will is completely understood in its meaning, there remains nothing to be understood by other inquiries, and no question about its color, its odor, its space-form, or its temporal duration would refer to its reality. Its particular relation to the world is determined by the particular selection of spatial temporal objects to which it takes attitudes. Their particular perspective in space and time gives to that special will a unique relation to the space-time world, but the attitude itself works outside of the space-time system. History deals with realities which stand in numberless relations to the temporal things, but which themselves are neither things nor temporal.

All this involves that the historical realities cannot also be members of a causal chain. The cause must precede the effect. We recognized that the last goal of explanation demands that every causal connection shall ultimately be reduced to temporal perseverance. That which is outside of time therefore cannot enter into causality, and the causal connections of the things to which the will of the beings refers are thus cleanly separated from the historical connections of the beings themselves. One person may influence another, but all persuading and convincing and stimulating signifies a relation from will to will which is psychologized as soon as it is interpreted in a causal way. In the life of experience the influencing will is not cause, but is a part of the new will into which it enters, and incomparable with any relation of things. In ourselves, too, one attitude does not hang together with another attitude by causal connection. Perhaps we feel ourselves bound in one will-act by our own resolution, but in the

life of experience such binding never means that we feel the one act as preceding cause of the other. The resolution itself is still living and enters into the new will-action. In the same way, the motive is for the experiencing will not cause, but a goal towards which the will is directed.

From here only we can see in what sense the willing being who enters into history is a free being. We often hear that the historian and accordingly the practical life has to do with free personalities. What does it mean? Some fancy that man is a part of causal nature and usually determined by causes, but that from time to time, perhaps when an important decision is to be made, he can throw a few causes overboard and annihilate their effect. Such thoughtlessness does not deserve consideration. As soon as the concession is made that a single atom of nature can be diverted from its path without causes, the possibility of nature is sacrificed by principle. More careful thinkers would say that every human will is indeed causally determined, but the determining conditions are so complex that a real predetermination cannot be in question. In this vagueness and inaccessibility, then, lies the freedom. Still others argue that even such indeterminability usually does not exist, inasmuch as we can foresee the actions of most people more easily than rain and sunshine. They add that nevertheless the action which is causally determined has to be accepted as free when the causal motives lie in the man himself and are not forced on him from without. And finally we have the more correct argument that after all the motives of the insane, or of the intoxicated, or of the hypnotized also lie in the man himself, and yet that we deny freedom to his actions. This freedom exists only when the causal process goes on in an undisturbed psycho-physical mechanism in which all previous excitements and trainings coöperate in a normal way. The psychological naturalistic problem of freedom is indeed sufficiently answered in such a way. The causal chain is nowhere disrupted, and neverthe-

less a clean and useful separation between free and not free action is carried through. The demands of the psychologist are in this way satisfied.

Yet, when the true historian speaks of free beings, if he understands himself, and if he has the power to remain independent of naturalistic patterns, he means something fundamentally different. He does not ask at all whether the causes for the attitude of the will were surveyable in the particular case and whether the effect was thus determinable beforehand. Nor does he ask whether the deciding causes were lying in the acting man himself and whether they worked in normal conjunction. He has no reason to ask anything of this, because the will and the deed did not point backward to any causes, and every possible question is met by reference only to the meaning, to the significance, to the purpose, and to the inner relations of the will. As soon as the question of causes arises, the historical interest has already been replaced by the extra-historical one, by the naturalistic psychological one. To be free in the sense of history means to belong to a sphere in which there exist no causes, because the question of causes of the will would be meaningless there. The insane man, whose deed the fellow-man cannot understand, just because his will does not come to him as a meaning, suggests the causal naturalistic interest. But for that reason the insane man cannot be subject of history. His mental life becomes an object. Of course such an object may be important for history by the will of others who take attitude towards it, but the paranoiac himself does not make history.

In this realm of true freedom, the historian now seeks the connections of the real subjects and the system of connected wills which he finally affirms is the world of history. In what sense are such connections between two subjects possible at all? Two friends stand in conversation. From personal successes and failures, experiences and hopes, they turn to an exciting political discussion. In every pulse-beat of their

talk each of the two is vividly touched by the real personal existence of the other, and with full devotion he takes part in the pleasure and displeasure of the neighbor. Sometimes one agrees with the other, sometimes there is contradiction; now he gives a piece of advice, now he expresses a doubt. Those two men have not for an instant considered each other as objects. Neither of them was conscious that a series of persevering contents of consciousness was proceeding in the brain of the other. Their inner participation did not know anything of the thing-like content of man, and reached out immediately to the will-like human being. The understanding and doubting, the questioning and answering, the admiring and despising, the loving and hating, the sympathizing and envying, each point in real life-experience directly from subject to subject. Of course there exists no relation which might not be explained in psychology, but those two friends who quarrel about politics do not take the psychologist's standpoint, and nevertheless they know each other completely. They know each other without a remainder. Everything which comes in question in their discussion at all has reality. No psychologist could teach either of them anything about the other man which could possibly deepen their mutual understanding. The psychologist who would observe those two would take a merely perceiving attitude, and he would dissolve the psychical contents which he associates with the perceivable organisms into sensations, that is, into psychical elements, objects of awareness. Each of those two friends during the talk also resolves the internal life of the other. The pleasure, the anger, the joy, resolve themselves into a mass of partial feelings; the suggestions, the deeds, the decisions, become disentangled into numberless partial will-acts; but every part has again that subjective character which must be interpreted, and which the objectifying psychologist cannot know at all. Only the willing subject thus knows friends and foes, leaders and imitators, comrades and opponents.

Thus there is a possible relation between willing beings which has nothing to do with the causal connection of things. Of course that alone does not prove that the connection which the historian seeks can be really understood. We find there the same situation which existed in the case of the natural sciences. The naturalist finds a mass of relations of objective things which he does not doubt because they appear with great regularity. Yet such electrical or thermal or optical laws of things were not understood, and therefore offered no real explanation until they could be transformed into relations of identities. In the same way the historian is sure that in amity and enmity, in sympathy and opposition, in agreement and disagreement, a real connection exists, as it is acknowledged as such in immediate life. Yet a real understanding of such relations is not reached thereby. The satisfaction of ultimate understanding, and therefore an absolutely valid value of connection, can here, too, be gained only under the one condition which brings rest to all striving: the re-finding of the identical in the new experience. Just as the manifoldness of the causal laws must be reduced to the perseverance of the identical things, the manifoldness of will-relations must be brought down to a perseverance of will, if absolutely valid connections are to become possible for the historical sciences. Only this absolutely valuable connection by identity is then the real history, just as the mechanical connection is the real nature. Certainly that in no way excludes the possibility that the historian, for his presentation, may make use of the ordinary relations of practical life, just as the naturalist speaks of plants and animals without ever replacing them by an enumeration of their ultimate atomistic elements. Yet in a last theory we must understand that those practical relations must be accessible to a transformation into identities if the connections of history are to be acknowledged as objectively valuable for thought, and that means as true.

The postulate for the identities of volitions leaves it un-

certain whether they can be found. If the demand could not be fulfilled, we should have isolated subjects, but no historical connections. But immediate life-experience shows the way clearly, and no artificial force is needed to interpret the historical facts by such identities. When I agree with my friend in his affirmation or negation, or when I sympathize with his inclination, or when I feel with his suffering or his hopes, in short, whenever I understand him, his will must have really become my will. To the naturalist who cannot emancipate himself from the thing-view, this sounds like mysticism. If the will of one being becomes the will of another, it appears to him as if, by a telepathic mystery, the will which is enclosed within one organism slips out from it to slip in at another place at another time. But we know now that the other will is not at another place and not at another time, because as will it is outside of space and of time, and no wall is broken down when the will becomes also the will of the other. In every act of understanding just that is fulfilled. The other will, however, does not simply become my own will. That would mean that I myself would become another person. I remain certain of myself when I understand the other. His will remains for me the will of another, and yet it enters into my own will-activity. His will does not lose anything by becoming my will, and my will does not lose its selfhood when it receives the other.

Every metaphor which is borrowed from naturalistic science falsifies the unique reality of understanding. Everybody who reads and understands Plato wills when he understands the single sentence just what Plato wills, and Plato's will thus enters identically into his will. Every Platonic will-act of affirmation lives undivided in its totality, identical in the millions of his willing readers. This act of understanding forms the fundamental relation of all personal connection. Whether I pity the crying child or admire the national hero, whether I follow the thinker and poet or despise the crimi-

nal, my connection with any being is dependent upon my understanding of his will, and that demands that his will enter identical into mine. The relation may be complex. If I feel ashamed of another, I understand his will, which again itself includes an understanding of mine. Above all, this identity is not lost when my own will is opposed to the will of the other. If I deny what the other affirms on the basis of my knowledge of his wrong judgment, his affirmation is completely contained in my denial. If I am malicious, his pain becomes my joy; if I am envious, his joy becomes my pain.

The task is to reduce the historical connection to such identities. For that purpose the willing man must be resolved into his partial volitions, and this resolution is not less unlimited than the analysis of physical things into molecules. The historically significant will of the individual divides itself at once, perhaps, into his political, logical, economic, social, scientific, artistic, religious, and moral volitions; and each one can be further resolved into similar will-particles. Every single group of volitions, then, leads to particular identities. Whoever says that he is scientifically a Darwinist, artistically a Wagnerian, economically a Marxist, and religiously a Calvinist simplifies the identification by pointing to historical personalities with whom he coalesces in taking their will into his will. But whoever says impersonally that he is politically a conservative, artistically a symbolist, philosophically an idealist, and economically a socialist points simply to undefined groups of subjects whose will he accepts. The relation of historical identity is no less included in such cases. Even to be citizen of a town, member of a group, friend of a reform, opponent of a fashion, means historically to receive certain volitions which can be found in certain subjects identically in the own will.

In such a transformation, we must not forget that even every new creation is only an original deviation, which as

deviation is at first partial imitation. Something absolutely new cannot exist in the historical world any more than there can be anything absolutely disconnected in the physical world. Whoever wills something new wills something old, only he wills it differently. He who overcomes an existing scientific doctrine, or opens new political vistas, or deepens the religious consciousness, or destroys social prejudices, or gives to liberty new rights or to beauty new forms, every time affirms the suggestions which he received from a thousand sides, and the new factor is small compared with that which was maintained from the tradition. The new scientific doctrine, the new law, the new art, stand endlessly nearer to the preceding form of civilization than to the ideas, the laws, the art, of uncivilized tribes. The essentials are taken over and included in the new deed, and the historical analysis may even discover the new tone in the whole chord as identical echo of a sound from other sides. The new unity may be really new, but the contents resulted from manifold suggestions in identical co-experience. The ideal goal of historical inquiry accordingly is an apperception through which every life-deed is transformed from its isolation into a relation of identity to other volitions. Everybody then includes the acts which he understands and which have influence on his will, and he himself enters by his will into those acts which he influences.

Of course the new will-acts contain more than mere identities. Even in the simple case of mere understanding, the fellow-will is entirely received and yet the own will is independently maintained. Otherwise it would be not an understanding, but a mere repetition. In every personal act, therefore, lies the identity which constitutes the connection and something new which must be acknowledged as the expression of the personality. To ask where this new comes from would at once drag the subjective again into the causal world of objects. The question of the causes has no meaning

here. The free existence of this new self in its actuality is the ultimate fact from which the historical interest starts. Just as it has no meaning in natural science to try to explain why the ultimate ether atoms exist at all in the universe, in historical science it has no meaning to ask why those new acts exist. We only know that if there were nothing but this new, nothing which could be refund identical, we should not have historical connection at all.

The material is so endlessly complex that here, too, the practical science must introduce abbreviations and artificial perspectives, to allow a view of the whole field. As in the natural sciences the manifoldness of things demanded the elaboration of general laws, the historian has to prepare the understanding of the whole field by the elaboration of controlling will-relations. He separates the important and the unimportant, and accentuates as important those personal acts which live on identically in a wide circle. As there exist graded series of special and more general laws for the things, there are also numberless steps between the influence of the average man whose will is included only in the will of his neighbors and the will of the religious leader, or the artistic genius, or the hero whose will tunes the will of millions and enters in pure identity into the minds of whole nations. As nothing is entirely disconnected, nothing is absolutely unimportant there, but only by this emphasizing of the important and decisive does the system of identities become an organized whole in which the fate of peoples in their leading spirits and in their quiet masses can be understood.

In this historical world the objective things have not evaporated, but they come in question only in their original reality, namely, as means and ends of will. If two children quarrel about a cake, the cake is not the chemical substance which the chemist knows, but the sweet object of desire. And if two nations quarrel about Manchuria, it is not that part of the globe which the geographer describes, but is a

means of economic and political expansion. The causal connection of things does not enter into the historical world as a physical process, but as an object of human interest, of human knowledge, of human calculation. And if nature, perhaps by an earthquake and flood, destroys civilization, it is always only the historical will which the historian reports. The flood is that which is feared or which inhibits activity, but it is not a natural process as such. Of course the presentation of the historian may often make use of the conceptional system of the naturalist, if he wants to describe the means and ends of the willing man, but such a naturalistic thing is after all raised to the sphere of history only as soon as it is interpreted in its relation to the will. The boat which carries Cæsar may be described from the standpoint of the technician, but its historical significance lies only in its ability to satisfy his will to master the waves.

A conflict between natural science and history is never possible, as both move in different dimensions. A naturalistic reply can never be the reply on a really historical question. The assertion of identities of things can never satisfy the demand for the identities of volitions. On the surface it might appear as if the one science gives reality to that to which the other science denies it. Of course that in itself could not be settled by any special science, as it is not the task of science to remove the possible contradictions between the different aspects of life. That belongs to the ultimate inquiries of religion and philosophy. It is the same situation as in the other fields of values. If something is perhaps morally admirable but æsthetically ugly, or beautiful but morally despicable, æsthetics and ethics themselves cannot settle the controversy. On the other hand, if history and natural science were really to weigh their comparative right for acknowledgment, it could not be denied that they do not stand entirely coördinated. Each of the two seeks knowledge; each refers the facts to absolute values of existence and

connection, and one absolute value cannot be less valuable than another. Yet the one may stand in a certain dependence upon the other. On the surface it appears as if there is no difference. The naturalist may say: It is a physical universe which produces the historical man and also produces the historian who grasps the historical connection. The historian on his side may say: It is the historical interplay of willing beings, which includes the soul of the physicist, by which the world of objects is transformed into a natural connection. But we know now, since we understand the meaning of history, that the relations are not quite so simple. The historian's claim is correct. The connections of the system of nature indeed presuppose the willing man, and even the existence of the natural things is dependent upon their being given to every possible historical subject. But we no longer have any right to say in the same sense that the reality of the subjects depends upon the existence of the physical natural objects. We know now that the objects with reference to which the historical man lives his life and to which all his attitudes are related are not at all those neutral objects of which the natural scientists are speaking. They are rather objects of will, means and tools of striving. These objects of will do not enter as such into the system of nature, but remain in the frame of history. Only when the willing man decides to detach the things from his will and to consider them as merely perceivable objects, then those things begin to exist as parts of the system of nature. The existence of the things in nature remains nevertheless absolutely valuable, and hence is absolutely true because every possible historical man must accept them and must think them in such a way, if he seeks an independent world at all. Thus there is no idea of an arbitrary character of the naturalistic aspect. The naturalistic view of the world is indispensable for the tasks of the historical man; it is not simply a kind of construction which he invents like a game. He can-

not fulfil his life, if he does not reach the truth of natural science, and the system of nature-thought in the consistent spirit of natural science is the only possible world of objects which can have truth. And yet the fact remains that this system of nature really presupposes the willing being, while the willing being for its reality does not presuppose the neutral objects of nature. Hence it is the free man who in his free deed, because he wills an independent world, conceives the things as unfree nature, up to that height of science at which even man himself is conceived as a determined mechanism. But this unfree causal nature is not needed to give reality to free willing beings. Already from here we get a vista of the mutual relations of values which have to be brought to complete equilibrium by the metaphysical values. To turn to them will be our last task, but we foresee that the prerogative of the world-will can never be denied. The world of history is logically prior to the world of nature.

C. — REASON

In the midst of life-reality we found three experiences for which we demanded an independent self-asserting existence, the things, the persons, and the valuations. They alone have pure existence, and the acknowledgment of their independence is the foundation of our knowledge. The independently existing must persevere. If we are to understand it as independent, as part of the real world, we must try to find it again in new experience. If we find it again, we have a connection between the various experiences. As this recurrence of the identical means a fulfilment of our will, it satisfies us. The objective connection is therefore satisfactory for everybody who wills a world, and therefore absolutely valuable. The affirmation of this connection is truth. Such a connection for the things meant the system of nature, and such a connection for the persons gave us the system of history. Finally, we have to consider the connection for the third manifoldness

of existing realities, for the valuations. But just as in the case of the existence of the valuations, here also, for the connection of valuations, a detailed discussion is not necessary because this whole volume is only an effort to make those connections clear. Here we have only to characterize the place which this particular kind of knowledge demands.

The connected system of valuations is reason. We know now that as connections, ultimately only those relations can be accredited which can be reduced to identities. Nature was the connection of things under the point of view of identity, history was the connection of persons under the point of view of identity; accordingly reason will be the connection of valuations under the point of view of identity. We shall have to discriminate all together, four chief groups of such valuations. We may call them logical, æsthetic, ethical, and metaphysical. These labels are not very satisfactory, but they at least point to certain chief characteristics of the four fields. The system of reason must offer a connection of identity in every one of these four fields.

First, we must make clear what such a demand involves. All valuation is a will in us, but not a will which depends upon subjective individual needs. The evaluating will was willed with the consciousness that we should maintain it under all changing circumstances, unless we were to abandon ourselves, and unless the world were to lose its meaning and reality. Hence the valuation is our own will, and yet superior to every will from personal motive and therefore strictly over-personal. On the other hand, this over-personal factor lies entirely in our inner world in contrast to the things and the persons. The sought connection of the valuations is thus a connection of will-acts. Of course we find a connection of will-acts also in history, but the difference is clear. Every historical being lives his life in personal will-acts, and the personal is just characterized by the fact that something new and free is superadded to the identical recurring. The historian who

seeks connections, therefore, looks backward ; he cannot look into the future because from one given personal act he can never deduce the reality of an act which is not yet given. He who moves from personal inclination may change the direction at any time, and is not bound to move along on the same road.

But he who evaluates is bound. Of course he is bound only as such an evaluating over-personal subject. As a historical person, he may bring his individual will into conflict with his over-individual demand. He can will the crime, while he evaluates the moral deed. But as a subject of moral evaluation, he must will everything which his moral evaluation demands. A will which is conceived as independent of all personal motives and desires can lead only to new and ever new over-personal will-acts, as identity is the only connecting principle. The whole connection of the valuations thus lies outside of the historical sphere in a system of objective reality. For the individual subject the connection of valuations is accordingly a necessary one. In this respect reason corresponds to nature in opposition to history. The natural things, too, are over-personal, and therefore in their causal connection independent of the individual experience. The permanence of the things can lead to any calculation of future effects ; thus the naturalist can determine the future. Moreover the determination of what is to be expected is most important from his point of view, while the historian is entirely unable to imitate him. For the valuations, of course, there exists no future and no causality because they are not in time, but the necessity of the connection and their remoteness from individual wills is the same for the over-personal valuations and the over-personal natural things. Every ideal construction of such a connection of evaluations finds its definite place in the system of reason.

The fundamental task is the same in all four fields of logical, æsthetic, ethical, and metaphysical valuations. A will

which posits values is given, and a new over-personal will which is identical with the first is sought in the strife of life. In our study of history, we recognized how will-deeds can remain identical in new form, and how their untemporal perseverance is different from the continuity of things. Yet the situation is not the same as that in the field of history. In the historical connection the will is maintained as belonging to an individual even if it is taken over by another person. In the over-personal will-act the relation to an individual is no longer in question. The identity is found when the one valuation can be put in the place of the other valuation in the system without changing the meaning of the will. Of course a new will must have new relations and new traits, just as the one side of an equation is different from the other, or as the identical atoms of a quantity of water have new traits if they are separated into hydrogen and oxygen. But the will-attitude itself remains the same. The logical acknowledgment is under the new conditions identical with that under the old ones, the new act of æsthetic devotion covers the preceding, the new ethical appreciation agrees with the earlier, the one religious conviction binds the other.

Of course it is not necessary that attention be directed towards the total transformation. The particular task usually demands merely interest in some partial identities. If we transform water by the galvanic current, we may be interested only in the oxygen and may ignore the hydrogen. If we transform the affirming will, for instance, of a law, we may not be interested in all the other included cases, and may devote ourselves only to a particular one. But the will expressed in this particular decision still remains identical with a part of the embracing will of the whole law. If in our reason the logical acknowledgments, the æsthetic devotions, the ethical appreciations, the religious convictions, really are connected, we must presuppose that they are in this sense ultimately identical with our fundamental will. The system-

atic understanding of all our values is thus an unveiling and exploring of our deepest self. All those logical, æsthetic, ethical, and religious values must then be understood as partial identities of our fundamental will. We shall have to return to this point of view in the discussion of the metaphysical values.

We may interpret the process at least in that field which we have crossed together, the field of the logical values. The situation is more difficult here than in the ethical, æsthetic, and religious fields, which we shall have to examine later. We have discriminated two fundamental logical valuations, the acknowledgment of the value of existence and the acknowledgment of the value of connection. We must now demand that all the connections of logical valuations be either identical affirmations of existence or identical affirmations of connection. The transition from one affirmation to another which is necessarily posited with it, we call a conclusion. Every judgment, we claim, affirms or denies an existence or a connection. The judgments which express the value of existence say: There is or there is not. If I judge: This is an oak tree, we may look on it as a case of subordination, but we may look on it at the same time as an affirmation of existence. There is here present at this place something which has the qualities of the oak, which I presuppose as conceptionally known. It seems as if we transcend such affirmations of existence if we do not speak about a single or a few objects, but if we speak in general about all; for instance: All oak trees have leaves. But that which we really aim to say is after all only: There exist oak trees which have leaves, and oak trees which have no leaves do not exist. The simple form of such a judgment thus practically covers several different affirmations or denials of existence.

But what makes us proceed from one affirmation — it may be simple or complex — to the new form of the identical will? In nature one position of things goes by perseverance of ener-

gies over into a new position. In our reason does one affirmation go over into a new affirmation also by perseverance of the will? The natural reply of the logician would be: A second affirmation must be added. The conclusion results from two premises. But let us see clearly that the mere existence of two affirmations never gives a third. I may know that all men are mortal and that Peter is a man, and yet may have no reason to form a judgment as to the mortality of Peter. On the other hand, we have no right to claim that in the system of nature it is sufficient to have only one position of the atoms in order that the second may result from it. The second comes through perseverance, but the conception of perseverance involves there more than identity of qualities; it also includes progress of the time-series. One position of things emanates from the other because a new temporal factor is added to the identical universe. This new temporal factor demands a new aspect; it presents a new definite task with the question: What is this identical world as soon as the new temporal factor has entered? In the logical world that is the rôle which the second premise has to play. All human beings are mortal. We see in it the affirmation of existence; namely, there are mortal beings and there are not-immortal beings. Now a new affirmation comes to that complex affirmation of existence. That second judgment is: Peter is a man. In itself this would not carry us on. But finally there arises in addition still a question which suggests the transformation of the first judgment in a particular direction. The second judgment really means: How is it with the man Peter? The answer is: Peter thought with the qualities of a mortal being has existence, with the qualities of an immortal being has not existence. If any one conceives him as immortal, I deny that this imagined object has the value of objective existence. Of course this affirmation of Peter as mortal is not identical with everything which was affirmed in that general affirmation of existence, but our second premise had narrowed the question

to the one particular answer, and all affirmations which could have been deduced as identical with that general statement had to remain unnoticed. Every conclusion is in this way the transformation of a judgment of existence or connection into another identical one on the basis of a definite question which introduces a new factor.

Every deduction and every induction is such a transformation of identities. The chemist can seek analytically the elements of a substance, or he can synthetically build up the substance from the elements. In both cases the things are conceived as continuous. In the same way in the induction from the persevering particular valuations logic reaches a general valuation, and in deduction from the complex affirmation a whole manifoldness of particular affirmations. But some kind of special question must show a particular task in order that the transformation to the identical may find a definite direction and a definite goal. The same case as for the logical valuation repeats itself in the ethical, æsthetic, and religious fields. Every time the over-personal will-attitude remains identical, but a new event and a new life-situation, a new impression, a new suggestion, must always present a new life-task to the will, a task in the fulfilment of which the identical attitude can realize itself. Only because the new attitude, the new appreciation, the new conviction, is identical with the original, is the transition satisfactory to the will and therefore absolutely valuable. To enter into the special principles of these fields is superfluous here, as the following parts of this volume are devoted to these æsthetic, ethical, and metaphysical problems.

PART III

THE ÆSTHETIC VALUES

CHAPTER IX

THE VALUES OF UNITY

THE values of existence and the values of connection which have so far interested us are ultimately inseparable. Both groups present the values of knowledge. The values of existence are posited in our naïve life. The values of connection demand a persistent elaboration which is performed by the sciences, and which therefore belongs to the achievements of civilization. Yet civilization only carries on what life demanded immediately. The connections in the realm of nature, history, and reason allow us to secure new values of existence for new things, new persons, and new valuations. When we asked for the ultimate meaning, both existence and connection were only different expressions of the independent self-assertion of the world beyond the personal subjective experience.

In the same way the values of unity and the values of beauty belong together. Here, too, the former are values of naïve life, the latter are decided by the conscious work of civilization; they are the functions of art. Yet here, too, those values of civilization are only continuations of the principle of the values of life. If we are to hold together the values of unity and the values of beauty, we might use the expression "æsthetic values," and yet strictly it is as insufficient as the term "logical values" is in some respects for the first two groups. But for a general survey such labels may perform their service. If we penetrate at once into the depths of the problem, we find that just as all logical values express the self-perseverance of the world, all the æsthetic values refer to the self-agreement of the world. And both the self-persever-

ance and the self-agreement are necessary forms of that self-assertion of the world which we must demand, if our life is not to be a chaotic dream. Both satisfy the will and are therefore valuable; but they satisfy the will not because they adjust themselves to the personal desires of the individual, but because the over-personal structure of the beautiful, as of the true, must satisfy every possible subject. Every possible subject must be satisfied because there cannot be any subject who does not will a world, and as the reality of the world involves self-assertion, and as self-assertion expresses itself in perseverance and inner agreement, the demand for beauty and truth is absolute. They refer to the structural principle of the only world which can mean for us a real world. Thus the individual will finds both the beautiful and the true world as an eternally given a-prioristically determined world. The a-priori is not something which lies ready-made and completed before us, but is the character of our own will, which demands the identity of the experience in order to have a world at all. Every subject whom we can acknowledge as a possible subject of a world must therefore be bound by this a-priori in its logical and æsthetic experience. Truth and beauty are not somewhere maintained from eternity in a world and now to be discovered by man; they are tasks of a world which we are building. But the world which we have to build is the only possible world, the only one which can have reality for our will, and which is therefore eternally shaped by the conditions under which our will can find a world. Whatever has not entered the structural forms which our will demands cannot be a part at all of that world which is for us the only possible real world.

We must now open the way for our approach to the æsthetic values. Of course there are many ways which lead to æsthetics. Whoever hears us speaking about the self-assertion of the world may possibly suspect that we choose of all ways apparently the shortest but to-day most deserted and

most disreputable one, the metaphysical way. Yet nothing lies further from us. The metaphysical method would demand that we start from some super-reality and by conceptual deduction reach the æsthetic facts, and that from the height of the abstract we should step down to experience. But we try to hold exactly the opposite direction. Here and everywhere we want to start from the single real immediate experiences, and want to climb up slowly to the general abstract ideas. Does that mean that our way must start from psychology? Certainly not. The prejudices of our naturalistic age favor such an antithesis. The æsthetics which begins from above is metaphysical; the æsthetics which begins from below is psychological. But is that really more than a prejudice? An entirely different way may start from real experience far removed from all psychology. That is the road of critical investigation. It must be ours. Whoever seriously wills a critical method cannot even acknowledge that the psychological method really starts from experience. The critical method alone really begins at the beginning, and only when the way has led up to a certain height, the path divides itself and a by-path leads to the broad psychological highway.

This must not be misunderstood. The empirical æsthetics is fully within its rights when it works nowadays essentially with the means of psychology. The psychological description and explanation of æsthetic processes still finds numberless problems, and their solution through quiet work is indispensable for safe progress. The most important achievements of modern æsthetics lie in this direction. The self-observing mental analysis was supplemented most fortunately by the experimental inquiries of the psychological laboratories, by the genetic studies on children and lower races, and not least by the physiological investigations of the processes of sensation and movement. In the foreground stands the question of which ideas, emotions, relations, and impulses are stirred

up in the subject of æsthetic enjoyment, and near to it the other problem of which mental processes lead to the æsthetic creation of the artist. The work of art must be completely determined by the mental forces which have produced it and by the mental excitations in which it shows its effect. Such psychological results can easily be transformed into useful prescriptions, and æsthetics may thus arrive at laws just as hygienic prescriptions are immediately developed from the knowledge of the bodily processes.

All that is certainly important. But no one ought to say that such psychological study really starts from the immediate experience and represents the first steps of æsthetics. As soon as I have reached a point from which the whole world presents itself as a sum of physical and psychical existing objects, there remains no other choice. The waterfall, the marble statue, the symphony, are then at first physical objects. Of course no one would seek their beauty in the mere physical thing which the physicist describes and explains. If every drop of the waterfall is calculated in its curve, every tone of the symphony determined in its number of vibrations, and the statue decomposed into the molecules of carbonate of lime, that which delights us is not found. The consequence is that it must be found on the side of the psychical things, inasmuch as the whole world is now made up of physical and psychical contents only. The psychical perception of the thing and the memory ideas and the emotions then become the starting-point for æsthetics.

But we know now that this whole way of considering the world is abstract and artificial. When we studied the foundations of knowledge, we recognized that the contrast of psychical and physical is not given in the original experience. The only antithesis which we found there was that between the personality which takes will-attitudes and the objects of this will. These objects were neither perceptions in us as the psychologist maintains them to be, nor the atomistic bodies

which the physicist measures. In the same way the will was not a psychical object, as it was not material of inner perception. We will it, we live through it, we let it become effective, we are certain of it, we refuse the counter-will, but we do not find the will in us as a perceivable content. The only antithesis which we find in the real subjective experience, that between the willing subject and the object of will, contains accordingly no reference to the antithesis of psychical and physical. On the other hand, there in the immediate experience nothing is to be described, as every description presupposes an object which is independent of will and determined in itself, and only between the describable objects exists that connection which is expressed in scientific explanations. There in the immediate experience we only had the right to ask for the meaning, the significance, the value of our will and of our object of will. It is the will towards objective description and explanation which explodes the immediate experience and creates that great antithesis of physical and psychical. The subjective experience itself is in every fibre only will and will-object. The will towards description is itself a part of this lived-through reality which is not describable, but only interpretable. We had to return once more to this primary consideration of the theory of knowledge to see that if we really want to begin from below, really from the immediate life-experience, we certainly cannot start with the explanation of psychical processes. When the waterfall or the symphony moves the depths of my willing soul, it comes in question neither as physical movements of water or vibrations of air, nor as psychical ideas, impressions, and emotions. The beauty belongs in my immediate subjective experience, not to my optical impression or to my sound sensations, but the sounding tones themselves delight me and the wonders of the waterfall. If we are really to begin at the beginning and not with thought-conceptions, however important, we must examine first the æsthetically valuable objects them-

selves, not as physical objects, but in their pre-physical reality; we must ask as to their meaning and their significance for our will.

We may see the difference of method more clearly, if we examine a few leading ideas which often return in the æsthetic discussions. The modern psychological æsthetics has nowhere worked with greater thoroughness than in the study of those processes by which we introject our emotions into the things. We feel ourselves into the beautiful objects and give life and soul to them. The question which psychology has to raise is very clear. Of course the physical marble block, or the canvas covered with oil color, or the printed paper of the volume of poetry, or the rocks of the mountain have no soul and no feeling for the psychologist. Every subjective element must therefore come from the consciousness of the spectator. The psychologist now examines whether, for instance, special bodily movements in us are necessary to awaken those feelings of activity which we project into the things, or whether we do it from memory pictures of earlier experiences. Does our own activity fuse with the perception sufficiently so that we entirely lose the consciousness of ourselves, or do we animate the thing with the accompanying feeling that we ourselves are moved by feelings? How different, if we take the standpoint of real subjective experience! There we are really certain of the power and strength, of the striving and feeling, in nature or in the statue itself. Not we animate the ocean and the rocks, not we give joy and sadness to the tones, not we make living the dead marble blocks; their life, their soul, their pain, their joy, speaks to us in the real experience; we are trying to feel their feeling and willing and to understand it with devoted soul.

We saw in our earlier discussion that we are certain of the will of our fellow-beings without any conclusions of analogy from merely physical objects. We experience the will of our fellow-men as an immediate suggestion which reaches our

will. In the same way, now, the beautiful comes to us in the real experience with the whole richness of its own striving and feeling and willing. When we substitute for the beautiful statue the dead molecules of the naturalist, we have killed the life which we found and have annihilated the soul which spoke to us. Afterwards, of course, there remained nothing to do but to project our own feelings into the things for the purpose of making at least the illusion of an inner life possible for them. If we really start from experience, we must acknowledge that the beautiful is never given to us as a naturalistic object, but as a free expression of attitudes and will which we as willing personalities can understand by feeling with them. It is the aim of æsthetics to interpret these real æsthetic experiences, and in such fundamental æsthetics nothing can be described and explained, and the objects are not objects which are at all accessible to description or explanation. They are values, but not things. The moon which fills the valley of the poet with softly silver ray is not the dead body whose craters the astronomer studies with his telescope.

In the spirit of pure æsthetics, this feeling of a will in the beautiful which approaches us represents a fundamental relation which needs no further explanation. If we did not understand the will of the things, if they were really mere physical bodies for us, we should not have any æsthetic experiences at all. Of course it would also be a complete misunderstanding if our claim were misinterpreted to mean that it is the will of the creating artist which we add by our ideas to the lifeless work of art. In a corresponding way we might think that it is the will of God as creator which we supplement in the æsthetic awareness of nature. No, it is the column itself which lifts itself and stretches itself to carry the burdening roof. We do not ask what the architect felt about it. It is the marble statue itself which wins us by its charm and its purity. We do not care for the feelings of the sculptor. And it is the same when the flower and the brook confide

their secrets to us. Only when we begin to psychologize, do we reverse the order which we really experience.

Besides this doctrine of the introjection of feelings, it is especially the conception of unity which nowadays controls the discussion. Here, too, the antithesis of the methods is evident. If we start from the physical and psychical things, we are again certain that the æsthetic unity of the manifold occurs only in the consciousness of the spectator and not in the beautiful thing. Certainly, the physical object as such has a certain unity of its parts. The tree is a unity for the botanist, as the root cannot be destroyed without destroying the branches. The unity is there the causal interrelation of the parts. And in a looser sense of the word, even the rock is a unity. It may be split, but as long as it remains unchanged, the shifting of one part in space demands also a shifting of all other parts. The mutual space-relations of the parts remain unchanged. This kind of unity belongs, to be sure, also to the work of art, if we conceive it naturalistically. But it is evident that æsthetics does not mean such a unity. Even the most absurd painting would have such physical unity. The æsthetician means the unity which connects the tree in the painting with the clouds and the sky and with the brook in the meadow, which are connected in the unity of the beautiful landscape, and which certainly have no unity from the standpoint of the scientist.

In this case the psychologist says that we ourselves spin the thread of relation by those feelings and desires which the manifoldness of the impressions awakes in us. In our soul the indifferent chaos of simultaneous things groups itself into a harmonious combination of perceptions. Then we call related that which awakens in us similar reactions. Such unity pleases us because it lies in the nature of our soul to have pleasure from the resounding of similar feelings as every activity has a tendency to spread in our mind. Again this is all quite correct psychologically, but it is a psychological con-

struction and not a rendering of the æsthetic experience. In the real experience the beautiful unity exists for us in nature itself or in the work of art, and it is our part to understand and to feel, and not to create it. The lightning flashes, the thunder rolls, the black clouds threaten, the rugged rocks stretch upward in defiant power, the surging sea rages and demands its victim. If we feel that with sympathizing soul, we do not seek the unity of the excited nature in ourselves, but in this raving of the elements. They are not only filled with the will which we share, but their volitions belong together, support one another, reënforce one another, and point to one another. The rocks and the clouds and the waves all really want the same thing, and we feel excited with their common emotion.

It is not different when the unity of the work of art speaks to us. The charming little rococo picture gossips of light shepherds' play. The position of the figures betrays the gallant tone; the features, the eyes, the lips, frivolously say the same; the laughing landscape in the background agrees with the flowers in the meadow, and the slender willow with the fleecy little clouds and the glancing brooklet. Every ribbon in the light gown flutters in tender play. In the soft colors and the mildly curved lines all wills the same, all wills the one, and their real unity must be felt if we want to understand the picture. The unity of the beautiful is the agreement of its real volitions, which we share only in our feelings. If the object of the experience is transformed into physical and psychical objects, this real unity has evaporated.

The illustrations of the projection of feeling and of unity may be sufficient. They had to demonstrate why for us the psychological method would be misleading, if we want to examine without presuppositions the values in their æsthetic significance for the real subjective experience. But now since we know the right starting-point, we can proceed straightway to our goal. And those conceptions which so far

we have used only as illustrations, the projection of feelings and the unity, may lead us on. Our thesis is that whenever in our experience a manifoldness of wills approaches us, their agreement, their volition of mutual support, is to us absolutely valuable. The group of values which results in that way is æsthetic, and among them we find art. But art is a value of civilization; we wanted to examine at first the immediate naïve æsthetic values. Thus at first we may exclude the values of art. We had to speak of art and nature together as long as we wanted to make sure of the fundamental method and starting-point for all æsthetic treatment. From here we may separate the further work. We shall speak later of art, but now we turn to the naïve life-experience and inquire into its æsthetic value.

Such immediate æsthetic value must be given to us where the manifold will of nature agrees in itself, and where nature expresses accordingly a unified will in a variety of mutually supporting expressions. To separate this group of values from those of art, we may call them the values of unity. And now we have to seek their characteristics and to determine their meaning and their sphere. We begin again with the outer world, and shall later turn to the fellow-world and the inner world. We start from the fact that in our life-experience nature approaches us with its will and suggestions, and that we feel this will with nature. How that is possible, we have recognized. We saw that we do not project the will artificially into the things, but that, on the contrary, we artificially eliminate the will. On the other hand, we have seen that the things of the outer world do not express a will for us all the time. They are always objects for our will, but, as we saw, usually they themselves are not subjects of will. In the fellow-beings the will speaks to us as suggestion and impulse all the time. With the things it is different. Perhaps it is especially different because we all have gone into the school of natural science and have learned to notice the effects of the things and to neglect their meaning.

The case where the thing, like the other man, brings its own will to expression arises only under special conditions. To experience a thing in its own will is natural to us only when we have small practical interest in it. Otherwise we treat it entirely as an object of our will. Often the impression itself works as a strong stimulus to force the own will on the will of the subject; often again the spectator himself may be especially susceptible through his own mood for the will-suggestion of certain things. It always remains essential that we can understand this phase of the outer world only when our practical desire which serves our personal interests is little concerned. The purple sunset may transmit its own excitement to our soul, but when the sun troubles us with its burning rays at noon-time, we try to protect ourselves from them, and this effort inhibits every sympathizing feeling with the own will of the sun which expresses itself in its fiery glow. The more significant the will of nature, the more easily it may overwhelm the petty personal will. The excited ocean becomes a deed for us, while the little lake is nothing but water fit for bathing, fishing, and sailing; only an obedient means for our will. And still even the pond may tell of its inner world when it reflects the overhanging willows and the sky. On the other hand, the excited sea becomes expressionless when it brings us into danger. Whoever fights with the waves does not feel them as angry fighters, but as a meaningless flood. As soon as we come to art, we shall find it fundamental that every work of art through its artificial isolation of the content favors and reënforces this entering into the will of the object. In the face of the world of art this feeling with the object is the only natural way, while in the face of nature it is the exceptional state. If we want to use the tree as kindling-wood, we do not look at it with the eyes of the painter, and do not ask about the will of its knotty branches.

Is this will of the outer world real? For the one whose soul understands and feels it, it has exactly the same immediate

reality which the own life-experience may have; but of course that does not involve that it can claim that objective value of existence which we studied under the logical values. Moreover, we know that the will of the thing certainly cannot have this objective value of existence, as we ascribed to a will real existence only when the same will could take attitude towards every other possible thing. That alone gave real existence to the will of our fellow-men. Yet that is out of the question for the will of the waves and the clouds; their will is exhausted in the act of their expression. Yes, we can go still further; we can say that the æsthetically valuable thing, even as an object, does not possess the objective value of existence. We saw that the real existence of the outer world is based on the fact that the object is experienceable for every possible subject. The physicist demands that, but in our vision of the sunset this thought-relation to other subjects is not involved. The beautiful willing nature is in that sense only an impression for us; its objective reality as an existing thing comes in question as little as the objective existence of its will.

But this fact must not be misinterpreted as if the lack of objective existence in any way interferes with the æsthetic reality. The æsthetic nature does not become by it a mere illusion. It has the full immediate reality of life. If we attribute to the life-experience the value of objective existence, we have taken this part of immediate reality into a certain system of will-relations. We have acknowledged that we can value it at the same time as possible experience of every possible subject. It does not become more real than the immediate life-experience; it has only become valuable in a certain direction, in that direction which alone is in question for truth and knowledge. The æsthetic nature and its will does not offer any reason for this particular relation and evaluation. Here the life-experience is brought into an entirely different system of relations and evaluations, the values of unity. This value of unity as such has not at the same time

the value of existence; the will of the æsthetic world has therefore not psycho-physical character. Yet the state which demands the one valuation is not less lifelike and not less fundamental than the state which suggests the other value.

We know now that æsthetic values can be given in the world of things only when the things have their own will. But that does not mean at all that the understanding and participation in this will sufficient for an æsthetic evaluation. Such a view is widespread, but we must decline to accept it. Many conditions of æsthetic attitude are fulfilled as soon as such participating sympathy begins, especially if our selfish will is really inhibited by that foreign will of nature, and yet the most important factor is still lacking. An æsthetic value is given to us only when a manifoldness of volitions approaches us, and when those volitions point to one another and agree with one another. This inner agreement is the deepest characteristic of everything æsthetic. Beautiful nature must come to us as will simply because agreement can reign only where there is will. In the dead nature of science we find the unity of causal interconnection, but the unity of agreement can never exist between mere objects. Agreement demands volitions of the same tendency, and therefore only a nature which wills can come under the æsthetic point of view. Something which is absolutely simple can never be beautiful, as there can be no agreement where there is no manifoldness.

But we must not seek manifoldness in the wrong direction. It is not a physical multiplicity: a simple tone or a simple light may excite us by its beauty, because æsthetically tone or color also appears as a manifold. Of course the auxiliary conceptions of physics have nothing to tell us there. The tone is composed of many thousand vibrations of air, the light of thousands of millions of ether vibrations, but we know now that the light ray, in so far as it is beautiful, is not at all that physical light process; it becomes such only when we elaborate its objective existence, and this results only from

the relation to other subjects. The beautiful as such is only an impression and not part of the objective universe of the physicist, and therefore as object of beauty not composed of ether vibrations. But in another sense these simple impressions really have a manifoldness. The color tone has its own excitement: red does not will what blue and yellow will. Every simple color has its own intensity, which again expresses an own will: the faint light does not express what the strong says. Each color has its own saturation: the whitish blue resists the saturated. The light has its space extension; even the smallest surface may appear equal in its parts or may flicker unequally. Every light has its own time-form: the short flashing light wills something different from the quiet lasting one. The light shines from the dark background, the stillness of which supports the luminosity. In this way color, intensity, saturation, form, time, background, and many other factors express their own will in the simplest impression, and only when they blend harmoniously together in their striving do we experience the beauty of the colored light. As soon as light really becomes only a point, or when the time duration is really shortened to an instant, the æsthetic value disappears.

If in this way the simple tone or light ray carries in itself a manifoldness of agreeing volitions, how incomparable must be the internal richness which the sunny spring landscape with the flowers and the song of the birds offers to us, with the fleecy clouds and the merry brook and the happy laughing meadows. Like jubilant children who dance in a ring, one takes part in the joy of the other, and their agreement of will becomes a unity. But this agreement of will not only binds them together; at the same time it separates them from the interplay of the rest of the world. In this way the beautiful forms its own boundaries, which no intruder can cross. The moon which gleams in beauty with silver light over the fields has not the least connection with the sun from which its light

comes, in the view of the astronomer. The doctrine of science must connect the given with the total universe, in order to carry through the logical postulate. The apprehension of beauty separates the one given thing from the rest of the world, and finds the fulfilment of its demands in the agreement of the internal manifoldness.

Now since we find the agreement in the centre of the æsthetic world, we can understand why a value is in question there. We know that we have a value only where the identical is maintained, that is, where the return of the starting-point in a new experience fulfils and satisfies our demand for a world. If we found only a single will in a piece of nature, we could not understand why it would be valuable to understand and to feel this will. How could it be valuable if I simply exchanged my will for that will of the external thing and thus felt myself into the meaning of nature? Æstheticians too often seek the real beauty here. But to throw myself down with the waterfall or to stretch myself up to the clouds with the rocks, to make serpent movements with the brook on the ground or to go up and down with the waves, is no enjoyment even in the imagination. It would be only a source of discomfort, and there cannot be value where there is no satisfaction. That changes at once if I seek the will in which nature approaches me in a new experience and find it identical again in new volitions of nature. That is fulfilment and satisfaction of my desire.

This satisfaction, this fulfilment, this value, must be over-personal. I do not feel with nature and do not maintain its will for the purpose of gaining anything for myself or to protect myself. This finding of the agreement in nature has no relation whatever to my personality. As soon as my personal interests entered, nature would become a means for my own will, and the will of the things would remain unnoticed. It is not my caprice that the will of the one thing ought to be found again in the other, but the æsthetic reality itself de-

mands it from me. I cannot perceive the one will without looking out and searching for an agreeing will, and without being disturbed by an unlike disharmonious volition. And yet this demand to find the agreeing will is after all only a special expression of our fundamental will to apperceive the world which we find in our life as an independent and self-asserting one. It is a necessary will for every one whom we are to acknowledge at all as a subject that the world is more than our mere immediate experience, that it is a world, and that therefore it expresses its selfhood by the agreement of its parts. It is accordingly an absolutely over-personal demand that the world show its world character by the inner harmony of its volitions, and the fulfilment of this demand must be valuable in an absolute and necessary way.

From here we can see clearly the antithesis of the æsthetic and the logical values. The values of unity and beauty on the one side, the values of existence and connection on the other side, are equally fulfilments of the over-personal demand for the self-assertion of our experienced world. In both cases we are satisfied, because we find that which we experience identical again in new experience, and in both cases we seek it again, because only this identical occurrence means to us the selfhood and independence of the world. But the direction in which this independence expresses itself is fundamentally different. As far as the world of things is concerned, we can say the logical valuation demands that the thing remain identical as an object, the æsthetic valuation demands that the will of the things remain the same. In the first case we must postulate the perseverance of the perceivable parts through all time, in the second case we must postulate the eternal agreement of those volitions which we feel in the things. The object remains identical when it perseveres, the will remains identical when it is willed in agreement.

From this difference many consequences result. From the first we can understand that the logical value must link the

present experience with the total world-series of all thinkable experiences. If the things are to continue, they must find their identical existence in the furthest past and future. The task is to connect the given with all which is not yet given or no longer given, and to elaborate the causal connection through this perseverance. Science connects every single piece with the totality, every grain of sand with the whole universe. The æsthetic aspect, on the other hand, isolates. The agreeing volitions in the experience together form a unity and exclude everything foreign. Nothing points beyond the harmonious life-experience, nothing connects with the past or the future. The value of beauty is perfect, if the given harmonizes in its own will-manifoldness. And it is clear too that this mutual agreement means at the same time mutual fulfilment; one will can be satisfied by another will in no other way than by being realized once more, and thus by being willed again. A will which wants to remain a will cannot seek from the other will anything but agreement, support, and accord. Truth connects and beauty isolates. Only apparently and externally is that contradicted by another fact which really stands in the closest connection with it. The truth ultimately seeks simple elements, while beauty always demands a manifoldness. Indeed, if in science everything depends upon the continuation of the objects, this persevering single thing is independent of the existence of other things. The possibility of understanding the interplay of things from the perseverance of partial things will be the greater the simpler we think the lasting objects themselves. Therefore we need the atoms. Beauty, on the other hand, demands agreement, and therefore presupposes manifoldness. Beauty thus always leads to the vision of many parts. But that atomistic real object is, as we saw, connected with all past and future positions of the universe, while this manifold beautiful is entirely detached from the remainder of the world.

Knowledge offers us the ways and means for action, as the

insight into perseverance teaches us to determine beforehand from the given that which is not given, that which is to be expected, that which is important for action. Beauty does not lead beyond itself, is therefore useless for practical action, but beauty teaches us to understand the inner meaning of the world. As knowledge determines the means of our action and decides about its success, we subordinate ourselves to truth, and by this subordination we master the world. It is by devotion that we serve beauty, but in this devotion we overcome the world and liberate ourselves from our needs. The devotion to the beautiful demands that we feel the will of nature and bring to silence the chance will of our individuality. By our subordination to truth we grasp the world as an independent self-persevering thing; by our devotion to beauty we grasp the world as an independent self-agreeing will.

So far we have sketched only the antithesis for the outer world, but we know that the same postulates must also hold for the subjects of the fellow-world and the acts of the inner world. Their perseverance, and that means their logical values, we found in the field of history and reason. There, too, we had to seek the simple elements and to connect them with the totality of the real. The fellow-subjects and the inner acts present to us, like the things for our knowledge, an unlimited system which has objective value. It is therefore natural to ask whether or not, here too, the æsthetic aspect may be possible and may give us fundamental values. For the subjects and inner acts also can we not seek the internal agreement, and through the inner agreement their isolation? Thus our question is — and at first this question arises far from cultural values of art: Are there immediate life-values in which the will-agreement of the fellow-subjects or the will-agreement of the inner world comes to an independent value? And without hesitation we must give an affirmative reply. It is arbitrary to confine the æsthetic values of agree-

ment to the things alone. The postulates which we find fulfilled in the outer world repeat themselves in the fellow-world and the inner world. Subjects of the fellow-world reach this agreement of will in friendship and love and peace; the excitements of the inner world find unity in happiness. We may perhaps call attention to the most essential point if we name this agreement of subjects "love" and the agreement of the things "harmony." We then have as values of unity in the outer world harmony, in the fellow-world love, in the inner world happiness, and we may turn to them with a few further meditations.

A. — HARMONY

We have developed the conception of the value of unity essentially with reference to the harmony of things, and given hardly any attention to the unity of subjects and the unity of the inner world. All the essential points as to harmony are therefore clear before our minds, and we have only to add some particular features. For instance, we have not considered so far the difference between the æsthetic valuation and the sensuous enjoyment which nature may offer us. The smallest and the largest, the drop of dew which glistens on the bud of a rose, the starry sky on a clear winter night, may be spectacles which we evaluate. But the fresh wind which cools us, the sun which warms us, the fruit which tastes well, the lips which tempt us, promise and give a personal gratification with a pleasure-tone which by principle stands in contrast to the over-personal valuation. The desire which is gratified by the sensuous delight is my individual desire for a special personal experience. I maintain the idea of the juicy taste of the fruit until it is realized in the experience of my senses. The will which is directed towards my own states determines at first my maintaining such an idea and later my satisfaction by its identical realization. The idea itself was accompanied by pleasure, and the pleasure started the organic process

which led to the fulfilment. In the æsthetic valuation, on the other hand, it is not our will ; it is the thing itself, the will of which seeks its realization in an identical will of the surrounding nature. We are æsthetically satisfied when we feel that agreement of the volitions in the things. We feel with the things and try to seek for the will which we feel in nature, a sympathizing will in other parts ; the finding of the same tendencies rewards our search. We seek the harmonious will — harmonious not with us, but with the will of the things — because we want to understand the independent selfhood of nature. Nature is no self as long as nature appears in contradiction with itself and does not express any inner agreement. In the practical pleasure in nature, nature is a means for the satisfaction of our own individual will : in the æsthetic valuation of nature, we are satisfied because the will of nature is in harmony with itself.

Such a fundamental antithesis does not exclude the possibility that both feelings may combine. When, heated from a sunny road, we enter the shady woods where the cool water of the spring relieves our thirst and berries in the moss refresh us, our intense delight and sensuous comfort may fuse with the impersonal devotion to the peace of nature. Usually, of course, it holds true that the thing which we use or which we avoid from personal reasons is for us only an object, and not an expression of an own will. But there are certain cases possible in which the own desire for the thing is still increased as soon as we feel intensely the sympathetic or antipathetic will of nature itself. Yet the fact remains that even in such a case the beautiful nature is valuable not because the will which we feel in it belongs to a thing which can gratify our desire for pleasure, but exclusively because that will which we feel in it harmonizes with other wills in the manifoldness of nature. It is therefore quite possible that nature may remain æsthetically valuable for us where parts of it, or perhaps even the whole, may be objects of our personal rejection.

The landscape may be awesome, the ravine and the wild torrent uncanny, the rocky path painful, the stormy wind icy; and yet, in spite of our intense discomfort, the mountains and the stream and the wind come to us with life. We feel their threatening will, and the unity of their will overwhelms us with insistent beauty. Nature is æsthetically free from values if we do not feel its will at all. But it is æsthetically anti-valuable only when the will of nature is felt as in inner disagreement, not when it is simply an object of personal resistance. Perhaps the beauty of the sublime always contains a factor of personal displeasure, since its will overwhelms and suppresses us. In a corresponding way the beauty of the charming may always contain a separate element of personal pleasure. Only in pure beauty everything which enters into the harmony of volitions is given as an æsthetic harmony in itself beyond pleasure and displeasure. In the landscape of pure beauty grow only beautiful flowers, and every flower has beautiful colors.

What is the meaning and significance of this will in the things of nature? On the dark pond the swan softly glides; every line of the swan-form, every light in its white feathers and in its mirror-image, every movement of the wings, and even the quiet ripple among the water-lilies, all sound together in the pure harmony of the beautiful impression. What is the will of nature which comes to such unity of expression there, and which would be confused and destroyed if the neck of the swan were short, or the lights colored, or the movements violent, or the water dirty? It certainly is not an abstract moral which is proclaimed to us there, not: Be like a swan. The swan has nothing at all to say which concerns us personally. Even the immediate suggestion: Take part in this peace of nature, cannot be the meaning of the will of nature there, inasmuch as this landscape can be willing for us and can have meaning only as far as our own feeling enters into it. What we do not feel in our own life-experience remains dead. As

soon as it becomes living, no advice is any longer needed to enter into it with feeling. Still less can we find the meaning of the scene in a conceptional communication. We do not evaluate the image of the swan because it gives us a knowledge of that which is typical for the swan in a naturalistic sense. Our æsthetic appreciation does not move at all in the direction in which the zoölogist or anatomist would have to proceed if he wanted to grasp the characteristics of the swan. The naturalistic conception of the animal is formed with reference to causal connections which refer to the external relations of the bodily parts. The æsthetic apprehension has nothing to do with the bodily parts, but refers only to the aims and excitements, the agreement of which would not be disturbed by any physiological impossibility.

The beautiful in nature is thus neither advice nor naturalistic information. Do we come nearer to the truth if we seek its meaning in an idea which lies beyond the real? Does such supra-real proclamation express itself through nature? Nothing lies further from us here. If nature has its meaning in its will, the æsthetic valuation does not connect at all this will with any metaphysical beyond. The beautiful agreement of nature is not suspended, but soars aloft on its own wings. It wills nothing but itself. To be sure, our metaphysical convictions may influence our æsthetic appreciations, but the effect is not different from that of our conceptional knowledge. Our convictions and in a similar way our moral views can reënforce or inhibit our feeling for the will of the things, but the æsthetic harmony is not touched by it. But then, what is expressed after all if it is neither doctrine, nor conception, nor metaphysical idea? We can answer only: Nature's own character is expressed, her own charm and her dignity, her excitement and her rest, her stormy desire and her quiet resignation, her serenity and her reverie. And yet every conceptional word leads us astray. Nature makes no programmatic music. What the swan has to say in its soft movement

through the lily-pond cannot be pronounced in any other language.

In still another direction we must characterize the value of unity in nature. A kind of agreement between the natural things is found also by the naturalist who can recognize everywhere the fitness of the natural objects. The interrelations of the parts of nature show at every point a surprising mutual adjustment, and that appears to be a new symptom of the harmony of things. How wonderful, for instance, is the mutual fitness of the blossoms and the insects. Yet we should sacrifice the most essential factor of the æsthetic theory if those two kinds of relations were acknowledged as parallel. The mutual adjustment of the things belongs absolutely to their external character, and has no reference to their meaning, their expression, their own will. The traditional conjunction of natural beauty and natural fitness must be dissolved. The over-personal value of agreement which we seek demands that we find the will of the one in the will of the other. That has nothing to do with the fact that the conservation of the one is secured by the causal influences of the other. Such external unity occurs in every physical system and has no æsthetic value.

Only one kind of æsthetic valuation of nature may still be mentioned because it is sometimes erroneously treated as the only possible case. The man of civilization who has trained his mental eye on the works of fine art and whose soul is filled by the suggestions of lyric poetry may look into nature as if nature were a painting in a frame and her mood a lyric poem. If we take such an attitude, we certainly are not disloyal to the spirit of natural beauty, and many an impulse towards the æsthetic valuation of nature is enriched and developed through this effect of art. But it is certainly not the primary kind of æsthetic appreciation of nature. Nature which is seen through the eyes of a possible work of art may then bring its æsthetic values to clearest expression because the work of

art may reënforce and elaborate them; but art only reënforces those values which exist for the naïve life: art does not create them. The æsthetic valuation of the experienced nature with its agreeing volitions is absolutely the æsthetic starting-point. The question of how far it is at the same time the historic beginning belongs to an entirely different aspect. We may appreciate those values with a new vividness by our training in the enjoyment of art, but this is possible only because art seeks and maintains those values. The values themselves exist independent and self-asserting. The sociologist may be right in claiming that civilization and art have helped to awaken in us the sympathizing feeling for the self-agreement of the will in nature, but our immediate experience tells us that the spheres of harmony sound the purest when we forget all civilization and art.

B. — LOVE

Can we, as in nature, find an absolute value in the world of subjects? We studied that fellow-world in its value of existence and in its value of connection, and understood how men as subjects of will enter into the life of history. Is the mutual harmony of their will now an absolute value, too? But it would be impossible to deny it here. Again we have a manifoldness of will which we feel with the subjects, and again we find such will in mutual agreement. All the conditions for a pure valuation are therefore again fulfilled. If we call love that harmony of souls which sounds through friendship and passion and peace and human brotherhood, then love must be an absolutely valid æsthetic value. It is the over-personal beauty of the fellow-world, as the harmony of things was the pure beauty of the outer world.

Of course man also stands in the midst of beautiful nature. There he stands in the masquerade of his gay-colored cloak of civilization as a picturesque thing among things; or he stands there in noble nakedness, and every line expresses the

purity of nature. But in the realm of nature man in his beautiful forms is found only like the flowers in the field. The value of love brings his soul to expression. What the beautiful female body as object of vision says by the play of its forms and lights is independent of that which proceeds in the soul of the woman. It is as with the swan in the pond, which expresses a meaning of its beauty of which its bird-understanding has no idea. Every new position, every new foreshortening, every new line of the hair, changes the will of the figure and brings new unities of expression. The will of the inner personality remains unchanged by it, and the outer figure goes on to will its own meaning æsthetically when, perhaps in sleep, the will of the personality has come to rest.

But now we want to seek the harmony of that inner will. That can always have only the one meaning, that your will is to become my will and my will your will. Only the forms of this fusion are endless in their manifoldness. The unity may be short or long: from the short meeting of will in the play of children or in light social company to the union which is loyal to itself beyond death. The unity may concern the smallest part of the personality or the whole self; from sympathy with the pain of the sufferer whom we see in the street to the life friendship from which nothing is hidden in the soul of the other. The unity may arise in the nearest as in the widest circle, from the love between man and wife which excludes everything but the loved one to the humanitarian love for mankind which includes everything that has the features of man. The unity may be joyous or may be tragic, from the happy delight with which two young souls find each other to the martyrdom of the service which sacrifices itself. The unity may be penetrated by selfish longing or may be absolutely unselfish, from the passion of the rapturous bliss of becoming one, in which the sensuous self is triumphing, to the mother-love which renounces herself that another self may be able to will its own self.

The usual way of looking on this unity of selves either denies to them the absolute value, or shifts the value to an entirely different group, to the moral values. The history of philosophy has not seldom seen in it the fundamental and decisive moral value. Schopenhauer's revival of the old Indic doctrine of sympathy gave the classical expression to such ethical teaching. He alone acts morally who is controlled by the certainty that the fellow-man and the own self are fundamentally one and the same, and he acts immorally who counteracts the will of the fellow-being by his own will, and who by affirming his own will denies the will of the other. In the coalescence of all souls lies the beginning and end of all goodness. To be sure, in Schopenhauer's world the immediate life-experience finds only the inner world as a will, while the fellow-world is at first merely an idea. To know the will of the other man, we have to project our will into the body of the other man. The volitions of the various individuals thus remain in the spatial temporal separation of the body, and can find each other only when all individuality is eliminated and we sink from the world-experience into the metaphysical unreality in which there cannot be any personal individualization. But we must object to such philosophy from the start. We recognize too clearly that the immediate contact between will and will does not demand a metaphysical overcoming of experience, but that it is the immediate effect of our relation to our fellow-beings, not less immediate than the experience of things. We remain thoroughly in the pure life-experience when we become certain that the will of our friend is our own will, that his joy is our joy, that his suffering is our pain. We do not need the breaking down of the bodily limitations, as the will of the fellow-man was from the start for us not a projection of our will into the perceived body, but a special kind of reality which we grasped in immediate life-experience. Thus it is for us a question far from metaphysical speculations whether the

fusion of the will of two beings is valuable or not. The value of such unity of will can in no case be found in the idea that it subdues experience and leads us to an absolute trans-experience. Just this unity of will is immediate life-experience for us. When we artificially transform the immediate life into perceptions and make out of the willing beings causally connected things, then only do we create those walls over which we have to fly later by a trans-natural mutual soul-contact.

If in such a way the metaphysical background disappears, in what sense may we still have a right to look on the coalescence of wills as a moral value? Of course we cannot really study here what we ultimately are to call moral. We shall have to separate carefully the moral from the morally indifferent, when we discuss the deeds and decisions of the personalities. But it ought to be kept in view from the start that we indeed have a right to speak of moral achievements only in the realm of deed and decision. It is no deed, no decision, no achievement, when in earthly or in heavenly love we feel an expansion of the own self, or when the soul of the parents resounds with the joy or the pain of their children. How such feeling happened to arise in us we do not know ourselves; we did not choose it, we could not do otherwise. To feel with the others and to have sympathy is our being. If we stamp our love, which is our happiness and our treasure, as a special personal merit, we enter into a vagueness of feeling by which the truly moral decision would have to lose its characteristic value. It is a gift of life, endlessly valuable, to find in our soul friendship and sympathy and love, but with the merit of morality such emotional tendencies have as little to do as musical talent or mathematical ability. If there is no moral merit in having a devoted heart full of love, then also it is surely no moral achievement which deserves praise when the sympathy expresses itself in a corresponding action. When a mother acts for the protection of her child whom she dearly loves, she does not think herself to deserve moral credit

for it. Yet the principle is not different when the inner unity of will goes beyond such narrowest circle. If we really love our neighbor as ourselves, then it is not an action which moves in the direction of ethical merit when we make efforts to help the neighbor. Such an action is not for that reason less valuable than a moral deed, only it is not a moral deed. We decline, therefore, to accept the unity of minds as a demand of morality. Love is one thing and duty another.

Duty and morality are postulated as absolute values. Are we therefore obliged to accept the conclusion that love does not represent an absolute value? The unity of wills would then only be a personal joy and chance inclination, which seeks individual gratification in friendship and love and human welfare, and which is not different by principle from the inclination for sweet foods and sparkling wines. But that, too, is entirely misleading. The devotion of the heart has no moral value, and if we were to group all human actions under the one point of view, that only the moral achievement is valuable, we should indeed have to eliminate love as indifferent, perhaps even as weakness. The devotion of the soul has nevertheless an unlimited value, a value as absolutely valid as morality itself, the eternal value of perfect unity. Therefore we had to bring love into line with the æsthetic values. And we must not misinterpret the meaning of æsthetic value in the light sense of the term. The unity of souls is not simply a charming spectacle which adorns our existence and beautifies the seriousness of life with pleasant play. We called the total values of unity æsthetic because all art and beauty of nature belonged in the same circle, but what is meant is a holy and serious value which grasps the deepest powers of our personality. As the starry night in its eternal beauty makes us feel the meaning of unity by its sublime glory, the value of unity comes to us with no less unlimited splendor when two souls have become one for better or for worse in eternal loyalty.

But we must keep the essentials in mind. The value which we try to grasp here must not be sought in the feeling of the self-surrendering personality. If he who seeks the will of the other man experiences at first in his own desire only a personal excitement, then satisfaction of his will can have only personal value. His personal pleasure in contact with the loved one may stand higher than the joys of the table, but it remains strictly individual, and unfit to lead up to the height of the over-personal value. The real æsthetic value belongs entirely to the unity of the will-manifoldness. It is the same satisfaction as in every other field of values. The one single part as such never has over-personal value; the value always belongs only to the relation between the two separated parts, which in a certain sense become identical. Thus that which is valuable is something quite different from the mere sum of the two personal individual enjoyments. The logical value of an equation is also destroyed when the symbol of identity is erased and only two groups of conceptions remain, each of which may have a certain logical significance, but which have lost their relation of equality. The enjoyment of the friend or of the loved one in the two single souls is entirely different from the consciousness of the unity between the two, a consciousness which may enter into the mind of either. Of course there is no opposition between the two possibilities. In the world of nature we saw that the personal pleasure easily interferes with the æsthetic appreciation of unity, because our personal desire took the thing as an object and did not listen to the own will of the thing. In the relation to the fellow-world, it must be different. The will which is to be found in its agreement with other wills must be most accessible to the subject who takes part in the united group. The friendship which brings the two friends into æsthetic unity cannot be felt by any one more vividly than by each of the friends. Each of them knows his own will from the deepest source, and finds his joy in feeling with

the soul of his friend. Each of them feels the will of both, and accordingly can have not only his own personal pleasure in the sympathy of the friend, but at the same time the over-personal æsthetic delight in the identity of the two will-attitudes. His pleasure refers to his personal part; his pure appreciation refers to that mental totality in its æsthetic unity.

Only where two souls have become a unity do we find a reality which is no longer a flickering haphazard experience, but which has the significance of self-assertion. Only where two souls have become a unity does there radiate into the world of will an own self-dependent meaning. We seek such a self-asserting meaning, and must seek it if we want to have a world. We must apprehend one will, therefore, in such a way that we maintain it with a desire to find it again identical. If we find it, this demand is fulfilled, we are absolutely satisfied, we have found a fraction of the self-asserting world. As this demand is not impelled by a personal need, but by the over-personal postulate for a reality, the satisfaction, too, must be over-personal. The unity of souls is a pure absolute value; it may be a fleeting word of pity which unites two indifferent beings just one heart-beat long, or it may be the inexhaustible word of the savior who brings love for the neighbor into numberless souls and binds them into a unity.

It is evident that this value of unity through love must have a certain contact with the value of connection in history, just as we saw that natural beauty has certain relations to natural causal connection, and that æsthetic and logical values anyhow have certain factors in common. In the connection of history, as in the agreement of love, the value lies in the finding of the identical will, and yet they are separated as much as logical and æsthetic values must always be separated. In the truth we seek self-assertion as conservation of a given unit which we follow up through all the manifold experiences. In beauty we seek the self-assertion as mutual agreement of a closed manifold. The logician has found an abso-

lute value in the fellow-world when he can trace one will as identical in the will of another, and by this demonstrate the chaos of the fellow-world to be a cosmos of order. The æsthetician of the fellow-world has found an absolute value when he feels the intended unity of striving in a manifold of will and demonstrates the love in the chaotic excitement of the fellow-world. The historic connection of the will-influences and the sympathetic connection of the will-devotions alike raise the fellow-world to an absolutely valuable selfhood.

Only one point may be added. The unity in manifoldness demands here as everywhere not only the unity but also the manifoldness. The richness and the inner variety of the unequal personalities reënforce the æsthetic value of the human harmony. The realm of love does not demand that individualities be eliminated and the differences effaced. The beauty of the stormy sea wills that each wave surge in foamy surf in its own way, that no two be alike, and yet that all aim towards the same inner agreement. There is no deeper unity of soul than where the strength of the man joins the tenderness of the woman, where the maturity of the parents is united with the innocence of the children. But the unlimited richness of these values of unity does not belong only to the manifoldness of the personalities; it results, too, from the manifoldness of their relations. Everybody enters into an abundance of human bonds. The larger the circle of those who are united the smaller is the group of the volitions which enter into unity. The harmony of peace which unites the peoples of the earth is not the harmony of brothers who become one with their whole soul.

C. — HAPPINESS

Whenever philosophers discuss the value of happiness one question usually stands in the centre: Is happiness the highest goal of action? Ought we to raise happiness to the highest

ideal of our human tasks, or is happiness only a morally indifferent by-product with which the duties of our life have no concern? The Stoic and the Epicurean alike ultimately strive to find happiness through the moral will. But the naïve man who seeks a deeper value for his life is unwilling to be satisfied with the thought that every duty is only a careful calculation of his own happiness. Morality is more than a weighing of our own possible pleasures for the purpose of preferring the lasting and unmixed to the fleeting pleasure which may be followed by pain. Any happiness, he says, leaves our life cold and empty when our work does not also serve the happiness of the fellow-man. There are the goals of our really valuable deed. The own happiness has no real value; the ideal task of the moral man is to devote himself to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. There finally starts the contradiction of the idealist. The happiness of the others is after all, he says, no higher goal than the own pleasure. Whether the greatest number of men enjoy their existence, and whether in this way the feeling of pleasure is multiplied, has nothing to do with the highest duties of the will. That which is most valuable, conscience, relaxes in the midst of happiness. All such adorers of happiness and despisers of happiness have only one presupposition in common, namely, that happiness is pleasure, and therefore as such a merely personal value. If happiness is to have an over-personal value, this must result from the relations of happiness to the moral action. It is the moral value of happiness which the utilitarian ethics preaches and the conscience ethics denies.

We know that the problem of morality will be ours at a much later stage of the discussion. But we can eliminate it here entirely, and can confine ourselves to the examination of happiness itself. We may begin with a complete concession. As far as happiness is pleasure it is the satisfaction of a merely individual desire, and therefore without any over-personal value. We have no right to acknowledge any differ-

ences by degrees there. The pleasure in absinthe, vaudeville, and gambling and the pleasure in chamber quartettes, old bronzes, and æsthetic talk with beautiful women may characterize two incomparable human beings, but the gratification of their desires remains equally free from over-personal values. And in the same way without absolute value is the satisfaction of all those single wishes which usually enter into human happiness—wishes for success and fame and beauty and wealth and power. We do not preach that they are without value because they are fugitive, or that they are without value because they are not rooted in the moral. Still less have we a right to denounce them as opposed to true values. Without value are such goods of our vanity because the desire which is gratified by them is a strictly individual will. Happiness as a feeling of pleasure, as satisfaction of personal longings, has no place in the realm of pure values. But there exists another happiness. If we do not use the word “happiness” carelessly, we ought after all to speak of the emotion of happiness only when it means more than a mere feeling of pleasure, more than mere fulfilment of a desire for the things of the outer world. The difference, to be sure, usually remains below the threshold of consciousness. The true happiness is not the satisfaction of a will, but the complete harmony and inner agreement of all our volitions. This agreement is a value, a pure æsthetic value. Every single volition in us may be personal and therefore without value, but a state of the soul in which all the volitions harmonize is a complete value. This unity is over-personally valuable and absolutely valid, like the unity of the beings in love and the unity of things in the beauty of nature.

In the unity of happiness it is the inner world of a single being in its own completeness which is in question. If we meet a personality whose inner volitions are understood and felt by us and are felt as entirely harmonious, his inner world lies before us with the same pure value of unity which the

outer world offered to us by a sunny spring landscape or the fellow-world by a devoted friendship. And if we find all that in ourselves, our own experience lies expanded before us in a pure over-personal beauty. Our own self is then raised from the level of mere personal desire to the height of completed unity in which our over-personal self finds absolute satisfaction. We must not forget that the purity of the over-personal value has nothing to do with the significance of the content. Even the most trivial judgment is logically absolutely valuable, provided it is true. In this way the æsthetic value may be given in perfect purity, even when the happy soul shows unity of volitions of which each is trivial and insignificant. We must only demand as in every case of unity that it is really a question of volitions. That already indicates the difference from the mere satisfaction of personal desire. Our personal longing becomes annihilated in its satisfaction by the things of the world. It is no longer a striving when it is fulfilled. If I am thirsty and long for water, my thirst experience is without any inner agreement; I imagine my satisfaction and I experience my dissatisfying thirst. The one tempts me and the other tortures me, and so my will is without rest. On the other hand, when the drink relieves my desire, this longing comes to an end, and if the will disappears there cannot be any agreement. Hence the mere desire or the mere gratification by things cannot offer any true happiness. The will must not be extinguished in the happiness, but must assert it. The mere absence of desires and absence of pain do not even suggest the true meaning of happiness. He who is merely gratified stands outside of happiness and unhappiness.

Happiness demands continuous willing which is manifold and yet united in itself. Certainly the outer world has to contribute to it, but its part will be the greater the more the experience of things, instead of annihilating the will, satisfies it in stimulating new and ever new volitions. Within a cer-

tain limit, that may pertain to the sensuous pleasures. The pleasure annihilates the original desire, but after all it stimulates at the same time the new desire for the continuation of the enjoyment and is therefore again a source of will. That is the reason that the sensuous pleasure, too, may contribute to true happiness. But the happiness must flow in endlessly richer stream from those sources in which the external stimulus has its whole meaning in the suggestion of new will. When the fate of the world intends well toward us, it does not carry us upward to the goal of our wishes on the wings of fortunate chances, nor does it indifferently leave us in our helplessness. Good fortune shows us the way towards the height, and gives us a helping hand when obstacles are hindering us, and when the way is too steep for us to advance by our own efforts. To arrive at the goal is nothing but a thrill, and to stand still without effort towards a new advance is never true happiness, even if we stand still at the point which was our goal of yesterday. That is the reason that all external goods have only a relative value for happiness; it is eternally impossible to imagine a state which makes us absolutely happy. But that also involves the pleasing thought that no external state can make us absolutely unhappy. However high the point which is reached, to maintain it without further desire is no value of life, and however low the starting-point, the smallest movement upward can be a perfect happiness. Happiness is unity of the inner strivings; that which lies beyond our expectations cannot disturb it. The mind which envies the bird for its wings and the fish for its fins can never become happy, and he who does not desire the yellow jacket of the Chinese dignitary is no less happy without it even though millions adore it as the highest goal. Happiness is always only unity of the inner world in its will-impulses; hence the deep influence of the personal temperament. It is never the outer fate which forges the optimist or the pessimist. The unhappy soul finds the disharmony of will even in the

most comfortable situation of life, and the sunny personality may remain harmonious in itself even when the storms are raging without. There is no evil for him whose will does not resist.

Happiness is will. Hence the inexhaustible content of happiness in truth and beauty and morality. Every true thought which we understand, every beautiful line which we follow, every moral solution in which we participate, is a suggestion for us to a new will which harmonizes with our fundamental will. The situation there never annihilates our will as in a mere enjoyment, but the more deeply our logical, æsthetic, and ethical will is fulfilled the more vivid remains the will itself. It develops itself in the experience to ever new and ever richer volitions. We stand without wish for ourselves in the face of the work of art or of the scholarly system, but the less we wish for ourselves the more we wish and will with the lines and forms, with the tones and words, with the thoughts and fates which captivate us. Without wish we follow the tragedy on the stage, and yet our soul is moved in its depths with inexhaustible will; and all this willing is in inner unity. As far as this will is projected into the drama itself, its unity gives us the æsthetic value of the work of art; but in so far as we feel it as the inner movement of our inner world, it makes us perfectly happy as long as we are really surrendering ourselves to the beautiful spectacle and no outer experience interferes with the harmony of our will.

This will-character makes work also an unfailing source of happiness; whether we influence mankind by our labor or cultivate the field, nowhere does the will find its end by its action. In every completion there lies a new beginning, and we do not want anything else from the happiness of the work but that the work may develop itself in fertility and may always open new opportunities for labor. To live one's life in all the fulness of its creating energies, to will from the deepest soul in every experience with things and fellow-men, to feel the

suggestions of new wills which stream together with the fundamental will of the self — such a moving equilibrium of the inner world is the highest happiness. Even when any counterwill by disappointment and grief intrudes into the mind, the happy soul may vanquish it. The overcoming of the hindrances of will strengthens the harmonious will and brings every gain to more vivid validity. But to live one's life does not mean only to bring to effectiveness its creating energies. To be able to serve in loyalty and subordinate ourselves to the greater task brings beautiful unity not less into the abundance of the resulting volitions. And here belongs the happiness of inner development, of learning and training and growing, and above all of love. Happy the soul which loves, as love indeed is a never-ending harmony of volitions which spring from the own desire with volitions which share the feelings of the loved one. But this unity of our volitions may also be strengthened by the inhibition and elimination of all inner movements which are opposing. Happy, therefore, are the one-sided ones who are controlled by one will, and who really experience only that which harmonizes with their own volition. The thousand counter-excitements which might disturb are brought to silence. Love has just this power. One group of volitions dominates in the inner world and forgotten is the chaos of our existence. Such is the influence of ambition and of fame and of the true joy of creation. The strength, the manifoldness, the significance of the volitions must give to the value of unity in happiness its particular æsthetic position. As the symphony stands higher than the little song, the symphony of a powerful, creative, rich, and influential human life stands æsthetically higher than the happiness in the corner and the joy in the hut. But the value itself is complete even in its most modest form; there is no greater logical value in the truth that one hundred times one hundred is ten thousand than in the truth that three times three is nine.

The inner world which in the experience of outer world and

fellow-world remains completely in unity with itself is absolutely valuable. All the conditions which we demanded for the value of unity are fulfilled. By that at last the absolute value of happiness has come into its right. An idealistic philosophy may have good reasons for separating the tasks of our actions completely from all reference to happiness. The meaning of duty and of moral good may be conceived so rigorously that the moral worthlessness of happiness may appear evident. But that ought never to be interpreted as if happiness cannot be a true pure value, and as if it should be banished from the noble community with truth and beauty and morality. Those who see in happiness nothing but personal pleasure cannot make any concessions, but only the rage of the iconoclast wants to expel all happiness from the world of pure values to prevent its being made a goal for our ethical actions. Happiness is a pure independent value, but an æsthetic, not an ethical one. The world in its over-personal meaning is absolutely valuable by the fact that the glow of happiness illuminates human souls.

The relation of happiness to our duties of life is not touched by such meditations at all. I may acknowledge the absolute value of happiness, and yet not acknowledge it at all as my individual task to propagate happiness in the social world. I may postulate that every one who understands the happy soul is perfectly satisfied in its self-centred unity, and yet I may live my life without any special interest in the question whether this or that man, or the majority of men, or the greatest possible number of men, experience such pure harmony of their inner world. It is the same as with the other values. I may acknowledge also the absolute value of scientific truth, and yet may not feel the slightest obligation to discover new truths. I may acknowledge the pure value of music, and yet not consider it my own duty to invent new melodies. In this way I may appreciate the absolute æsthetic value of happiness, and yet decline to contribute to the

spreading of happiness. It may be that life shows more important tasks to me. It may be that the insight into the dependence of happiness upon will convinces me that no external action is really fit artificially to create the happiness of others. It may be that I find so many factors influential in happiness — health, love, talent, work, friendship, family, success, patriotism, fame, beauty, liberty, wealth, knowledge, art, religion — that happiness may appear to me most uniformly distributed if all those factors are shuffled together in a haphazard way just as life always tries to do it. I may therefore be unwilling to interfere artificially with the events of life. Such a chance distribution may seem to me to secure happiness more uniformly than if we intentionally eliminate the inequality for a few special factors, as for instance for the factor of wealth which some accentuate one-sidedly in its importance for happiness. It may even be that ultimately the opposition between the æsthetic and the ethical values may disappear to my view. We cannot proceed to our last goal here. The question of happiness will still come back to us often.

CHAPTER X

THE VALUES OF BEAUTY

THE values of beauty were for us developments of the values of unity. The values of unity are immediately given by nature and life; the values of beauty are systematically elaborated by the work of art in the history of civilization. It is the antithesis which we are to meet in every one of the four large fields of values, and which after all is not an antithesis but only a further development of that which is given to naïve life by the means of culture. The discussion of what is beautiful and what art aims at does not begin here for us. We have pointed to the essentials before. Everything which we found about the unity in the manifoldness and its absolute value is valid for the work of art also. The self-agreement of the world in our life-experience gave us the value of harmony for the outer world, of love for the fellow-world, of happiness for the inner world. If art is called systematically to bring the self-agreement of the world to its expression in the history of civilization, fine art is fulfilling this task for the outer world, literature for the fellow-world, and music for the inner world.

What must be added to the value of unity that the values of beauty may arise? The æsthetic value of self-agreement of the given was completed for us in every case when the experience was felt in its own will-manifoldness, when these wills supported one another, and when they separated themselves as a closed unity from the remainder of the world. Each of these factors was necessary. The given must be felt in its own will. A thing which is only object for us can never have

æsthetic significance. This will must be really felt by us in living through it. The fellow-will can never be æsthetically in question for us if we take attitude towards it only from the standpoint of our own will, and if we do not sink into the other will. The mutual support of the wills must be complete; any inner discord can never bring to a pure expression the meaning of a self-asserting world. Finally, there must be perfect separation of a closed unity from every other experience; the given manifold can never be æsthetic if we are interested in its connections and relations to the remainder of the universe. If now civilization endeavors to work out the inner agreement of the world with conscious purpose, the task must be to shape the chance experience artificially and intentionally in every one of these directions. An ideal solution of this task is possible only by pure art, which does not aim merely in one or another of these directions, but which by its particular methods necessarily progresses in all of them.

As long as not all of these conditions of inner agreement are fulfilled, but only the one or the other, the chance world is not wholly transformed into beauty. We are then halfway to high art. The side arts and the applied arts arise here. The landscape architect, for instance, beautifies the given nature purposively. He reënforces the manifoldness of the impressions by planting a variety of trees and bushes, by introducing artificial hills and bridges and ponds and roads. If ever possible, he may frame the landscape and limit it for the view from a special standpoint, and above all he will take care to arrange the parts of such a manifold in an harmonious way. Yet whatever the landscape artist may spread before us it remains far from the ideal of a beauty which is isolated in itself and detached from our attitudes. The way may wind gracefully, but it leads far away to a distance which we do not perceive, and beyond those hills there live other men. The trees promise fruit which we hope to harvest in autumn, the meadows demand the mower, and the bench there invites

us to take a rest. Each part connects itself with other parts of experience which are not present. Each part links itself with causes and effects, with hopes and expectations; our own will takes attitude, and the more our will interferes the more everything becomes merely an object and we forget that the things themselves wish to say their own say, and that their own will seeks the inner agreement. In a similar way the art of dancing brings the forms of the body to a manifold and yet unified expression by the rhythm of the changing movements. Nevertheless, no beauty of the dance can make us forget that these human beings of flesh and blood have only for a short while thrown off the burden of the hours, that they do not move dancing through life.

All that holds true even for the applied arts, for the arts and crafts, for the stone-work of the architect and the word-work of the author. When the gown is embroidered in rich colors and lines, when the roof of the castle is supported by massive columns and adorned with towers, when the historical account of a great period is heightened by an imaginative and intuitive language, we are far from the æsthetically indifferent chance activity. Practical life needs the gown only to cover the body, the hall to protect us against the weather, and the chronicle to furnish information about facts. The beautiful cloak and house and historical work always lead far beyond the immediate needs of life. They aim to reënforce the manifoldness of the content, and to bring together this manifoldness again in a unity of expression; they aim to strengthen its own will, and to suggest to us to feel that will for ourselves. In these embroidered lines the gown submits itself to the form of the body, in these towers the will of the palace uplifts itself and rests on the columns, in the rich movements of the historical style the will of the reported deeds expresses itself with a vividness which no dry chronicle could reach. And yet in every case such work remains in a world of relations and connections. If works of applied art are to be loyal to them-

selves and sincere, they cannot suppress the question whether the gown fits the body, whether the house serves the practical interests of life, whether the historical report is reliable. But by that the personal attitude is at once demanded, and a connection with that which is not given must be noticed. Even the most wonderful cathedral and the ideal temple would not satisfy us if they did not suggest that it is the right place for worship. A complete devotion to the meaning and will of the given manifold, a devotion which forgets everything which is not present, thus becomes impossible.

To reach this highest point of detachment, one thing is necessary. The suggested experience must remain without the value of existence. Only that which is unreal eliminates every relation and every practical attitude becomes meaningless. In the landscape painting there are no people behind the mountains, and the road never leads beyond the frame. The marble lion will not spring on us, the dying heroine on the stage does not expect us to come to her help, the figures in the novel will never enter into our daily life. Art brings to us unreal experiences, and at once all those demands for agreement can be fulfilled; whether they practically are fulfilled depends only upon the question whether we have a perfect work of art before us. What is the meaning of this unreality, and where does its significance lie? Certainly the work of the artist is not in every sense without reality. The bronze statue fills a real space exactly like a real man, the Hamlet on the stage even is a real living man, and as a matter of course our impressions from the work of art are real experiences like the impressions from the world in which we are acting. It is also not sufficient to seek the unreality in the fact that the painting is not the real landscape itself, but only represents it, and that the novel is not the real love-affair itself, but only tells about it. No, the fact that a work of art only represents the happenings of the world is not that which characterizes its æsthetic unreality. The naturalistic illustration and the

court report are in the same way only representations, and yet they do not come into consideration at all as unreal.

What is meant lies rather in the following. The value of existence which completes itself in the value of connection demands, as we saw, the recurrence of the identical in new experiences. We studied how this identity constitutes the conservation of the things and beings and their causal connection and their historical influence. As a matter of course, the painting and the statue and the paper on which the words are written remain identical too. As the canvas with oil color, as marble, and as paper they are indeed really existing things. But we do not perceive the statue as a marble block: it is a hero to us, the canvas is an ocean landscape, the verses are the expression of an emotional soul. If we considered the contents of the works of art as real heroes, as real surf, and as real despair, they would awaken in us the expectation that they might enter into new connections. The real hero, the waves, the emotions, cannot go on without expressing themselves in new deeds and processes. The full apprehension of the presented would then have to awaken the wish for new and ever new forms. If we have real waves before us, their rolling must go on, and the present form must be transformed into ever new ones. Even if I see unyielding rocks before me instead of the fluctuating ocean, those rocks are real to me only if I may expect changes from them by their continuation. Their outlines must cross each other in new lines when I come nearer to them, and they must offer me a new spectacle if I climb up on them. The man who is to be real for me must speak and act and make gestures.

To be unreal in the æsthetic sense means, therefore, not to stir up these expectations. The waves of the painting ought not to move, the hero of the statue should not speak; they ought not to be anything but just what the presentation offers. They have no past and future, no connection and influence; all which they have to show is contained in the offer-

ing. We cannot even say that the work of art points beyond itself. The painting is the landscape itself, but it is a landscape which does not connect itself with any other experience, and which therefore has no value of existence. The marble is the hero himself in his unreality. Photography and the newspaper account represent something real which awakens expectations; the painting and the novel do not represent anything. Their content is everything in itself, and only those expectations are inhibited which refer to conservation and connection; that alone makes the content unreal. The means by which the artist suppresses in us the expectations are manifold. The painter gives us nature in the whole richness of its colors, but deprives nature of the three dimensions. The two-dimensional picture is still the whole landscape with all its sentiments and motives; the landscape still contains every suggestion which would come to us if we were to look through a window into the distance, but the elimination of the depth inhibits all expectancy. The wanderer on the way in the meadow will never move on in the painting. The expectation that the wanderer may proceed is not destroyed because the painter was unable to reproduce the landscape in its plastic form. On the contrary, the painter transposed the landscape into the flat plane just for the purpose of completely destroying the expectation that the wanderer might advance. The sculptor keeps the three dimensions. Hence he must have other means of excluding expectations. He gives up the color. The colored wax figure which almost deceives us and almost suggests the expectation of movements stands therefore far below the level of art. The true artist can give to the plastic work only a soft unsaturated color-tone, or if he wants to use natural colors, he must transpose the figure into small dimensions to exclude every possibility of a deception.

The poet makes use of the measured rhythm and of the rhyme so that no one can misinterpret his verses as a mere report of happenings and feelings in the service of life. His

epic and lyrical forms must exclude from the start the expectation of personal complications. The drama which is played in the darkened theatre in the frame of the strongly illumined stage inhibits by this separation every possible expectation that these people with their heroism and their intrigues will enter into the practical life. In this artificial suppression of all felt relations lies the true unreality of the life which art offers to us. All the essential sensations which the things and beings might stimulate in us must be contained in the work of art, but that alone does not give them any reality. Reality in the sense of existence always means a transcending of the immediate impression and the expectation of a recurrence in new experiences. The present offering may therefore show itself in its whole inner richness of the valued manifoldness, and yet may remain entirely unreal because it does not aim to be anything but the present experience. The unreal does not become by that a mere illusion or an appearance, as such words would indicate that the work of art tries to come to us as a reality, but does not succeed. Moreover, in such words lies the implication that the unreal is something of a lower order, something which is less valuable than the real. But the unreal offering of art should never deceive us by the suggestion of reality, and certainly does not stand on a lower level. The unreal is only something absolutely different, which is not on that account of a smaller value.

The preponderance of practical life-interests may tempt us to conceive the relation as if the real alone is positive and the unreal negative. Then it seems as if something essential were missing in the unreal, and as if it would become more valuable if it could still secure for itself also the reality. But with the same logical right we might turn around this whole relation. The unreal is that which offers itself completely in its presentation; it is that which is a whole, which does not point to anything outside of itself. On the other hand, the real has its

meaning in the expectation which it awakens and in the connections which it postulates. In the given experience it is therefore something incomplete, imperfect, unfulfilled. Now the real has become negative, and that which lives in art has become the positive, the higher. The real must now in its incompleteness strive to reach by its connections that self-perfection which belongs to the work of the genius in every instant. From the standpoint of science, art gives us merely an illusion instead of the more valuable reality: from the standpoint of art, science speaks merely of that which is incomplete instead of the more valuable perfect. It would be more correct to acknowledge that the reality of nature and the unreality of art are two coördinated entirely different experiences, which have no reason for mutual jealousy. The unreality that is the self-perfection which eliminates every question as to changes and connections is no humiliation, but is power and strength in art. It is the one-sidedness of our usual view of the world that we silently presuppose that the value of reality alone has fundamental importance, and that the value of agreement has only an accidental secondary character. Both stand at first entirely coördinated. With the same unjustifiable exaggeration we might consider that which agrees in itself, that which is perfect, the beautiful, as the true valuable world. Then it would be an accidental side issue that there also occur in the world experiences which cannot boast of the value of agreement, but which awaken the expectation of connections and hence which have reality.

Thus there is nothing of a conscious self-deception with reference to the reality in the spectator, and all theories which seek in such self-deception the significance of beauty are misleading. All that which we seek in the work of art is really present without any deception. The traits of reality, on the other hand, we do not seek in it. We can even say that art does not seek to show us things and beings at all, as our study of the logical values indicates that the mere conception

of things and of beings posits relations beyond the immediate impression. Things and beings belong to the world of truth and not to the realm of beauty. "Thing" is fundamentally a naturalistic conception and "being" an historical one. That which the painter shows us should not ask any expectations, and therefore can never really be a thing. It is a stimulation, a suggestion, a demand. It does not say: "I am such a thing"; it rather says: "Understand me; take part in my will." And just as the naturalistic thing does not enter into the fine arts, the historical being has no place in the realm of poetry. The poetic figures are for us experiences of their volitions, which do not belong to any being in the sense of reality. We recognized that the historical conception of being involves a connection of the given will with not-given wills. The persons of fiction do not enter into such a connection. The lover whose emotions we willingly feel with his lyric poem is not a conceivable subject for other attitudes. The question with what sentiments he takes attitudes towards politics or chemistry is not a question which we might disregard during the enjoyment of the poem, but a question which is absolutely meaningless. That love-song does not come from a being who after the fashion of historical men remains identical with himself in every situation, but is a completed expression of the love-feeling itself without any thinkable connection with other experiences.

The artist is therefore free from the laws of nature and the connections of history. He can and must eliminate parts which would be indispensable in reality, and yet nobody misses them if he has the necessary maturity for æsthetic appreciation. The bust is cut off at the chest and no one connects it with the other parts of the body which anatomically belong with the head. The marble head demands the legs as little as the color of the skin. Whoever asks to what harbor the ship in the ocean picture is sailing, and where the woman is living who is addressed in the sonnets, has left the stand-

point of art. The ship has never to reach the harbor, and the loved one has never to become visible for human eyes. On the other side, the artist is free to introduce connections which would contradict all naturalistic and historical expectations. The female body may end in the tail of a fish, the shoulders of a child may bear wings, and the trees and the stones may be able to speak in the fairy-tale. Nothing in the realm of art has to make any concession to those expectations which are connected only with the real.

If the artist has to exclude those attitudes which refer to reality, we must inquire what art can offer in place of it. How far is the elimination of reality a necessary help for the perception of that unity which we demand? One interrelation is evident. That which offers itself as unreal excludes every expectation of practical effects. Hence the effect on ourselves and our own surroundings is excluded, and that annihilates by principle our interest in entering with an own action and in taking attitudes. There is no point of contact between the work of art and our practical personality. We cannot enter into the painted landscape, we cannot embrace the Venus, we cannot join the conversation of the comedy scene. We cannot do it because the statue does not stand in our physical space at all, and the scene does not play in our physical time. The one space-form and the one time-form resulted, as we saw, from the mutual relation of things. That which is absolutely detached cannot take part in them, but must remain in its own space-time atmosphere. Thus we stand without wishes in the face of the unreal. We do not want to change it, we do not want to make use of it, nor do we want to protect ourselves against it. In this way our own personality is brought to inner silence as we are certain of ourselves through our will. Our self with its attitudes is perfectly eliminated in view of the content of the work of art. Of course we stand as subjects of will before the framed painting. We are willing in so far as we desire perhaps to own the painting, or as we

want to praise the painter of it; but that refers to the thing, to the piece of canvas which as such enters into the connections of causes and effects. We do not stand as willing beings in front of the persons in the painting. No space, no time, no causality, connects them with us, and a subject without will, not our personality, apperceives the group of persons in the painting. We sit as willing, judging beings in the theatre before the stage, but we do not interfere with the secrecy of Romeo and Juliet's dialogue; we cannot disturb them, we cannot warn them. Without individual personality and without space and time connection with them, we witness their love.

But for these very reasons the own will of the apperceived experiences can now come to its fullest strength in us. We are eliminated; now the rocks and the clouds can speak. We do not want anything for ourselves; now the hero of the tragedy can will in us. We ourselves have become the will of the landscape and of the heroes. In ourselves those experiences can will their own intentions with uninhibited purity. The artificial creation of unreality thus becomes the condition for the richest will-development of the experience, and only through this penetration of experience with will is the condition given for the apprehension of its inner unity. Only will can be in agreement, and the more objects of the artistic experience can express their own will the more they may show us their inner harmony of intention. The content will be the richer in its own will the more significant it is. Even if the unreality of the content excludes the practical will-attitude of our own self, yet the trivial and indifferent remains unable to plant its will in our mind.

If the content is significant enough to let us feel with its own will, the artistic value must depend upon the unity of this will. What are the conditions which favor it? The first is evidently that we must have before us something which represents a totality. As soon as the experience contains a will

which can express itself only in coöperation with the will of that which is not given, we have no artistic unity. The sculptor may give us a bust without the trunk, but he cannot give us the nose alone, and the dramatist cannot give us a fraction of a conversation which we do not understand. The copy of the nose may nevertheless interest the anatomist, and the conversation the historian, but artistically they are impossible. On the other hand, neither natural science nor history can decide from their own conceptions what should be acknowledged as a unity. It is the agreement of will, that means the identity of purpose, not the causal connectedness which we demand. The landscape is therefore just as much such a unity as a single tree, and the closedness of the landscape is in no way disturbed even if perhaps the frame cuts off the open sea or the foliage of the tree. The novel is a completed unity even if the minor characters may offer us no life-story, but exist only in accidental occurrences. All which mutually supports itself in its will belongs together there as unity; all which is necessary for the expression of this unified will is indispensable for the work of art; all which has nothing to do with the common purpose is superfluous; all which counteracts the common end is disturbing if it does not support it indirectly by coming in for the purpose of being defeated. As the artist is free in introducing into the unreal world and in eliminating from it whatever he wishes, he will be able to secure an inner agreement which is superior to any reality.

But his liberty goes still further. He can connect in his unreality, as in inner agreement, that which in reality would leave a complete discord. The painter can paint a most beautiful picture of a dirty, ugly street, the poet can fill a most harmonious tragedy with the destructive disharmony of human fates. It is again the unreality which expands the æsthetic field in this way. In life the single man stands in relation to his surroundings. The dispute of two persons can therefore awaken only unæsthetic feelings in our daily life.

Either we consider the dispute as a whole: then it stands in disturbing conflict with the harmonious form of the society to which that disputing group belongs. Or we consider the individual man: then we find him in conflict with his opponent. Life can resolve this unrest only from the standpoint of society in settling the dispute by justice, or from the standpoint of the individual by transforming the hatred into love. For the artist or the poet the situation is quite different. Now the question is no longer what the dispute means for the other parts of mankind, as all the threads which connected them are cut off by the unreality. The occurrences on the stage or in the novel, as they are unreal, must be absolutely ends in themselves. Disturbing disharmony with the surroundings is thus excluded in the world of art. That which is offered to us is a piece of world-totality in itself, and every individual man now becomes only a part of this new whole. Now the dispute and the discord is the real meaning and purpose of this group, and the drama is harmonious if every figure adjusts itself harmoniously into this controlling purpose. The more vivid the fight, the more unified and the more perfect stands every single person on this background in this own little world. Now our will is no longer torn in different directions by the discord and the tragedy. However much the individuals there desire to destroy one other, we will with all of them, as only then are we able to bring the final meeting, the destructive fight, to an expression which shows agreement in all its parts. The same repeats itself in all other arts. That which is ugly in nature can everywhere be transposed into beautiful art, and we never have to take refuge in the anti-artistic thought that we enjoy there only the overcoming of technical difficulties in the rendering, or that we have the artistic joy in recognizing outer reality. Here, too, the evaluation rests entirely on the inner agreement, which takes new form because in that unreal world a manifold may offer us a completed whole, while the same manifold in

reality could be considered only in its relation to not-given factors.

But finally we come to the most important element. The unreal, which as such is without relation to the forms of our own space, of our own time, of our own nature, and of our own history, must create for itself its own forms. The men of the painter stand there firm on their own feet in a two-dimensional space without depth, the personalities of the sculptor live there in a world without color, the heroes of the tragedy speak there in rhythm of verses, the lyrical feelings resound there in rhymes. Everything which is disturbing and superfluous is simply annihilated, and the beginning and end, the frame and the setting of the stage, close the whole so totally that nothing can leak through the new form. This new own form of the unreal which art has created, and without which reality is never eliminated, stands entirely in the service of the unified task. The form itself is an expression of the will, and favors, yes, makes possible, the inner agreement of the offered experience. The lyrical mood has not only its content, but its own new world-form. It is not only meaning but shape, is not only joy or pain but rhythm and stanza and rhyme; and each must contribute to the unified will. We have to follow up for the special arts how content and shape coöperate there harmoniously.

The essential thing for us is that the manifoldness of these conditions of art does not represent a haphazard combination. The manifold content must be significant, it must be unreal, it must express a will; this will must be felt by us, our own will must be eliminated. If the relation to surrounding, to nature, to history, must be cut off, the whole must be completely isolated, it must have its own form, and this form must be harmonious with the content. But all these factors belong together; they are not combined by chance, they are controlled by one single fundamental demand. All this is necessary, if the inner agreement of the offering is to come to ex-

pression. Only because we seek inner agreement must we apprehend it as will, and only because we want to understand it as will must it be significant in itself and must our own true personal will be eliminated. Only because we want to eliminate our personal will must the offering be unreal, and must therefore be detached and must have its own form. Only under these conditions, therefore, can it be a work of beauty. On the other hand, we understand that this inner agreement of will must be for us an absolutely valid value. It must bring us into a situation which is independent of all personal desires and pleasures. Only in so far as the experience agrees in itself has it an own meaning which transcends the chance flash-like impression. If we seek a world we must maintain the single experience with the demand for an identical recurring of this will in the tissue of the experienced manifold, and only when the identical is felt are we satisfied. In nature and life we could never hope for that perfect agreement, because every particular part stood in a thousandfold relation to the universe and to history, and thus influenced our own hopes and fears and demanded our own desires and impulses. Thus a complete sinking into the will of the world was never possible. The inner agreement, and through it the value of unity, can become complete only when all those relations are united and the experience has found its own detached form by eliminating the expectations of reality. All that can be given to us through art alone: by the fine arts for the will of the outer world, by literature for the will of the fellow-world, by music for the will of the inner world.

A. — FINE ARTS

The fine arts are to express the inner will-agreement of the content of the outer world when it is raised to its unreality. As we have discussed so far the value of unity especially with reference to the outer world and its natural harmony, and the value of beauty especially with reference

to painting and sculpture, we see the field, on the whole, clearly before us. There are only a few further considerations needed as supplement. Above all, it may be desirable to inquire somewhat more carefully how, in the case of the fine arts, content and form belong together, and how they serve their common task.

Every picture in a frame has to communicate to us a content. It may be a saint or a genre scene, still life or landscape. We have carefully studied why this content must stimulate in us a manifoldness, must be significant, and must be closed in itself, containing all which is necessary for the expression of its intentions and excluding everything which points beyond this work of art. We have seen also that the value of this content for the purpose of beauty is independent of the question whether the same content would still be beautiful in the world of reality. Pulled down into the real course of nature, the beauty of many a painted content would be lost. We should not enjoy in life the anatomists who stand around the opened corpse, or the drunken comrades in the smoky inn. Compared with the reality, the content of the picture is further favored by the fact that it is disburdened of everything which does not serve the unified will. The real outer world is everywhere stuffed with partial contents which are not significant for our experience. Even where the perceptions of our senses come to an end, we still have to acknowledge many things as real which we discover by our artificial means. The artist is free from all this; for him there is no content beyond the perceived one. If we should look at the painted flower with a magnifying-glass, we should not find as we do in reality more and more detail of the plant-tissues; the plant-tissue would disappear, and we should see the pigment and grain of the oil color. The content of the work of art must be taken as it offers itself, and we can ignore everything which does not want to show itself; we have no right to go into further details. It may be that in the portrait painting face and

hand alone are really visible, every other part of the figure is eliminated ; and yet that is all which has artistic existence there. Perhaps one single light reflex must stand in place of a thing : nothing else was worthy to enter into the content of the painting.

Of course knowledge and science too perform a selection from the chaos of experience. What we call the existing reality is certainly sifted and much is eliminated. We have studied that carefully. Only that which can maintain itself and which in its self-conservation can enter into the connection is acknowledged as scientifically true. But this scientific elimination makes the manifoldness of the world grow far beyond the experience. That which we experience finds the limits of our senses, but that which we scientifically understand is unlimited, like the system of our numbers, which can endlessly add new numbers and can divide them without limit. All that we experience is only an infinitesimally small fraction of what knowledge conceptionally recognizes. Science simplifies our experience by ordering it, but multiplies the content of our possible experience. Where the eye sees the single drop of dew, our physical knowledge finds trillions of atoms. The inner significance of the atom is of course no longer comparable with the drop which moistens the flower and which reflects the sun. The meaning of the particulars thus becomes empty while their number increases ; and when natural science speaks the last word, the number of the parts becomes endlessly large, but all are of the same kind and entirely insignificant in their individuality. The simplification of art goes exactly the opposite way. Art reduces the number of things, but reinforces their significance. All which is not immediately given does not lie in art's world at all. Science looks with its conceptions beyond the furthest stars which the telescope may discover ; art never looks beyond the frame of the painting. But even in the frame the artistic simplification can never increase the details. Science may resolve the drop of

water into millions of elements; the painter posits for the millions of drops one single radiant stroke of white to express the foam of the surf. And yet the daring power of this one white line may express the meaning of that wave which storms against the rock more vividly than any accumulation of details would have succeeded in doing.

We may say in general that art diminishes the details in their number, but reënforces their inner energy. The swan on the pond becomes for the anatomist a long series of organs, and every organ becomes a series of tissues and finally of cells, and each of the cells is necessary to make the connections clear which explain the organic functions of the swan. But those millions of cells which are reached in such a way are entirely indifferent for apperceiving the swan as it appears to us there on the pond. The painter, on the other hand, does not even give us those few parts which we really see in the swan. Even there he still selects, and perhaps only a few white blotches signify the body, but one noble line from the head to the wings brings us the whole proud tranquillity and soft purity. By the confinement to a fundamental line the whole being of the bird has become condensed into one impression. Of course this suppression of the insignificant contributes again to the feeling of unreality which was so important to us for all evaluation of beauty. The suppression of all sensations from other senses helps in a similar way. The painted wave does not bring us the coolness and the salt air, and yet this lack is thoroughly a strength and a reënforcement, as it inhibits the expectations of reality. The content of the painting is thus offered to us by those features which are most significant for the expression of its meaning.

However, we must not overlook that the offering of the content is by no means the most important factor of the painting. We have seen in what way the value grows with the significance of the content, but it deserves attention that the value does not grow at all with the novelty of the mate-

rial, and even decreases with the increasing ramification and unusualness of the content. Even the most dramatic court trial, which seems to be the climax of a novel, is in a painting æsthetically by far less impressive and interesting than perhaps the picture of an old peasant woman, and the most surprising exotic landscape is indifferent to us at the side of a picture of an intimate little nook among the familiar trees. Everything which is complicated and strange at first leads us away from the given. It posits for our imagination something real in the place of the unreal, and that destroys art. That court scene does not have its meaning clearly in itself; it is a middle piece, for which we add beginning and end in our minds, and enter into connections which are not completely contained in the appearance itself, but are simply attached. The exotic landscape almost awakens even naturalistic interest. But still more important is the other circumstance that in all such cases the content pushes itself into the foreground and wants to be the only factor in the combination of content and form. That which is new or strange or instructive becomes content alone, and by that pure art is destroyed. If the content is to be really significant and important and deep, and yet is not to win a preponderance in the whole which disturbs the equilibrium, it must be a content which is entirely familiar to us or which has a general character. This makes the incomparable value of the religious subjects. In Madonna pictures, for instance, the overwhelming content in its depth of emotion can be grasped and yet the mental equilibrium can be kept because the material is so well known. And such general meaning belongs to the landscape which is nowhere, to the female body which is nobody's, to the imaginative scene which is at no time; there art can reach its most harmonious effects. If the content is not general, the picture too easily serves naturalistic or historical information and instruction; the poetry becomes part of the biography, the landscape becomes part of the tourist's report. True art needs unity of content

and form, and the content therefore must have a self-dependent but only coördinated significance. That can be only if the form itself becomes expression of a meaning and of a will.

Of course for us here the form is not only the spatial form but the whole garment in which the content presents itself. There belongs the color with all its differences of intensity and saturation; there belongs the line with its curves and angles, with its distances and shapes. All those form-parts are made use of also where art is not in question. The illustration in natural history and even the photograph in the rogues' gallery can fixate the content only by lights and lines. But in the work of art alone the demand arises that these means of form themselves contain the value of unity. This is indeed a demand which represents something entirely new in the vision of the outer world. In the harmony of nature we appreciated the perfect forms, but they were forms and colors of things. In the picture the thing becomes, from the standpoint of form, something accidental, inasmuch as that which is to be filled beautifully is no longer a group of things but the space of the picture. And this space, as we recognized, is not a part of the one space of the outer world, and the light which floods through this picture space is not the sunlight which falls through the window of our room on the painted canvas. The frame enclosed a space and an illumination both of which are entirely independent of the rest of the world. The annihilation of all connections and the introduction of this new self-dependent own world-form gives to the lights and the lines an independent will and a significant meaning, provided that the content does not push itself into the foreground. That is not simply the consequence of the limitation by the frame or of the confinement to two dimensions. If, perhaps, we observe a large framed map of America, we see plenty of lines and colors. Every river and every mountain gives lines and forms and every state has its own color-tone.

Yet it would be difficult to feel an independent life in these colors and lines. Whether those rivers form an harmonious combination of lines does not interest us because those black lines on the map do not seek to express any will as lines, and hence they are neither in agreement nor in disagreement. They have only one significance for us, to represent relations of the real geographical world, and this connection with the directions of the real streams constitutes their whole importance.

On the other hand, the lines and colors of the Sistine Madonna do not have to represent anything but themselves. They are not, like the forms on the map, representations of something real, nor are they, like the forms of the outer world, suggestions for a practical action. Entirely detached from everything else, they are determined in themselves as expression of the one framed space. Accordingly each fold in the gown, each line in the rhythms of the child's body, the outlines of the wings of the angels and the sharp lines of the side figures, the lines of the curtains and the heavenly form of the Virgin, each becomes a will which expresses its intentions and seeks most intimate connections with the agreeing will of the other lines. This will has no other purpose but itself. Its own demand is agreement with the lines of the whole, and no other language but this picture language would be able to express the meaning of these folds and forms. The endless harmony of this will reënforces the will itself to more and more vivid activity. And without effort we might submit ourselves and sink into the soul-breathing gracious lines and their harmonious interplay until the painting became for us a beautiful swaying of melodious lines. But that all holds true even for the simplest forms. Here in the landscape picture the steep ascent and the soft curve, the mild wave-form and the acute angle, the broad foundation and the slender height, all come to us in the pure detached picture with their own demand, and every confused mixture

or disorder in such volitions destroys the unity. Every part submits itself to the whole. The one side aims not to tumble over but to be balanced by the other side; the loose play of the upper part demands that the lower part have solid bases; the division into a larger and smaller segment postulates that the one does not suppress the other, and that each may express its own being with independent clearness. And from such simplest harmonious counterplay leads the straight way to the most wonderful symphony of lines like Rembrandt's *Nightwatch*.

The same holds for the lights. Their will is not movement like that of the lines. Their will is excitement, but the endless manifoldness of these excitements enters in the same way into a mutual interplay. Each color-tone has its own way of exciting, and quickly changes it with the saturation and with the expansion. With cutting severity the saturated color turns itself against the softly-toned unsaturated colors, and with antipathy the pure color stands beside the impure, the warm beside the cold. The little blotches of one color which are scattered over the painting charmingly send their salutations over to the broad colored surface of equal tone, and the light color radiates exuberantly between the agreeing dark ones. But one step more. The lights aim not only to be in agreement with each other, but also with the lines. The excitements and the movements must enter into one harmony. The mild excitement cannot tolerate the forcible movement of the lines, and the great pathetic swing of the lines does not will the faint color-tone. And finally the last and the greatest: the excitements of the lights and the movements of the lines want to be in perfect agreement with the meaning of the content. The enjoying spectator of the picture is rarely conscious with what infinite certainty the genius of the great painter secures this highest unity, and how much of the beauty depends on this all-embracing harmony. In itself it would be entirely possible that the sweetest Madonna should

be clothed in a gown the folds of which are angular and the colors of which are loud, and that the side figures should be given in hard sharp outlines. Such colors and forms might in themselves harmonize completely, and might in full agreement characterize a wild loud struggle. But these acute angles and excited colors would agree with the content only if the subject were perhaps an exciting battle. In the same way the horrible story of the battle with all its disasters might be reported with the softest colors and with mild curved lines in charming forms. The little white clouds might adorn the sky, and the trees might frame it in gracious curves. The content itself would not have to suffer at all by such mild whispering line-forms, and yet the unity of the picture would again be destroyed. The ragged stormy clouds in the sky, the knotty branches of the trees, the sharp pointed stones at the bottom, should all take part in the turmoil of the battle and express their wild excitement.

It is hardly necessary to extend these reflections to other fields of the fine arts. The character of the beautiful agreement of all parts remains the same everywhere. Nothing is changed if, for instance, in the beautiful ornament color and form alone without a content carry through their play of intentions, or if in the drawing the color is absent. The sculptor simplifies the material still more; still more, therefore, he reënforces the significant. He must reduce the manifoldness of the content because the important elements must stand out from whatever point his work is seen, and from nowhere must one part be allowed to cover the other parts sufficiently to destroy their significance. But while he gives fewer parts than the painter, he can now take the inexhaustible richness of the dimension of depth into his work of beauty. And what an abundance of will expresses itself in the play of lights on the plastic surface is indicated by the difference between the lifeless plaster of paris and the living surface of the marble.

B. — LITERATURE

In the form of language literature gives us an understanding of the human will. Not the outer world but the fellow-world approaches us there with the pure immediacy of its suggestions and intentions, which are not to be perceived but felt. The mathematical and astronomical, the physical and chemical, the biological, and even the psychological books do not belong to literature. They do not deal with the will in its purposive aspect, as even the psychologist, when he speaks of the will, treats it as a meaningless psychical content. They all deal with the world as nature, and when such works are nevertheless considered as literature it indicates that we do not reflect in that case on the content of the book, but on the writer, and that we take the books, therefore, as expression of will and realization of the personality of individual scholars. Their content stands outside of literature. On the other hand, the works of historians and philosophers belong to the literature of the world if they are loyal to their highest task. The historian indeed speaks of the personal volitions of subjects and the philosopher of the over-personal volitions. In both great departments nothing is ultimately to be described and to be explained, but attitudes are to be interpreted, and to be understood, and to be brought into a will-connection. But history and philosophy are sciences; they aim towards knowledge. Their value is the value of connection. We want to speak now of that literature which aims to be art. The given material is the volitions. The historian and philosopher follow up those volitions in their influence, their consequence, their return; the poet grasps a manifoldness of wills, and apprehends their inner agreement, their unity, their harmonious closedness. In this way history and philosophy are led from the particular will to the world-connection of the will-totality, and yet steadily maintain the particular. The poet can never begin with that which is entirely simple. He

has to start with the manifold, but his manifold by its own unity detaches itself completely from the remainder of the world, and leads nowhere over to another will.

It is the task of literature to find the inner unity in the manifold of the wills of the fellow-world. History and philosophy posit the will in the system of its connections, literature in the unity of its agreements. There the self-assertion of the world-will shows itself by the fact that nothing flashes up by chance; that every volition persists and maintains itself in new and ever new form. Here the self-assertion of the world-will shows itself by the fact that every volition is in inner agreement with other volitions and is thus expression of an independent meaning. Where this unity is felt, it must offer absolute satisfaction. The life of our real fellow-world shows this unity seldom, just as the real outer world seldom offers real natural beauty. We clearly recognized why the connection of realities works on the whole against the perfect detachment and inner agreement. There the work of civilization has to set in. Literature is to open to us the meaning of the fellow-world just as fine arts opened the meaning of the outer world.

Thus literature deals with the will of the fellow-world, not with the outer world. If *belles-lettres* deal with nature, they never move in the track of natural science, and do not even want to offer that which the painter offers. For the fine arts, nature itself is willing; for the poet, not the will of nature but the influence of this willing nature on the willing man is in question. When the novelist sketches the landscape background or the lyric poet forms a piece of nature as content of his verses, nature as such is never the real content. The content is the feeling human soul in which nature reflects itself and in which nature becomes living with such intentions. When in the painting the moonbeam reflects its glimmer in the sea, we, the enjoyers, are to understand this magical will of nature. When the poet shows us such a picture in his

rhymes, we are only to understand and to feel with the human soul which proclaims what the beauty of nature has brought to it. Nowhere in the wide field of literature is there anything under-human or over-human which in itself can be poetical content. Nature and God exist in poetry only for man's sake. His life must be interpreted and must be understood in the agreement of its inner abundance. Whatever does not belong to the human will sink to the bottom through the meshes of poetry. And even if a Shelley makes the cloud speak, it is not the real cloud which speaks to us as it would do from the canvas of the painter, but it is an imaginative fellow-mind in the cloud, which has learned by far too much from natural science.

If the meaning of life is to be interpreted, it must be really life itself which the word of the poet brings to us. But how can we combine that with the fact that he speaks of something unreal which has its origin in his own imagination? Nevertheless, there is no contradiction at all. We saw how the same apparent antithesis disappears for the fine arts as soon as we grasp the conception of reality in its deeper meaning. Reality is a certain value of conservation. If we say that an experienced will which we understand is real, we accredit to the will a certain value which is lacking for the unreal. But at the same time we are bound by it to accept obligations which do not bind us in the face of the unreal. To be valued as real meant to us to be maintained through the total connections of the world and to be linked with the unlimited series of phenomena. To be understood as unreal means, in the first place, that it is to be interpreted and to be unified out of its own content without any reference to the other processes in the world; that it is independent in itself, complete and free. This freedom cannot be deprived of its value by our adding with condescension that it is after all only the invention of the poet. No, that which the poet has created is not that unreal will which we understand and feel as speak-

ing in the poem. What he has created is the tissue of words. Creating always means a certain connection which as such can exist only between realities. The word, the sentence, the story, can be created because of course they are realities. The real poet creates the real poem. The unreal will-content of the poem cannot enter into any real connections, not even into connections with the creating poet, because it is unreal in itself. Just as the artist has not planted the imaginative landscape which he paints, so the poet has not produced the will to which he loans his words. The will which we understand in the story or in the drama is an experience for us which nowhere points back to its inventor, and therefore which never can be lowered in its value by such reference to the author. As soon as we understand the will of the tragic hero in the drama, the experience is for us an immediate life-fact, exactly as much as if the historian reported such a will to us, or as if we heard about the intentions of a fellow-man from his own lips. The single deed which we experience there loses nothing whatever by its unreality. The only thing which is eliminated is its relation to other experiences. Whatever goes on outside of the work of literature is repressed, but that one deed which the poet proclaims stands before us as the true original experience, full of the warmth of life.

The will of the character in the work of literature, therefore, cannot gain anything for its living selfhood by being an imitation of a real historical person. The characters of "As You Like It" demand our true participation with the same right as those of "Julius Cæsar." The historical reality of the political model has for hearer or reader only the one significance that his historical knowledge elaborates and enriches the offered impressions, but this knowledge should never lead beyond the boundaries of the given work of art. The relations which we know from history are sharply cut off by the limits of the drama as far as they tend to bring about connections with that which is not given in the drama itself.

They remain effective only as far as they give a more significant content to the characters. But that holds true after all for every conception which the author uses. Our knowledge enriches our apperception of every word, and as we must understand the language of the poet to be able to follow him at all, in the same way all naturalistic or historical knowledge may penetrate the content of the verses. The localities, the political and religious institutions, the historical events which are mentioned in the piece of literature, therefore mean more to the well-informed man, perhaps even more to the readers than to the poet himself, but only in such a way have we a right to support the apprehension of the historical characters in literature by our historical knowledge. Their reality value, which is the most important thing for the writer of history, is in belles-lettres entirely excluded. The Macbeth of the drama is not more real than the witches. They are all equally unreal, and they are all equally true experiences as soon as their will is really apperceived by us as will.

That is indeed the indispensable condition. We must really understand the will which expresses itself in those words and must feel and live with it. If it is not a will, that which we hear remains only a description of things. Then there is no life in it, and the task of interpreting the meaning of that life cannot be fulfilled. If we heard there about beings who are delighted over pain and who are depressed by the fulfilment of their wishes, beings who know only the future and cannot remember the past, beings who have other senses than we have and who think with another logic, we should be unable to understand them. They would be objects for us, but not subjects with whom we could feel. The character, even in the fairy-tale, must have the fundamental type of willing in common with the real beings. But as soon as we come in contact there with beings whom we can understand, it is just their unreality which offers the most favorable condition for our complete feeling with them, a feeling upon which the con-

sciousness of inner unity is dependent. As soon as we deal with real persons, all the connections are given. We are dragged in with our own desires and inclinations, with our partisanship and our hopes. Only the unreal can speak to us and appeal to us and demand our sympathy, and yet keep us in quietude without own wishes. In the face of the real being, we take attitude ourselves. We will to favor or suppress his influence, to reward or punish him. We want to fight and to assert ourselves. In the face of the unreal will, we are not conscious of any own will. The feeling of our own personality is inhibited, and impersonally we sink into the will which is suggested by the words; we sink into the will of the hero. We are without wishes in the midst of the poem because the unreality has lifted us beyond the realm of action, but the will of the intruding word forces us with its own demands the more intensely. Without any own wishes and without resistance we will the will which is suggested by the characters of the poem. It is true the historian, too, may appeal not seldom to our artistic sense. Then also we enter without personal attitude into the spell of those life-energies of others. But the typical attitude in every historical reading is that we are also interested in the report of historical occurrences on account of the influences and consequences of those volitions. The world in which we do our daily work stands in question there, and we want to understand its products of civilization by turning back to those whose will has prepared it. In the work of literature the will is an end in itself. It becomes for us a last purpose to understand those wills in their fulfilment and in their disappointment. And all subordinates itself to the one ideal of finding in this abundance of will the inner unity, and that ultimately means of finding a meaning in life.

If the poet leads us away from reality he does not promise us satisfaction by showing us another and more beautiful, a better and fantastic life. On the contrary, that would have no

value whatever, as there cannot be any values outside of the world of experience. The poet gives us exactly that life which we know and that experience the meaning and inner agreement of which we desire to understand. When he repudiates the reality and leads us to the unreal, he must do so because only then can he bring us, without any wishes on our part, before a human will. Only then our own fear and hope, liking and disliking, have disappeared, only then those endless disturbances from the attached side-things and after-things are cut off, only then the will of life can be grasped in its original purity, and can be felt in its vividness, and can be appreciated in its inner agreement. Whoever steps down to reality has already lost the deepest meaning of the fellow-world.

Literature brings us before the will of man. Now we know that every human life expands itself in three forms of experience: outer world, fellow-world, and inner world. Every personality may awaken in us, therefore, the threefold question of how its will finds its way in the outer world, how it relates itself to the fellow-world, and how it shows itself in the inner world. It would be artificial to over-emphasize this difference, which is certainly not fundamental in the way in which the various attitudes of the different values are. Yet to a certain degree this separation may perhaps indicate the fundamental character of the three types of literature. The epos narrates what the hero experiences in the outer world, the drama presents how the hero stands in the fellow-world, and lyrics express the way in which the own will in the inner world comes in contact with experience. On the surface such a separation seems denied by the fact that as a matter of course in the epos, too, the hero has dealings with the fellow-world. And when we see with what ease good novels can be cut into effective plays, we may become doubtful whether there exists at all a difference of content between epos and drama. The form alone seems to decide. Yet a certain difference in the treatment of the content cannot be over-

looked. The dramatic poem finds its significance in a distinct antithesis of purposive personalities. The whole drama works toward that opposition of characters, and through it we have the rise to the climax and the solution. That does not hold for the epos. We follow the hero in his pilgrimage through the world and observe his development and his fate, and it makes no difference whether the waves or the men threaten him. The men whom the epic hero or the heroic pair find on the way are embedded in the outer world so that they fuse with the background into a unity and do not reach the freedom of dramatic figures. The other men he finds are much more stimuli, or means, or resistances, or dangers for the hero, like the temptations and hindrances of the outer nature. In the drama the counterplayers are internally coördinated to the hero, they are self-willing, while the epos makes their selfhood fainter. And finally in lyrics, nature and fellow-world have become inner experience, and their will has been transformed into the mood of the soul.

One factor, however, is common to all three contents of literature, the manifoldness of the volitions is held together as a unity. As a matter of course that does not signify that literature reports only loving, harmonious, human beings. On the contrary, we emphasized that at least for the drama the sharp antithesis of opposing wills belongs to its deepest meaning, and yet Hebbel has justly said that the true drama does not leave any dissonance. We know it in our experience of trembling enjoyment when in the highest tension we give our attention to the stage, where the human passions crash against one another until the hero breaks down with death in his heart. We know that our own participating will demanded it, move by move and word by word, just as it proceeded. We feel how this hateful attack was thrown out at just the right instant, we hear with delight how the destructive counteraction was conducted, and the wilder the raging of the battle the more vividly we feel that every syllable from

every lip brings just the desired, the welcomed, the longed-for word. In our deepest soul we will with the one who gives the death-blow, and yet at the same time with the greater one who is still victorious in his death. It ought not to happen otherwise; every side movement, every escape, would have hurt us in our solemn excitement. From the first scene to the last fall of the curtain, we ourselves demanded the horrible just as it developed itself.

The æsthetician must follow up how through fear and pity this great participating will works itself out and reaches its goal. We are interested here only in that objective power of the play which is able to reach such an effect, the power which holds us, who have no wish and no personal part in the affairs, in the spell of participation and sympathy, and forces us to will with all the parties, with the Cæsar and the Brutus together. But again that is possible only if the drama as a whole forms one will-unity. There in that closed will-manifold which the poet has detached from the world and in which there exists no expansion beyond the limits, but only self-expression, it has no meaning that the hero will unless his enemy opposes him. Ultimately the will of the one demands the counter-will of the other. What the poet will give us is not the single man in his singleness. Nothing completely single can ever have æsthetic value. The poet leads us to an isolated manifold. Every particular element stands in all its connections in this isolated limited world. As once Antigone, always again the heroes of the poem have violated the laws of the state to remain loyal to the higher law, and always again the will of the man of the state and the counter-will of the man of conscience sound together into a pure harmony. The hero who upholds his inner voice must perish; his individual will must be defeated by the stronger force. And yet he himself wills that these earthly powers work and fight; he wills that his body be destroyed so that his soul may be saved. This inevitable conflict is just what is unrolled

before us, and both conflicting sides enter without dissonance into the whole. If we want the whole at all, we must will each of the two fighting parties. The more severe their suffering and the deeper their downfall, the more vividly we shall feel with the fate of the heroes. Yet we will it in our own wishless and disinterested interest, because we feel that in this combination of will, the hero must will his outer defeat to bring his personality to the purest expression.

In poor melodramas the torturing pains of the hero torture us, and thus by the artistic barbarism eliminate our freedom from responsibility. We cannot will there with the villain who brings suffering to the innocent, because this group is not held together at all by one unified will. But the tragic hero whose great will is limited by the other will sacrifices himself to save in us the belief in his will, and yet to maintain in us the right of those who brought him to downfall. It is the deepest unity of the life-energies which manifests itself in such tragical conflict. And at its side stands the conflict of comedy in which the will at first poses as great, but as soon as it has to confine itself under the pressure of the counter-will is just as well satisfied with the smallest bit of fulfilment. The agreement exists there, too, but it shows itself in such a way that the great will is recognized as really a small one for which a true opposition never existed. If the inner agreement can be found even in the conflict of the tragedy, it needs hardly any further emphasis that such unity exists where the epos and the story speak about the conflicts of the human life with the surroundings. The epic hero, too, must fight. He may struggle with his enemy, with his love, with his God, and may go down in suffering, but he must develop himself, must remain loyal to himself, and must even win death for himself. Such a life which the poet makes us feel with the hero demands that the enemies attack him; they may be human beings or they may be lightnings. The whole surroundings, nature and man, become alive, but their will, too,

wills not what the hero wills, but what this human life wills. For that reason only the novel keeps us in breathless tension. Hindrances may heap up for the loving couple, but we will these dangers, we will these cabals, inasmuch as we are entirely under the will of this isolated life-totality, and we feel that just this counter-will harmonizes with the will of this self-agreeing manifold.

So far we have spoken only about the content of the literary work. We must not forget that in literature the form is the greatest. We demand from the poet, too, that his material shall not push itself into the foreground, and he is most welcome when he sings once more the old song of the spring and of love, because nothing else matters but how he is able to sing it. Of course in literature it may often be difficult to decide what belongs to content, and what belongs to form. In the drama, for instance, the language may be both. The language is certainly a part of the offered content as far as the choice of words and the positions of words is to characterize the speaking person, while the language is form as far as through it the poet is speaking. The language of the poem should be counted mostly as form. Dialect speech might be considered essentially as content. In regard to space and time, too, we ought to make a clean separation between what is content and what is form. For instance, the dramatic rule which demands from the drama unity of time refers only to the content of the drama and not to its form, or rather to the form of the content and not to the form of the drama. The content of the play may demand that its action occur in one day, and the form of the drama may demand that the play may be given in three hours. The dramatic time-form may be short and terse, and the time of the content may yet embrace many years. The manifoldness of form is certainly still richer in literature than in the fine arts. We have the rhythm of the line and its melody; the rhyme and the choice of the words, their picturesqueness, their strength; the organization

in the stanzas and scenes, in chapters and acts. This organization might be taken together with the rhythm as a temporal form. The rhyme, on the other hand, belongs together with the melody as sound of the words. We should then have three factors, the time-form, the sound of the words, and the meaning of the words, and this separation corresponds to the space-form, the color, and the light-intensity in the fine arts. The temporal rhythm and organization would correspond to the shape which the play of lines gives to the visible arts. The musical tone and consonance of the words would correspond to the colored manifoldness, and the strength and the character of the words would correspond to the strength of the lights. But just here the picture shows the gradation only in the one direction, while the language has in the meaning of the words an unlimited manifoldness of directions, of kinds, of gradations. Finally we must postulate here, as in the fine arts, that the form not only offers a complete unity in itself, but also fuses with the content in an harmonious agreement.

The meaning of the words has the leading rôle there. The artistic effect which emanates from the meaning of words inspires and ennobles the poetry. We do not mean that the word awakens a beautiful vision. No, in the word itself lies the beauty, in its intensity, in its suggestiveness, in its self-dependent will. When in the song word joins word, as the pearls with glimmering lustre join each other in the gleam of the chain, the chance memory images which may be stirred up by the single word are almost insignificant for the soft beauty of the poem. The purer the effect the freer it will remain from such indifferent fringes of consciousness, and the more intimately the beauty will lean on the significant word itself and its poetic meaning. How strange the effect of an old-fashioned word in which the original meaning still faintly echoes, or a picturesque word that points to hidden relations, or a rare word which resounds long for the

feeling. But what is true in this way for the single word holds still more for the complex phrase, for the whole sentence, and finally for the total style. Certainly rhythm and sound enter as important parts, but the mutual relation of the word-energies themselves is after all decisive. All this is ultimately felt as an unending moving of actual forces, of impulses, of volitions. To appreciate a style, each word must be for us not a sound and not an image, but an irradiation of intentions. Just for that reason it becomes possible to seek an inner agreement. The wills of those words must not interfere with each other, they must support each other in their purpose, must mutually reënforce their fullest meaning in order to devote themselves to the expression of the unified will of the whole sentence.

The rhythm of the words is will, too, and again it is the inner agreement of the volitions which satisfies us. This will of the formal side expresses itself of course most strongly in verse. There comes perhaps a trochaic rhythm. The claim which its up and down suggests is already expressed in the first rising and sinking syllables. Every syllable demands for itself alone that attention be given to it, and yet this demand becomes effective only if the sound contrasts with less accented syllables. When after the first accented the first unaccented syllable follows, we feel how this first sound secures for itself the right of the chief accent and suppresses the second. We understand there the will that the first sound is to dominate in the foot, a will which demands agreement from its surroundings. Other trochees are following with the same demand. But an unlimited continuation would make it a colorless indifference. We seek unity, but it must be unity in a manifold, and we have a manifold only if every single part still brings its unity to effectiveness. This individual importance would be lost if one should uniformly follow the other without interruption. Accordingly a small surveyable group organizes itself into a unity of its own with an own chief ac-

cent in a single line, perhaps separated by a final rhyme from the next group with a similar demand. In the same way verses join each other in the stanza, the stanzas each with the same uniform will in the poem. They cannot be combined with iambs. The iambs will that in their sphere in every foot the dominating rôle shall belong to the concluding syllable; the first sound is to serve the second, is to lead over to it so that the hearer may linger on it. Each iambic has its own will which is welcomed by the next, and yet each has its own phase. The sound and the meaning and the shape of the word may easily bring about the result that in a natural reading of a page not two pairs of syllables show exactly the same distribution of accents. Everywhere we feel the same fundamental will, and yet each word preserves its own freedom. It is an unlimited movement, picturesque like the play of the waves in the ocean. This quiet harmony of rhythms controls no less the higher style of prose, and the organization of the smaller groups repeats itself with an imposing movement in the building-up of chapters and scenes and acts.

Finally the tone and the melody of the words represents an own will also. The dark sounds and the light, the broad and the sharp ones, the soft and the hard and the hissing ones, the words with fading sound and those which break off sharply, the word-melodies which ascend and those which descend, all have their own intentions which seek agreement. When at the end of the verse a sound penetrates the soul with an especial emphasis and energy, it seeks a tone which wills the same, and satisfaction arises when at the same place again a rhyme with equal feeling salutes it. The pure form thus becomes a moving to and fro of will-intentions in the manifoldness, a will-satisfaction through the agreement. But all these volitions of the form parts again must sound together in harmony with the will of the content. "Füllest wieder Busch und Tal Still mit Nebelglanz" — who will say what relieves our soul so magically there, the quiet landscape in the soft

moonlight which lies spread before us as the content in the verses, or the mild wave of the line rising and sinking, the melody of the tones in which the first words of the first two lines harmonize like a hidden suggestion of a rhyme, the pure imaginative energy of the words themselves which starts so magically in the first word? Every sound, every tone, every syllable, every meaning there in devoted harmony wills the same as the content of Goethe's stanza.

C. — MUSIC

What pure happiness brings to us in practical life is brought to us in the purposive work of civilization by the art of music: that internal unity in which the unrest and conflict in us is brought to harmonious agreement. In our naïve attitude we found happiness as the immediate unity of the wills in the inner world as against the harmony in the will of the outer world and the love in the will of the fellow-world. In the realm of art in which those naïve life-values are raised to intentional values of civilization, the will of the outer world found its unity in fine arts, the will of the fellow-world in literature, and now we demand that in the same way the will of the inner world find unity in the art of tones.

For the field of music of course it is as true as for the field of poetry and painting and sculpture, that the most familiar way of approaching it is the physico-psychological one. When we spoke of fine arts, we might have discussed every single problem in a psychologizing spirit. We should have studied the visual perceptions, the associations, and reactions which result, and from the simplest harmony of color to the richest painting, the whole effect of our enjoyment might have been described and explained as an organic psycho-physical process. In the same way we might have analyzed and explained the effects of the poem and of the drama. Then those conflicts would have turned into organic interfering waves; brain-

processes and peripheral changes would have given account of the manifoldness of effects. Yet we know that we had to avoid this convenient way of science. At the threshold of our æsthetic discussion, we recognized the fundamental difference between such studies in the psychology of art, which are certainly important and which are prominent in the work of our psychological laboratories, and on the other hand the true æsthetic inquiry which had to be ours. In the world of music the temptation is especially strong to avoid the difficult æsthetic study and to stick to that aspect of the sounds and rhythms, of the melodies and harmonies, which seems so much more concrete, the aspect of natural science and psychology. As soon as science has elaborated the psychophysiological system in the service of causal understanding, every tone-experience can be brought to expression in such language of causes and effects. The manifold of sounds now becomes describable and explainable, and with it the manifold of the psychical processes in the mind which enjoys the music. There is no melody and no chord in the symphony which cannot be completely described by the change of air movements and the combination of vibrations. Here start the important investigations of modern tone psychology. The task is to explain the pleasant effects of the combination of certain tones, their relation to the absence of beats, to the coincidence of over-tones, to the difference-tones, to the fusion of the fundamental tones, or to explain the agreeable results of rhythms by their relations to the tensions and relaxations of the body, to the attention and expectation and emotion. And if we turn to the melody and finally to the whole of the musical work of art, we shall reach more and more complex problems of explanation. But by principle the understanding of the psychological effect of the symphony works with the same conceptional scheme by which the explanation of the simplest pleasure in the octave is secured. The problems and their solutions are controlled by the one-sided interest in the

causal connection of objects which the abstractions of an objectifying science have posited.

But here, too, we have to seek our way before the experience of music has been conceptionally transformed into a series of causes and effects. The tone is still sounding there and not composed of vibrations, and we who apperceive the tone still understand the tone itself in its excitement, in its intention, in its will. It is not our psychological mechanism which produces those impulses as our psychical reply to the tone-impression; in our experience we do not know anything of such a process, and the question of explanation is not ours. We feel the excitement as energy of the tone itself, and we take part in the strength of the tone, feeling with it and not creating it. Even the particular sound nuance of the voices and instruments is still a characteristic unity; it has not been resolved into different combinations of over-tones as it has to be in psychology. The more we set ourselves free from the naturalistic thought-forms of physics and psychology the more we can reach the pure musical experience in our immediate feelings. It is an experience which has lost its soul as soon as it abandons itself to the dissecting thought-act of explanation.

We may start from the rhythms and sounds. We recognized the meaning of the rhythm in true experience when we meditated about poetry. The temporal values and energy-values are combined there. But we must not think of the objective time and its fractions. Just as from an æsthetic point of view the marble statue does not stand in our space, but brings its own space-atmosphere with it, the times of the musical work cannot be measured with our watches. It is an own time, which arises in the sounding itself. And the temporal equality of the bars is an equality which after all only the physicist refers to the objective time, just as the psychologist may refer it to the organic movement of the body. For the listener, at first we have only the forming of

groups in which each single group as a bar expresses a certain equality of value in the internal relation of its energies. An identical will controls it. The accent at the beginning of the bar dominates the will-combination of the group. The single tones in the bar are not short or long in an objective time, but they are fugitive, light, and hasty, are quiet, heavy, and sustained, and only from these characteristics results their claim that the flying movement of many light tones does not count more than the dignified procession of a few sounds or the restful sounding of one imposing chord. Small groups of equal values join each other and form larger groups with their own distribution of chief energies and side powers. But every rhythmic unity serves the work of art only by repeating itself, and as its own meaning is for us a characteristic distribution of energies, the repetition means that the special claim of forces is acknowledged in the next group. It finds agreement there, and the same plan of distributing the energies becomes a new deed.

This mutual willingness offers just those presuppositions which we found everywhere as a necessary condition for value, agreement of will. We apprehend the one group in which a characteristic will manifests itself and seek in the same given manifold the expression of the same will. Then only the planless chaos transforms itself into a unified, organized, self-asserting whole. We seek the will which springs from the same source, and when we meet it our over-personal demand is satisfied: an absolutely valid value is grasped. But uniformity of the bars does not inhibit the inner variety. As in the poem no one iambic has exactly the same distribution of energies as any other, no bar in music is stamped by a pattern. New and ever new combinations and separations play into the uniform order; the second move of the bar prepares for the expression of energy in the next bar, and links itself in this way with the new group. The energies may stir about in freedom, and yet they never lose their ready and

willing inner agreement. All that repeats itself in the broader groups, and perhaps even through the whole tissue of a sonata this inner harmony of the rhythmic partial volitions can be vividly felt.

The harmony of the tones and sounds joins that of the rhythms as the harmony of the colors agreed with the unity of the space-forms in the picture. Usually the differences of tone-pitch are compared with the differences of colors, but perhaps it would be more helpful to give up such a tradition, and instead to compare the color of the picture with the nuance of the sounds, that is, its instrumental character, and on the other hand the differences of pitch with the distances in space. Then only should we overcome the curious experience of having only six colors, red, green, yellow, blue, white, and black, but more than ten thousand musical tones. There are indeed numberless tones, just as there are numberless points in space, and there are only a few colors, just as there are only a few nuances of sound. If we see a single light, we say it is blue or bluish green; if we hear a tone, we say it is violin or whistle or trumpet or human voice. But the only essential thing for us here is that tone-distances and sound nuances and rhythms are as necessary for the upbuilding of the musical form as the space-distance and colors and shapes are for the form of the painting and sculpture. What the sound nuance has to say to us surely must not be deduced from memories which refer to the instrument. The sound of the organ does not say that it is the organ and that its place is under the arch of the church. The complete fulfilment which lies in the organ sound moves the soul immediately in a way which is incomparable with the daring dash of the trumpet fanfare. Each sound has its own power of energy, just as the landscape appears unequally excited when it is seen through glasses of different colors. But the energy really lies in the sound itself. It would be explanatory psychology if we were to say that all refers to feelings of energy in us which result

from a special distribution of over-tones. And these exciting energies tend to remain in mutual agreement, they reënforce each other, from the duet in the chamber music to the unlimited multi-coloredness of the modern orchestra.

This demand for inner agreement comes to us most vividly in the harmony of the sounds and in the resolved harmony of the melody. If we avoid the psycho-physical formulation of the question, all the fusions and over-tones and mathematical relations of vibrations do not contribute anything to our understanding of the real problem of harmony. It is in a certain sense an ultimate fact that we experience perhaps in the chord of the major scale a manifold in which each tone seeks the others and favors them. The lowest of the tones dominates in it; we feel its controlling force, and yet at the same time its willingness to welcome the highest tone, the similar finer and frailer octave. And both together hold and support the third and the fifth, which want to express their own meaning, and yet which in their whole intention refer to the fundamental and its octave. It is like one uniform structure in which all parts support one another, in which each submits itself to the whole, and yet in which each is allowed to be more than it could be for itself alone. And always it is a moving equilibrium; it is a complete last fulfilment in the unity and yet an endless swaying of the inner movement. The octave might be compared there with the closedness and yet never ending movement of the circle, the fifth and third and fourth with various ellipses, the intervals of more characteristic manifoldness with richer figures, each of which is closed in itself. The inner agreement remains even in the most excited consonance.

In the living work of music the chord is of course by far richer than in such isolation. There in music it is beginning or mediation or procession or conclusion, and its value of unity is so strongly influenced by that which leads to it and by that to which it leads that even the dissonance, the inner

disagreement of the tones, may become part of sounding beauty. The disagreement enters just so far that its overcoming in the following tones brings the more vividly the real inner agreement. Only in the succession of tones can the incomparable meaning of the subtle sounds express itself; only in the mystery of melody can the tone reach the full happiness of the pure fulfilment of its will. It is a seeking and finding, a half-allowing and hindering and a fulfilment, which comes to us in the play and counterplay of the sounds. From the unlimited possibilities of tones our scale has selected just such distances as bring the differences clearly to expression, and yet which indicate distinctly how they are related to each other. The whole richness of those mutual relations lives in every musical manifestation. Even in the smallest melodic movement, if we really understand it, every progress of tones points to this background of the relations in the scale. The tone from which the movement starts does not disappear. The new tone is conscious of its dependence from the first, and when it proceeds and presses forward, it does not seek without plan a mere sounding. Bound by the inner law which is proclaimed by the first tones, every coming tone is already prepared, and in latent demand for harmony in the whole tone manifold it has found its place beforehand. The clearest case offers itself at the end of the whole. If a melodious tone-movement has reached the tone before the last, even the unmusical person feels that just this must be the last tone. He does not will it; the tones themselves will it. He feels how the whole tone-movement has pointed toward this one tone and has demanded its entering as the conclusion. Perhaps nowhere does the self-will of the tone come to us more impressively, and if the music is suddenly broken off, the tones remain and wait for their salvation by the one tone which they demand, for the return to the tonica.

Of course it would be flat and trivial music if the hearer

could always say with the same certainty beforehand what solution is to follow. And yet even in the freest and most original creation of music, that very tone when it comes is welcomed by the totality as the one expected. The tones which we have heard will the following, they eagerly demand them in themselves, and the more richly the flights and runs of tone deviate and escape, and the more frequently the side-intentions try to intrude, the more vividly remains in the totality the fundamental desire for the return and the postulate of overcoming that which separates the desire for unity. And those side-intentions and that counterplay all come in just as the whole demands it to express its own will. Every single tone finds its ready-made little place, where it slips in as if all the other tones had prepared for its coming.

All this, too, can be explained in the language of psychology. For the psychologist the tones themselves do not will anything. Their selection is determined by the instruments, by the resonance of the rooms, and by many other historical conditions, since by the hearing of such music our psycho-physical systems become trained in certain settings of the reaction apparatus. We have acquired a latent disposition to reply on hearing certain tone series with expectant psycho-physical attitudes which are determined by intervals of the scale. All these feelings of expectation fuse with the perception of the sound, and hence arises the illusion that the tones themselves have a desire and expect beforehand the joining tone. But the matter-of-course fact that such transformations into the causal language of physics are possible does not change the understanding of the original experience. If we enjoy musical beauty, we may not know anything of this psycho-physical scale knowledge; and yet we may not lack in the least a full understanding of the chamber quartette or of the symphony. We understand the glistening tones well, and we should not understand them better if we substituted for the tones the air vibrations and posited their will in our

own psycho-physical attention and its reflex apparatus. The tones will each other as in the poem the rhyme seeks the rhyme. That is the most certain immediate experience. But with that everything is posited which is necessary for the over-personal satisfaction. The tones are now not impressions but will, and we hold and keep the will which speaks to us and seek a sympathetic will in the given manifold; and tone after tone comes and fulfils this demand for agreement of will. There a value is completed. Rhythm, sound, harmony, and melody thus equally represent will-relations which in the beautiful work of music are in inner agreement. But it hardly needs any emphasis that these four kinds of agreement must combine themselves again to common deed. As in the painting forms and colors and in the poem the rhythm and the rhyme and the strength of the word must harmonize, in music too the rhythm cannot be separated from the melody, nor the sound from the rhythm. The change of the one demands the change of the other. The slow succession of tones played in a hasty tempo has lost its value of melody. An unlimited multiplicity of will must be interwoven in this way, and yet must support and mutually favor itself in all its parts.

But does that really completely express the meaning of musical beauty? Has the music really only this fountain beauty and this arabesque value? Are the formalists right who deny to the work of music all further meaning and content? Surely, then, we cannot compare it with a painting in which the lines, forms, and colors may delight us, and yet which besides form and light offers a self-dependent content. Nor can we compare it with the poem which also has the beauty of the sound and rhythm and the strength of the words, and yet which besides all that moves our heart by the meaning of its content. But is it really true that in music the beauty of those moving tone-forms does not allow also an harmonious content? Of course those are surely in the right

who do not consider it the purpose of music to describe the things of the outer world. Such meaning and content really do not belong to the tones. Where the programmatic music begins to describe the things, the programme usually has to help out to show the way for the imagination. Even when the things are imitated by their accompanying noises, when the rolling of the thunder or the trampling of the horses proceeds through the orchestra, it remains external, accidental, and ultimately unmusical. Only when the mediation is brought about by accompanying feelings, music enters into its own right. But then the awakening feeling is in question and not the impression of things, and that touches an entirely different ground.

But can we even say that music presents feelings? Whose feelings are meant? The piece of music may tell us something of the feeling-life of the composer and also something of the player, and yet surely this individual manifestation of soul-life cannot be the meaning of the music. When we see a drama on the stage, we also have a strong impression of the internal life of the writer, and independent from it an impression of the mental life of the actor. And yet neither is the inner content of the play for us. The composer has no right to be dreamy when he composes reveries, and the virtuoso who plays them still less. If a dreamy feeling expresses itself in the tones, it must be detached from the composer and the musician as such, as the feeling-content of the poem is separated from the reader and the poet. But others believe that music itself has to render feelings; and there cannot be any doubt that composers have sometimes consciously tried to do so. Yet the artistic effect hardly transcended an external imitation. That cannot be the deepest life-nerve of music. Such a description of the feelings of other men remains indefinite and accidental. Again we are ultimately dependent on the title and the printed programme. The lyric poem gives us such expression of the feelings of the other man. In music

we cannot link the feeling with any definite fellow-being. The verses speak to us as a neighbor speaks, but the tones do not refer to any definite place, and do not start from any definite person, even if we see with our own eyes the artist who draws the bow over the strings of the violin. Painting speaks with the language of the outer world, verses speak with the language of the fellow-world, but tones do not come from without and as strangers: in ourselves live all their movements. It does not belong to their meaning that the tones start there without from the instruments and are mechanically produced by human beings. The melody is not changed if it comes from right or left, from above or below. As soon as we apperceive it, it has become spaceless, and its whole existence develops itself in our own inner life. That is not meant in a psychological sense; that would be indifferent and insignificant. Psychologically, the painting and the drama, too, must become my own idea to interest me at all. Here we stand far from any psychology, at a point from which we see the outer world and the fellow-world in contrast to the inner world of the self. The fine arts and poetry thus refer to the not-self, but from such a standpoint of immediate experience the tone-movement appears in the own I. The sounds of the symphony are not our contents of consciousness. As such they would not play a particular rôle. The paintings and poems would be such, too. But those sounds are our own life-experiences, their intention is our intention, their will is our will, their fulfilment is our perfect rest.

In this sense we say that just as the fine arts manifest the outer world and literature the fellow-world, music expresses our inner world. Nothing definite, nothing conceptionally determined, is communicated by the tones. They awake the own self, and only what there is in ourselves can get life through the tones. The same tones may awaken in one the image of the spring landscape and in another the picture of beautiful beings, may awaken here love and there joy or en-

thusiasm, but the truth is that they do not present anything and do not describe anything, but liberate the own willing self to its free life in the moving tones. The work of music forms our own inner world to a unified tissue of volitions, and thus brings meaning into the wilderness of our feelings. The will which music brings to us is thus not a metaphysical world of will which comes to description. No, it is our personal life-will, and our personal feelings develop themselves in it.

Moreover, those volitions and emotions and feelings are unreal, just as the landscape of the painting and the hero of the poet are unreal. They, too, do not demand connections which lead beyond the æsthetic experience itself. They do not demand any action, they do not intrude into the practical existence; they are perfect in the experience itself, and nevertheless they remain true immediate experiences with the full warmth of life. The painter who shows us the outer world assures us of the unreality by presenting to us a mere two-dimensional extension and avoiding the depth; the poet who brings the fellow-world to us emphasizes the unreality by speaking in verses or from the framed stage. The composer who shows us the volitions of our inner world brings out the unreality of this will by intertwining it with the spaceless fugitive tones which have no model in the world of things and beings, and which therefore offer no hold for our actions. But as soon as we are conscious that our will is not a real will, and that means that it is no will which demands actions and which enters into the world of connections, then it can without inhibition live itself into the will of the tones, and can feel itself in the abundance of their will.

The other arts touch us with the things and the beings; the tones lead us back to ourselves. We will with them as they have their own reality in us and do not want to be anything but our own self. Our own will thus becomes that fundamental will from which the tonal movement starts. The dominating will of the *tonica* is felt as our own I, and the play

of the melody enters into this will of ours just as the outer world of experience penetrates into the inner world; and as we remain continually conscious of ourselves also in finding the outer world, every tone in the melody is felt in relation to the fundamental tone. In the manifoldness of the harmony, it is as if the whole multiplicity of our own inner world comes to consciousness, and yet here, too, every intention remains related to the self. It is not the outer world itself which we find in the melody, not the fellow-world itself in the harmony, but only outer world and fellow-world as experiences and inclusions of our inner world. Everything remains related to the striving and counter-striving of the feeling and willing of the self and returns to it in the unity of the I. Life with its connecting reality can bring us this perfect inner agreement of our will only in the instant of purest happiness: in beautiful music it comes to us lastingly. The tones which realize their will and hold what they have aimed at from the beginning, through all the hindrances and deviations, become to us expression of our own will, which asserts itself in its inner world through all its outer experiences. And this inner agreement of our desires finally gives to our own life its perfect meaning. Music does not picture this will: the tones have become music only when they have become our inner world and its will. Then only can our inner life form itself in such a unity through their manifoldness that it becomes pure beauty itself in its rhythm, in its harmony, in its life-melody. But the tones to which our life thus gives meaning and content in the perfect form express a will which asserts itself, and this maintaining of the identity of the will completes the eternal validity of the absolute value.

PART IV

THE ETHICAL VALUES

CHAPTER XI

THE VALUES OF DEVELOPMENT

EVERYTHING which we have considered so far was lying before us finished and completed when we evaluated it. It was something entirely given, which was valuable in its existence, in its connection, in its unity, in its beauty. But that which is to be valuable for its development's sake gains the value just in its transition from the given to the not-given. It is not being, but becoming. Experience alone is not sufficient there; the deed is needed. As soon as the deed is performed, the development completed, we have again only something which is finished, and as such it can again claim only the value of connection, no longer the special value of development. Such becoming may go on in the outer world, in the fellow-world, and in the inner world, and the inner forming may be absolutely valuable even where the deed is done without any conscious evaluation. On the other hand, the valuable deed may subordinate itself to a conscious purpose; it then becomes an achievement. Such purposive intentional realization of values meant to us civilization. Hence the values of achievement are values of civilization; the values of development are immediate values of life. Both belong intimately together. Civilization carries on in the values of achievement what is enclosed in the values of development in naïve experience. Thus they are related to each other like the values of existence and of connection, or the values of unity and of beauty. The values of achievement which civilization upbuilds are those of industry, of law, and of morality. We must study them carefully later, but our next step must be to inquire into those life-values: when is the becoming which does not aim

to be a real achievement yet absolutely valuable? We shall have to separate as before the outer world, the fellow-world, and the inner world; and correspondingly we ask for the development in nature, in society, and in personality. In nature we call it growth, in society progress, and in the personality self-development.

So far we have considered facts which were given and therefore withdrawn from any free decision. The system of nature or of history or of reason is given to us and binds us by its objective fact-character, and so does art and love and happiness. In development and achievement, on the other hand, our evaluation depends upon the freedom. The value itself does not yet exist, and does not necessarily result from that which is given. Of course much depends upon the standpoint. The drama and the symphony also pass by, and when I see the first scene or hear the first bars, the remainder has to unveil itself slowly. Nevertheless, I consider the work of art as something completed; I value it in its completion. The same holds true as to the succession of natural connections or of the acts of reason which science reports. The solar eclipses of the next thousand years do not yet exist as experiences, and still they belong as parts to the universe which I can calculate from the given facts. No deed of freedom can change their being. Unnoticed factors may interfere with my calculation, but whatever may come is completely determined by that which is given, and it comes in consideration only as an entirely necessary connection. Whatever stands in such a causal relation does not allow a deed and in this sense no free becoming. Everything is closed beforehand. That also holds true for the connections of reason. Whatever the mathematician may find, of course his seeking and finding is a free deed and an achievement, but his mathematical magnitudes do not show a becoming. Their unlimited system is necessary and in its structure completed. For the connections of history this evidently does not hold. The historian cannot calculate

the artistic or political history of the future as we calculate a solar eclipse. History is really deed, liberty, development. Historical science therefore can deal only with that which has become a given fact, that is, with the history of the past.

Of course there cannot be anything in the world which cannot be made a possible object of knowledge. Everything can be brought into scientific connections. If yet free development is to be possible, it cannot mean that there are parts of the world which are inaccessible to the explanation of science. That which characterizes the difference must be rather a different standpoint. That which is from one point of view a series of given facts, the completed connection of which science has logically evaluated, is from another standpoint a development which we value as the free deed of the becoming. Just as the completed connection is accessible to science even when the end is not reached but only calculated beforehand, on the other hand, the evaluation of the free deed and development may very well be possible even when the goal is already reached. We have only to put ourselves in our thought into that instant in which the decision and development are starting. The solar eclipse of the future is treated by science as if it were already a settled fact. Correspondingly, if perhaps we want to evaluate the achievement of Mucius Scævola, we have to think ourselves into that moment in which he stood still free before the decision whether he should thrust his hand into the flames. In the same way development and achievement stand in contrast to unity and beauty. Here, too, it is a fundamentally different standpoint. The inner agreement which is material for the æsthetic valuation belongs again only to that which is completed and finished, while that which we are to value as achievement and development must be incompleted and unfinished. That which is to be beautiful must have performed its decision; that which we are to appreciate as achievement must show itself to us at first before its decision.

When are the conditions given for this special kind of valuation? We said the world must come in question in its becoming. The experience which comes to us must accordingly be the starting-point for the transition to something else. It must extinguish itself to let a new experience take its place. But the mere otherness can never be valuable in itself, as we saw that every satisfaction rests in the grasping of the identical. This transition can be valuable, therefore, only under the one condition, that the other which comes is a realization of the first which has gone and is thus identical with the first purpose. If we apprehend a given in such a way that it wills to be another, the transition into that other is a realization which satisfies us. It is this transition which we call development. If such a will to a particular otherness is a will in which everybody must participate, the satisfaction in the transition is over-personal, and the value of the development is accordingly absolute. The value of a development or of an achievement is thus dependent upon the fact that an experience comes to us with the will to be something else. The seed which wants to be a sunflower may develop itself. If it does not grow, if the sprout withers, this value of development does not become fulfilled. And if a rosebush grows up where we expected the sunflower, again there is no development. In that particular life-situation in which we deposit the seed-corn in the ground, we apperceive it as a seed which wants to become a flower. Its will-purpose is the true experience for us, and in the change of things the full flower alone can satisfy our desire for the identical content. In this way the change becomes valuable. We see clearly the contrast to knowledge here. For the physicist the seed also has its will, but only the will to remain itself. For the purpose of explaining the changes which later come when the seed lies in the moist soil, the naturalist must apperceive that seed-corn as the combination of innumerable particles of which each remains conserved. If the flower grows out of the soil,

the naturalist does not consider it as a change in the content of the seed. For him it is now the material of the seed together with the water and the chemical substances of the soil and the air, which all in common build up the flower, but which all remain unchanged in this upbuilding. For the naturalist, the flower is therefore in causal connection with the whole sum of originally separated substances among which the seed was an essential but small fraction. The connection is logically valuable because the flower is identical with that mass made up of seed and soil and water and air, and can be understood by the mere conservation of those substantial particles. On the other hand, if we value development, the flower is identical with that which the seed-corn willed, and all those substances of its surroundings were only means which it utilized to realize its goal in becoming the other.

In the midst of a given definite manifold a will which is directed towards a not-given can never find its satisfaction. In the world which is given we cannot find value unless every demand is completely satisfied in the given itself. Every logical and æsthetic valuation is directed towards such a given manifold. Thus the will to the otherness can never have a place in the true or in the beautiful. In the logical values the given will conserves itself in the given totality; in the æsthetic values the single will agrees with the other wills in the given manifold. Only in the values of development and achievement the single will gives up the given and by its deed goes over into a not-given. The appreciation of this transition is therefore never knowledge and never æsthetic estimation; and yet the valuation which expresses this entirely different attitude has a completely coördinated independent claim. In one of these three forms every possible valuation of the world-experience must express itself. Every evaluation had to be based on identity. The experience may come to us as completely determined. In that case we may either follow up the single experience in its identity, or we

may perceive the identity of the many experiences in the manifold. But if the experience is not yet determined and still dependent upon a free deed, there is only the one possibility of finding an identity; the final end which is reached must show itself identical with the intention. Any other, any fourth relation of identity, cannot be possible in the midst of the experiences. It was the independent self-conservation of the world which constituted that logical value; it was the independent self-agreement of the world which constituted that æsthetic value; and the fact that now the will to the not-given leads to an identity between intention and fulfilment brings us the independent self-realization of the world. We might call it the ethical value. By it alone the self-asserting world expresses its deepest meaning. Of course we still must examine whether the world really has this deepest meaning of the ethical value. It depends upon the question whether we really find an absolutely valid will to otherness and its realization. It would be possible that every will in the experiences is directed only towards self-conservation and agreement, and that every other will has only individual character. In that case we should have truth and happiness and beauty in the world, but no deed which as such can claim absolute value. Then there would be no development, no progress, no achievement in its purest meaning, and while the actions and processes and new formations might secure personal satisfaction, they would not offer a basis for an absolutely valid valuation.

This new group of values is similar to those which we considered before in the circumstance, that the evaluation always refers to a relation and not to the contents which enter into the relation. We saw every time that the single as such never has a value. The value belongs only to the relation between that which we grasp and which seeks its identical counterpart and the new experience in which the identical content is found. Not the impression has logical value, but its return in new form secures the value of existence. Not

the single parts of the manifold have æsthetic value, but their relation of inner agreement. The same holds true for the value of development, and just that is too easily overlooked. The final end of a development is in itself not more valuable than the starting-point. It is the transition from one to the other which is valuable. The becoming is valuable, not that which has become. Only if we keep this fundamental principle of the doctrine of values firmly in mind shall we be able to avoid later a distortion of the deepest meaning of the values of achievement. The values of industry and law and morality depend upon the clear recognition that it is the deed and not the result which constitutes their value. The development is valuable, but we have no right to say that the reality to which it leads is better than the reality from which the development started. We separate again the consideration for the outer world, the fellow-world, and the inner world, and thus begin with the growth in nature.

A. — GROWTH

The natural science of our day is proud to be a science of development. The rigid being of things has been moulded into an insistent becoming, and only through the knowledge of developments have "the riddles of the universe" been transformed in our time into such convenient matter-of-course solutions. We know how world-bodies develop themselves new and ever new from rotating nebular masses, how the earth developed itself from the sun, how the surface of the earth developed itself by cooling off, how "fourteen hundred million years ago" the first little living lump developed itself from inorganic substances, and how the lowest protists developed themselves from it, and later the other invertebrates, and then the fish and reptiles and birds and mammals, and finally the men. And yet the theory of knowledge must stick to it that in the nature of the naturalist by principle no development exists.

Development, we claimed, cannot be asserted without valuation. We did not demand that the goal of the development itself be more valuable than the starting-point, but the development is a transition and a change which is valuable. It would be meaningless to speak of development without this reference to a value. But just this valuation is entirely opposed to the deepest meaning of natural science. We recognized that by principle the things which enter into the causal connection of nature cannot have any other will than the will to conserve themselves. The only value which the naturalist can acknowledge is the value of connection, which is completed as soon as the changing appearances are reduced to the perseverance of the parts. The direction of the change cannot itself again be valuable without our completely leaving the circle of naturalistic conceptions. The will to be something else can never enter into the connection of nature in so far as nature is to be object of knowledge. All purposiveness is thus excluded from natural science, and it is purposiveness which gives meaning to the value of development. This does not in any way exclude the use of teleological aspects for the work of the naturalist. The purposive consideration is there only an instrument towards the causal knowledge. Science starts there from the end-point of a series of changes, but its aim in looking backward is to find the causes which led to this end-point. The will towards the end does not become for that reason itself an effective cause. In this sense even the physicist and astronomer may group their facts under teleological points of view. They may speak of movements which aim towards the smallest possible loss of energy, or of an exchange of energies which leads to the greatest possible energy that can be transformed into labor.

Such teleological treatment is still more natural in biology. The whole modern Darwinism is in this justified sense controlled by the reference to goals. Everything is related to the aim of nature to produce completely adjusted organic beings.

Everything there seems subordinated to the goal; and yet the meaning and the success of this modern biological view lies just in the fact that no will which aims towards this goal is put into the calculation itself. Everything is deduced from causes which are effective without aim and purpose; everything becomes finally explained by the conservation of things and energies. Whether the investigator examines the facts with reference to the effect, or starts with the causes, is then fundamentally indifferent for the character of the final solution of the problem. If he starts from the effect for which he seeks the causes, he may hold that end before his eyes as a goal. Even in the final presentation he may group the causes in such a way that they seem to be directed towards a goal, but among those causes he does not acknowledge an energy which as such is intentionally directed towards a goal. In the system of nature no teleological energy has brought about the change from the protists to the other animals, and no teleological energy makes the acorn grow into the oak tree. The vitalism which would like to coördinate such teleological energies to the physical chemical energies in explaining the life-processes is untenable and logically reckless. Such vitalism may be welcomed if it seeks only to be the reaction against the superficiality with which certain naturalists try to give the impression that science to-day can already mechanically explain all processes. There it is perhaps quite useful that such a reaction points to those many occurrences in nature which still resist the mechanical interpretation. But vitalism is then only a collective name for the problems which are still unsolved to-day. Vitalism itself does not offer the smallest handle for their explanation. The mere acknowledgment of a teleological energy cannot contribute in the least to our understanding of nature as nature.

The relation is only apparently changed where a mental consciousness of purposes really enters into the question of the natural phenomena. In the realm of the natural mechan-

ism, even the psychical thought of a goal is only an ideational content which is coördinated to the other causes of the event. By principle the method of explanation is not changed by it. The psychical process of thinking a purpose is only a part of the psycho-physical process which works causally like any other cause. From the standpoint of subject-reality, and therefore from the standpoint of the historian, every aiming and positing of purposes means a transcending into that which is distant. But that is an aspect of the will in which the attitude is felt and participated in and willed in its subjectivity, and which is entirely different from everything objective, perceivable, and causal. From the standpoint of natural explanation the intention itself becomes a content of consciousness which cannot be more or less effective than other contents of the world. It is a partial cause of the following events. The finding of plans and purposes in the organic beings ought never to push natural science away from its causal track. Even the inventor who constructs the machine, with all his anticipating thoughts, is for the explaining naturalist only a part of a causal system, and his inventive thoughts and impulses are only a part of the causes which coöperate in the construction of the machine. His deed, which for the historian of civilization is important just by being apperceived in its purposiveness, becomes for the naturalist and psychologist a content of consciousness which causally produces certain bodily movements. From the standpoint of the naturalist, therefore, nothing is simplified even when the hypothesis of a purposive intelligence of God is posited at the beginning of things. God's mind itself then becomes a complex psychological problem; God's thought-purpose itself then demands an explanation through causes and an explanation of its effects, but it does not in itself explain anything. The religious vitalism is in no better situation than the biological. The will — it may be that of animal or of man or of God — no longer wills anything as soon as it has entered the system of nature.

Accordingly it is settled for us: the real will towards otherness and its fulfilment do not represent a naturalistic conception. They have nothing to do with knowledge. The value of development which belongs to such fulfilment of a real will in its will-purpose therefore leaves natural science untouched. The will towards becoming and growing may slumber in every grain of seed, and yet the naturalist would and could never find it. But has natural science therefore the right to proclaim that the relation which does not exist in its world must not be acknowledged at all as valuable and as valid? Such a demand would evidently involve an arbitrary and one-sided over-estimation of one single kind of valuation. The reality of nature with its value of existence resulted from the fact that we recognize in the experience the will to self-assertion, to perseverance, to conservation. That certainly does not exclude the acknowledgment of the will to changing and to becoming. If we apperceive the experience of the outer world under the point of view of the one demand, we build up the world of nature; if we apperceive the same outer world under the point of view of the other demand, we build up the world of deed, of progress, of achievement. The one does not interfere with the other as long as they are not carelessly mixed with each other. If the will to conservation is fulfilled, we reach the value of connection; if the will to alteration is fulfilled, we reach the value of development. The connection means to us a truth which we recognize; the development means to us a deed which we estimate. Just as we acknowledged that in the system of nature there cannot be any progress, we certainly must also acknowledge that in the system of the teleological self-realization of the world there cannot be any truth.

We cannot take any other attitude towards the progress of the world but that of estimation. We can welcome it with enthusiasm, we can serve it unselfishly, but to make it a part of our knowledge would be a self contradictory intention. If

we seek the connection, we must find the persevering elements so that we may give an explanation for the apparent change. If we seek development, we must find the intentions so that we may interpret the meaning of the apparent connection. We may return to our earlier illustration. The botanist who follows up the grain of wheat considers it as a combination of numberless chemical atoms which never disappear in the course of natural events and never in themselves can grow. The grain is lying between soil material, which also perseveres, and by the conservation of its given elements and energies transpositions must result by which the soil loses material and becomes assimilated by the seed. The blade thus rises by the conservation of the total mass of substance, which transforms itself in the position of the atoms, but remains the same in its content. The sower, on the other hand, who confides his grain to the field has no interest in this chemical equation because his whole hope is turning to the un-equation between the seed and the ripened wheat. Of course it is an un-equation only as far as a connection is in question. The sower, too, wants the relation of an equation. The wheat is finally to be identical with that which the seed promises and intends. The elements of the seed, therefore, do not interest him at all. The seed as a whole is for him a unity which is turning towards a goal, and only the meaning of this will towards a goal, not the parts of the content, have a significance for the development for which he hopes. Now the seed itself becomes the wheat, but the relation between that which is sowed and that which is harvested is valuable only as the securing of the intended goal, — valuable by the fulfilment of nature's purpose.

The independent right of an unnaturalistic valuation of development thus seems beyond doubt. Whether the things fulfil their intention must be decided without any reference to the causal connections. Of course we need not inquire whether in practical life the sower may not have learned

plant chemistry, and whether the botanist does not also think of the hopes of the sower. The mutual relations of the valuations will have to be discussed much later. Now at first we have to follow up each value in its pure original characteristics. Our next question, therefore, must be whether there really exist purposes and intentions which belong to the apperception of the outer world in such a necessary way that the things cannot be thought without such intentions. If the purposiveness of the things should be merely a personal expectation of ours, the fulfilment also would bring merely a personal satisfaction. Only if the things are filled with purposes which are independent of every personal desire and which are superior to every chance individual will, can the satisfaction in their fulfilment represent an over-personal value. Only the fulfilment of an absolutely valid will towards otherness means a progress which has absolute value. Hence our fundamental question must be: How far does the outer world show a purposiveness which is independent of individual interpretation?

At the first glance it appears as if it must be simple to find a convincing answer. If we want to explore the objective intention in the becoming of nature, it only seems necessary to search out what nature has really performed. The direction in which it has changed must be an expressive sign of its fundamental intentions, and even if the deeper meaning remain a secret to us, we may presuppose that all will move on in the same direction in which it has proceeded for uncounted millions of centuries. If nature has a meaning at all, it is impossible that the total way of transformations in the past has denied it. If at the beginning of time the things had an intention at all, that which has come about must have brought them nearer to the goal, however far the goal itself may be. In looking out for this fundamental direction, we are certainly independent of every personal chance attitude, and we can see nature, as it proceeds to its own great goals, uncon-

cerned about the little human wishes. Man himself is then only a small addition in the gigantic process of development, and even his field, the earth, becomes a particle of dust in the total process of the becoming worlds.

But as soon as we begin to inquire somewhat more carefully into the meaning of this spectacle and to recognize the direction of this progress, this confidence evaporates. Numberless forms arise, and yet not one which does not in the same spectacle disappear again. There is no life which is not succeeded by death, no upbuilding which is not followed by downfall, and however many world-bodies arise from the nebulous masses, as many crash into each other and are destroyed. If we expand the view over the totality, we see an endless coming and going, growing and dying; an eternal rhythm in which there can no longer exist one single direction. It is an insistent pendulum play without beginning, without end, without aim. Returning and returning, the worlds are built up and crumble; billions and trillions of years there is always the same periodic coming and going — no aim, no meaning, in endless movement. Who can say that in this circle of movement the one direction means progress and the other regress?

How could it be otherwise? About which nature are we speaking here? Surely that is not the nature with which our life is intertwined and which in our real life-experience comes to us to be interpreted in its meaning. In our own experience no new worlds have been built up and have died away. For us the becoming worlds are glimmering little points in the midnight sky. And the times through which the world has passed are not reported by the memory of mankind in a trillionth part. The world which vibrates without meaning is not a content of experience, but the result of the calculations of the naturalist, calculated under that particular point of view of science in order to fulfil the special demands of causal explanation. We recognized beforehand that scien-

tific connection and a real development must contradict each other in their presuppositions. The world which the astronomer constructs in cosmic endless times to satisfy the demand for explanation must indeed ultimately transform every apparent change into periodic rhythm and thus hold it at a meaningless standstill. This is necessary because that which science wants to recognize as true must be thought as that which perseveres. The real fundamental becoming into an otherness which would be indispensable for a real development is therefore excluded by the presuppositions as soon as the calculated world of the naturalist is substituted for the world of immediate experience. The world which emanates from nebulous masses is fundamentally unfit to express to us the over-personal meaning of the outer world. The nature which moves by mechanical laws and is not concerned about man is not a nature about which man has to be concerned on his part when he tries to grasp the purposes of the world.

Thus it seems that we might take rather an anthropocentric view. Development and progress is then everything which leads towards man, regress everything which hinders the origin and spread of mankind. Of course there also experience may be transcended, perhaps endlessly. But the construction of primitive mankind which led to the civilized man, of the kingdom of animals which led to mankind, of the development of the earth which led to living beings, is now all directed toward one clearly distinguishable goal. Here is no pendulum movement. How the world reached its great goal may be left to the decision of the naturalist. He may find out whether meteorites brought the germ of life from foreign worlds to the earth, or whether moneres, which developed into monocellular beings, formed themselves at the bottom of the sea, or whether endlessly lower life-forms arose at first, which through a long development grew into microscopically visible substances. Even death in the realm of the multicellular beings is then not a regress; death itself becomes a necessary

adjustment to secure the higher and higher abilities of the organisms, and finally to lead to man. From here it can be clearly recognized in which direction nature wants to move. The progress must lead beyond man towards the superman, in whom everything which characterizes man beyond the animal is still reënforced and concentrated.

Yet we must absolutely refuse this view, too. This interpretation of the meaning of the world is also only an encroachment of natural science. This whole train of thought belongs to the causal scientific aspect, and if it is true that scientific connection and progressive development exclude each other, this belief in development towards man cannot be accepted, as it is really only masked natural science. We call it "natural science" first because in the experience of mankind there does not exist, and cannot exist, anything which makes man the product of lower forms of nature. In the experience of man there could of course never arise a man where there were no men. The whole connection with the lower forms thus again belongs entirely to the constructed world of the naturalist, which by principle is without intention and development. From the standpoint of natural science, it is arbitrary to detach the one short phase which leads from the cooling-off of the earth to the spread of the civilized man and to separate it from the cosmic movement in its unending rhythm, growth, and destruction of stars. All that paleontology teaches us can always be used only to increase our knowledge of the outer world, but such phylogenetic natural science can never help us to understand the development which we estimate as a progress. Experience itself, not the constructed truth, must show us that world of which we want to understand the intentions and aims. But this whole view is a naturalistic one for a still more important reason. The man who is the product of the phylogenetic development is not at all the man who finds nature in his outer world of experience and who seeks the value of the outer world. This seeking

subject of attitudes is the historical being; it is man in his will-subjectivity, who as such does not at all belong to the causal process which has led from the cooling-off of the earth's surface to the causal production of the human race. That being who posits goals and estimates nature cannot possibly be the goal of nature, because he is not included in the natural course of objects, but belongs to the entirely different connection of subjects. The naturalist cannot know any other man than the speaking mammal; but however richly he may equip this being with psycho-physical functions, it remains a misunderstanding to consider him at the same time as a subject which takes attitudes towards the real experiences of the world. Nature has as little the intention of letting man and superman grow as it is nature's goal to let nebulous rings roll and to condense them into world-bodies. Biology can interpret the meaning of our natural surroundings as little as cosmology.

There remains, then, only one way to come to the meaning of nature. We must consider that nature which we find as object of our real practical will-attitudes. What this world of things was caused by and what it was millions of years ago now has no interest for us. There is only one thing which must necessarily be demanded from the outer world, in order that it may be able to come into action at all: nature must be object for the will of the historical man. This alone can be the task and the goal of the outer world. It is to be material for the deed of the willing subject. The purpose of nature is not that the causally determined man be produced by it, but that the free man may stand on it. Nature wants to be his domicile and his tool. If this relation to human will did not exist, it would have no significance for man to speak of a value in the becoming of the outer world and thus of development or of regress.

Such a task of course does not exist as a psychological purposive thought of the seed buried in the soil of the field,

and no conscious will moves the wind and the waves; but for us subjects of attitude, nature can be active only if its task of entering into the life of man is recognized. Only in this relation to the striving man can nature be object of estimation, just as only in relation to the law of causality which takes no concern of man can it become object of knowledge. To be sure, nothing remains there of the proud trillions of years. That nature which alone has meaning and goal in itself does not lead to endless distances either in space or in time. It is the nature with which we strive daily and which daily serves us. Not by personal demand, but necessarily, we apperceive it with the task of being for us. With reference to this goal we measure the value of its changes and of its becoming another. Such nature alone, therefore, has development. The fruit which grows for us, the ground which offers its metals to our labor, forest and stream, fresh air and water and sunlight, fulfil in this way a purpose which stands independent of the chance wishes of individual beings. To be material of human deed is the absolutely necessary purpose without which we cannot think that nature which we find in our real life. Only in being means and help for our human purposes can nature have significance for us. Only in fulfilling this purpose can nature show its deepest meaning and its purest value. Not every blossom becomes a fruit, not every wave is willing to carry us. As everywhere, here too that which is valuable, that which is free from values, and that which interferes with values are near together. We find the same situation in the circle of the logical values. Not every world-impression has the value of existence. Only by following up the persevering impressions can we gain that which really exists and in this way work out from the chaos of experience that which is naturalistically real. And in the same way not every experienced manifold was harmonious. We had to raise the beautiful from the mass of the indifferent and ugly. In the same way now not every change in the world is a progress,

a development, a valuable growth. Only in following up that which is directed towards its goal can we hold fast the living, meaningful nature in its pure value.

Our idea, accordingly, is not to posit man in the centre of the causal nature as anthropocentric science of past days tried to do. We stand entirely outside of every possible causal science. In the nature of knowledge all mankind is but a microbe on the surface of the earth, and the earth itself only a little speck of the universe. But in the nature which we meet and estimate in life, man with his thought of an unlimited causal world stands there as the one unique being for whom nature exerts itself in order that he may live out his life in freedom. He could not take a step, he could not perform a deed, he could not realize a plan, if nature were not to help and to serve; and even where nature seems reluctant and demands hard labor, it offers resistance only to the chance individual, but remains in its meaning the tool and the source of energy for historical mankind. It is the right and even the duty of the naturalist to presuppose that nature will ultimately prove itself a complete causal connection, however far science may be to-day from such an end. He therefore presupposes that nature really is such a connection. In the same way it is the right and the duty of the striving subject of historical life to presuppose that nature is ultimately controlled by the purpose of serving the rational being, however many life-plans of the individual may be interfered with by nature. The intention of nature remains, then, the effort steadily to approach this goal. For the striving man the nature of the astronomical distances and of the trillions of years is exactly as unreal as for the naturalist the nature which is guided by intentions. How both forms of valuation ultimately may be combined we cannot yet consider here. It is evident that they must touch each other because in seeking knowledge the naturalist too becomes a striving subject and the world which he tries to know enters into the human will; on

the other hand, the striving subject becomes a knower when he selects nature as a tool for a particular will-purpose.

Of course the development of nature is not valuable because it helps us as individuals. That could make the result of development useful and agreeable, but it could never give to development itself an absolutely valid value. The value lies exclusively in the fact that nature in its development realizes itself, is loyal to its own purpose, fulfils its own intention. This goal of nature, to be sure, is to serve mankind, but that which raises the becoming of nature to the level of an absolute value is not the fact that the goal is the service for man, but that this intended goal is really reached by nature through its own energies. If there were any other goal which we should have to recognize absolutely as the aim of nature, however strange or dangerous to man, it would nevertheless remain a pure value if nature fulfilled its purpose. But there is not and cannot be any other goal for nature. Nature must be conceived as filled with this aim because in our experience we mean by nature only the object of man's will and thus the tool and means of mankind. Our fundamental will from which all valuation arose was the one will that the experience was to be more than mere experience and that it should hold and assert its own selfhood in itself. The will to be tool of man, material of his deed, must be conceived, therefore, as the objective character of nature if nature is to assert itself independently at all. Whether nature can reach this selfhood can be recognized only when nature really turns to this goal and proves that it is in unity with itself. Every becoming by which it devotes itself to this service and transforms the seed into fruit demonstrates that it fulfils the fundamental demand to be a self-asserting world. Wherever nature really serves, its deed fulfils the absolutely necessary demand for its self-identity, and its performance is therefore absolutely valuable.

B. — PROGRESS

We saw how everything which is historical refers to willing beings, and how an historical connection can be understood only from the continuation of identical attitudes. We reached in this way a system of history which had the same reality as the system of nature, and which equally demands our acknowledgment and our submission. But in an equal way such treatment must then find its limitations. We saw that the naturalist can speak only of changes and transpositions, which are ultimately perseverances, but that he does not know anything of improvement, growth, and development. The historian must be in the same situation. We saw that he has to separate the important from the unimportant, the influential from the uninfluential, when he elaborates the real connections in history. But his historical interest is not in touch with the question whether it turns to the better or to the worse, whether the change leads upward or downward. The connection which constitutes the decay of classical antiquity is for the truth-seeking historian not less a goal of scientific inquiry than the other connection which constitutes the upbuilding of ancient civilization. As the biologist must explain equally health and disease, life and death, the historian too has to give the same interest to the interpretation of the times of inspiration and to the times of horror in the history of mankind. He has only to make us understand how everything happened to occur.

To be sure, there is this difference between the material of the historian and the material of the naturalist, that the stuff of the historian is itself will or related to the will, and such will in itself can have reference to values. Yet the historical connection must impartially interpret the just and the unjust, the truth-seeker and the teacher of errors, the martyr and the criminal. He has to examine how far their will influenced the will of others and ultimately the will of our fellow-world.

The purpose of the historian is not to estimate and to appreciate them. That which grows in freedom has become for him an unchanging series of existing facts on which he looks retrospectively to understand the connection. He does not have to decide whether it had an absolute value that there were heroes and traitors, thinkers and fools; that the nations blossomed and died. Yet the question as to the value of the historical process cannot be disregarded. The historian may with a cool heart look on the crawling and swarming of the nations, but somewhere outside of the historical research a standpoint must exist from which it can be clearly seen what in such an historical movement was really progress and development. It might be called philosophy of history. But somewhere it must be asked whether the changes in mankind are a coming and going without meaning and goal, and whether history has not purpose and ideals as well as connection. And where absolutely valid purposes are to be fulfilled and ideals to be reached there exist values.

He who enters practically into historical life to build up or to break down, to reform or to teach or to revolutionize, does not want to know how it came about, but he wants to bring to power that which in his conviction is valuable. He unselfishly puts his energy and perhaps his life into the work because he is convinced in his deepest soul that this human history is no indifferent purposeless natural process, but that every hour has its solemn task. The opposite parties may quarrel over which change would represent real progress and development, but that the right change has an absolute value is their common presupposition, and they assert this conviction in unselfishly serving it. And this belief in the absolutely valid value of the right ways of mankind cannot possibly be confined to the narrow little practical sphere of our personal activity. In the hurry of the daily work the reference to the totality may disappear to our eye. Yet this daily fight itself gains meaning and significance only when it subordinates

itself to the movement of mankind and acknowledges in that totality the unlimited values. We saw that nature shows its development only when it is detached from the thought-forms of natural science. History, too, can show the progress of mankind only when it is separated from the thought-forms of the historian.

Development in the changes of mankind can be found only if we reach a standpoint for a general evaluation. Historical research as such cannot help us there, even indirectly. Empires are built up and crumble. What remains of the proud life of Babylonia? Five thousand years hence what will testify to our existence? The masses migrate and migrate, fight with each other, subjugate each other, mix with each other; now here, now there, inner movements arise, spread out, and disappear again: without plan and without purpose the stream rolls on through the thousands of years. The historian has no right to contradict such a view. Others again may say that nothing depends upon the conservation of that which arose, but that the happiness of those who live is essential. In their view the history of the world may have been a great regress of mankind. In the beginning there was happiness; the happiness of the narrow carelessness which served the senses and did not ask for the morrow. That golden age of laziness which was not obliged to make any sacrifices for what was distant is destroyed by civilization, and every day expands the responsibility and by it the unrest of the community. Every pulse-beat of culture thus means less happiness, and no artificial return to nature to-day can hinder the downfall of mankind. Again, the historian has no right to contradict such an interpretation. Others, to be sure, may claim with the same right that civilization is just what has opened the inexhaustible sources of joy and has broken the intolerable chains of earlier days, and that pleasure has therefore been steadily increasing. Again, others may convince us that the human feeling of pleasure always oscillates about a middle position,

and therefore that there must be on high and on low levels always the same quantity of pleasure and of pain. The historian as such never has any reason to object to any of these interpretations.

The historic connections remain the same, independent of the question whether the whole is understood as an ascent or as a descent, or as an indifferent remaining on the same level of enjoyment. Moreover, the historian has not the least reason to object if still others are opposed to all those three views and claim that progress or regress has nothing whatever to do with the feeling of pleasure. History as such has indeed no reason to consider the greatest possible number of happy human beings as the goal of development. It might with the same right acknowledge as such a goal the greatest possible number of healthy human beings or of musical human beings. But it would not be less arbitrary if the historian were to use as standard for the past simply the state of our civilization to-day. In that case he would have to praise everything which led to our present situation and condemn everything which hindered the movement towards our modern life. The fact is that our own time is full of movements which interfere with one another, and combines many kinds of civilization which are to a high degree unequal. Above all, the mere fact that our situation is as yet the latest cannot give to it an overweight of value. If we were simply to say that our present state is the most valuable because it is the latest, we should already have accepted the presupposition that history is a development which goes on exactly in temporal succession without any regress. But if we were to presuppose that, then we might just as well leave our hands idle and not make any effort, and let things go as they please; whatever to-morrow may bring, it must be more valuable because it is the later. Partisanship in favor of our time in contrast to the past is thus just as unfit to offer us general aspects of valuation as partisanship for our nation, or for our profession, or for our church, or for our politics.

Of course there has never been a lack of efforts which tried to force on history such narrow and arbitrary pseudo-valuations, but they do not contain a scintilla of theoretical necessity. Yet the situation is not better if, instead of a chance party creed, so-called objective characteristics become emphasized. The fundamental question always remains open: Why is the valuation to be anchored just at this point? Most deceiving and therefore most dangerous are all those presuppositions which get their apparent objectivity from the field of natural science. The silent presupposition there is that the direction in which the changes in nature move on must also determine the goal for the free human deed. But the fallacy of such an idea is evident. Two cases are possible. Either we call nature the total organic process including all human history: then the question of any ideals and duties is meaningless. Whatever may occur is then equally predestined by nature, and no human move and no human reform can ever produce anything which does not carry the stamp of nature. The good and the bad are then equally the outcome of the natural processes, and no line of change can claim to be more in harmony with nature than any other. Or the other case: we call nature only that which lies below human activity and which is material for the human deed. In that case the will is entirely free in its decision whether it wants to take the changes in nature as its model, and whether civilization is to imitate nature or not. Progress in the social development may then perhaps consist just in deviating from the ways of unfeeling nature and in seeking new paths which may lie in an opposite direction. In short, if we silently presuppose that culture goes with nature, we have a right to do so only if we consider civilization itself as a part of nature. In this case the presupposition is a matter of course which does not affirm and does not deny any particular mode of action. On the other hand, if we separate civilization and nature, we have no right whatever silently to presuppose that culture has to shape

itself after the model of nature. Of course there is no doubt that every life can be conceived from the point of view of natural science. But if the transition of the living beings from the monocellular organism to the man of civilization is really apperceived as a natural process, nothing from the naturalist's point of view shows an improvement or a development. The man of the twentieth century runs by railways, he swims by steamers, he perceives through his newspapers, he speaks by cables, he remembers by libraries, he strikes by cannons; and yet he is in no way better adjusted to his external conditions of life than the tiniest infusor is adjusted to its conditions in the drop of water. We have only an increase in the differentiation, an increase in the manifoldness of the parts, an increase in the complexity of the reactions. But who has the right to claim that the complex is better than the simple, and that the differentiated is more valuable than the undifferentiated?

In such a naturalistic view of the social organism nothing can claim to be more in accordance with nature than anything else; however fate may turn, everything remains a necessary natural process. If in our industrial life to-day the employers and the laborers oppose each other, it remains in the midst of such a naturalistic spectacle a fight equally natural if the power of capital presses down the life of the laborer to the lowest limit, or if the laborers, strong by their union, force their will selfishly on the owners, or if the state forces the compliance of both parties and thus secures an equilibrium. The strong may force the weak, or the weak in their combination may dominate the strong, or the counteracting forces may be inhibited by external pressure. Each of those three possibilities can be found a thousand times in nature. Nature does not have to suggest anything there, and whatever results must be equally accepted as development simply because it happened to result.

But let us consider the other case. Instead of considering

mankind as part of the necessary process, we may posit man in his freedom as against and over nature, and now we speak of development when he goes on in his freedom in the paths of nature. For instance, in the spirit of Darwinism, the progress of nature must be referred to the selection of those individuals who are best adjusted to the surroundings. Thus it seems logical to say that mankind will move on in a progressive line only if care is taken that the badly adjusted individuals are eliminated, and that mankind will sink down if those are artificially maintained who are not sufficiently adjusted to the surroundings. That sounds almost self-evident, and yet it is a fallacy. It veils the decisive fact that the antithesis of good and bad adjustment already includes the whole problem of valuation. Only by independent decisions concerning the values are we able to say what ought to be called well adjusted in the structure of civilization. In our cultural sphere, for instance, is only the strong, muscular, strenuous body the well adapted, and the weak, nervous organism badly adjusted in spite of the fact that the brain-cells of the latter perhaps force the movements of mankind into new paths? It may have been rightly said that the world of antiquity collapsed just because the best part became eliminated by the partisan fights, by persecutions, by death punishments, and by asceticism. But the question who were the best can be decided only if we already see a line of development towards certain goals of civilization. From the standpoint of mere nature those victorious persecutors would have to be counted the better adjusted ones on account of their victory.

We have no safer ground when the naturalists of society insist that their historical goal is the purity of the race, a doctrine which has recently pushed itself into the foreground. It is not essential that such a race theory lacks every safe foundation, and that the conception of the pure race is entirely arbitrary. The results of linguistics, of anatomy, and of social psychology undermine all such speculations. The

decisive fact is rather that goals are here prescribed, the evaluation of which can never be found by real naturalistic considerations. The result is reached merely by superficial comparisons with the processes in breeding. The pure race is a possible naturalistic conception. The conception of an excellent race already points to human purposes and transcends the conceptions of natural science. But the chief question, whether we are to evaluate as excellent in history those traits which are decisive for the conservation of the pure races, can be affirmed or denied only by entirely independent considerations. We have no right to decide beforehand that excellence coincides with purity. At first we must know what excellence from a human point of view means. Only then can we examine whether purity of race or mixture of races offers the more favorable condition for the development of such excellent nations. A philosophy of history which, unconsciously influenced by practical prejudices, claims that the cultural purity of society which we call excellence demands that natural purity of the race which means freedom from mixture, is merely based on a confusion. With the same logical right it might be maintained that a morally pure painting could be painted only with chemically pure colors. But whether the purity of the race or any other naturalistic conception is posited as the standard of social development, it always remains a mixing of explanation and estimation. Fundamentally, no problem of explanation can at all touch the problem of evaluation. Hence it also remains indifferent for the estimation of progress and regress which factors were most influential for the historical occurrences. The discussion whether the masses or the leaders are more responsible for the changes of the historical world, whether the surroundings of the nations or their inherited disposition is most influential, whether the economic conditions are fundamental for the political and cultural events — all these problems may be decided in the one or the other direction to-day: they

cannot contribute anything as to what is to be estimated as an upward or a downward movement. Wherever evaluation intrudes into the objective historical account, it is by principle no better than the theories of the old astronomers that the stars moved in a circle because a circle æsthetically is the noblest line.

Instead of all this, our question must be whether in the social historical life any one goal must be necessarily conceived as belonging to the reality of mankind. Only if our demand for a self-asserting world involves the postulate of a certain will in mankind must every fulfilment of such a will be acknowledged as valuable. Here again it is not a question of a psychological discovery. The community has not the will to a certain goal as a conscious idea in itself, nor may we in apperceiving the community have such an aim in clear consciousness. The question is only: What must we logically will and maintain as the purpose of the community, if we are to raise the experience of a fellow-world at all to a reality with independent meaning? We may approach an answer to this question by the following considerations. The human beings do not interest us here with reference to their individual inner world, but as parts of a fellow-world, that is, as beings who have relation to each other. The fellow-world can have meaning only in so far as the members are related to each other. We have to abstract, therefore, from the individuals in so far as they express their own desires. Only their mutual relations and their common purposes enter into the community as such. Now we demand that such a community shall have its own purpose by which it asserts itself as self-dependent. That can mean only that the members of the community are to reach a common will by which the community as such is upheld and asserted. This is secured the more fully the more every single member in his will represents the standpoint of the whole group.

The inner life of the individual remains untouched by that.

In the community every individual expresses his belonging to the group the more clearly the more he detaches his will from his individual desire and emphasizes in himself the common will. Such a group may be a pair, or a family, or a city, or a profession, or a church, or a nation, or a concert of nations, or all the men of to-day, or the whole history of mankind. That does not indicate at all that every one in the circle has to fulfil an equal task. We do not speak of lack of discrimination. If we play a game of chess, I may take care of the black men and my opponent of the white, but the rules of the game must be willed by us in common, and the procedure of the game in accordance with the rules must be equally important to both of us. If I protect my king and attack his king, my opponent wills with me and I do not by it one-sidedly attack the standpoint of our whole little group. My opponent and I will the same. If instead I were to will that I win at any price, even if I am the worse player, I contradict the will of the group. The group willed that the better player win. Thus the manifoldness of the individual will-act in no way suffers by subordinating the individual will to the larger will-structure of the group. The community has found its ideal form only when each one considers his particular task from a standpoint which is equally given for every other member of the community. Not only many heads but many tasks compose the life of a nation, but the national standpoint can and ought to be the same for every one in his task. Without such a postulate the particular group has lost its self-dependent meaning.

Even from here we can see the values of development. We claim that we cannot think a group otherwise than as filled by the desire that each member give up for his will the merely individual standpoint and take the standpoint of the group. Every transition to the fuller realization of this demand must therefore be a pure value. We say every transition, not the final end of it. Value always belongs only to the fulfilment of

the will. The group which wills such a transformation of its members produces a value in satisfying this will for becoming a true group. But as soon as the satisfaction is reached, the will fulfilled, the development perfected, then simply a certain state of society is given in which there is no longer anything to be fulfilled and to be developed, and where therefore no value is to be estimated. The movement towards the goal is the only valuable factor. The goal itself may be entirely indifferent. We must never forget that an absolute value may always belong to something which in another direction may be unimportant and trivial and indifferent. The silly judgment that two times two is not three hundred is as true as the most valid mathematical discovery. In this way the development of a group may be valuable as a development even if that which is finally developed is only a superfluous association, or a dangerous party, or a selfish nation. If we consider that particular community at all as a self-dependent group, we must necessarily conceive for it the goal that every member is to take the over-personal group standpoint, and every change in the direction towards this goal then must be a satisfaction of our objective sympathizing will.

Nevertheless, we can at once go beyond this point. We do not give any interest to the unlimited number of silly and unfertile judgments which at any time can be asserted with full logical value of truth; we maintain only those which may enter with a certain significance into wider connections of thought. In the same way we subordinate the many possible values of development to larger and wider connections of progress. That does not mean that the narrower group ought to disappear in the wider one, perhaps the townships in the states or the states in a colorless mankind. On the contrary, every development demands manifoldness. But we cannot really hold in our own participating will the goal of a group if a more important will in us is directed against it. In itself we can grasp the community goal of a gang of thieves as well as

that of an academy of philosophers. Yet if we cannot really will with them, the transition towards that goal cannot be felt as a fulfilment of an over-personal will, and the character of a pure value is then lost. In this way every social development must refer to a more fundamental purpose and ultimately to a last goal. This ultimate end is evidently the pure absolutely over-personal standpoint, which does not belong to the individual as member of a particular group, but which belongs to every thinkable subject as such. Each individual is to aim towards a standpoint at which he shares the pure over-personal will, as this will only characterizes every subject as belonging to the community of those who will a world at all. The ultimate controlling goal of the human community is thus a transition towards a standpoint at which every individual wills in accordance with the over-personal will, that is, with the pure valuation. Whatever moves towards this goal is pure progress; whatever moves away from this goal is regress.

In this way alone every single formation of groups and development of communities receives its own definite place in the valuable totality. The community which has reached its own goal now has no longer simply reached an indifferent state of society, but its own completeness becomes a step in the development towards the absolute aim of the human totality. A higher goal cannot exist, nor yet a coördinated one. It is the one goal which is unattainable, but which is fundamentally necessary. Without it we cannot think the fellow-world in its totality. Every individual as member of the fellow-world ought to become a subject of pure valuation. Such valuations are many. Some of them, the values of knowledge and of unity and of beauty, we have discussed, others, such as the values of law and industry and of morality and of religion, will interest us later. In every one of these directions a true development can go on. We have a real progress which is absolutely valuable in itself wherever the

understanding of things is carried forward to its truth, where the perception is raised to its beauty, where unity and love and harmony are propagated, where nature is remodelled to economic values of industry, where human instincts are ordered by law, where morality is victorious in the inner world, where belief grows towards true religion. On the other hand, wherever beauty is torn down to the level of mere enjoyment, where the understanding of things is ruined by cutting off the connections with the totality, where discord and misery are spread, where the common tasks are ruled from a selfish standpoint, where economy becomes a short-sighted utilization and political life becomes a one-sided misuse of power, where morality becomes cunning and religion becomes selfish superstition, there mankind sinks down, even when it boasts of the shining means of daring civilization.

Consequently we have no right to seek a definite order of stages, perhaps from uncivilization to half-civilization and from half-civilization to civilization, or, as positivism liked to formulate it, from a theological thinking to a metaphysical thinking and finally to a positivistic thinking. In the same way all those interpretations which refer the progress of mankind to a goal which lies beyond possible experience are excluded for us. In the midst of a religion there may arise the reference of mankind to a holy last judgment, but this religion itself first has to demonstrate itself as a valuable part of human development. The examination of a social value of progress must not lead beyond our world of possible experience. On the other hand, we must acknowledge such progress wherever in the midst of experience the transition leads towards the standpoint of pure valuation. Progress is therefore possible even on the lowest level of society, and even the richest and most complex society may move backward. Moreover, the manifoldness of possible valuations may bring it about that at the same time in the same social organism progress, standstill, and regress may exist. The

religious consciousness of a nation may raise itself in a glorious development to a standpoint of pure valuation, and yet its scientific recognition of truth may be of the lowest order. The valuation of beauty may be lifted up to splendid heights, and yet the moral valuation may be declining. Nobody would take the philosophy of India, the art of China, the religion of Palestine, the literature of Greece, the law of Rome, as standards for judging the total development of those nations.

It would have to be examined whether it is possible anyhow for every kind of pure valuation to find its full development simultaneously with every other. It may be that the one inhibits the other, and that therefore an historical division of labor may be necessary. In the primeval forest there may be a progress in a certain direction which far surpasses the moral depravity in many electrically illuminated metropolitan streets. And all that repeats itself in narrower and narrower circles. In the midst of a single nation or a single community or a single group, the progress in one direction may go on at one place while the progress in other directions may find its best energies somewhere else. It can hardly be expected, for instance, that religiousness and morality find their strongest development in those spheres of the state which are devoted most eagerly to the raising of the economic or of the artistic life. Progress in the endless manifoldness of life does not know simply a general yes or no. Everywhere there is an unlimited play of movements upward and downward. And yet of course it remains true that in the history of all mankind the civilized nations represent a higher stage of development than the uncivilized, and that between these extreme contrasts many intermediate stages of half-civilization can be discriminated. It may be left doubtful whether every people can climb up from step to step by its own energy, whether the so-called half-civilizations can be transformed at all into full civilizations, or whether the world of history has to make

new and ever new independent starts to lead to the richest developments. The decisive factor remains that in the sphere of civilization, we find raised to the height of over-personal pure valuation that which in the uncivilized circle results still essentially from a mere personal individual standpoint.

That is not contradicted by the fact that, just on the low level, life goes on in such pattern-like way that every one appears like his neighbor, while only in the sunlight of highest culture the finest flower of individuality comes to development. To be pattern-like does not mean to be over-personal, but rather under-personal, and to show the flavor of personality in the life-functions does not mean to be selfish. That which really characterizes the antithesis is rather the instinctive, the accidental, the desultory, the immediate element in the life of the savages in contrast to civilization. There passion is dominant, here discretion; there the instinctive reaction and here the careful planning of the deed; and all this evidently lies on the way from the haphazard personal will to the over-personal group-will, and finally to the absolutely valid valuation. It is this transition which leads slowly from the mere sensuous perception of the things among the lower races to a conceptional apprehension, and ultimately to a firmly formed science which is valid for everybody. In the same way the original naïve haphazard life which does not take care for the next day is slowly transformed into the serious responsible maturity of society which demands sacrifice in the service of a coming generation. In the same way the unsteady activity which is moved by every external impulse goes over into the steady work of the nation which is anchored in the traditions of the past and in the consciousness of ideal goals. In the same way the selfish laziness changes into respect for labor and for creative work. Everywhere it is the ascent from the personal to that which has common validity, from the individual will to the pure valuation.

Of course the movement itself must be influenced by the

particular dispositions, means, starting-points, and inclinations. It is meaningless to discuss whether to-day perhaps one or another civilized nation stands higher. There are different foundations and different chief accents. Inclination to mathematics and natural science may not go together with inclination for history, nor talent for fine arts with talent for music. Especially significant differences may show themselves in the will to action. The will may realize itself more with reference to the outer world, or more with reference to the fellow-world, or more with reference to the inner world. In this way there must result three fundamental types which may come together even in the narrowest circle. But those three types determine in the same way the large parties and divisions in the land, and finally whole nations and groups of nations. Even in the most primitive societies these three contrasts must exist, and therefore do not at all represent different stages of civilization, but coördinated traits. Each of the three may be maintained from personal savagery up to the highest level of over-personal fully civilized valuation. These three groups are those of the laborers who shape the outer world, the warriors who deal with the fellow-world, and the thinkers, poets, and priests who give expression to the inner world. The first group is controlled by attention, the second by will, the last by understanding and feeling. Trading, fighting, and religious tribes have existed at all times, just as there exist in every state unpolitical groups, conservative groups, and liberal groups. The first must put chief emphasis on effort, the second on loyalty, the third on justice. The first aims towards an increasing mastery over nature, the second strives for the power of the nation, the third for its moral and cultural development. In this way we also still find to-day civilized nations which work towards the highest possible achievement, others which see their aim in the most perfect development of their state organization, and others which recognize their task in the freest possible

initiative of every individual. One does not stand higher than another, and each moves on the path of pure development as far as in its particular kind of will it approaches the standpoint of the over-personal subject. On the other hand, each of the three types can also enter into regress. The power may be misused and dragged down to personal spheres, and industry and energy and liberty may be put into the service of selfish arbitrariness and mere enjoyment.

It is nevertheless not by chance that in this endless play of numberless forward and backward movements the conviction stands firm that the general movement is an insistent progress, and that every regress is overcome by a reënforced development. If that were not so, the growth and disappearance of the cultural values of mankind would be simply like the growth and disappearance of the flowers in the field. Instead of an education of humanity to a higher and higher aim, we should see only a planless up and down. Every individual life would then ultimately be meaningless, and it would be meaningless to serve a party, a profession, a nation, and mankind, inasmuch as we serve them in order to fulfil their meaning. But that cannot be, because, as we saw, progress always leads from the personal to the over-personal, regress from the over-personal to the personal. The over-personal, just because it does not refer to one or another chance individual, figures as an incomparably greater power of self-conservation and impressiveness. The personal has a haphazard character; it is carried only by the single will, it has no strength to propagate itself and to suggest itself to the neighbor and to the fellow-world. All progress therefore leads to something which in itself has the strength to hold its own, all regress leads to something which must soon disappear again because it has no strength of propagation as it is a merely individual affair. The outcome of the whole interplay of progressive and regressive movements must therefore be after all increase in the power of progress. The regress is

ultimately always only an individual personal desertion from values. Progress, on the other hand, creates new values which propagate beyond the creator, and which are gained for the community, never to be lost. If a new truth is discovered, others may come who leave it unnoticed and go backward, but the discovery itself is gained, and will touch other souls which can rise to the understanding of that value. If high art has found the perfect expression of unity for a piece of the world, its beauty may become for a declining time a mere low enjoyment of the senses, but others will come who will be overwhelmed by the power of this unity and who will rise to the apprehension of this over-personal value. The same holds in a similar way for law and morality, for economy and state, for religion and philosophy. The regress there always has something chance-like and can be eliminated: the progress always has an element of indestructibility because all progress creates values which as such hold for every one at any place and at any time. The sand of the deserts may cover old civilizations, but their inmost spirit must always be left to the great forward movement of history. Only the externals crumbled when their time had passed. This progress can never reach an end. Every new value opens new tasks which at first appeal to the personal will, and only in the struggles of history can be led towards an over-personal solution. Every pure value is complete in itself, and yet in the evaluating subject every new value posits a new situation of will which demands a new equilibrium and which therefore leads beyond itself. In this way not only the ultimate goal of the progress of mankind is an endlessly unattainable ideal, but each partial development, too, carries in itself infinite opportunities.

C. — SELF-DEVELOPMENT

The inner world, too, knows its otherness and the disappearance of that which is given. We have discussed the log-

ically valuable self-conservation of the inner world ; it gave us the connections of reason. We further considered the given experiences of the inner world with reference to their unity ; there we found the æsthetic value of happiness. Now we stand before the self which is to shape its experiences : when is the change in the inner world and its becoming absolutely valuable and accordingly a true development ? But we must emphasize at once one point which will be of decisive importance for us later. The valuable self-realization is at first not at all morally valuable. The conception of morality must be held back for that cultural value in which the valuable self-realization becomes a conscious goal, and in which accordingly the deed becomes a real achievement. At first the self-development is a pure value of naïve life and no purposive deed of civilization. It develops itself with reference to purposive tasks, but however manifold the goals may be, the purposive raising of the own self to become a value is at first not itself one of the goals. As soon as we proceed to the value of morality, we shall recognize the opposite. The valuable self-realization then becomes the conscious purpose.

The way to the acknowledgment of the naïve life-value of self-development lies clear before us. All shaping of our inner world must be a transition from that which is given to that which is not yet given. This transition must be valuable if it fulfils a will which is necessarily involved in that which is given. If our conscious inner experience is of such a kind that we cannot conceive it at all otherwise than with a certain will which we acknowledge without reference to our individual desires, the fulfilment must satisfy us in an over-personal way and yield us an absolute value. But we know already the will which necessarily belongs to every inner world which is to be acknowledged as such. It is the one will which we recognized as the fundamental will of our personality, the will that our inner experience is not only a dream, but has its self-asserting reality and thus belongs to a real world. Our own

or any other self, which as an "I" stands as against a "thou," is to be more than a haphazard piece of mere experience, and is to have an independent significance and meaning. The true question is then: If the self is to have an own meaning, what is the not-given towards which the given self-experience necessarily aims — aims as the blossom in nature aims towards the fruit, as uncivilization in mankind aims towards civilization?

But we must keep clearly in mind what that I really is whose possible progress and regress comes in question. That I is certainly not the whole content of consciousness in a psychological sense. The idea of the outer world and the demand of the fellow-world are enclosed in that psychological mental experience just as much as the perception of the self. The I of which we are speaking can be only that will by which we take attitudes. The aim for the transitions of this I can always be only again a new will. The given will may be directed towards a content which is not yet given, but the realization of that content and the arising of pleasure do not change the I and do not bring it forward or backward. By the fulfilment of a will which is directed towards a content, the I becomes neither expanded nor reënforced. That which the self must will in order to affirm by the fulfilment of this will its own meaning must therefore necessarily refer to its own willing. That means the self wills to develop its own willing, wills to unfold and strengthen its own volitions, and yet always remain in unity with itself.

This is indeed the only possible change in the I which can be valuable, because it is the fulfilment of the only possible plan by which the I can get self-dependent meaning. If it does not will to remain in unity with itself, if it wills that its own volitions are no unfoldings and reënforcements of the experienced own will, it ceases to be a self and becomes a meaningless series. If the I is to be conceived with reference to its own valuable changes, the unfolding of the will which remains

loyal to itself is the only possible goal for it, and only a transition in this direction can have the value of development. We must again separate the different stages as we did in the social development. The first demand will be that the single volitions which compose the work of our day shall not be in contradiction to each other. The self develops itself in every new deed to new volitions which are in harmony with the given ones, and manifests the purpose of the given I by new expressions. If we were to classify the millionfold will-efforts, we should say that here belongs everything which results from patience and assiduity and eagerness, from self-moderation and courage. Everywhere the old will becomes unfolded and carried out in new volitions which have the same tendencies and direction. In another way the same end is reached by modesty, by contentment, by humbleness of mind. They can make the will remain in unity with itself because from the start they do not allow the will to turn to the unattainable. But we emphasized that, in all this, no virtue, no duty, no conscience, no obligation, no morality, is in question, but only a choice according to free inclination. To be contented and assiduous and brave and industrious are qualities which the individual develops in his inner world in accordance with his disposition. They are given not otherwise than artistic talent or mathematical faculties, a gay mood or a loving heart. He who is industrious by nature does not constantly have to fight against his laziness by a moral achievement; he who is frugal does not struggle in moral strife with avarice; the courageous man goes bravely on his way without being at all tempted by cowardice.

The same holds true for all the inclinations and tendencies in which the new will remains not only in unity with the original, but unfolds it with reënforced energy. The desire for higher culture, for solid achievement, for creative deeds belongs here. The whole personality comes to richer expression, and yet it always remains only a joyful self-realization which

cannot expect any special estimation of such achievement. But the new must always really lie in the plan of the old if we are to recognize the development as such at all. If rich knowledge should sink into our mind as in a dream, so that we could suddenly and without mediation take attitude towards the whole world, or if a sublime artistic work could be created by us without any previous inclination on our part to such artistic rendering, the transition would have no value of development. It would not be a becoming, not a progress, but a sudden disappearance of one state in favor of an unprepared other state. We ourselves are growing in our education and culture because the expanded mental horizon grew before our eyes, and the new attitude is felt by us as a development of the preceding tentative apprehension. The artistic deed is ours not because we know and could explain how we have performed it, but because it is an expression of our leaning and of our intentions. Self-conservation, self-realization, self-reinforcement, must set in, in order that transition from the given to the new volition may become a true progress for the inner world. Every counter-movement, then, signifies regress. If the will is lost because we are lazy or cowardly or without patience, if the power is wasted and the interest wanders fugitively from one thing to the other, if the faculties are unused, and if high plans are crumbling and the self stands before the world without task, then the value of self-development is sacrificed.

Yet this practical realization of the intended volition represents after all only the first step of the valuable self-development. A contemptible inclination and even a criminal volition may also grow in us and the superficial conditions of a valuable development then seem fulfilled too. But it is quite different. The growth and change were really valuable for us only when they were the fulfilment of an intention which we willed and felt as necessary when we apperceived the self. The criminal volition may grow, but we cannot apperceive

a self in such a way that the growth of the destroying will itself becomes aim of the volition. We cannot apperceive it in this way because such an intention would be inhibited by that reasonable fundamental will which we recognized in the deepest layer of every human soul, inasmuch as it made the man a man. We cannot conceive a self otherwise than as having the will for a self-asserting world at its deepest bottom, and that means that it really wills that which is absolutely valuable. That involves that if the subject should be able to unfold himself fully, he could not have satisfaction in the error, in the ugly, in the discord, in the misery, in the regress, in the crime, in the sin, and his satisfaction would be transformed into disgust. We cannot conceive a subject without this fundamental will to the absolute values, because we saw that this affirmation of the absolute values was nothing else but the affirmation of a world which asserts itself, and we cannot acknowledge any subject as subject at all who does not will to share with us a world. He becomes a subject for us only by affirming the world, and that means by demanding ultimately absolute values.

The inner life which is controlled by criminal and sinful will may thus appear on the surface as if it expressed the meaning of its personality even by reënforcing the anti-valuable volitions. But the fact that we must necessarily demand from every subject who does not become for us an irresponsible insane person or a beast the fundamental affirmation of the values makes such a surface view impossible. The will to the negation of the values may be felt and found at any time as the particular state or trait of an individual, but can never be understood as his deepest meaning, and its fulfilment and reënforcement can therefore never express the self-development of the personality. The question of what in the individual person has to be conserved and to be re-enforced in order that his personal aim may gain the pure value of real self-development thus ultimately depends upon

that general will of reason without which we cannot acknowledge any subject as a self. Man therefore finds his true value of self-development only when the particular will which grows in him is in harmony with the ideals of his reason, that is, with his demand for the self-assertion of the world. And this demand includes the totality of the logical, æsthetic, ethical, and metaphysical values. To be the bearer of these values is the noblest meaning of life. Life alone gives the possibility of this self-expression, this self-unfolding, this self-reënfacement through the self-directing will. To think low of life, to play with life, or to throw it away therefore means negation of the absolutely valid value of self-development. It is characteristic of a low state of society and of low character in the personality. On the other hand, to estimate the life merely for its pleasures' sake means to draw it down from the height of the over-personal to the chance life, which is nothing but just experience. Only as bearer of the development towards the pure valuation, life's content becomes more than a personal experience and enjoyment, becomes itself independent, self-asserting, a value. Life and the development of its energies to the highest purposes are therefore absolutely valuable. And nothing is taken away from this pure value if we must yet insist that the mere ascent of life is not a value of achievement, and that its endlessly valuable self-realization still remains outside of the morally good and the morally bad.

CHAPTER XII

THE VALUES OF ACHIEVEMENT

THE values of existence completed themselves in the scientific values of connections, the values of unity demanded their elaboration in the values of artistic beauty: in the same way the values of development must lead on to the values of achievement. In each case the first were given immediately in naïve life, the others were created in a conscious purposive effort of civilization. Outer world, fellow-world, and inner world are filled with the tendencies which lead them to the goals of development, but only that intentional purposive elaboration of values which we call civilization secures the achievements of industry, of law, of morality.

Development, too, as we saw, exists only where a becoming begins through a free deed. The world, seen from the point of view of causal connection, knows changes but no development; effects result, but they are not better than the causes. Transpositions as such cannot be ennobling. We often hear the careless opprobrium that the great historians recognized the "ideas" in the development of the nations, but that they did not sufficiently demonstrate what the causes of those ideas were and which effects came from them. But that is a confusion. When the world, the social or the natural one, is considered causally, it is not controlled by ideas; and when it is conceived as animated by ideas, then we have chosen a standpoint from which the question of causes and effects is as meaningless as the question of its fifth dimension. Development in the world is possible only where there is inner freedom for the unfolding deed. In the causal system that which

arises anew is conceived as already completely determined in the totality of the given, and thus ultimately nothing new. Only from the standpoint of development does the becoming lead to something new which is inaugurated by a free deed, and which exists in the given only as a goal and a purpose. In this realm of freedom we saw the uncausal outer world move towards its goal, and we recognized that its goal is its suitability and efficiency for the purposes of man. In the same way we saw the fellow-world moving towards its goal and recognized that its only possible goal was the over-personal generality of its will. And finally we saw the individual in its inner world move towards its goal, and the goal was the unfolding of its real will. All these goals were necessary ones. We recognized that they must be conceived as belonging to the will of those worlds, if outer world, fellow-world, and inner world are to have a meaning at all. But because these aims had to be conceived as necessarily posited with the independent apperception of the world, therefore the fulfilment of those purposes must be absolutely valuable. This value is absolute because it must hold for every one who is to think a world as such at all. On the other hand, no one can be acknowledged as a subject who does not agree in this demand for a self-asserting world, but who is satisfied with experiencing it as a dream and a chaos. It is therefore absolutely valuable that the seed becomes the nourishing fruit, that the tribe becomes a responsible nation, that the pupil becomes a mature man. And yet this transition, however valuable, is never consciously aimed at on account of its value.

We cannot think the immature without recognizing the aim towards maturity as its meaning. But the boy who grows through that valuable development and becomes a unified personality is not himself moved by the will to become mature and to pass through an absolutely valuable development. He simply has the desire to unfold himself. And it is the same with the fellow-world. Not the development itself

is intended, but the task of the day. The development comes in this sense by itself and unintended. Only he who evaluates the transition compares the meaning of the beginning with the final end, and recognizes in the fruit the purpose of the seed and in the empire the aim of the warrior tribe. The own value is nowhere at first felt as a real task. He who creates evaluates only his work, but not the creation of his work. Development is objectively valuable, but for the subject who develops himself, his own state is not in question as a value.

Here begins the new group of cultural achievements. The task of the development can be secured and reënforced by intentional purposive effort. The natural progress of outer world, fellow-world, and inner world can be protected against inhibition and reënforced against obstacles by the artificial work which we call civilization. The social group which approaches its goal with the own intention to upbuild values, the individual who consciously works towards the realization of his ideal plan of self-development, are no longer chance bearers of values. They really perform an action in order that the value may become realized. Then only we have an achievement, then only estimation and appreciation are demanded, then only the self-realization of the world reaches its highest goal. The situations in the three large fields of outer world, fellow-world, and inner world are here so different that it may be more useful to divide the consideration from the start and to follow up this purposive development for the three fields separately. But in spite of this separation, the fundamental uniformity of all these values of achievement ought to appear. Yes, just here it may become evident how only the systematic deduction of the values allows us to recognize their mutual relations. For instance, the law of the fellow-world and the morality of the inner world offer a similarity which is too easily hidden. At first we have to ask for the purposive achievement of nature.

A. — INDUSTRY

In the philosophical household, economy has always been the Cinderella. When her more fortunate sisters, richly adorned, drove to the dance, she was scolded and had to sit at home in the kitchen. And yet if the young prince ever could see her— It is curious indeed, and yet on the other hand easily understood how little idealistic philosophy has taken care of economy and industry. Truth and beauty, morality and law and religion, are eternal values which uplift struggling mankind, but commerce and trade, manufacturing and consumption, are low functions which pull down the human soul. Without value in themselves, they are tolerated only to satisfy the needs of man. The god in man creates the moral and the true and the beautiful, but the hungry and freezing animal in man creates economy, from the harvest and the chase of the savage to the mills and the stock exchange of a tamer generation. To create pure values means to lift one's self above the mere economic labor, and the philosopher whose eye turns to the ideals of world-development has no reason to waste his interest trading and marketing and egotistic earning. All that has seemed such a matter of course that it hardly needed a special argument. It seemed sufficient simply to banish the industrial life from the realm of philosophy.

This scornful attitude, of course, did not exclude the philosopher of history from always giving serious attention to the economic side of social existence. Often even especial emphasis was put on the economic foundations of the historical development. The materialistic view of history finally saw in the industrial life not only an important part, but the decisive basis of all social forms and changes. But whether the economic conditions have determined the historical development, or whether the political, the intellectual, the moral interests, had an equally strong influence, the ideal

worthlessness of the economic factor is not changed by that in any case. The realistic historian of civilization may consider the economic factors as the essential ones, and may yet estimate their intrinsic value no higher than the idealist. It remains for him, too, merely the material metabolism of the social body which lies at the bottom of the really valuable mental life. The philosopher and the historian may disagree as to whether the mental goods have only relative historical character, or whether they have, as we demand, an absolute value which unfolds itself in the historical world. But they are accustomed to agree that the technical industry is not at all valuable in itself, and has only indirect value by its relation to the social, political, intellectual, legal, and moral goods. Ultimately it all refers to the fact that the impulse of the market is the own selfish interest. Such greediness of gain represents almost a mental antithesis to the unselfish devotion to the eternal goods. Everything which enters into industry and economy thus becomes almost a pure anti-value.

The inferiority of the economic life has also been recently demonstrated with emphasis without reference to those mental motives, but rather with reference to the character of the product. It has been claimed that the value of human creations must be graded in accordance with the influence which they exert. The highest value belongs to that which has the strongest and widest and most lasting importance for the development of mankind. But every human work has the more prospect of exerting influence beyond the space and time of its origin, the more easily it can be detached from the conditions of its becoming, and that means after all, the more spiritual it is. Religion and philosophy therefore represent the highest values, and science and art and morality come very near to them. Finally, state and law and social order are found at a considerable distance because they are much less fit to be carried over to other conditions, and as the last in the series there comes the economic life. It belongs to the soil in

which it grew; it has in a way low earthy character. The peoples themselves may be graded thus in their value for civilization. A nation stands the higher the more it has created for the spiritual goods, and the lower the more its work has been directed towards the economic life only.

But can this really be the last word? It may be doubtful anyhow whether the possibility of becoming detached from its surroundings is really decisive for the lasting influence of a cultural achievement. But in any case we should have to ask this question only for the inner meaning and content of the work, not for the work in its external characteristics. Temples and palaces are certainly not detachable from the soil on which a people has erected them, but the style of architecture which characterized such works of stone may become detached and propagated over the globe. The Greek temples could not be moved, but the order of their columns has wandered further and has lasted longer than the religion for the worship of which those temples had been built. Might it not also hold of industry that its material content may be bound to the soil, but its meaning and spirit may be movable, detachable, and may exert influence at a far distance? It would then even externally fulfil the conditions which are claimed for true culture. Is not the spirit in which the economic life is conducted as different from tribe to tribe, from nation to nation, from age to age, as the spirit in which temples are built and scientific systems are created? Chinese and Japanese art stand much nearer to each other than Japanese and Chinese business ideas and economic views. Romanic and Anglo-Saxon economic life are filled with an entirely different meaning. If we really want to examine the possibility of propagation, we certainly must ask how far this characteristic spirit can become detached and can realize itself in new spheres.

But with this we have already touched the point the neglect of which has led to such one-sidedness in the valuation of the economic life. Not only the economic form but the

inner spirit of the economic life can be as different as the different stages of morality and law, of science and art. Industry, too, can be brought under an ideal aspect, while the only view of economic life which has so far always formed the background of the evaluating history of civilization has been a low, almost a hostile one. How would it have been if the philosophy of values had always been treated only in a puritanical community, in which the fine arts and worldly music were perhaps counted as sins against the demands of the church, and in the best case as mere sensual enjoyment of the eyes and as a low feast of the ears? Such a community would then take it as self-evident that art only serves egoistic desires and has no position in the circle of the absolute values. Art might then perhaps be placed even below economy, as the selfish desires for the satisfaction of economic needs are at least posited by nature itself, while the longing for mere tickling of the nerves by art is a superfluous aberration. And yet that would be the same art which by its over-personal value of beauty forms the inexhaustible enjoyment of unpuritanical mankind.

May not the work of industry and economy to an equal degree allow of different interpretations? It may be looked on with the narrowness of those who recognize there only the satisfaction of low instincts, and it may be considered with the wide view of those who recognize there too a highest absolute value. The philosophy of values has no right simply to accept that low confused view in which the pure valuation has not found its historical unfolding, but has to see the value with the eyes of those who have the vision of its over-personal content. It is entirely natural that in philosophy the narrow-hearted aspect of economic life has prevailed. The standard of the values was chosen by philosophical thinkers, and yet at all times the spirit of scholarly research finds its best energy in a certain opposition to the impulses which control the life of the market. Let the world all around pursue the earthly

treasures; the thinker follows the ideals of knowledge uninfluenced by gold, and he almost instinctively arms himself for his calling by a condescending aspect towards lucrative labor. He may devote indefatigable care to the investigation of economic facts, and yet while his special calling is the inquiry into economic life, he may couple the highest estimation of his calling with the lowest estimation of its material. However important industry may appear to him, he may yet consider it as a low function of life.

But if we want to understand art, we must see it with the eyes of the true artist. If we want to understand the economic life, we must look on it from the point of view of the captain of industry and with the spirit of those who have opened new paths to the economic life of the nations. If we observe the economic factors, wherever the commercial and industrial life find their proudest development in the various ages, we must feel that egotistic greediness has been on the whole only the small coin in the market, but that all great transitions and developments demanded very different impulses. To create, and to create with the whole soul for that wonderful work of the economic development is the desire and the ambition of the true worker. The gain is estimated because it indicates that the problem is solved, that the conquest is completed, and that which is earned is used again for a new progress. To take part in the work, to toil for the enterprise, is the joy of life. In pioneer days it comes to its most enthusiastic expression. Young and old, poor and rich, are joined by the one feeling that it is a gigantic work which they are to build up together. To open a land, to make the desert fertile, to dig out the treasures of the soil and to send the works of industry over the globe, to awaken in the millions new and ever new demands, to satisfy them in a million ways — that is an inspiration and an ideal which stands, in the feeling of the worker, not lower than justice and freedom and truth and morality. Where one blade grew and two are now growing,

where one railroad track went through the valley and now two are built, where one chimney smoked and now a thousand testify to useful labor, there an absolutely valid progress has been secured by which the world has become more valuable. And such a noble view of economic life is detachable from the soil as well as art and philosophy; it can spread and has always spread at the periods of the golden ages of industry. As soon as the economic life is penetrated by such enthusiastic feeling, it is not difficult to recognize in it that which constitutes the true value which is common to all industrial activity. But then it becomes indifferent whether such an absolutely valuable process connects itself in the practical world with low or with high motives, just as the eternal value of truth is not touched by the question whether the individual misuses knowledge for selfish ends or perhaps even for contemptible purposes. That which stands for decision is only the problem whether the economic progress is in itself a pure value independent of the question of how far the conscious appreciation of this value has unfolded itself in the historical development of society. But all this connects the consideration of industry with our study of the values of development.

In discussing the development of nature, we recognized clearly that the nature of the naturalist, the nature of mathematical physics, does not know any progress, and that its transformations are without value. But that did not exclude the fact, as we saw that the true outer world has its purposes, its aims, its values. We saw that the outer world, in which and with which we live, at first had not entered into the thought-forms of causal science. In the life-contact with the willing man the outer world is only means and obstacle and material for our purposes. A real own meaning of nature only shows when it adjusts itself to the human purposes, when it helps the purposive will of man, and only the change towards this goal appeared to us as a true growth and development.

As soon as we have liberated ourselves from the one-sidedness of the causal sciences, — of course without in the least touching by it the unlimited right of the natural sciences in their own circle, — nothing can hinder us from proceeding in exactly the same direction towards new values.

The true no-remodelled nature wills to serve man — not man in the petty personal selfish meaning, but in the absolutely valid rational sense. The outer world remains without significance when this deepest relation to mankind is not conceived with it, and if instead of it the world of indifferent atoms is substituted for the world of natural experience. As soon as this direction of the outer world is recognized, we see the necessary goal of the work of civilization. A conscious effort must be made to help nature in the fulfilment of its intention, to secure, to reënforce, and to strengthen without limit the progress towards this ideal. That is the meaning of industry and economy. Just as the conscious labor of the arts alone can complete that aim of the outer world towards inner unity which manifests itself in the beauty of nature, in the same way the desire for development in nature completes itself only in the industrial life.

The outer world aims to serve the purposes of man. Every step forward must therefore necessarily be determined both by the given world and by the ever new human purposes. Both must remain in steady correlation. Economy is always a system of natural goods serving the human community. We do not say, as it has been said, that economy is a human community served by a system of natural goods. The difference seems small and yet it is fundamental for us. As soon as only the social community, with its wishes and needs and satisfactions, is in question, everything moves in the circle of the merely historical: there are no absolute values. But if the goods themselves, if nature in its purposive adjustment is conceived as the real content of economy, the way is open to estimate economy also as pure value. The community

which satisfies its hunger and protects itself against the climate, or which, many stages higher, gathers together the treasures of the globe by steamers and railroads to enjoy life, fulfils only personal purposes. But the nature which nourishes and protects man, and in endless transformation distributes itself everywhere in order to fulfil the human purposes, really offers an over-personal value. For those who can see the outer world only through the spectacles of the naturalist, this difference falls away. If nature is meaningless and dead, nature cannot have any task and purpose, and only the man who uses nature can interest us. If we start from man, we can have only personal valuations. But if we start from nature, we reach the over-personal value because everything is now based on the fact that nature fulfils its only thinkable task. This fulfilment must satisfy every one who recognizes the meaning of nature at all, and we saw that every one who wills a world must sympathize with and apprehend this intention of nature. As it is the will shared by every one whom we can acknowledge as a subject at all, its fulfilment has over-personal value.

It is the same difference as that between the merely agreeable and the truly beautiful. If it were merely the satisfaction of the human needs seen from the point of view of the will of man, every economic change would be only an effort for the personal satisfaction of ourselves and of our neighbors. But the mere comfort cannot be a source of pure values, and it makes no difference whether, after the fashion of the savages, the comfort is secured by a few cocoanuts picked from the next tree, or whether a hundred thousand hands are necessary to bring the pleasures of a life of luxury to the modern city man. And where there is no valid ideal, enthusiasm has no point. Economic labor then remains on that low level which is controlled by pleasure and pain. But everything is changed at once when the demand of nature itself is in question. Now it becomes a task to awaken the slumbering

desire in the outer world, to lead nature's faint will by helpful human work to fuller and fuller success, and finally to bring to fulfilment that which must be accomplished as the necessary general task of nature. Now the real meaning is no longer related to pleasure and displeasure. Of course it may also belong to the tasks of nature to spread pleasure and to eliminate pain, but the real purpose of the economic development is then not this pleasure but the fulfilment of this mission of nature. By that truly an ideal is posited, and to serve it in devotion becomes a pure goal of the work of civilization. Then it is a dignified duty for noblest enthusiasm to help in order that slumbering nature may awake and perfect itself just as the seed develops into the fruit. Whoever contributes to the economic life of his time in such a spirit reaches an idealistic achievement even if he only tills the field or steers the ship, sells his wares or hammers the iron. In truth and beauty and morality, too, he who serves faithfully is but seldom called to perform the great and decisive deed. The task of the hour may be small, but its idealistic content is not diminished by that. The world is too easily inclined to confuse the contrast between materialistic and idealistic feeling at work with the contrast between material and not-material means of work. As the business man has to deal with material things, every idealistic value is disclaimed for his labor, while the intellectual work is easily recognized as idealistic. But that is misleading. The work with not-material stuff can have very selfish materialistic motives. Even in science and art and law and religion, many a man without ideals serves professionally from materialistic motives, and on the other hand the purest idealism may control the simplest economic deed. The only decisive question is whether the act was performed from self-seeking motives or from a devoted belief in the absolute value of that which is to be done. Whoever recognizes or at least dimly feels that in industry, too, a great unlimited world task is performed will coöperate in this

gigantic work with unselfish devotion just as the true artist or scholar or judge or minister may work in his place.

This pure valuation of the economic progress must not be mixed up with that pride with which the man of civilization gladly looks on his growing technical mastery over the energies of nature. The one has nothing to do with the other. This triumph of applied physics and chemistry is admired there entirely as scientific achievement. Not the progress of nature, but the overcoming of nature, satisfies such ambition. The labor which overcomes all hindrances is in question there not as an economic but as a scientific value. When the bridge is built and the tunnel pierced and the wireless message sent over the ocean, this proud feeling of progress of the positivist turns directly to the thinker whose calculations were so splendidly confirmed. Not nature made the progress, but society with its deeds of thought. It is a philistine pride of the ages of enlightenment. Nature is still without rights, without will, without purpose, in slavery.

But as soon as the chains of slavery are broken, in order that nature may be estimated in its own will and that human effort may be understood as a coöperation with nature, then technical science itself enters into a new relation. The free will of nature remains dominant. Without it the outer world and all industry and economy would be without own meaning and value, but where nature is turning towards a goal which is important for man, the coöperation becomes possible only when the transition from the given to the desired can be completely understood. And only this transition awakes the human interest, which slowly grows into the theories of science. Thus economy does not find the one mechanical nature of the physicist in which the atoms have been moving for trillions of years without purpose in accordance with causal laws in the universe. Economy rather finds a nature which works with us and the meaning of which lies in its intention to fulfil the purposes of the willing men. Only in the

interest of this coöperation does the causal interpretation produce the conceptional vision of the useless world mechanism. Economy is thus not included in physics, but physics, as far as it becomes technical, is a part of economics. Nature in a way accepts the physical form as soon as it is willing to enter into coöperation with man, because only in this form can it be determined beforehand and therefore can combine its activity with the purposes of the thinking men.

As soon as this unity between nature and man has been reached, the activity of man himself becomes a part of the nature which unfolds itself with reference to its purpose. The things of the outer world are then filled with the energy of the laboring men. Nature in a way absorbs there the muscle work of the human being. Whether the hand works or the electrical machine, whether the arm or the steam engine lifts the weight, whether the feet or the electric wire carry the message, makes by principle no difference for the economic success. Everything is determined in this way by the will of man, but the outer world aims towards the common purpose by its own energy in its natural development, and, absorbing the forces of man, nature pushes forward to the highest cultural achievements of industry. At every point of the human development nature stands ready to make its goods a unity with the will of man and so to produce economic goods. From the fruit on the next tree and the fish in the next brook which satisfy the primitive man, the way leads forward to our world of economy in which the tea-plant of China and the sugar-cane of Cuba and the silver-mines of Nevada and the porcelain of Germany and the flax of Ireland and hundreds of other gifts of nature must be developed and detached until our tea-table tempts us. The fire flashed up and helped the human purpose, the clay formed itself in the pottery, and corn and grain grew in the scratched earth; the stones, later the bronze, and soon the iron moulded themselves into weapons and tools, and every progress created unlimited new satisfactions and new

demands. Larger and larger became the masses of goods which streamed together in order to serve man, more and more varied their transformation, their elaboration, and above all their mutual adjustment. The hollow tree which satisfied the barbaric seafarer became the gigantic steamer which carries thousands over the ocean, the sling of the savage became the cannon, his hut of clay grew into the cathedral with its dome and into the skyscraper, his signs on the bark of a tree became the newspaper which carries to millions the cabled news of the whole globe, the fire in his cave became the electric arc-light which drains its energy from the waterfall miles distant, his garment of skins became the costume in which the cotton of America and the wool of Europe and the silk of Asia and the diamonds of Africa were brought together; but simple or endlessly complex, everything is a part of that nature which helps to fulfil the purpose of mankind.

Of course the modelling of nature into useful tools and the fusing of the goods does not alone reach the goal of nature. That which the mines and the fields and the mills may produce must be distributed, and must flow through millions of channels to get where it reaches the human will which it aims to satisfy. Here begins the exchange and the market, the buying and selling near and far. It is a meaningful spreading and exchanging of places between the things of nature, entirely different from the meaningless movements of the natural atoms. The money is only one among these flowing natural things, but for nearly five thousand years the dominant one. By its neutral exchange-value and its possibility of being conserved, the money can reënforce the service of nature for the human will in an unlimited way. But even when in the midst of a developed financial system the check of the millionaire can be exchanged for goods with which whole tribes might satisfy their needs, it remains after all a piece of nature. In an almost magical way, it has absorbed into itself

the effective powers of an endless manifoldness of natural energies, but it still remains nature which serves mankind. This economic artificial growth of nature demands such manifoldness of energies that it can never be sufficient for it to fuse with the energy of a single human being. Division of labor is necessary in order that nature may fulfil the task of liberating its material, of moulding it, of elaborating it, and of distributing it, from the lowest stage to the modern swarming in the mills and the markets.

It is not essential for us to remind ourselves once more of the well-known wonders of our world of economy, but only to emphasize the absolutely valuable meaning of this movement and its difference from the naked personal interest. In every stage, in every form, the economic content is not the society with its needs and its pleasures and pains, but the content is nature with its absolutely valid purposes, the fulfilment of which must be an absolute value. Yet it must be especially emphasized that the value is never bound up with a particular result of this economic development of nature. We know that a single thing can never represent a pure value, but that the valid value always refers to a relation between two identical points. Whatever economy may reach as something completed and given, has no value at all, measured by the absolute standard. It may satisfy demands, but then it is only agreeable and useful, not absolutely valuable. Absolutely valuable only is the development itself in which nature fulfils its tasks, and in which, therefore, nature brings about the identity between the goal which must be necessarily conceived as belonging to it and the real fulfilment. Only this relation of identity, this transition, this progress, is a true value in economy. The lazy, careless will of the bushman becomes satisfied by the fruits and beasts just as well as our will is satisfied by the world of industry of the twentieth century. Measured by mere personal satisfaction, the one is no better than the other, and as source of such personal

comfort, neither one nor the other is valuable. But it is valuable that nature offers its gifts to such richer and richer will, and remoulds its treasures with clear purpose into goods which satisfy the ever new will and lead it to more and more complex volitions. That is a deed comparable only to the always new unfolding of science and art. Nature fulfils in the light of consciousness its own task. That is the meaning of industry and economy. And not the result but the free deed of this fulfilment is an incomparable pure value, the self-realization of the outer world.

B. — LAW

We saw that values arise whenever nature, community, and self unfold themselves and fulfil the task which must be necessarily conceived as their own. We called such free transition from intention to realization an absolutely valuable development. We then asked as to the achievement of civilization which secures and reënforces such development with conscious purpose. For nature we found such achievement in the economic work of industry. The next turn of the road must therefore lead to the question whether the development of the community, too, can be made a conscious purpose. In the case of the community it may be difficult to characterize by one single conception such an achievement of civilization. Of course there are many possibilities to secure and to reënforce the upward development of society. And these possibilities are so manifold and so different that it might appear artificial to render them in a simple formula. It is evident, for instance, that education belongs there, that every political reform has its place there, as well as many other purposive acts which serve the true development of the fellow-world. And yet one factor is fundamental and central: it is law. Law, and the state as far as it serves the law, offer the achievement sought in the safest and purest way.

We assert, then, that we find in law a new absolute value; but we do not forget that such a claim of absoluteness is for the value of law perhaps more threatened by misunderstandings than in any other field of values. The historic relativity of the ideas of law appears as a matter of course. The arbitrary legislative intrusion into the formation of law seems a daily occurrence. Above all, the old-fashioned ideas of a natural, eternal, higher, divine law seem so entirely abolished that it appears almost reckless still to speak to-day of an absolutely valid value of law. Yet we must look more carefully. Is there really any possibility, in spite of the changing laws of the Assyrians and the Romans, the Icelanders and the Japanese, of proceeding to the one immutable eternal law? Various ways seem to stand open. The legal statutes of the nations are as manifold as their languages, but just because mankind proceeds in a continuous striving from a lower to a higher legal life, we are sometimes assured that every historic law can be taken only as the uncertain tentative effort to express the one eternal law of mankind which is written in the stars. As the scientific theories of the ages change, and yet beyond those striving imperfect theories the one perfect truth remains immutable, in the same way the absolutely valuable law is far superior to the law tablets of Hammurabi or the penal code which a modern parliament has laid down. Only pure reason can grasp this unwritten eternal law. At all times a Platonizing idealism has postulated such an over-historical, absolutely valuable law.

All this cannot tempt us. We now know surely that the values which our critical philosophy is seeking are not hidden in an over-reality which is inaccessible to our experience. Truth, too, was for us not a ready-made completed ideal structure beyond experience, but in our real true judgments was lying the whole value of truth. And the necessity which dominates beforehand our true judgments lies not in an absolute beyond experience, but lies in the fundamental char-

acter of our own will which necessarily seeks the identities. The same holds true for every value: its only possible place is in this world of life-experience. The form of every possible value is predetermined and independent of any arbitrariness, and therefore absolute; but it is predetermined only by our own will, which constitutes our character as subjects who have a world. It remains meaningless to seek the absoluteness of the value in any relation of it to a metaphysical beyondness. The outer world, the fellow-world, the inner world, can satisfy our will or can violate it; to seek absolute values means to examine when this satisfaction has overpersonal meaning. But it is always satisfaction in this experienced world, and anything which holds for worlds beyond experience must not throw even a faint glimmer of light on our way; that can only mislead us. With better right even than the naturalist, we could assert that we do not know another world than the world of experience, and every reference to a super-world would not have given the firmness of an absolute meaning to the values which we find, but by principle would have destroyed them. All this cannot be different for the value of law. If there is anything absolutely valuable at all in the sphere of law, it must be demonstrated in the historical legal life. Even the ideal as far as it has not been reached must take its whole meaning from the possible formations of the given social community.

Those who in this way turn to the historical life of the nations may perhaps seem tempted to seek the absolutely valuable by sifting it from that which is accidental in the historical forms. That which changes from nation to nation must be perishable. But if we could find laws which return everywhere, or if at least we could find certain lasting norms of law, even if they are expressed in unequal formulations, then we should after all have a certain stock of law common to all which might claim such superior value. Ethnologists, to be sure, would be skeptical about it from the be-

ginning. The statutes show themselves everywhere so entirely determined by the particular forms of society that at various places and times not only different rules have been upheld, but even practically opposite rules. But let us grant that there exists some kind of law which can be uniformly found wherever men separate right and wrong. The nearest approach to it would perhaps be: "Thou shalt not kill." Of course every community has its exceptions. There is a widespread right to kill the weak or the old members of the tribe, and with us it is a right to kill enemies in a war or to kill the degenerates as punishment for their crimes. But even if it should hold without exception that the killing of man is an absolute wrong, we should have to discriminate carefully two aspects. On the one side it means that slaying is detested, and on the other it means that this existing abhorrence is forced on the members of the community with common coercive measures. The question is whether it is this forcing or that detesting which is to represent the value. But it seems evident that the mere abhorrence for the murderous deed does not at all represent law. Such an aversion does not differ from other feelings which developed themselves in the social community. Of course it may be valuable that a disinclination for killing has developed in the social life, but as such an emotion it remains only a value of social development. The abhorrence for killing thus stands at first on the same level with other inclinations and disinclinations which are legally quite indifferent. The slaying is detested just as the consumption of rotten food is detested. It is an instinct which may protect the community, but which has in itself no meaning of a legal value. There may be superadded a moral value. It may be a matter of conscience for the individual not to kill under any circumstances. But the moral value of this domination over an impulse is of course again something different from the value of law. The real value of law finds place only in that

second factor which had to be added to the mere abhorrence for killing to make out of it a legal prohibition of killing, namely, the order which forces that social dislike on every single member of the social group.

But if it is really true that the legal value belongs to the social order which forces the volitions of the community on the individual members, then the prohibition of slaying loses its exceptional position. We turned to this particular interdiction only because it returns so frequently and thus belongs to the stock of prescriptions which are general. But if the legal value does not lie at all in the content of the interdiction, but only in the superadded order of coercive measures, then of course it is quite indifferent for the question of values whether we consider a law which returns frequently or an accidental and isolated law. The order of coercion is anyhow common to all laws even if their content is quite different. The absolutely valid value of law thus never lies in the fact that certain contents of law return everywhere; such an idea moves by principle in a wrong direction. The content of the laws may represent a value of social development, and may be combined with moral values, but the value of law must be entirely independent of the content.

Also that possible but not at all necessary connection with the moral conscience can never constitute the legal value as such. There exists no legal instinct as an inner voice. For a moral decision we ask our conscience, and no one else can be substituted for ourselves there. In a legal doubt we ask the lawyer, and it is only a chance if we ourselves know what to do. Morality is always an affair of the inner world, the law an affair of the fellow-world. The social life of ideally moral personalities would surely lead to results which would be in many respects similar to the ideal legal life of internally unmoral persons. But in the first case, there would be no law, just as in the second case there would be no morality. Morality and law are perfectly parallel, but just for that

reason they can never touch each other. Morality must always remain in the field of the personality and law always in the field of the community. The inner world of the personality, conscious of its moral duties, is never simply a fraction of the community, and the community, conscious of its legal duties, is never simply a combination of moral personalities. We shall soon recognize that between those two parallels, while they never touch each other, there exist many lines of connection. For the understanding of law in its necessary values we must hold to the law itself and cannot get any help from the moral conscience.

After these negative considerations we may now turn to the positive factors. We insisted that the content of every prescription or restriction expresses at first merely the satisfaction or dissatisfaction with certain deeds; as such an expression of the common will it is not a legal value, but a value of development. We have carefully studied this social development. We saw that we had to accredit the will of the individual to the community only in so far as it really referred to the common work, and that all progress demanded the transition from the selfish will to the social will, and finally from the social will to the absolutely general evaluating standpoint. In this way the family and the community and the tribe and the nation grow in pure life-development, just as the seed grows in the field. Far from right and law the community must thus develop a common will and desire. The individual wills more and more that which every other member of the community would will in the same way. Instead of the selfish splitting-off there arises the unity of the manifold, in which every single member takes attitude in the sense of the whole group. Only where such transitions arise can we recognize progress and development.

Now we are seeking that work of civilization which secures and reënforces intentionally such a development. We said beforehand that there must be many means to secure it. If,

for instance, the community has developed a certain over-personal way of looking on the world or a common way of interpreting or feeling, then civilization will have to take care that artistic education or scientific instruction of the youth forces on the individual just this mood of feeling and thinking. But there are evidently certain volitions which are superior in importance for the development of the community as such, namely, those volitions which themselves constitute the social life. It is clear that those will-acts by which the mutual relations of the members of the community are formed at all must remain the foundation of all social existence. If the development of the group is to continue, and if the progress is not to be lost again by counter-movements, then the community must take care that those volitions which refer to those mutual social relations are really willed and realized by every single member. If it is the purpose of civilization to secure by an intentional effort the natural development of the social group, then the community must force on its members in the first place those actions which the community wills as means of binding the social group together. The community must oblige the individual members to will with the social group, whatever will may have developed in it. Society must take care with coercive measures that in its midst all which society as a whole wills in order to remain a society at all be really done.

The character of these mutual relations necessarily shows far-reaching differences. It is conditioned by the different heights of development which are reached, and especially by the unequal conditions of life. If the community is to form a social unity and is to unfold itself in mutual adaptation of its members, a trading people, for instance, must develop entirely different estimations and disinclinations from a warfaring people and again different from a religious people. The economic situations, the political forms, the geographic conditions, the climate, the natural racial disposition, the

common traditions, unite to bring about very unlike inclinations and disinclinations for mutual human relations. The admiration for faithfulness and obedience fits the one community better, the admiration for self-dependence and industry fits the other better. The one community, to protect its own social existence, may consider life as holy, while the other, under its entirely different life-conditions, may be able to protect itself only if it permits the killing of the weak and the old members of the group. With the one perhaps the deepest abhorrences will turn against economic fraud, with the other against cowardice, and again with others against irreligiousness. On the other hand, it seems no less necessary that in certain fundamental directions satisfaction and dissatisfaction concerning mutual treatment must have something uniform in all communities. The fact that stealing, robbing, and murdering is on the whole almost everywhere detested only indicates that the development of a society demands everywhere this feeling-tone because without it the social life as such would be undermined under any conditions. Just as the food is different from country to country and the nourishment of the Eskimo would be unfit for the African Negro, and yet certain fundamental relations of nourishing material are the same for the whole globe and must be the same from physiological reasons, in the same way in social life a certain minimum of appreciation of deeds must develop itself uniformly everywhere. The economic, political, religious, and climatic factors work towards the difference of those valuations of actions. On the other hand, that which is common results from the fact that everywhere only women bear children, everywhere men are stronger for fight, everywhere the personal talent for various achievements is different, everywhere industry and laziness, far-sightedness and stupidity, strength and weakness, stand opposed to each other, and everywhere agreement gives greater strength than discord. The decisive fact for us is only that a richly devel-

oped valuation of mutual treatment unfolds itself in every community, while this common will in itself does not hold any element of law. The fact that stealing and murdering is detested by every single member of the group belongs to the progress which lies outside of law.

But this is sure: the advance from the mere satisfaction of selfish instincts to the detesting of the injury to others is really a progress from personal desires to overpersonal attitudes. It is a step forward on the way to an absolutely valid valuation. And when we discussed development of the fellow-world we saw that this transition alone characterizes every possible social development. To hold this development firmly and to make sure that it is not lost by a slipping backward of individual members must be the work of civilization, which aims to secure and to continue this value of natural development. If the progress is not to be lost by chance counter-movements, the community must find means to make it impossible for the individual member to strike against those will-tendencies which hold the group together as a unity. Such coercive measures already exist in the customs of the group. With the customs begins the securing of the common will, and this power of the customs goes on partly supporting and especially supplementing the less important volitions at a time when more energetic means of force have been already established. In the same way the religious support secures this common will; the rules and prescriptions of the gods protect it. Yet the protection becomes a real conscious deed of the community only through the legal order.

Hence law is for us the order by which the realization of the common will in the mutual treatment of the members of the community is intentionally secured and guaranteed by coercive measures. This order, this guarantee, this certainty for the realization of the common will, forms the only absolutely valid value of law. The content of that common will,

on the other hand, has nothing to do with the value of the law as such. Whether the group-will is highly developed or still stands on a low stage, whether it contains an important content or an indifferent one, a content which is conditioned by accidental circumstances or a content which agrees with the deepest demands of morality, all has no influence on the value of law. The only important question is whether that which the community really wills is intentionally guaranteed by coercive measures. The value of law can therefore come to a rich development where the content of the law still manifests a low stage in the development of the common will; and on the other hand, the estimation and detesting of human actions may have reached a high level and yet the value of law may still be poorly developed.

Hence what is absolutely valuable in law is not the content of the law, but the order of law by which the realization of that which is willed in common is forced on every member of the community. But it is clear that this order of law must represent an extremely complex structure, which contains much more than the mere written laws. If we look to the most highly developed forms of the modern civilized states, we must recognize as legal order the whole organization by which the will of the nation transforms itself into coercive measures for the individual. There belongs the constitution of the state which gives power to the legislatures, to the head of the state, and to the representatives of the people; there belong the laws which are proclaimed; there belong the public attorneys, the courts, the judges, the lawyers; there belong the means of punishment, the jails, and many other factors. The state itself with its essential functions is thus a part of the legal order.

If that is the situation, we know also what must be antagonistic to the values of law. It is not the legal wrong, the crime, which is anti-valuable, but the lawlessness. All the ways are anti-valuable by which the will of the community

is falsified, by which perhaps the legislative bodies do not represent through the mode of election the real common will, or by which legislators themselves do not formulate with their best conscience the common will in the laws. Laws which contradict the common will and state attorneys who submit to the prejudices of single groups are anti-valuable; unfair judges or useless penalties or arbitrary methods of procedure are anti-valuable. A law which faithfully renders the will of the community and is carried through without partisanship may be absurd, because that particular community may have absurd ideas on that special point, but the law can never lose by that anything in its valid legal value. Of course the essence of this coercive measure can be already given where such manifold division of labor does not yet exist. There may be no written laws and no legislators, but only judges who decide the quarrel by their own opinion and who punish the guilty. But that does not change the fundamental principle. Such a judge or such a head of the tribe can perform this function only because he is sustained by the will of the community, and his personal opinion is thus accepted beforehand as the expression of the common will. Even where an apparently autocratic will is super-ordinated on the community, its power remains the result of the common will, and by the living creation of right through his irresponsible volition the community gives to itself a legal order which secures the development of its own will.

That which holds true for the order of the state repeats itself in the same way in every group which controls itself or which acknowledges traditional rights. It may be a small club, the statutes of which bind the members; it may be the concert of the civilized nations, which by international agreement force the common will on every particular nation. The most different groups may penetrate each other. The church community may develop its own law beside the state law, and always the conceptionally formulated law will be only a

section of the whole valuable legal order. The state remains superior to all other groups from the start because the club or the party or the community or the denomination ultimately derives its order from the coercive measures of the state.

If in this way the value belongs to the legal order, that is, to the objective law, and there again not to the content of the law but to the coercive guaranteeing of the common will, then the personal legality of the individual actions does not represent an absolute legal value at all, and the illegality is not destruction of a value. The subjective legality may be morally valuable: that does not interest us here. Correspondingly the crime of the individual would be morally anti-valuable. But actions which deny the value of law can thus be performed only by the community and not by the individual. Under this aspect the individual legislator and the individual judge of course must be considered as representatives of the community. The individual criminal may oppose the absolute values by his immorality, but not by his illegality. If he does not will to fulfil the law, but prefers to suffer the penalty, or rather if he is willing to run the risk of a penalty, it is his individual practical decision which belongs in the sphere of personal experiences of pleasure and displeasure, besides the relation to the question of morality. The criminal deed of stealing or killing or deceiving or committing adultery is no negation of the absolute value of law; but selfish legislation, perversion of the law by the judge, unfair penalty, arbitrariness of prosecution, antiquated laws which no longer express the common will, in short, uncertainty of the law and lawlessness, alone can interfere with the absolute value of law.

And after all, have we a right to call this value absolute? Could this whole task not be understood as a relative function? But here no wrong concession ought to confuse the situation. The absolute value of the legal order stands beyond every relativism and skepticism. We demanded from the absolutely valid values the identity of experience so that

the will to self-assertion which is recognized in the first experience became satisfied by the identical realization in the new experience. If the community is to maintain its own self, the only indispensable demand must be that its deeds be identical with its intentions. If the common will is turned aside before it realizes itself, the total meaning of the common life is destroyed. The transition from the common will to the identical action of the community is therefore the satisfaction of an over-personal demand, and that means a pure absolute value. Where the community has reached a stage of development in which the slaying is detested, in that group no slaying must be allowed if the social will is not to negate itself. The guaranteeing of a common life without murder by the threat of punishment for the murderer and by just prosecution, jurisdiction, and punishment is therefore an achievement of the community by which its own fundamental will is realized. The community would become an accidental nothing-but-experience without own meaning, without own goal, and without own value, if the demand for the identity between its will and its action should disappear. It is the one demand which gives to it the meaning of an independent self-asserting significance. Therefore its fulfilment by the legal order remains eternally valuable. The jurist has a right to say that justice must be done even if the world is to perish. It means that the legal order remains eternally valuable, while the world of the merely personal individual demands may break down.

C. — MORALITY

The problems which the moral life forces on the philosophic thought are abundant. While men within wide limits always agreed as to the ways in which they ought to act as moral personalities, in our times as in former times they have disagreed with reference to the meaning and significance of morality. We have to detach our particular question from this

large background of ethical problems, and we shall be able to answer our special problem the more directly, the more we focus our attention on this one question and leave all others untouched. But while it is in no way our aim to wander through the whole field of ethics, we cannot help recognizing that our particular question carries us to the centre of the field to a point where practically all ways meet. This one question is of course: is there in our moral life anything absolutely valuable? If we have to acknowledge any absolute value of morality, we must further examine whether we are justified in locating it just at this place in the system of values. We know where we stand. We have found in industry the conscious purposive development of the outer world and in law the conscious purposive development of the fellow-world. That which remains must be the conscious purposive development of the inner world. If morality is to fill this place in the system of values, it will mean that morality is that achievement by which the self-development of the personality, its self-realization, becomes a conscious deliberate task. Is that really the value of morality, and does not the value perhaps belong rather to the result which is to be reached by the moral deed?

But the situation has already been cleared for us, inasmuch as it is ultimately the same that we find in the case of the value of law. The relations of law and the relations of morality correspond to each other with surprising exactitude, and every solution which we found there fits in here also. That does not mean in the least that morality leans on the law. On the contrary, even if we were to conceive the principle of law in its widest sense, including perhaps all the social coercive measures, even the customs and the church influences, nevertheless morality would remain independent of it. In a corresponding way we emphasized that the law is entirely independent of morality. We said that law is never an enforced morality, as morality belongs in the sphere of the

individual will. The law is the achievement of the community, and that means of the community as a unity, not as a bundle of isolated personalities. It has nothing to do with the law-value that the demands of law may conform to the moral will. And it is also no law-value that it is moral to subordinate one's self to the law. The law with its own values would be unchanged if no morality existed. The community would be able to secure the realization of its own will by coercive measures even if no individual should feel bound by moral obligations. In the same way morality is free from law and any other social coercion. Custom and law, church and state, may press on the conscience with all their powers, but the moral deed itself begins where those influences stop. The moral is entirely an action of the inner world.

In the moral field, too, we can start at first from the ordinary daily experiences to find out what constitutes the pure value. A thing in the possession of another man tempts us, but we detest the stealing, and finally overcome our desire in accordance with the voice of our conscience. It may be that such an example of stealing still too much suggests law and right. We may therefore just as well substitute actions which no judge punishes. Let us say that we can protect ourselves against damage by a lie, but we despise the lying and again we follow our conscience; we suffer the damage in order to stick to the truth. Or to point not only to the suppression of actions which the conscience condemns, but to the performing of actions which the conscience demands: we see a stranger in a burning house, we are afraid of the danger into which we come, yet we feel that the saving deed is our duty, and without hesitation we rush into the flaming house as conscience orders.

In the sphere of law we always separated the will-content of the law from the legal order. Here, too, in the same way we may sharply separate the content with its feeling-tone from the enforcement by conscience. The content is the

detested theft, or the despised lie, or the estimated life-saving. Exactly as in the case of the law, we must now ask again: After all what is valuable, the fact that these contents are despised or are estimated, or the other fact that the realization of these feelings is enforced by conscience? The first possibility would be the most convenient solution of the problem. The dislike of the theft is so strong, we might say, that it overcomes the pleasure in the possession. The pleasure in the life-saving deed is so vivid that it suppresses the displeasure of danger. The absolute value accordingly lies in the fact that this overwhelming pleasure is attached to the valuable saving of fellow-men, or that this superior displeasure is attached to the violation of the other man's property. The value of the moral deed could thus be deduced from the pleasure and displeasure in certain effects. It is morally valuable to prefer the fellow-life, the fellow-happiness, and the fellow-welfare.

It is indifferent for us which special nuances are given to such effect-morality. It may be the most trivial utilitarianism which gives value to the production of pleasure, it may be the more serious doctrine of ethical culture which evaluates the wholesome development and efficiency. The doctrine may perhaps even sink down to naked egotism, which demands the pleasure of the neighbor only because it ultimately guarantees the own comfort. Or it may raise itself to the highest point and demand a deed because the general imitation of it would correspond best to the life-conditions of the whole community. We do not ask why pleasure of the neighbor is to be preferred to our own pleasure. We do not even ask why the securing of happiness or of common welfare by moral actions is to be more valuable than the production of the same effect by accidental processes. Indeed very often this mere happiness goal can be reached more quickly by rather immoral actions. We leave all these questions untouched, as they would lead us away from our goal.

For us everything depends only upon the one point: Have we really a right to seek moral value in the fact that man prefers certain ways of action and detests certain others?

But we have answered this question beforehand. When we discussed the self-development, we recognized that this affective value of certain modes of action belongs entirely to the valuable development of the self and represents the progress from the selfish instinct to the pure evaluating will. We found the individual abhorrence of the lie and the theft and the cowardice in the sphere of the values of development before there was any question of special merit, and before the action took the character of morality. All which exists before morality is in question may become a condition for the moral life, but cannot constitute its real meaning and value. This is indeed the situation. The evaluation of the happiness of the neighbor and of his welfare and of the life of the community is one of the conditions for morality, but this evaluation itself still entirely lacks the value of morality, just as we saw that the mere detesting of slaying and robbing does not at all constitute a value of law. Every ethics which deals with results and effects necessarily remains at the standpoint of the pre-moral. He who does not take any evaluating attitude at all towards lying and stealing and life-saving is unable to act morally; but he is not immoral, he is a moral. The conditions are lacking for the possibility of amoral process. But this moral factor is after all something new which has to be superadded to that evaluating attitude.

We saw that if the inner life is to be a development, it necessarily leads from the short-sighted selfish longing upward to a pure evaluating apperception of the world. We saw how the inner world can realize itself only when every volition comes more and more into agreement and harmony with the total will-structure of the self. And we saw how this practical inner unity of will finally leads to an ideal of higher unity in which all volitions are controlled by an inner

fundamental will. This controlling ultimate will demanded that the world be no dream, no chaos, no mere flash-experience, but have its own meaning, its self-dependent significance, its self-asserting reality. Just that involved the postulate for pure values. We saw that therefore in the natural development the self which wills to unfold itself approaches more and more the standpoint of pure valuation. It is not a question of an external force, and not a regard for the social community, it is simply the development of the inner world, a free self-unfolding which leads from the selfish desire upward to the valuation of all that which gives the meaning of self-assertion to the world and represents absolute value.

It depends in the first place upon the historical progress of the community in which stage of this development the individual may stand. Even the lowest citizen of a modern state stands nearer to the pure evaluation of the world than the most magnanimous member of a barbarian tribe. Again in the midst of every community any individual can stand much higher than other members of the same group. Yet we know that the moral achievement and the moral feat does not depend upon the height of this development. If we were simply to accept the value of development as a value of morality, then responsibility and merit, conscience and duty, would have lost their real meaning, and instead of reaching an obligation we should remain in the sphere of inclination. Certainly he who wills pure values instead of desiring the mere personal objects of desire is the higher kind of man. He who seeks science instead of the mere sensuous enjoyment, who seeks the happiness of mankind instead of the personal advantage, who seeks progress instead of decay, who seeks right instead of arbitrariness, religion instead of superstition, in short, who seeks a world of meaning instead of remaining with a meaningless dream of life-experience, certainly stands nearer to the goal of mankind. He is superior to his fellows, and our admiration must do homage to his soul. But all joy

in such a pure evaluating soul is of the same kind as our joy in a creative talent or in a far-reaching intelligence. It is something high and beautiful which helps towards the noblest purpose, but something which has grown and has developed itself without personal merit. The pure will of his soul is in no higher degree his own deed than an artistic talent or the genius for statesmanship or an optimistic temperament. We may and must value it as the development of such a great, beautiful, pure soul in its ascent to the heights of mankind, but it is not a moral admiration which we feel. Correspondingly he who still stands undeveloped on a low state of valuation may awaken our pity, but his low degree of development alone cannot lead us to a moral contempt. An entirely different kind of consideration must come in if we are to recognize the real moral value. Any ethics which refers to the content can never lead us to our goal. Such an ethics remains in every form by principle at a pre-moral standpoint.

However, we must consider one point more before we reach the decisive stage. The upbuilding and the destruction of values are influenced by our own doing. Of course we find values and anti-values about us all the time which lie beyond our own activity. But life continually brings us into situations in which it depends upon ourselves whether a value is to be realized or to be destroyed. In such a case our action itself is a part of the forming of a value. In such a life-situation we will our action not because it leads to a value, but because it is itself a part of the value. Of course in itself an action is indifferent. As muscle activity it has no value whatever; but when it enters into a process of the outer world, or the fellow-world, or the inner world, so that a value becomes completed by it, the action itself becomes a part of the value. It enters into the total situation like an harmonious color in the picture, like a tone in the melody. If we will that value, we must also will that particular way of acting, because this kind of action itself raises that particular piece of the world

to the height of a value. When the value is built up or destroyed by our own action, the action is not an external means which might be replaced by some other means, but is itself an indispensable part of the value. Only by that particular action the totality of the result becomes a value; not the end alone, but the action itself is willed. The saving and helping actions themselves are desired, the lying and stealing actions themselves are detested. As long as we do not evaluate but only desire and selfishly demand the end, we do not care for the action as such. From the standpoint of the mere impulse we will nothing but the result; it is indifferent to us by what means it is reached. We desire the thing, but we do not desire the action which gains the thing. For the selfish enjoyment it is entirely indifferent whether by the action itself a meaning and a will of absolute value are posited into the thing. Only the life which builds up values demands those actions by which we affirm the world as value. And yet we must say again that we still have not touched on a moral relation. We will the action as a part of our valuation. The valuation encloses and involves the will of the action, but it is really only a willing of the action, not an obligation. It is a valuable development that we have progressed to such a valuation and therefore to such volition of certain actions, but this volition is no duty and no moral value. The personality which has reached a point at which it wills those actions which build up values of course stands much higher on the ladder of development than the other personality, which only desired the result of actions. Nevertheless this whole development remains outside of morality. We evaluate the action as such because it builds up a value, but we perform it simply because we will it.

Now we have only to take one step further. The self-development, we say, has brought it about that in certain situations of life we will certain actions without reference to the effects which they have on us, but merely for their own

sake as acts which affirm a value. If now the conscious effort of culture aims to secure a guarantee of this value of development, one thing alone is needed. Whenever the action which we will as such comes in conflict with another action which we do not will as such, but which promises a result desirable for us as individuals, the first action, the one which constitutes the value, must be enforced. This can be done by a perfectly new, perfectly unique valuation: we learn to consider our selves as an absolutely valid value which realizes itself through our own actions. As long as we merely want things and effects while the action itself is indifferent to us, we the acting subjects cannot be in question for our selves as valuable or worthless. But as soon as we will our selves in a particular activity, the fulfilment of such a will, that is the realization of the valued activity, makes our selves valuable. We will our selves as truth-speakers or as life-savers only on account of the action itself, not on account of the desirable results. When the self which is willed in such a way becomes realized, a pure over-personal demand is fulfilled. Our life-saving or truth-speaking personality now becomes a reality which asserts itself.

If an external effect tempts us to the opposite action, we might reach a desirable result, but our action no longer corresponds to our will to action. Our own deed makes us as acting persons worthless. That which becomes realized in our action is then no longer that self which we wanted in an over-personal way, and our pure will does not become satisfied by the action of our personality. If I look inactively on the burning house instead of helping at the saving of men, I secure my personal comfort which I had a right to will and to desire. But besides my comfort I willed at the same time my self as a life-saving person. My action has therefore really not realized my own self. I have not asserted myself. I am no longer identical with my self. I have become worthless. If I lie or steal, I always reach my purpose, and the result was

indeed desired, but the action itself was not desired. I did not wish to lie or to steal. I truly willed my own self as speaking the truth or as respecting property. My lying and stealing have fulfilled and reached what I wanted in one respect, namely, the agreeable effect, but they have not realized the opposite action which I demanded as a part of my own acting self. My self as I apperceived it has not transformed itself at all into a new experience, but has been lost. The lying or the stealing has destroyed the value of my personality.

This identity between the will to that action which we really will as action and the final action itself is the value of morality. Not the action is valuable, but the personality which in the performed deed realizes its will to action and by it the own willed self. A man is immoral if he does not perform the action which he wills as action, and therefore does not realize himself, but prefers instead to perform an action which is desired only in order to secure some desired result. Morality is the realization of the action which we will as such. Where a particular kind of action is not willed at all, the personality can never lose its moral value by another action. The criminal who steals must will the action which respects property, as action. If he does not will it at all, his theft may have legal importance but is morally indifferent. The self-value of the personality, then, is not diminished, as he did not deny his own will to action. He who does not desire himself as speaking the truth may speak an objective untruth, but he cannot lie. His untruth is morally as indifferent as the babbling of the insane.

To look on ourselves as possible values must be learned. It is a deed of self-realization. We must learn to separate the self which we willed and the self which arises through our actions, in order that we may apperceive the identity of both. As long as we will only the effects of our actions and not the actions themselves, such a separation is foreign to us. Our action then comes in question only as means of an effect, and

not as realization of a self which we will. But as soon as this new cultural apperception is learned and we know how to compare the action itself before and after the deed, the fulfilment of the willed action really represents an absolutely valid value. The self which willed its action now stands before us as an independent self-asserting reality. It is as if from an over-personal point of view we participate in its will and are satisfied in its realization. As soon as this standpoint is reached, the valuable development of the personality is indeed completely safeguarded. We recognized the development of the personality in the fact that more and more the evaluating standpoint is taken and not the selfish one, more and more the world is acknowledged in its self-assertion and not accepted only as a mere meaningless flash of experience. If we now come into a situation in which the valuation would lead to one action and the selfish desire to the opposite action, the value is in danger at first. The impulse to the personal enjoyment might be stronger than the will to that action which builds up the over-personal value, but if we have learned the new apperception, the whole situation has been entirely changed. Now the choice is no longer between one result which we selfishly demand and another result which we unselfishly evaluate. No: we now find on the one side the selfish demand, and on the other side the value of the own personality. To follow the selfish desire now means to sacrifice the value of the self; to give up the promised personal enjoyment means to gain the value of the self.

Moreover, the situation is not such that we have to make the decision whether we want to evaluate the absolute value of our self or not. As soon as we have become at all conscious of our own absolute value, we cannot take any other attitude towards it than that of evaluation. We always saw that just that is characteristic of every pure value; nobody can apperceive it without participating in the evaluation. Just as we cannot understand the logical conclusion without willing

it, we also cannot apperceive ourselves in our moral self-realization without necessarily willing ourselves in such an act. Just as it may be that we do not understand the conclusion, we also may not have reached the moral apperception of ourselves, we may not have proceeded to that separation between our will towards an action and its identical realization; but as soon as such a standpoint has been reached, it becomes impossible not to evaluate that identity between the volition and the action. We cannot prefer a self which remains not identical with itself to a self which asserts itself and therefore becomes valuable. The new view which is reached by civilization therefore gives a guarantee that the evaluating standpoint has become protected against the desire for pleasurable effects. In evaluating the acting personality as such we protect and guarantee those actions which serve the values.

This guarantee is no complete one. The consciousness of the endangered self-value may still be overcome by the desire for an enjoyment. Then we have an immoral action in which the self unfolds itself in opposition to the value in order to satisfy a personal demand. But no external force would be able to secure the maintaining of the stage of development which has been reached so effectively as this apperceiving of the own personality as an absolute value. Now we recognize it as a matter of course that the true value of morality must be independent of every determination of the content. Which action we will is entirely indifferent. We are moral as soon as we realize the action which we really will as action. It has nothing to do with the moral value whether the action which we will as part of our acting self represents a high or a low stage of development. At all times endlessly much pure morality has been achieved which as to the mere effect of the action represents a low stage of development.

From the standpoint of the valuation of development, we have not even the right to insist that the moral man stands

higher than the one who serves the values without the force of this self-valuation. The noble soul whose will towards the values is in itself strong enough to overcome all selfish impulses without being forced by any regard for the moral self-value may stand higher than many a man whose faint will towards values can overcome the selfish will only by the feeling of his own moral value. It would be over-rigorous to give value only to the moral action. An action which without effort, without struggle, and without reference to the absolute value of the own personality results only from devotion to values, may represent the highest personal value of development. But such an action has no moral value. Such an action does not become immoral, but it remains amoral, without losing by that anything as manifestation of an absolutely valuable personal development. In general, however, it will hold that the moral will which is anchored in the absolute self-value of the acting person also represents the higher stage of the self-development. This is the more the situation because then alone the action in the service of values, that is the ideal purpose, is secured against all influences. Whether the beautiful life-impulse really overwhelms by its own energies the selfish longings must always remain accidental. Even the purest love for values may become ineffective when perhaps a great personal grief can be eliminated or a fascinating enjoyment can be gained by a worthless action. Only the evaluation of the own self can raise the action which serves the values beyond every possible action for pleasure, and can lead the martyr to the stake for the sake of truth.

Only in the face of this self-value arises an obligation, a duty, a conscience. We have fully convinced ourselves that not every value involves an obligation, an ought. When we studied the meaning of the values we recognized that we have no right to refer our over-personal will to an obligation which comes to us from beyond experience. An obligation exists in the sphere of law when society threatens the individual

with its coercive measures. An obligation exists in the same way here in the field of morality when the consciousness of our endangered self-value threatens our will. We stand before two possibilities of action: the one action we do not care for as such, but it leads to the desired result; the other action we desire as action. There enters the threatening of the obligation. If we do not act as we want to have our selves as actors, we shall lose our selves. The voice of conscience cannot say anything else to us. Thus there is only one fundamental moral obligation: you ought to realize that action which you really will for the action's sake. There exists no moral law: you ought not to lie, and you ought not to steal, and you ought not to kill, and you ought to help, and you ought to save. Whether your helping and speaking the truth is that kind of action which you really will as action of your personality depends upon the height of your development. No one can demand that from you as an obligation. But if you will this action, then you ought to perform it, and you ought not to be tempted by pleasure or displeasure to actions which you do not at all will as actions. Realize the action which you will on its own account. That is the only possible obligation. It is true even this categorical imperative might be transformed into a hypothetical one: realize the action which you will yourself, if you do not will that your own self lose its identity and by it its value. But this condition is absolutely impossible. You can never really will that your self shall not remain identical with itself.

Self-faithfulness, self-loyalty, is accordingly the only moral obligation and the only moral value. Burglary and murder are in themselves not opposed to morality, but only opposed to the value of development. If my extra-moral development had led me to the detesting of the action and yet I carried it out, it would be antagonistic to morality. But then it is not the burglary which is immoral, but the non-realization of that acting self which I willed. Even the struggle between various

conflicting motives of value is not really a moral conflict, but an extra-moral one. It is not a conflict between two moral duties, but the only moral duty is to realize that action which we really will. The inner struggle refers only to the question which of two actions, both serving certain values, is really willed by us. Only when this decision has been made can the moral realization set in. Only if we know internally what we really will can we be faithful to ourselves.

The far-reaching agreement between the moral value of the personality and the legal value of the community is now evident. Both have only the one meaning, to demand self-faithfulness, and by it to guarantee the stage of valuable development which has been reached. The mutual will-relations between the members of a community have been developed outside of law, and the volitions of the individuals have unfolded themselves outside of morality. Whether the communities and the personalities have really developed themselves depends merely upon whether they have more and more fulfilled that task which necessarily had to be conceived as belonging to their self-asserting reality. This will of the community and of the personality may have grown to any stage of development, and now self-realization must take care that it is protected against a sinking down to a lower stage. It must be guaranteed in its valuable height, and that can be done only by the force which law brings to the community and the moral conscience brings to the personality. Both law and conscience demand that the community and the personality perform those actions which they really will. The value of law is thus destroyed only by a lawlessness in which the will of the community no longer becomes action. The value of morality can be destroyed only by the disloyalty to our selves by which we leave unrealized the action which we really demand. That which is protected and secured by law and conscience must change and may perish, but eternally valuable remains the power by which that

which is really willed in fellow-world and inner world is safely protected. The community can secure the realization of its own will only by law, and the personality can secure the realization of its own will only by morality. But to realize itself, to remain faithful to one's self in freedom, and in this way to posit will and act as identical, means for community and personality alike that an independent reality must unfold itself in them. By this self-identity they are no longer merely isolated flashlike, dreamlike experiences, but really absolute values.

PART V

THE METAPHYSICAL VALUES

CHAPTER XIII

THE VALUES OF HOLINESS

ONCE more we look backward. In the swarming of our experiences we sought that which is valuable. We recognized that anything single, anything which is nothing but a mere impression, is in itself necessarily without value. We gain a true satisfaction only when that which is experienced can be maintained to be found once more in a new experience, and in this way self-asserting in the midst of change. Satisfaction demands tension and relaxation, demands starting-point and goal. The realization of the agreeable and desired gives such satisfaction, and may thus reflect on the experience the glimmer of value. But such are chance values which depend upon the standpoint of the individual personality. Even if in a social group such pleasure valuations of the individuals agree, it remains merely an accumulation of personal satisfactions as long as for every member the conservation of his pleasure or removal of his pain is decisive. It remains the confused practical interplay of enjoyments and advantages, of comforts and vanities.

But we sought pure values which belong to the true meaning of the world. We sought the values which satisfy absolutely without reference to the states of the individual: the over-personal values. Such pure values must glow wherever things and impressions and expressions assert themselves in the new experience and thus remain identical in spite of the new forms which they take in the changes of life. There we have a satisfaction which does not depend upon enjoyment; there we have a fulfilment which is not determined by personal desire. The life-experiences rush by and are nothing

but flashlike bits of experience, valueless and worldless, or the experience asserts its ideality, manifests by it its self-hood, and builds up an independent world. Such a world is absolutely valuable because everything which enters into it must necessarily satisfy every possible subject who demands a self-asserting world. The things and the volitions enter into that world at first in so far as they maintain themselves in the return of the experiences. The valueless dream sensations then transform themselves into a valuable experience. The meaningless single bits become an absolutely valuable world which is object of knowledge. And this world of knowledge and truth is absolutely valuable without any reference to the question whether our independent chance experience takes hold of much or little in it. But further, the things and the volitions also enter into this world of values in so far as their manifoldness shows itself in inner agreement. When the many are ultimately only one, when the separated parts of the manifold harmonize in such a way that we become certain of the one through the other, the totality of such harmony again must be absolutely valuable. Every single is here again not only starting-point, but also fulfilment. The world of love, of happiness, of beauty, arises before us in eternal purity. Finally we recognize in that absolutely valuable world the development and the deed. Whenever the single bears in itself a richer, fuller, more effective end, consciousness must be absolutely satisfied as soon as this end becomes realized in new experience. The seed becomes harvest, and law, progress, and morality realize themselves in a world which leaves every mere personal desire far behind. And yet here, too, the value lies entirely in the identity of will and realization.

We have followed up how each of these three groups of values arises from immediate life-experience, and how each can be elaborated and enriched by the conscious purposive labor of civilization. We have further seen how each equally refers to the outer world, to the fellow-world, and to the inner

world. Every step showed to us clearly how everything in this world of values depends upon the self-assertion of the experience. The equal had to be grasped as equal in new experience. The old must show itself in the new form as conservation, as fulfilment, as realization. Each such identical self-assertion must be again a starting-point for a new volition. Everything which belongs to this sphere of self-asserting experience must be eternally valuable, as it must satisfy every one who wills a self-asserting world; and nobody can be acknowledged as a subject at all who does not will such a world. To acknowledge a subject as such means to presuppose that whatever life and world may bring, everything which fulfils the conditions of self-assertion must be absolutely valuable to him. It makes no difference whether this self-assertion shows itself as self-assertion in the logical values, or as self-agreement in the æsthetic values, or as self-realization in the ethical values. But in spite of all these conformities of structure, after all we then have three independent worlds. The world-formula which binds every one of them in itself is ultimately the same; the threefold realization of the formula, however, leads to three world-realities which are closed in themselves and independent of each other. The logical values of the first are grasped by our knowledge, the æsthetic values of the second are reached by our devotion, the ethical values of the last demand our estimation. To confound them with one another necessarily involves a destruction of all three kinds of values.

Of course an experience may enter into manifold relations of values. A development, for instance, which represents a valuable progress, and which is estimated as such, may be in its completion an harmonious whole which fascinates us by its natural beauty; and at the same time we may group each phase of that development into a logical scientific connection. In this way the same experience may be accessible to a threefold valuation. But that does not change the fact that it is

something different in every one of those relations of value. The chain of causes as such can be neither beautiful nor morally inspiring; the moral achievement as such is not a scientific connection; and the completed harmony as such does not seek to be estimated as an achievement, but rather excludes everything not completed from the æsthetic appreciation. The valuations are not only independent of each other; they usually lead to different ways even when they are externally parallel. A novel may reach the highest value of beauty, and yet its characters may be historically, as objects of logical truthful connection, without any value. They have no value of existence in the world of our valuable knowledge, and moreover the deed of the hero may be a moral crime. On the other hand, an achievement may deserve the highest possible ethical estimation, and yet may nowhere offer a hold for æsthetic enjoyment. But the mere independence and separation do not express the whole meaning of their relation. Life insisently shows us that the values directly clash with each other. It is the sharp mutual opposition of the pure values which pushes us forward to new desire and to new deed. The world of the existing facts too often denies the demands of morality and the desire for harmonious unity; the world of beauty may hinder progress and may deny the connection of things; the world of valuable realization and development may destroy happiness. Our whole existence is filled by the tension of these opposing forces.

In all this we have no right to super-ordinate on principle one affirmation of our world-experience above the others. Each of the three, entirely coördinated with the others, arose from the same primary material of life-experience which itself was still without value. In our daily thinking we are all inclined to super-ordinate the logical group of values over the other two. We have the feeling that the world which we apperceive with the value of existence and connection is the only standard world. The worlds of happiness and of morality

seem to vanish at its side. They almost become worlds of illusion, while the world of existence is the world of reality. Or they become side determinations to the one true world. The world is then really the world which has existence and connection, and the happiness and morality are only in a secondary way attached to that world of true knowledge. Of course we now know that such a preference is unjustified; we know that to acknowledge the world as really existing does not mean anything else than to evaluate the experiences with reference to certain relations. The existence of the world, its reality and its connection, means to us a certain evaluation of life-experiences. If we emphasize the other relations and in this way gain other values out of the life-material, they arise with exactly the same right. The world which has existence because it maintains itself is not more important and not more immediate and not more certain than the world which has harmony because it agrees with itself, or the world which is meritorious because it realizes itself. All three are coördinated necessary structures equally held together by the over-personal form of our consciousness, by our over-personal demand for the self-assertion of experience, and the over-personal satisfaction in the fulfilment of this demand.

The more clearly we recognize the coördination of these various worlds the more we must become impressed by the idea that the conflict cannot be eliminated by their own means. Every compromise not only remains external, but interferes with the meaning. When, for instance, the science of past days made the values of beauty an argument of explanation, deduced the movement of the stars from the beauty of their curves or the central position of the sun from the noble purity of its fire, the true purpose of explanation and knowledge was evidently sacrificed. It is not better when the science of our time breaks the chain of causal processes in the brain in order to secure an uncausal freedom for the will on account of its moral value. In the same way the attitude of

æsthetics is given up when scientific information or moral achievement is demanded from the work of art. And the moral deed becomes emasculated when not the ethical value of the deed as such, but the æsthetic value of the resulting happiness is taken as standard. If we allow the boundaries of the fields of values to become effaced, we cannot do justice to any evaluation. To combine the values must mean much more than carelessly to confound them.

But it is certain they must be combined somehow if the world as a whole is not to become contradictory and by that ultimately worthless. We have sufficiently recognized and understood in its necessity the fundamental fact that only that which in the changing experiences remains identical with itself can be valuable. Only this identity brings satisfaction to the seeking will. That which is absolutely new necessarily remains illogical, unæsthetic, immoral. The totality of worlds would therefore have to be anti-valuable if the achievements of morality, the beauties of happiness, and the connections of truth could not be ultimately apperceived as identical. The world crumbles, life becomes meaningless, and by principle must leave dissatisfaction if the transition from the one group of values to the other is to be a transition to an entirely new reality. Of course we must not think of truth and beauty and progress in the light in which our philosophical investigation has shown them, ultimately controlled by the same fundamental attitude of our consciousness. We have no right to substitute here the insight of philosophy for the real life. The individual personality which does not philosophize is not conscious of the way in which the over-personal consciousness works. Those over-personal transformations which constitute the ethical, æsthetic, and logical experience are known to us in ordinary life only by their final work, but not by the act. To possess the ethical, æsthetic, and logical values, therefore, does not mean to be conscious of the steps which lead to these systems of absolutely valid satisfaction. In other words, we

may have the true and the beautiful and the good, as absolutely valid values, and yet may not know anything as individuals of that philosophical unity which we slowly begin to recognize by our critical examination. For the naïve individual the natural process and happiness and morality are simply separated spheres which we find as such and which we must acknowledge. And yet in every act of our life we are in contact with all those spheres. How could we act, how could we merely step forward, if the separation should remain by principle one of fundamental character? We aim to create values in freedom, and yet we acknowledge the causal necessity of the processes; we seek the value in the creating deed, and yet find happiness and beauty in the completeness which no longer allows any transformation. Thus our life becomes torn and without hold; our will is tending to and fro, and when we hold the one world, the other remains for us something strange, incomparable, unreconcilable.

The meaning of our life depends upon the possibility of apperceiving our world ultimately as one and the same. And it is not only that the world then gives meaning to our life, but under this condition the world as a whole becomes absolutely valuable because it remains identical with itself and asserts itself when we step from the truth to beauty or to morality. We found this self-assertion in the midst of the logical and in the midst of the æsthetic and in the midst of the ethical; we recognized that there cannot be any other kind of self-assertion, and therefore no other kinds of values, in the midst of our life-experience. The world as a whole must now be valuable if this self-assertion can lead from one group of values to the others; that is, if the total world of connections realizes itself again in the totality of the moral and of the beautiful. As long as our thinking and feeling remain before a world which falls into three pieces, the desire for identity is not satisfied, the result not valuable. Therefore we know beforehand that only a world which asserts itself in truth,

morality, and beauty as identical can have an ultimate value for us. This a-prioristic fact necessarily binds us in every particular act of apperception. If the world as a whole is to be valuable and not only an inner chaos, we must feel bound by the conviction that the identity of the three worlds of values itself has validity. As in all the other groups, we find the affirmation of this value in immediate life-volitions, and we elaborate it in the work of civilization. The life-value which secures this unity of the various worlds of values is religion. The conscious purposive work towards this end is philosophy.

Thus we claim that religion and philosophy have the same task. Both aim to apprehend the worlds of values as ultimately identical with each other, and therefore the world-totality as absolutely valuable. Both philosophy and religion must transcend the life-experience for that end. They lead us to a world which is enlarged and expanded in the spirit of this over-personal postulate which overcomes the apparent opposition of the values. But have we the right to consider such an overworld which lies beyond experience still as reality? It is true the real in the narrower sense of the word is confined to that which is logically valuable, that which has existence and connection. A religious or philosophical transcending of experience is in this sense certainly unreal, or better extra-real, or perhaps over-real. But we saw from the start that realization can mean something more fundamental than the mere entrance into the world of existence. We always found realization when the new experience became foothold and starting-point for a planned action. The realization is always completed and therefore a new reality reached as soon as the new formation of the identical allows us a definite basis for the intended activity. That might sometimes lead us from the merely imagined to the world of physical existence, but not less often both the expected and the realized may lie in the same sphere of ideas or of thoughts. Our own will and

our own action must decide whether the change in our life-experience is to be acknowledged as a realization. It is such a realization when it supports our new deed. We recognized this before, and we now only have to consider the result for our particular case. Religion and philosophy demand a progression over the limits of the experienceable, and we hesitated to subordinate this apparently over-real to the conception of value, because every value demands that the given be realized in an identical reality in a new form. But we now can say that the world indeed realizes itself in such religious and philosophical enlargement of experience. Such over-experience can certainly never become a part of the experienceable world of physical existence. It remains, therefore, unreal in the narrower sense of the word. But it is a content of our convictions, and as our conviction gives us the very firmest hold for our actions, the final realization, in the wider sense of the word, is here fulfilled in the highest degree.

The experienceable world, which is split into the logical, ethical, and æsthetic special worlds, realizes itself in the all-embracing, ultimate world, which is maintained by our religious and philosophical convictions and in which all opposition disappears. And as this ultimate world is identical with the totality of the worlds of values and yet a complete realization, the relation between the experienceable and the over-experienceable again represents an absolute value. It is the metaphysical value. But the supplementation of all possible experience in religion and philosophy takes opposite directions. In both cases the conviction supports the new world-totality, and in both cases the conviction gives us full reality because the transcending world offers us a hold for action and thus dominates our life. Yet the antithesis of the directions is fundamental. To make it clear at once, we may say that religion transcends experience, but that philosophy goes back to the presuppositions of experience. Religion constructs a superstructure which overarches the experienced world, phil-

osophy builds a substructure which supports the experienced world. For that purpose religion creates God, who gives the value of holiness to the world; philosophy seeks the ultimate foundation in the eternal act, which gives to the world the values of absoluteness. Both groups of values, the religious values of holiness and the philosophical values of absoluteness, stand together as metaphysical values as against the logical, æsthetic, and ethical values.

A sharp demarcation line between the metaphysics of the religious feeling and the metaphysics of the philosophizing reason is not in question for practical life. The religion of a Plato, of a Spinoza, of a Fichte, certainly belongs by principle to philosophy, and the historical world-religions are penetrated by philosophical elements. The philosophical way is sought essentially when the last unity which gives meaning to all the metaphysical values is to be reached by conscious purposive efforts of thought. Religion in its way reaches the same goal by following the feelings and emotions, and without a conscious knowledge of the ultimate purpose. In this sense — and as a matter of course only in this sense — we group philosophy among the values of civilization, but religion among the immediate values of life, inasmuch as we always demanded that the values of civilization be expressions of a purposive effort consciously directed towards the goal of up-building a valuable world.

The immediate values of life interest us first; they are the values of the world of God, the values of holiness. In the system of values the holy thus represents the last value, coördinated with the true, the beautiful, and the good. But we now understand that in another sense it is super-ordinated on those other three values, inasmuch as the purpose of religion had to be the unification of all the other values. The world which is penetrated by the belief in God no longer knows the opposition between the true connections, the beauty of happiness and the moral realization. And this world of God is real

because our conviction, which in the sphere of religion we call belief, realizes it.

Religion must fulfil this task even at a level where a developed idea of gods is not yet in question. At least, the directions towards these ultimate values may be recognized wherever a symbol reflects on the world in such a way that for the excited emotion the disappointing contrasts in the world disappear. The unity of nature, happiness, and deed becomes effected in consciousness. The lowest tribe in Ceylon indulges in wild nocturnal dances in the depths of the forest. They dance around the large arrow with rhythmical shoutings. No spirit and no god is in the arrow for them, but the arrow is the centre of their existence, the chief means of their preservation. Their whole thinking turns around the arrow. In all important events, in disease and need, the arrow is worshipped. In these midnight dances the arrow irradiates a power which transforms their whole world. The things of nature which oppose man, his longing for happiness, and all his willing for action are now held together. The arrow helps and will help; the arrow triumphs over the hostile nature. The world now exists to serve their will and desire; all opposites are overcome. From the ecstasies of such savages who have not even reached a real belief in the spirits up to the solemn worship of a church community leads a continuous way. The immediate opposites are overcome in purer and purer form. The logical self-conservation, the æsthetic self-agreement, the ethical self-realization, are more and more clearly embraced by the thought of the metaphysical self-perfection of the world in which everything which is valuable is in harmony.

The intensity and vividness and depth of the religious consciousness must decide how far religion succeeds in reaching the pure value of a perfect harmony of our values. On the other hand, independent of the strength of the religious consciousness, the value must also be determined by the question

of how far those various values which are to be organized have reached a development in themselves. A religion which combines undeveloped ideas of nature, barbaric desires for happiness, and undisciplined demands for action may be just as intensely religious as another which combines complex science, refined feeling of agreement, and high moral conscience. Such a religion as the former is not less religious, but it stands on a lower level because it refers the pure metaphysical value to impure material. The highest religion must arise where the purest union of the purest values is given. Still further conditions for religious differences must be given by the fact that the different values may be developed in a very unequal way; moreover, they may be emphasized to a varying degree. For instance, there are religions in which the ethical values preponderate so fully that the logical and æsthetic values are merely embedded in the ethical, and their identification is brought about by enclosing the one in the other. In the same way there exist religions in which the æsthetic or the intellectual factor preponderates.

The decisive principle, however, remains that this act of identification constitutes the meaning of religion. Religion is related to the single values as those single values are related to the immediate life-experiences. Religion is accordingly also a form of apprehension through the over-personal consciousness, and it is in no other sense necessary than the logical, æsthetic, and ethical values themselves. It is the form in which this combined content must be thought in order to become a common self-asserting world at all. But religion is the form of forms; it is the absolutely valid form for the connection of that which is itself found in various forms. Thus religion does not lead to firmer values, but to more embracing ones. The certainty of truth, or the perfection of beauty, or the dignity of morality must be each in itself complete — no value has to wait for sanction by a belief in God. The power of truth cannot arise from the fact that it harmonizes with

beauty or morality. But by this harmony only the world attains its ultimate completion. Only in this accord of all values the aim towards unity on the part of the over-personal consciousness can reach its last goal, at least as far as a naïve life-work can reach a last goal at all. To reach the ultimate end, to be sure, still more will be needed: the systematic, conscious labor of civilization will become necessary. That is the task of philosophy.

If the world of possible experiences is to be supplemented by a trans-experience which combines all the values, this new thought must again take a threefold expression. It must refer, like all the values which we recognized, either to the outer world, or to the fellow-world, or to the inner world, however much all these three developments may fuse with each other. It is therefore certainly not a sharp separation, but only an indication of fundamental tendencies, if we suggest such a threefold division. In this sense we should say that the religious value with reference to the outer world manifests itself through the belief in the creation, with reference to the fellow-world through the belief in the revelation, and with reference to the inner world through the belief in the salvation. We must follow that up still further.

A. — CREATION

The religious mind which looks up to God, the creator of heaven and earth, is not concerned with an hypothesis of natural science. Belief in the religious sense has only the word in common with that other belief which confines itself to believing because it lacks sufficient hold for a full knowledge. The belief in God is not an uncertain tentative opinion which is satisfied with an unsafe hypothesis because no sufficient proof for full certainty is at our disposal. On the contrary, the religious belief carries in itself a certainty which is superior to all logical power of demonstration. Above all, God the creator is no naturalistic hypothesis, because that creator

which would be meant only as cause of the natural process in the sense of natural science would lack the essential qualities for a god.

It may be doubtful whether the naturalistic contemplation of things makes it at all necessary to transcend the world of experience and to seek a creator of the world. The chief argument of past days was the adjustment and fitness of nature, which seemed explainable only if a foreseeing intellect had planned it from the beginning. But in our day such a view has lost its chief meaning. The rise of forms which are adapted to their surroundings and which maintain themselves under changing conditions through adjustment nowadays no longer appears to natural science as an unsolvable problem. On the other hand, the sciences recognize to-day more sharply how endlessly much in nature is not at all adjusted and adapted to purposes. Above all, the hypothesis of a creator who stands as against the world with forethought and planning purpose would solve the problem from the standpoint of the natural sciences only when the creator himself is conceived as a bodily-mental structure. When we discussed the values of development, we saw that the human inventor may be considered as a sufficient cause for the origin of the machine, inasmuch as physiology understands the inventor himself as a series of causal processes which coöperate to produce the adjusted parts of the machine. The inventor conceived as cause is not in question in his purposive reality, but only as a psycho-physical process, and his purposive thought is itself only a piece of the psycho-physical natural process, a link in the causal chain. But in the same way God, too, would then be nothing but a gigantic psycho-physical apparatus. And that means that he might be sufficient to explain the resulting effects, namely, the world-experience, but that his own working would then offer exactly the same problems. God himself would then have to be causally explained. In short, in this way natural science would always only come back again to a

naturalistic object which as such would never give an ultimate conclusion to the inquiry.

It is different when at the beginning of the series a creator is posited who is not psycho-physical mechanism, but is a subject in the way in which we ourselves are real subjects. We always postulated that our own deed of will as part of the historical reality must be understood in its freedom and without reference to causes. Our deed is free because it would be meaningless to ask for its causes. Its whole reality lies in its purpose. It does not seek to be explained, but to be interpreted in its intentions. A creator who wills the world in such a way is indeed beginning and end, and the world which he plans is included in the totality of his deed. The causal chain of the world would then be constituted by the creator's free will, and the freedom of his will, which we can understand by feeling our own will, would bring to rest every further inquiry. Yet we should have to admit again that this whole creating super-will has reference only to that which demands explanation, the causal process of nature. Such a world creator, therefore, cannot will anything but that blind swarming of the unchanging elements of things. The creator's only purpose would then be the purposeless movement of the atoms. Such a creator certainly would no longer be a mere natural thing which itself demands explanation; he would be the creator and the lawgiver. He has posited the immutable masses and the unchanging energies; and yet: can such a creator who would be confined to this explanatory task ever mean a God for us? A will which wills nothing but the existence of the world-substance and the validity of the natural causes would be an omnipotent spectre, which would not awaken awe or confidence, hope or fear, thanks or love. No religious feeling could respond to him, and the most essential elements for a God would be lacking. Yes, we hardly even have a right to speak of omnipotence if such a creating spirit does not will anything but nature as nature; he cannot will

anything but the law, and is thus without power in the face of a process according to law. For the thought of action determined by goodness there would be no point of contact at all.

If such a creating will is to become a God, something fundamentally new must be added: the will must enter into relation with the æsthetic world of happiness, of unity, of beauty, and with the ethical world of development, of achievement, of morality. Only this combination of the separated worlds of values gives to the thought of God the power of life. Whether the world over which God dominates is the infinite universe of the modern natural science, or is a little section of experience which the imagination of the savages has cut off, in every case the true test of the god-character remains the unification of a manifoldness of values. Whether God stands above the things or lives in the things themselves, whether there is one god or many, remains a separation of secondary importance. Only one question is always fundamental, whether the same god who orders the things in their natural connection at the same time forms our experiences to beautiful inner agreement and realizes our ideals in the development of the world. The religious feeling must be certain that the world in which the things move in accordance with God's will is a world in which the connections are controlled by natural law, in which everything unites itself in inner harmony, and in which the good deed brings with it the victory. The connection of knowledge may be still the most superficial combination of experiences, the inner harmony may be no more than the happiness of mere enjoyment, and the victorious good may not represent more than the selfish wish of the tribe. Thus the values may stand on the lowest level, but the world which is dominated by God must serve all these groups of values in common. To believe in God the creator means to be convinced in the inmost mind that through the agency of an over-experienceable power the opposition be-

tween natural order, happiness, and morality is removed from the world. No explanation of the scientific kind has to make this unification conceivable. Only he who is immediately and personally certain and convinced of this unity through God has religion.

Such a creator stands at the central point of every great historical religion. Sometimes the logical, sometimes the æsthetic, sometimes the ethical postulate may have the overweight in accordance with the emotional dispositions of the different peoples and ages. These emotional factors also decide which personal attitude in the relation to God may prevail. It may be gratitude and love, or the feeling of dependence, humbleness, and even fear, or perhaps confidence and courage, or finally self-sacrificing renunciation. But in the unerring belief which gains its deepest life-feeling from a beyond in which all values become a unity lies the religion which lives in all changing religions. If we look to the furthest Orient, we find in the Chinese a people which certainly clings to the earthly life. Its cult of the dead cannot hide the fact that it was fundamentally poor in religion until the Buddhistic religion intruded from without. But from the beginning the great teachers were certain that the supreme master, who is at first the sky itself, regulates the natural order of the things and at the same time the moral order of man in perfect unity. The original Chinese consciousness found its deepest emotional expression in Laotse, who proclaimed: "Man comes from the earth, and the earth from the sky, and the sky from the Tao, and the Tao comes from itself. The whole created nature with its products is only a manifestation of the Tao. While Tao is a spiritual and immaterial being, it embraces every visible thing and in it are all beings. A supreme spirit lives in it in an incomprehensible way. This spirit is the highest and most perfect being, because in it there is truth and belief and confidence. From eternity to eternity his glory will not cease, because he combines in him-

self the true and the good and the beautiful in the highest degree of perfection." That is the fundamental tone which sounds through the religions of all nations and all ages. The order of nature, the pure happiness, and the moral striving must somehow be combined in something which is beyond experience, which we cannot understand, but in which we must believe.

From China the way leads westward to India. The wonderful people of India with their early flagging energy have unfolded their best powers in their religion; pondering and dreaming, through four thousand years they have transformed those fundamental thoughts always anew. From the undeveloped symbols of the earliest times to the philosophical systems of religion of the later priests there remains a certain mysterious feeling, while the content of the religion hardly allows a unified formula. Nevertheless it might be said that from earliest times a certain belief was slowly prepared which later found incomparable expression. It was the belief that the things are only an illusion, the suffering only an appearance, the evil only a misinterpretation. All the true being is spirit, and in devotion to the pure spirit all truth, all happiness, and all morality necessarily flow together. The elimination of the opposition of values is here gained by an entirely new turn of thought. The opposition is overcome by recognizing the world of opposition as an illusory world, but the ultimate meaning is, after all, in the turn of the Indian thought the same as in all other religions of world-influence. Here, too, the belief has overcome the struggle between natural knowledge and the desire for happiness and the postulates of morality. It is evident that the desire for happiness is in this case the moving power in the whole system. In spite of all apparently moral energy of renunciation, it remains after all the æsthetic desire for the removal of suffering which controls the totality of this world-view and which subordinates nature and morality.

The true world of India is eternal and immutable. Every becoming is only an illusion. In sharpest contrast to it we find the belief of the Persians and the religion of Zoroaster. The history of the world is a world-struggle which will end with the triumph of the good and the defeat of the evil. After a world-period of twelve thousand years the savior will come and awaken the dead. The religious drama thus plays in this temporal world of the senses, but the effective religious power here, too, combines morality, happiness, and causality. Those Persian peasants, surrounded by enemies, recognized that the good and the beautiful and the causally necessary were entirely separated in their suffering existence, and that the powers which controlled their world allowed the victory of the immoral. There began the mission of Zoroaster. The true god, he proclaims, has nothing in common with those gods of evil. In the true god are combined power and morality and the kindness which brings happiness. The true god is the creator and conservator of the world, and especial thanks are due to him for ordering nature in accordance with laws; but at the same time he is the holy power which in absolute purity effuses continuous godly energy and helps the moral men powerfully to protect the world against the impure and bad. This god, finally, is just, and guarantees for the good word and the good deed wonderful reward at the last day of judgment. The great accord of the triad of values is thus completely fulfilled here too.

Marduc was considered the king of the gods from the foundation of the Babylonian Empire under Hammurabi. At the dawn of creation Marduc begins his control of the world. He secures the victory of the light and overwhelms the dark powers of evil. He guides the blessing streams, he gives the harvest and all food for men, he heals sickness and liberates the sufferer from pain, he awakens the dead. However much there may be which is crude and entirely under dominance of the naturalistic myths, this connection between the power

over nature and the happiness of men and the pure helpful deed repeats itself in the whole Babylonian-Assyrian mythology. The anger of the gods sends the great flood to punish the evil deeds of men. They send pestilence and defeat in war to those who do wrong, who break their pledges, who destroy the harmony of the family.

We come to the Mediterranean. It would be in vain to try to transform the Egyptian religions, with their numberless gods, with their cult of animals and dead, and their long changing history, into a closed system. But as soon as the thought of a highest power has been formed, it again serves at the same time the domination over nature, the help towards happiness and success, and the enforcement of moral obligations. It is Amon-Ra, the supreme sun-god. "He gave order and the gods arose; he made the men and created the animals. The men came out of his eyes and the gods out of his mouth." — "The oppressed put their confidence in him, as he is the helper of the poor who cannot be corrupted." The last happiness in the paradise of Osiris is found only by him who in the court of the dead can confess "that he has not done any sin against men, and that he has not done anything which the gods detest." In the domain of Ra there cannot be any opposition between the process of nature and happiness and moral realization.

If we see the Greek gods in the mirror of the Homeric songs, we may be doubtful whether the Hellenic soul, too, unified the values of the world by its religion. On the other hand, if we see them in the image of the Platonic myths, we know that the accord of the true and the good and the beautiful was never purer and deeper. Yet even in the unphilosophical heaven of gods in which so much low immoral longing and so much unjust caprice were mingled, after all it was Zeus who dominated, and, as the king of the gods and men, was the protector of justice and the helper of the weak and defenceless. And if the poet in his longing for beauty makes

the gay life of the gods appear devoid of morality, Athene and Apollo manifest by their national influence that a deep moral power emanated from these children of Zeus. The incomparable beauty and power were thus after all joined with a moral efficiency.

Jahwe, the god of the Israelites, was at first practically only a naturalistic power, the god of the mountain and the thunder-storm, but the spiritual, moral deepening of the Jahwe thought is the history of the Jewish nation. If, at the breakdown of the Israelite state, the Jahwe religion did not disappear, it was because through the words of the prophets the god had been developed into a god of moral order superior to the chance of natural experience. From the deepest moral soul Elias had demanded that the people must choose by principle between the true, holy, moral god and the unholy natural gods. The god of Israel was a powerful god who could divide the sea, and yet he was a benevolent god who brought welfare and happiness to his people, and above all he was a just god who would give up even his people if moral justice demanded it. In this unity lie the meaning and the strength of the belief.

For the Christian religion it holds true, more than for any other, that the mere apprehension of the outer world and its beyond is not sufficient to express the deepest meaning of the religion. Only the apprehension of the self and the beyond of the self, the confidence in salvation, express the life of those who believe in the crucified one. Certainly the outer world, too, must find its place in the totality of the Christian doctrine, but the kingdom of God is in ourselves. Yet at first we only have to ask as to the view of the outer world. But it is clear already from the gospels and from the convictions of early Christianity that this world of things is created in freedom and set in order by the same god who has prepared it as the realm of morality and who has blessed it with happiness. Universal power, morality, and love are combined in the

creator. The world, his creation, is from the beginning arranged so that the ordered process of nature, the happy life, and the victory of the good must lose their apparent contradiction for the soul of the believer. From the beginning Christianity is the doctrine of the unification of nature, happiness, and morality by the holy transcending power of the spiritual creator.

Since the days of the first Christian communities all the particular views have passed through incessant changes. The order of nature is very unequally conceived if sometimes every change in the world is understood as always a new action of the creator and at other times there is a sure belief that God has given to nature the laws for all time. Still more, morality is very unequally conceived. Sometimes it is a pre-supposition that every human soul has the free power to decide between good and bad, at other times it has been a fixed belief that God had decided beforehand who is to have the power for good and who may victoriously carry through the struggle. And not less different is the way in which happiness has been conceived if it is sometimes promised for the resurrection at the last day and sometimes sought in the trustful belief itself in the heart of the fighter in the hour of the fight. But in the fundamental demand these contradictions do not change anything. In every variety of religious doctrines, whenever they were really supported by a living belief, the chief fact has remained the same: the world of the creator was destined for the unity of the different values. The moral may lie in the decision of the individual, or may have been performed by the predestination of God; the happiness may come after æons, or may illumine our soul to-day. The restless wavering between the true, the good, and the beautiful in the world, for the true Christian of all periods, is brought to rest by the belief in God the father. It is as Augustine said: "Thou hast created us with an impulse towards thee; therefore our heart is restless until it finds rest in thee."

The Islam religion would not have found such power over the people if the Koran, in spite of its fantastic exaggerations, had not clearly taught that the world-totality which Allah created serves at the same time the natural order, morality, and human happiness. The seven fundamental qualities officially accredited to God, it is true, do not include his merciful benevolence, but the Koran speaks of it at many places. It contributes much towards the belief which seeks the living unity of values in Allah and Mahomet. But it is still more important that the Koran also leaves no doubt that in spite of the predestination which results from God's omnipotence, after all the individual man determines the moral value of his action. After his death he will be examined, and at the day of judgment he will find reward or punishment. If the good overweighs the evil, he will pass the bridge of hell without damage and will reach the paradise which prophets and martyrs enter immediately after their death.

What expresses itself so clearly in the great historical religions is less clear and less perfectly suggested by the natural religions and half-religions of the lower races. Indians and Persians, Egyptians and Greeks, Israelites and Arabs, started alike from crude symbols of nature and life. But, after all, those gods of nature and of dead leaders and ancestors, even in the clumsy form of earliest myths, contain from the beginning the tendency to combine separated groups of values. Just through this original disposition the low symbol of God continuously grew with the development of the various values which entered into it, and slowly and steadily, without a sudden change, it absorbed in itself the power of highest belief. What Jahweism became in Israel is hardly suggested in the preceding Jahwe adoration among the Kenites. But that local god of the mountain, who was in a higher sense morally indifferent, after all combines the power over a natural region with the will to strengthen the life-hopes of the tribe and to bring to victory the over-personal will of that group. Even

in the crudest form, the symbol must be more than mere over-personal cause of nature in order to find religious submission at all. That all holds true for the thousandfold forms in which animistic gods to-day still control the hopes and fears of the uncivilized peoples. Whether the natural powers become humanized there, or whether human leaders become transformed into natural powers, whether conceptional words become personal names — in every fetish there is already given a creating energy which somehow controls the natural connection of the things and at the same time enters into relation with the common will and wishes of the tribe. The most different volitions may stand in the foreground and the forms may still be changing and fugitive, but even in the most primitive shape the absolutely valid value of the unity of values can be recognized. It is as the Buddhists say: "Many ways lead from the most different starting-points up to the top of the mountain, but the same moon shines down on all of them." And after all the same moon also shines over those many paths which only lead a short way up and do not reach the top of the mountain.

B. — REVELATION

The power of God was to us the beyond of the outer world; the revelation is the beyond of the fellow-world. The revelation supplements the historical connection of willing beings just as the creation supplements the causal connection of things. Through revelation the holy spirit pervades the whole fabric of human society as religious doctrine, as cult, as church and clergy, and gives to the life of the community its over-personal value. If our valuations are to be without contradiction in themselves, it is not sufficient to believe that the world of things is more than mere nature. We must also feel certain that the claims of men which approach us as historical reality are more than merely demands of historical men. Our social life is not only filled with social strifes, but is the battle-

ground of opposing valuations. The consciousness of our duties and of our rights, the dignity and power of the historical traditions, the over-personal hopes and appreciations, may oppose one another. All these contrasts can and must disappear only when we are certain that the historical connection ultimately points back to God. We must feel that the demand of men is ultimately sanctioned by God himself, in whom all order and all morality and all bliss become a unity. Only in so far as the historical willing flows immediately from God's own will is the highest value of completion reached; only then can it combine in itself in a scientifically inconceivable way the values of historical order, of moral deed, and of endless life-harmony.

The over-personal demand for complete unity of values must trace the life of the community to a religious revelation. God then becomes for the historical life too the spiritual background in which the contradictions become reconciled. God's influence means not at all merely a direct continuation of the historical tradition in retracing history beyond its origin. We saw that a god who does not will to be anything but a cause of nature would not be a god, but merely a psycho-physical mechanism which itself would belong in natural science. In the same way a god whose revelation was nothing but the beginning of the historical continuity would not be a god, but merely a vague chapter of pre-history. The over-human influence becomes a religious revelation only if it includes, beside the historical value of connection, also the æsthetic value of fulfilment and the ethical value of the ideal goal. Revelation can therefore come in at any time anew, inasmuch as the will of God may enter into the historical process at any point to unite the valuations and to give to the human community confidence and direction.

Every miracle is such a new revelation, and it is clear that in this sense the miracle belongs to the most necessary manifestations of the evaluating consciousness. The miracle is no

suspension or annulling of the natural laws, inasmuch as the connection in which the miracle has a meaning is not the order of nature, but is the connection of wills. That which goes on in the miracle is without any relation to the question whether those experiences can be apperceived also as physical facts. As soon as they are brought under such a point of view, of course they must be obedient to the natural laws, and the apparent exception would simply constitute a problem which science was so far unable to solve. But such a point of view of science is artificial and foreign to the real life-experience of the miracle, in which everything depends upon the manifestation of a will. We saw that it is always artificial to bring the real historical life under the thought-forms of the causal natural science. The world of freedom demands rather its own forms of connection. Only in a world of freedom the miracle takes place. A will manifests itself there which we understand as the will of God. There is no breaking of the chain of natural processes in question, because in that realm of freedom no natural order is involved. The power of the miracle does not lie in its negative relation to suspended causes, but in its positive relation to a superior will, in the significance and uniqueness of its revelation.

The revelation, therefore, must always give to man much more than merely the recognition that God exists. The whole historical life finds its impulses and its uniting meaning there. The orders of the state and the crowns of the monarchs are divine. The law and the power of punishment are divine, marriage and oaths are divine, every moral deed and every ideal striving in the community are divine. The whole historical life in its reference to the revelation becomes in this way embedded in religion. It is therefore entirely wrong to believe that there can exist a fundamental opposition between religion and state, or between religion and science, or between religion and art. Wherever such an opposition historically arises, one of the two sides, or both, must have become dis-

loyal to their highest ideal task. The special values, as for instance science or art or law or industry or love, may enter into conflict with each other, but religion cannot be in disagreement with any one of them by principle, as religion's fundamental task is to unite the valuations by reference to a beyond. A narrow-minded church, a selfish state, a petty school-knowledge, a reckless art, a frozen morality, may not come into harmony with one another. That is easily understood.

Where there is community-life, there revelation is also needed. The religion alone always brings that which diverges again to convergence, inasmuch as the consciousness of historical tradition and order, of moral duty, and of fullest happiness can be combined only through such a transhistorical relation. The mere progress of civilization would be unable to conciliate all opposition of valuation. Certainly on the lowest levels there is usually no definite tradition for such an over-historical communication. The priests know that the fetish and the idol have their magical powers, that the holy animal must be adored by the whole clan, that the prescriptions of the taboo must be observed, but there is not necessarily a definite act of revelation by which this over-natural information was gained. But everywhere, among the primitive peoples of Africa and America and the South Seas and among the Mongols, everywhere the beginnings of state order, of moral duty, of legal obligation, of social harmony, and of explanatory knowledge, have found their last connection and their unity with hopes and wishes for the common happiness through the revealed proclamation of the priests.

This belief finds its fullest elaboration in the great developed religions. When Zoroaster on the height of the mountain experiences the contact with God and is lifted to the heavenly throne and hears from God himself the divine truth, the Persian belief finds in this over-historical starting-point the essentials of religion. From there flows the energy with

which the historical order, the hoped-for happiness, and the moral conviction in the life of the Persians reënforced one another. There before his throne God himself had made Zoroaster his prophet. Every historical development had in this over-fact its absolutely safe starting-point.

Buddha did not receive the revelation: his earthly life itself was revelation. To become a savior for mankind he decided to descend from heaven to earth. As his mother he chose a pious queen, and as soon as he was born, he cried with a loud voice: "I am the supreme and best in the world, and shall make an end of all suffering." In the later belief of the church, the historical Buddha even becomes only one manifestation of the real Buddha. He remains the most important appearance, but before and after him Buddha manifested himself also in other forms.

The always new revelation of divine will has perhaps nowhere more deeply entered into the national life than through the Delphic oracles of the Greeks. Political alliances and fundamental laws were made dependent upon the voices of the Delphic Apollo, and through Apollo Zeus himself was speaking. The question is not how far the calculation of priests and how far the sincere belief in prophets influenced the people. The decisive fact is that through the belief in the words of the virginal Pythia a deep civilizing harmony of political state movements, of social peace movements, and of moral law movements was secured. The logically valuable historical order, the æsthetically valuable harmony of love, and the ethically valuable realization of the deepest will through action could be melted together in the life of Greece into a unity only by the power of the cult with its manifestations. The same holds true for the Assyrians and Babylonians with their abundant talent for religion. Here even art and science are apprehended as immediate divine revelations, just as the throne of the kings is established by the gods. The laws of Hammurabi's old Babylonian statutes are all to be

referred to divine revelation. The relief in the famous diorite block shows how the sun god installs the king as judge.

The religious significance of Moses, too, lies in the fact that God manifests himself to him as a living god who restores to the people oppressed under the Egyptian might their belief in their destiny. It was the divine revelation which through Moses spoke to the discouraged people and started a new development, in which all the ideals again became a unity. But just as God manifested himself before to Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, so the Jahwe of Moses has revealed himself to many successors and has given to the historic development of the believers the over-historical unity. In the belief in revelation also lies the decisive power for the world-task of historical Christianity. Certainly the meaning of the Christian conviction is grasped most deeply when the revelation is posited into the own heart and is sought in the change which a true belief brings to the inner life. But the church, both the Protestant and the Catholic, at first had good reason to maintain the revealed doctrine as revelation. The inspired sacred writings as such were inexhaustible sources of the historical influence. The life of Jesus with its miracles was a manifestation of the God of love. The Christian community found in this manifestation, from the manger to the cross, the point of transcending reference from which every valuable hope and will and work attained inner unity. The miracle had this world-moving influence not because it was supra-natural, but because it was supra-historical. It had no relation whatever to nature as such, but it stood in decisive relation to history. For the historical volition it was the inspiration and transformation. For Islam, too, there can hardly be a doubt that Mahomet himself really believed that he was called to his mission by Allah, and that his prophetic manifestation would realize itself. Islam does not deny that God has revealed himself to the world by angels and prophets and saintly men from Adam and Noah to Jesus, but the Koran

which contains the manifestation through Mahomet is alone destined for all mankind. It is the true word of God, which was decreed by God from eternal times, and which was sent down by the angel in order that Mahomet might manifest it. Again the believers had thus gained an historical beyond which gave to the political, the æsthetic, and the ethical energies a common unified direction.

Thus the community-life has secured at all times the unity of its diverging valuations by the belief in an over-historical starting-point in ever new forms and symbols. In the belief itself this identification of the values became realized; no perception and no science were needed for it. The mystic, to be sure, at all times and at all places has found this relation to a revealing god immediately in himself. When the revelation which he experienced irradiated to the fellow-world, he became an historical religious power; when that which his vision saw determined only his own religious life, the historical life-connection was cut off. On the other hand, the belief of the community must be deepened when the manifestation which the individual experiences in his own believing heart harmonizes with the revelation of the church, and if the inner world in this way testifies to that which the fellow-world must demand in order to maintain the unity of the values.

C. — SALVATION

The inner world is filled with contradictions. Through our own power this opposition and strife of our inner volitions cannot be subdued. The soul seeks a beyond of the inner experience in which this counterplay comes to silence. It may be a heavenly predestination which takes care that just our own self after all finally comes to a complete unity. Or it may be the pious worship and a heavenly vision which raise our self above all inner struggles. Or a life after death may unroll itself before the believing eye, and may offer everything which life has denied. Or an atonement may purify us from our sins.

Infinite, indeed, are the forms in which the misery of mankind externally and internally is overcome by belief, and a last unity gained not for the natural process of the outer world, not for the historical movement of the fellow-world, but for the experience of the inner world. The longing for this absolute value of unity in our inner world is the demand for salvation. It arises wherever in the world mankind exists, because the necessary, the moral, and the happy never have completely unified themselves in the life-experience of any one.

The thought of a life after death in a better place is not at all necessarily in the foreground; and on the other hand, just this thought has been often developed without reference to the idea of salvation. The idea of the soul which is suggested by the facts of death or by dreams may lead to a belief in another world which is not at all a better one. Even among the lowest savages, who show no traces of religious impulses, the idea of a life after death is often developed. The dead are furnished with shoes for the long journey, but that they will find a better life in the strange land is at first not involved in the consideration. Yet the way from such ideas to the paradise is only a short one. Even to the lowest Indian the beyond is a place for enjoyment and pleasure, and for the hunter it is a hunting-ground rich with buffaloes. But while the better life is at first often independent of the desire for salvation, still more often the salvation is independent of a heavenly life. Here on earth the suffering of the soul will disappear, and all will come to complete unity by divine influence, by benevolent providence, by prayers, and good deeds. Yes, even the life after death does not necessarily have to be removed from earth. The doctrine of transmigration of souls, for instance, in the ethically shaded form of Brahmanism, is surely a doctrine of salvation. The man whose existence is filled with good deeds is raised by divine influence to a higher stage of life, which is freed from the pains and struggles of the lower stage. The partial liberation from the present suffering

will thus come when the present life-struggle is fought to an end, but it will come in the form of an earthly life.

Yet the fullest liberation is found for the Indian thought only in the complete emancipation from the treasures of life. Life is suffering because it is desire. When the desire in us is annihilated, the torture of existence is ended. An unselfish, mild, pure state of mind and the discipline of abstinence is Buddha's sermon for the masses; but those who want to reach the beatitude of complete deliverance must go beyond it and come to a state in which all sensuous excitements are extinguished and a dreaming ecstasy is brought about. The centre of gravity seems to lie only in the liberation from pain, but Buddha says that everybody is himself the cause of his suffering, and by himself he will be liberated. That which is to be aimed at is then ultimately not deliverance from the world, but liberation from the selfish attitude towards the world. Only when we relate the things to ourselves as individual persons do they become evils. If we sink into that absolutely valid reality, there is no longer anything ugly or anything painful. This salvation from the conflicts of the world is therefore ultimately the own rising to the standpoint of pure valuation.

It seems as if the highest conflict, the conflict of the pure values themselves, is not touched by all that. But it is clear that we become conscious of that conflict of values only by the selfish reference of the world to our own personality. The necessity of the world-process and the beautiful harmony of things and the purity of moral ideals are not in themselves in conflict. The opposition comes only by their mutual crossing in our personal will-experience because the unity of our personality then demands also a unitedness of those demands for values. The necessary natural process which as such is valuable becomes perhaps an anti-value when it contradicts the demand for harmony and brings us misery. In the same way the harmony of joy which is valuable may become a sin

when it contradicts the value of morality. And again everything which is valuable in the world of moral purity and beautiful harmony may become untrue for us when it contradicts our demand for a reliable order of things. The misery, the sin, and the untrue are thus rebellions against æsthetic, ethical, and logical values as soon as they are referred to the individual person. As long as they are only related to the world itself, they are merely mutually independent values. If the relation of the values to a personal will is extinguished, then there ceases the mutual disturbance of the values, because then they no longer have any mutual relations. He who sinks into the world without reference to his own self has therefore overcome the opposition of the true values. But he has not overcome the opposition by reconciling and uniting them, but by eliminating the demand for such unity through renouncing his own self. The world in itself is not sinful, not unhappy, not untrue. Each of its values is a becoming of a special kind, an elaboration of special ideals which do not disturb each other, but which do not come in contact with each other. Indian philosophy thus opens a way to a new kind of unity, the unity not in the world but in the soul which strives for ideals. Not the god who dominates the all but the soul which starts the valuations of the world must now be conceived as the ultimate unity. But if that is the meaning, then religion has been transformed into philosophy. He who seeks the unity by sinking impersonally and therefore over-personally into the world, and therefore finds it not in God but in the seeking self, is on the way to a philosophical view of the world, even when he continues to speak the language of religion. Buddhism is therefore in its ultimate meaning philosophy. In the same direction moves the religion of salvation in all times as soon as the impersonal sinking into the world becomes the predominant element. Neoplatonism expresses it clearly.

The Jewish religion began with a strong personal claim on

the world; the conflict was therefore intensely felt, and was referred entirely to the given world itself. Only a god beyond this world could remove this inner friction of the experience. The fulfilment of the prescriptions which God likes can secure the earthly welfare in which all conflicts of the inner world are harmoniously solved. The promised kingdom for which they hope is at first still to come on earth. The beyond of the experience is simply experience of the future. Only late the Jewish nation developed the belief in the life after death, a belief which was living in the Greek mysteries as well as in the Persian and Egyptian national consciousness. In Christianity this belief enters into the centre of the ideas. Not a kingdom on earth but a kingdom in heaven will come, in which bodily human existence and happiness and justice and peace will be united. The unity of the logical, æsthetic, and ethical values in the inner world is completely realized in the Christian belief in a beyond. The earthly life with its conflicts is now embedded in a larger whole as an harmonious part. In this infinite totality all limitations of experience and all struggles of the world are annihilated, and this supreme value which harmoniously unites all values is more certain than the experience itself because the conviction of belief maintains it. In the religion of Islam all that reappears.

It corresponds exactly to the meaning of values that in the church of Christ and in the church of Mahomet, there is a hell with its tortures as well as a heaven. Values can never be affirmed without making the denial thinkable, too. The absolutely ultimate value can be reached by the soul only if it wills values at all. The moral value is the only one which must be created by own activity. Whoever denies it by sinful deed does not will any unity in his deepest willing, and therefore destroys for himself the heavenly certainty. The imagination may give to the tortures infinite content, but the deepest torture after all remains that the unity of will cannot be reached, that the heaven is closed. The decisive fact is

that a heavenly kingdom in full unity of valuation exists. "Thy kingdom come" is the prayer of the soul which desires salvation. In this highest completion of the inner world nothing is fundamentally changed when in the sense of Paulinism the future resurrection is not referred to the body but to the spirit, and if the death of the crucified one is thought as atonement. Christ now intermediates the salvation, but the state of beings saved maintains the same features.

The Christian thought of salvation, too, leads beyond itself, or rather leads from the purely religious to the philosophical attitude. The moral consciousness has often objected to the idea of atonement, the æsthetic consciousness has revolted against the idea of a final condemnation, the logical consciousness has resisted the consequences which seemed to belong to resurrection. But the philosophizing change in the idea of immortality arises after all from quite different considerations. In the unphilosophical form this belief stands and falls with the presupposition that our inner world is a process in time, a process which by an unlimited temporal prolongation becomes the possible bearer of infinite values. But just this presupposition does not hold. When we discussed the sciences and separated the historical aspect from the naturalistic one, we recognized that all historical reality is given by deeds of will which are not describable and explainable things, but attitudes which must be interpreted, understood, and appreciated. As such living realities the human experiences, we saw, are not in a causal connection, and not in the time of the physical things. Their reality lies in the connection of their meaning, and this connection belongs to the realm of freedom. The question of causes and of temporal duration is for these immediate will-experiences as little admissible as the question of their space-form, or weight, or color.

Of course we saw that everything in the world can be treated as object; the self then becomes a passive spectator,

and the experience becomes a causal content of consciousness. We recognized that as the task of psychology. But then the immediate life-reality is sacrificed; it is an abstract aspect which becomes necessary for the special purposes of explanation. If we do not have to explain the inner world, but to understand it in its meaning and in its values, we must try not to analyze it psychologically, but to grasp it in its immediate will-character. In this purposive life-reality our inner life is not in the time-form of the physical things. Our self is directed towards things which are considered as present, or as past, or as future, but the self itself does not become a thing by that, and is not simultaneous with its present things. The self itself remains outside of the physical time because it posits and embraces that time in all its directions. In the over-temporal act of the will, the total infinite time of the things is enclosed. An immortality which is merely a prolongation of a temporal process can therefore refer only to that psychologized mental thing. The free over-temporal self, the acts of which constitute our immediate life, cannot go on through an infinite time because it cannot enter into time at all.

In any case, no real value could arise if our self-reality were to live its life in the physical time. All that is banished into time is absolutely not existing if it does not lie in the present instant. The past and the future are equally beyond reach. Reality then transforms itself into an unending procession of single instants, and everything which is merely instantaneous is in itself absolutely without value. We saw that every value depends upon the identifying realization between separate contents. Schiller's Don Carlos exclaimed: "One instant lived in paradise is not too dearly bought by death." But such an instant would be entirely worthless. The value could set in only if at least two instants were given, and the second were recognized as the identical realization of the first. But that is possible only when the two separated contents are taken into one unified act. The first must there-

fore not have become unreal when the second enters. The anticipation and the realization must not be two temporal processes, as in temporal form the first would no longer exist when the second arises. They must rather be separated parts of one atemporal will-act. But if one single temporally conceived and therefore psychologized experience is worthless in itself and unfit to enter into a value, the mere multiplication cannot change anything. A mere chain of temporal contents of consciousness therefore remains indifferent from the standpoint of value, even if it goes through uncounted millions of centuries. The mere extension of our psychological phenomena in time would be, for the meaning of the personality, just as accidental, external, and ultimately worthless as the expansion of our body in space. Our life would not become more valuable if our arm should reach to the furthest star. In the purposive atemporal experience lies our personal reality. Therefore the unified identification of values can be found for our inner world not by a temporal prolongation but only outside of time.

The spiritual beyond, accordingly, begins not after æons, or after the bodily temporal occurrence of our death, but must be included in our over-temporal will-connections. It is a beyond because it transcends all the real acts of our will, and can never be completely grasped in a concrete life-experience. It is therefore an ideal, but this ideal can be believed as real because our conviction maintains it. The true salvation in the spirit of Christianity is the victorious arising of that will-attitude in us by which every opposition of values is overcome and the full unity of the true, the harmonious, and the good is reached in our soul. It is the salvation of the over-personal blessedness. All understanding of this ultimate unity then leads into the depth of the own soul. Now the salvation no longer results as the effect of a divine action, but by our own aiming toward a higher purer life. The beyond of our inner world lies at the bottom of our self, and by

that insight the religious thought takes a turn towards philosophy. Nevertheless, the Christian thought remains also in this form still true religion. It remains religion because in the centre stands the certainty that this own consciousness of the unity of values is upheld by the belief in God. The belief in the divine power of uniting the values is now itself the saving fact. That again is certainly not to be understood in any psychological sense. The decisive reality remains unexpressed if this belief comes to be described as a psychical cause and this expansion of our soul as a psychical effect. What is really in question is the connection of meanings in free volitions. To love God means to the inner world the absolutely valid conciliation of all mutually opposing evaluations. The torn and broken experience of the self has become in the belief a meaningful unity, the inner struggle has come to rest, the helpless bondage has been transformed into freedom by salvation.

CHAPTER XIV

THE VALUES OF ABSOLUTENESS

THE pious soul finds God in a vague longing toward the unity of values; to find this unity of values by a conscious, conceptionally clear, purposive labor is the ultimate task of all philosophy. Thus the goal remains a common one, but the way towards it is entirely different. This difference is too easily misunderstood, and yet the God to whom prayer rises has lost his deepest religious meaning if he transforms himself into the absolute of the idealist. The ultimate principle which philosophy is seeking is not meant to come to us in creation, revelation, and salvation. Certainly religion, too, has reached an absolutely ultimate. There cannot exist a being who stands behind the Godhead. As soon as the purpose is to apprehend the given worlds of truth and of harmony and of goodness as identical with one another, the belief in God alone can bring us certainty. No philosophical remodelling of this belief can supplement this completing thought or still less replace it. Only by the relation to God can these conflicting worlds be united in such a way that one fulfils itself in another and that their totality itself becomes a pure value. Yet the presupposition for this deed of belief remains that these at first conflicting worlds are given as experienced realities. From the things of life which we find, from the real nature and history, from the love and happiness that men really experience, from the moral order which is really given to us, our longing arises to the holy, which is supra-real and which unites all that is given. From such starting-points the unity cannot be reached in any other way; no philosophical thought can explode this belief. The valu-

able experiences themselves do not become changed by this superstructure of a divine reality.

All this must be entirely different as soon as philosophy tries to seek the unity of the values. Then the first step must be to examine the presuppositions of the values themselves. That which we call the given and that which we call the experience must themselves become problems of thought. By such a turn the direction of the search becomes entirely changed. If we examine the given experience itself we must turn from the experience to the experiencing subject, from the values to the evaluating consciousness, from the world to the I and its reason. But if those realms of value are dependent upon the actions of the self, their unification can no longer be brought about by merely uniting the separated experiences, but rather must be brought about by uniting the evaluating actions of our I. Instead of outward movement to an inexperienceable reality beyond the world which religion seeks, we then necessarily have an inward movement to the absolute in ourselves, in which the different evaluating acts have started. This new direction towards the absolute by an examination of the inner conditions of valuation can indeed be in question only when the longing for an ultimate unity has led to a methodical and systematic labor of thought. Such intentional elaboration of values was what we recognized as civilization in the narrower sense of the word. Philosophy is therefore an achievement of civilization like science and art and law. Religion creates its value by its naïve immediate feeling of life which is at the bottom of our certainty of existence, of our joy in life and happiness, of our belief in development and progress. Of course at the higher stage religion absorbs numberless values of civilization. The nature which God created may be conceived by the believers in accordance with the scientific work of physics and chemistry. The belief may make use of all cultural means of poetry and music, painting and architecture. The church may be secured

and propagated by legal and moral achievements of civilization. But the original religious deed of belief remains always an immediate apprehension of the value. Religion is therefore a life-value to us, philosophy a cultural value. A mutual suppression and interference are no more in question than any conflict between the naïve unity-value of love and the systematic unity-value of art.

For us there is no special proof necessary that the systematic examination of the possible fields of value really leads back to the evaluating soul. Our total undertaking was evidently one long example of such a method. In studying the various groups of values we had to understand them as functions of the subject. We had no free choice there. If we were really to examine the true and the beautiful and the good and the holy with reference to that which is similar and which is dissimilar in them, we had to turn from what is apparently given as completed structures to those inner energies in us which posit the separated values in the swarming experiences. If the question is now how far these values themselves can be brought to a unity, it is evidently for us the most natural continuation of our analysis to turn again to this inner positing of values in ourselves and to seek its ultimate conditions.

The true goal of philosophy, we said, is the unification of the values. The examination of the special values gives the special part of the philosophical task: the logic, the æsthetics, the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of nature, the philosophy of history, and so on. But the totality of philosophy is more than the sum of these parts. They all find their ultimate foundation in the closing examination concerning the inner unity of the evaluations themselves. Only by binding together and uniting all the valuations does the world-totality itself become valuable, and that alone gives us a philosophical view of the world. The philosophical view of the world, on the other hand, can alone give meaning to our life. If we

interpret the task of philosophy in this way, we do not take sides for one philosophical school against other philosophical tendencies. When we defined the task of religion as unity of values, by such a definition we drew boundaries inside which there was room for Buddhism and the cult of the Greeks and Christianity and Islam. If we define as the goal of philosophy the unity of the evaluating acts, again we have not excluded any special kind of philosophy by it. The ultimate problem of the philosophers has found very different formulations in the history of philosophy. Yet without any deep intruding changes of the historical systems, it might be demonstrated that the solutions of the ultimate philosophical problem have always meant a fundamental reconciliation of all contradictions in the evaluating deeds.

Such a view does not involve the demand for a fundamental metaphysical principle. On the contrary, the reconciliation of the conflicts of valuation may be secured far from all metaphysics. The opposition between the valuation of knowledge, with its demand for causal laws, and the valuation of morality, with its demand for freedom, is, for instance, completely abolished as soon as it becomes clear that both do not refer to the same world at all. Moreover, in the sphere of experience itself a kind of unity is established as soon as one particular valuation becomes in principle super-ordinated above all others. For instance, if the connections of the outer world are posited as the only values which are absolutely valid, we must come to a naturalistic, materialistic view of the world in which there can be no conflict of valuation. Certainly such quarter-philosophy will very quickly prove itself insufficient, inasmuch as such a valuation of nature cannot itself be deduced from a world which is nothing but nature. But in that case all the other valuations would simply be accompaniments of the moving matter, and therefore fundamentally subordinated to the causal process, and finally embedded without conflict in the unified view of the world. In

the same way any other group of values can be raised over all the remaining ones and can thus secure unity by the domination of one factor.

If instead of the connections of the outer world the connections of the fellow-world are emphasized, the result is a not less one-sided philosophy in which the historical development alone is evaluated, and all the other valuations are then historical deeds which result from it. If, instead, the connection of the inner world as psychical content is over-evaluated, the result must be a positivistic philosophy of the inner experiences, which again easily forces all other values into its service. Hence systems which are apparently the most extreme opposites in philosophy agree in their effort to give preference to the valuation of connection, and to make these logical values supporters of all the other possible valuations. Only contents of knowledge, not agreements or developments or realizations, can then claim fundamental value. In contrast to such systems, æsthetic or ethical philosophy may go the opposite way with the same one-sidedness, perhaps merely to oppose the naked philosophy of the intellect. The romantic philosophy, for instance, subordinates everything to the valuation of unity, and again it may be either the unity of the inner world which controls everything, or the harmony of the fellow-world, or the loving devotion to the accord of the universe. A philosophy of duty, on the other hand, interprets all knowledge, that is, all the evaluating true judgments, as a special case of moral obligation. In this way we see before us numberless possibilities to secure the unity of the valuations in experience by super-ordinating one special kind of value over all others. Our definition of philosophy, which seeks the philosophical task in the unification of the valuation, leaves us ample room for all the varieties of philosophy which history has matured.

For us such a solution of the problem has become impossible. We have examined the valuations, and have become cer-

tain that the values are coördinated to each other. We have lost the right to conceive one group of values as dependent upon another. Each valuation arises with equally valid claim from the immediate life-experience. To apprehend the world in its self-realization, in its progress, in its achievement, is not a more and not a less ultimate value than to understand it in its harmony and beauty, or to recognize it in the security of its existence and of its lawfulness. Our study of the values therefore excludes for us every philosophy which ignores the equality of right between the logical, æsthetic, and ethical valuations. Existence as such is not prior to and not more fundamental than goodness or harmony.

If the various values are entitled to equal rights, no one of them can serve as the one fundamental value from which the others are to be deduced. Hence we must either forego their unification, or we must conceive them all together as deducible from a fundamental act which lies further back. To forego the unity cannot mean anything else than to conceive the world in its totality as contradictory and therefore worthless. Each value may remain valid in its particular sphere, but only in reference to the special field. Referred to the world-totality, everything would lose its pure value when the contradiction between moral, true, and beautiful reality cannot be overcome in the totality. To have value meant for any experience to show itself identically realized in a new experience. The world as a whole therefore has a value only when the separated realities show themselves ultimately as various realizations of an absolute reality which remains in them identical with itself.

To be sure, we can go through our life without concern for the value of the totality. It is the habitual method of mankind to act, to enjoy, and to estimate the world in pieces. But whoever has found in himself the deeper question as to the unity cannot find rest in the negative reply. The answer that the world does not have any unity, that the valuations

fall asunder, and that a self-asserting totality does not exist at all is ultimately no possible answer. It is no answer because when we ask for the values of unity we do not mean to ask about something ready-made for which it would be possible to state whether it exists or does not exist. The question means rather how is the unity to be created. Values are tasks which are to be fulfilled. We saw that the values of the true and beautiful and good were also not simply hidden somewhere ready-made, and now to be discovered. He alone found them who created them. To find a valuable world-totality is in the same way nothing but a task: the task of apprehending the world in such a way that everything which we acknowledge as valuable is a necessary content in it, and that nevertheless the world remains in unity with itself. Before such a task the question can be only whether we are successful in the fulfilment or not. The purpose of apperceiving the world of harmony, of truth, and of morality as a valuable self-completing whole demands our effort just as science and art and law demanded it. To deny to the seeker the valuable totality of the world is as meaningless as it would be to tell the naturalist that the parts of nature are not really in causal connection. He would answer that the experience can become a causal nature only by his logical work as the value of connection in the world depends upon his thinking the identification. In this way the philosophical world-totality is also certainly not something ready-made, not something which the philosopher has to unveil from its masking drapery. It is the goal of apprehension towards which he aims. His question regarding such a valuable world-whole is therefore, if he understands himself correctly, not whether there is an ultimate reality or not. His question is only what the character of such unity is, or rather how the world must be conceived to gain that unity. That such unity really is valid is thus presupposed in the question itself. Those who do not ask for it cannot know it. But those who do ask, and are

thus already seeking, possess the certainty of its reality, and their search refers only to the elaboration.

At the very threshold another objection must also be removed. If philosophy declares the ultimate meaning of the world to be a self-asserting unity of values, this result of thought must be fixated through conceptions and must be expressed in judgments. But through this fixation and expression the coördination of the values again seems sacrificed, inasmuch as the whole now becomes object of knowledge and therefore becomes subordinated to the logical valuation. But that is misleading. The fundamental difference is neglected here, the difference between the sciences of experience and metaphysics. In all the sciences, in the natural sciences, in mathematics, in the historical sciences, and in the philosophical special sciences, we always had to do with the connection of the given, with the relation of things or beings or norms with each other. As soon as we are to grasp the deepest fundamental reality, we have an entirely different task. The unification of the separated groups of values, as we saw, was not to be reached simply by combining the given realities, but by embedding them in a beyond of experience. The great evaluating deeds must be recognized as parts of a self-asserting absolute act, which as such is postulated but not experienced. If we call the unification of our experiences our knowledge, the unification of our experiences with a postulated absolute fact cannot again be treated as knowledge. An entirely different deed of the I has to come in. It is an act of conviction. From the bottommost depths of the personality this postulate breaks out. Only if such a self-asserting absolute fact is posited from which all special valuations emanate is the world-totality itself really valuable.

This valuation of the totality is therefore a value of special kind, a metaphysical value of conviction, which is fundamentally to be separated from the logical values of connection. Without the deepest decision, without staking and

pledging the whole personality, in short without conviction, there is and can be no ultimate philosophy. This ultimate deed of conviction is indeed never a merely describable process which could be expressed in its real meaning through the terms of science. Those who would like to narrow down the account of reality to a mere description of objects may therefore feel satisfied in ruling out such philosophy as "ineffable." If there were expression only where there is description, philosophy would indeed have to choose between ineffability and despair. The pseudo-philosophies of materialism or positivism would have to take the place of real philosophy, and yet they could remain enthroned only so long as no one dared to ask what they mean by their claim to be true. But being ineffable in this sense is a fate which the absolute deed of philosophy shares with every single historical will-act if it is taken in its immediate reality. Even the most modern forms of "realism" put themselves in the wrong from the start when they give an account of the will in the same way in which they describe the trees. Wherever there is will the immediate life-reality is lost if the psychological abstractions make it a describable object. To be ineffable means, then, not to have been pressed into the thought-forms of natural science, but to have been left in the life-form of immediate reality. There is a richer form of expression than mere objective description. Every yes and no, every affirmation and every denial, even the affirmation of easily effable realistic half-philosophy, proves in every statement the possibility of expressing that which is not describable.

This ultimate value of conviction is now indeed superordinated over the logical and æsthetic and ethical groups of values. A philosophy maintained by such a conviction does not raise the logical valuation over the other valuations because the certainty of conviction is not based on logical knowledge. All the values, the logical, æsthetic, ethical, and religious ones, thus remain coördinated with reference to the

ultimate principle to which the conviction relates them. The fact that this conviction must be communicated by conceptions, judgments, and sentences does not at all transform it into a scientific knowledge. The poet, the priest, the statesman, the judge, makes use of the same linguistic means with which the investigator communicates his descriptions; yet they certainly do not communicate to us knowledge, but attitudes, decisions, and inspirations.

We now stand before a new ultimate value, the absolute of philosophy, the fundamentally ultimate which bears all reality in itself. It is the over-experienceable in which all experience comes to completion. No knowledge can reach it; only conviction can make it certain. And yet this conviction again is only a special kind of evaluation, that is, a special kind of pure identification. It is the identification of all the other values. This identity of all the mutually opposing values is reached by understanding all the values as expressions or realizations of a last self-asserting reality. The worlds of those values which enter into our experience represent the self-asserting self-realization of the one metaphysical deed. Nothing can have validity which is not maintained by this ultimate act, as soon as the task of raising the totality of values itself towards the level of a value is completed. But from the world of evaluated experiences, how can we reach that postulated, primary reality? On the ground of systematic philosophy of course it cannot be a question of fantastic speculations and dreams. We have just as much right to leave the solution of a cubic equation to the play of imagination. Entirely definite, extremely complex facts are given, and from them the self-asserting underlying fact is to be determined. To be sure, it must remain the deed of conviction that can give to this ultimate principle validity and in this sense reality, but the determination of its characteristics demands at first strictly logical labor before the conviction can evaluate the last result.

What we are seeking must be sharply determinable in its content, and must bear in itself the total richness of our experience, and yet must not itself be experienceable. My experience is the life-content of my personal self, and what is to be conceived as experienceable at all must belong to a self. The conditions for the possibility of being experienced are therefore annulled as soon as the selfhood, that is, the relation to the individual personality as such, is eliminated. My contents of experience, the whole world of my values, must thus become over-experienceable as soon as I give up my self, that is, as soon as the I annuls itself. With the I falls the thou, and with the total reference to individuals falls the opposition between the self and the things. Thus, if we give up the boundaries of the inner world, then we also annul the fellow-world and the outer world as such. The content of experience has by that ceased to be experience. It has become over-experienceable manifoldness: the self has been expanded to the all. Over-experienceable thus means not something which we do not know at all. An inexperienceable manifold of such a kind would lie outside every possible interest. The over-experienceable which enters into our conviction is the real experience for which, by annulling every relation to a self, the character of being experienceable to a self is eliminated. When inner world, fellow-world, and outer world become transformed in this way into an over-experience, we know from the start at least this about it. As soon as this over-experienceable reality posits in itself an I, it constitutes by that positing at the same time a thou, and in positing subjects in this way it also posits the opposition to objects. In short, as soon as there arises an I in the over-experienceable, the whole system of inner world, fellow-world, and outer world becomes necessary.

It may be pointed out at once that such over-experienceable reality is of course over-personal or impersonal in an entirely different sense from that in which the special values were over-

personal. It was indeed essential for the truth and the beauty and the good that they are not related to the states of the own personality like the agreeable or the useful. Their valuation was independent of the self, inasmuch as they represent pure values only if they are equally valid for every possible self. The pure value is necessary and general. However, the detaching of the values from our accidental self meant there no elimination of the relation to individual subjects. On the contrary, the value was value for personalities, it was over-personal only in so far as it was valid, not for this or that personality, but necessarily for every thinkable personality. But now our over-experience demands that we think away the relation to individual personalities.

By such a decision all the further steps appear necessary. What remains from our total experience as soon as our self has been enlarged to an over-personality? Of course, at first everything must fall away which has as content our own self in its accidental states, in its pleasures and pains. As soon as the particular standpoint of the self is made void, pleasure and pain have lost their meaning. They were only the indications for the way in which the self grasps the world from the standpoint of its particular interests. But evidently not enough is done by eliminating these feeling-acts of personal attitude. In the same way everything in our experience which lies outside of the pure values belonged to the particular personality. We recognized that the value was everywhere based on the demand that its content must be acknowledged by every thinkable subject. The anti-value, for instance the error or the wrong or the regress or the discord, is accordingly that which cannot be postulated as belonging to every thinkable subject. It can be maintained only by particular persons, and therefore it stands and falls with the individual self. As soon as the self in its individuality is extinguished, there can remain from the total experience of the self only that which can be conceived as common to every thinkable self,

the realm of values. But we cannot rest even here. In the values, too, a personal factor meets a general factor. The maintaining of the identical, that striving for the unity in the otherness and for the realization of the given in new form, is general and independent of the particular self. Whether we had to do with logical or æsthetic or ethical or religious values, we always found the valuation determined by this longing for identification, and this was fundamentally independent of a particular self. This act therefore can enter completely into the impersonal over-experience. But the identified contents — they may be parts of the outer world, or of the fellow-world, or of the inner world — are after all in every valuation again in the particular form of their relation to the self. Their space-position and their temporal form, their grouping and their vividness, are dependent upon the particular standpoint of the single self.

If everything is really to be eliminated which is posited by the particular self, the separation between inner world, fellow-world, and outer world disappears, and nothing can remain in the space-time relation which is posited by the particular standpoint. That which is maintained as identical is therefore now no longer an outer world which stands in opposition to the maintaining will; hence the will which maintains the over-experience finds no content outside of itself. Its content therefore must be contained in its own activity, that is, in the over-experience the will has become its own content. Then only have we an over-experience which is liberated from the selfhood. It is a striving which has become its own content, and which aims to maintain this content. A personal self, then, does not belong to this ultimate striving. Yet it is not incomparable with the self, as in the self, too, this will towards identical maintaining binds all valuable experience. The fundamental act of the self thus remains even after eliminating all the characteristics of the individual personality as such. That fundamental act shares its essential

principle with the self, but it is no longer an individual self. It is conceived as the selfhood without individuality. We might suggest it by the word "over-self." The over-self is therefore reached as soon as the reference to the personal conditions in our experience is eliminated. On the other hand, as soon as the over-self posits in itself a limited personal self, its undifferentiated content must at once separate itself into a self, a co-self, and a not-self, that is, into inner world, fellow-world, and outer world.

We look back once more over the last part of our road. Our evaluated experience is full of contradictions and without inner unity. The logical, æsthetic, and ethical values, all of which were found in each, the outer world, fellow-world, and inner world, appear as separated realms of value independent of each other. But we demand that we be able to apprehend the world-totality as a value, and that means we postulate that the world-totality remain in unity with itself. The separated worlds of our experience must therefore be understood as various part contents and expressions of one fundamental world which lies beyond every possible individual experience, and which remains identical with itself in every becoming and change. We had to examine, therefore, how far experience involves an over-experience from which it can be deduced. We asked what remains of experience when the conditions of individual experience, namely, the relation to a personal self, are annulled. We have found that then there remains that fundamental striving which we recognized as the underlying act of every valuation, namely, the striving for a new which is identical with the old. Inasmuch as this over-personal act shares this striving with the self, we called it an over-self. Such a will to the identical maintaining has in that over-experience no external material, no outside object, as the ultimate reality cannot still have something beside itself. Its object must therefore lie in itself. The over-will is its own content. But as soon as

in its unfolding a self arises, the manifold of inner world, fellow-world, and outer world would be posited by it, and with them the logical, æsthetic, and ethical series of values. From the fundamental will towards identical maintaining the over-will would bring forward the total of valuable experiences with their separated and contradictory realms of values. The over-self, which is united in itself and which we postulated by conviction, would thus become the source of all those independent and contradicting experiences to which our knowledge, our enjoyment, and our estimation are related.

The character of this over-experience can now be followed up. We know at first that it is a striving. The over-self which encloses in itself the conditions for every possible experience is thus certainly not a thing which has existence: the fundamental reality is life-activity, deed. We know further that it is a striving towards identical maintaining. The over-self, therefore, can never lead beyond that originally given, as its own meaning lies in the maintaining. We know further that the over-self does not find any material outside of itself, as every outside content of experience is dependent upon that individuality which is eliminated in the over-self. Finally, we know that the evaluating identification never refers to a merely unchanged. On the contrary, wherever we had to do with logical, or æsthetic, or ethical, or religious values in the outer world, the fellow-world, or the inner world, the identical was always somehow changed and enhanced. Either it became more vivid, or it realized itself externally, or it entered into new space-time forms, but in every case it changed its character in such a way that it could become the starting-point for new action and deed. We saw that to be realized means to remain identical and yet to become the foothold for a new action. If this energy is to be effective in the over-self, the striving which is directed towards self-assertion must not only maintain itself, but must realize itself, enhance itself, move on to new and ever new footholds of new actions.

If a striving is to realize itself and thus to fulfil itself, and yet to maintain itself, it becomes necessary indeed that the realization shall be of such a kind that it leads to new striving. If the fulfilment were not to lead to new striving, it would be extinguished by the fulfilment and would therefore cease to be striving. The over-self is a striving which aims to maintain itself identical, that means to maintain itself in its striving. Every goal which is reached must therefore be starting-point to a new activity and must enhance itself incessantly.

From here we can already take a wide outlook. If this over-self were to create in itself the limited standpoint of a self, the whole inner world, fellow-world, and outer world, we saw, must arise, and with them the whole manifoldness of the values of experience. The over-self would then realize itself by its own deed in the pure values of logical, æsthetic, ethical, and religious life. The over-self would bear the worlds of experience and realize itself in them. It is clear that that would indeed fulfil the conditions by which the totality would become a value, inasmuch as the striving of the over-experience and the values of the world-experience are now related to each other like purpose and realization. The over-self remains loyal to itself when it expresses itself in the world of the experienceable values. The manifoldness of values would then be no longer a conflict in which the values interfere with each other, because in those values works that one aim of the over-self towards self-assertion. The total world is absolutely valuable, as all which we know of it — on the one side the aiming over-self which is posited by the conviction, on the other side the true, beautiful, and good which is posited by experience — blend in a perfect unity. One realizes itself in the other, and our will towards identification becomes satisfied in a general, necessary way. It cannot have any possible meaning to go beyond that and to ask still further as to the value of the world. The all is now completely in unity with

itself, and therefore leaves no demand for identification unsatisfied. This value of unity is necessarily the last. If we were to ask further on whether it has any value that such a valuable all exists, we should contradict ourselves. To seek the value of the existence of the world-whole would mean that we seek something else which can be posited as identical with the world-whole and which realizes itself in it. But if this other were still real, the world-whole would not be the whole: the presupposition would be given up. The value of the world, like every thinkable value, can only lie in the mutual relation of its parts. An absolutely single can never have a value in itself, even if it is a world-totality. In the identification of its own deeds, the infinite value of the world-totality is completed.

The counterplay manifests itself when we look towards the over-self from the standpoint of our self. Our whole experience, with all its contradictions, by the relation to the over-experience now gains its unity, its rest, its final meaning. The experiences which were independent of each other and therefore accidental now become harmonious parts of the deeds of an over-self which realizes itself from inner necessity. The values of the world of experience by that relation are anchored to the deepest bottom of ultimate reality. An entirely new meaning of the values now becomes clear. We called valuable that realization of the parts of experience which in a general and necessary way had to satisfy every possible subject. But now the meaning of the value transcends the desire and satisfaction of all thinkable selves and enters into connection with the over-experience of the over-self. The experience accordingly takes its ideals from an over-experience which, to be sure, is not to be found beyond the things like a god, but which is effective and valid impersonally in ourselves. The valuable is therefore that which is in harmony with the will of the over-self.

Apparently by this last meditation we have argued in a

circle. We acknowledged the over-self because by it the world becomes a value for us, and now we find that a value is that which is in harmony with the over-self. The over-self is demanded by the valuation, and the valuation is conditioned by the over-self. One of the two evidently must be the original starting-point, but the critical examination of such a last hold can be given to us only in the real experience of the self. Hence the relation is simply this: the self posits the over-self by an act of conviction, because it is an absolutely necessary value for every thinkable self. In the metaphysical view of the world which arises by this positing, the over-self is the only fundamental will and everything which corresponds to its will is valuable. Accordingly the deed of our self posits the over-self from which every self arises. The self must expand itself towards an over-self to find in it the rest, the certainty, and the identity with the absolute whole.

The character and the working of the over-experience must come to sharper relief when we refer the world of experience to it. We must therefore examine how the experience changes when it is conceived as melted into this over-experienceable striving. Here for the last time we might separate outer world, fellow-world, and inner world, and examine for each realm how it enlarges its meaning in the relation to the over-reality until all manifest themselves in common as the life of the over-self which continually enhances its aiming, which remains loyal to itself, and which has as its only goal the eternal value.

A. — WORLD

From the swarming of our impressions the valuable outer world of our knowledge arose. Such a world was no longer made up of the chance impressions of this or that one, but it was constituted by the existing and connected things which are valid in their reality for every possible subject. From the same material of the swarming impressions of life also arose

the valuable outer world of our pure joyful devotion. That world was no longer made up of the chance pleasures of this or that one, but was constituted by the harmonious beautiful surrounding which in its unity was valid for every possible subject. Finally, from those swarming impressions arose the valuable outer world of development and achievement as object of our estimation. That world was no longer made up by the chance aims of this or that one, but it was constituted by the energies which unfolded themselves and enhanced themselves to higher and higher values which were valid for every one. Yet the one world did not know about the other : one moved on in necessity, the other in freedom ; one was always perfect, the other always uncompleted. That which was true was perhaps not beautiful or did not show progress ; that which developed itself perhaps disturbed the harmony ; that which was beautiful perhaps could not be brought into connection. And yet the world as a whole must ultimately be united in itself, must be self-asserting and thus identical with itself, if it is not to be without value as a whole. And if it is worthless as a whole, the values of the parts would be lowered to the level of illusory values.

But we recognized that this ultimate unity could become conceivable for us as soon as we understand that those separated worlds of experience are only different expressions and realizations of one and the same fundamental world. Such an apprehension offered itself as natural as soon as we had found that those valuable worlds of the pure experience arise only by particular attitudes in our apprehension, and that these various attitudes can all be resolved into one common behavior of our will. Hence in the ultimate reality we have not separated worlds, but separated deeds of one will. This fundamental will in us, however, necessarily lies beyond experience. We know it only by its achievements, we know it as a necessary presupposition without which the performances in us cannot be understood. We know it because we experience

its results, but we cannot find it in its own reality in the midst of our individual self. The individuality of the self must be given up if we think ourselves into the standpoint of that fundamental self, and in giving up the individuality of the self of course we eliminate also the outer world, in so far as it presents itself from the strictly individual standpoint. The beyond of this self-experience is accordingly a fundamental will which creates in itself the individual selves as well as the various logical, æsthetic, and ethical forms of apprehension. And this over-self, this fundamental will, no longer finds the outer world which the individuals find, but can find only itself as material of apprehension.

That lies far away from such playing philosophy of will as that of Schopenhauer, which is based on the external similarity between the things and ourselves. Such a philosophy argues that the things move like ourselves, that we do not know their inside, but that we know our own inside as will, and that we therefore have the right to draw the conclusion that in a corresponding way the things also are will in their inside. Our result has nothing in common with such metaphysics. The things which natural science knows have no inside. They are and remain always exactly that which they present themselves as being in the thought-forms of naturalistic apprehension. As parts of the chain of causes and effects, they can never be will. In the over-experience of the over-self, they are will to us because the outer world as such has been entirely annihilated in it. The outer world as such arises in contrast to and together with the inner world of the individual self. If the individual self is annulled, the outerness of the world is annulled too. The over-self therefore cannot find anything without; and as we found that the only thing we know about the over-self is that it shares with our individual self the will to activity, we must conclude that the will of the over-self finds as material only its own willing. To introduce any additional element would be fantastic specula-

tion. Real philosophy is bound to calculate with those elements which are objectively found either in the experience or in the presuppositions which are necessary to make experience possible. On this basis the fundamental postulate, that the ultimate reality is one, can be fulfilled only if we demand that the content of the world is a world-will.

On the surface it looks as if there still remains the torturing question: What then, after all, is this material of the world? Even if the evaluating over-self and the evaluated world are one and the same fundamental will in the infinity of its aiming, we are anxious to test its substance as a chemist analyzes his material. But all such questions arise from misunderstandings. From the start we have emphasized that the will is no being, but an activity. Only when the over-self apprehends itself and makes itself in this way an object, can it become content to which the evaluating I finally attaches the value of existence. Yet even when everything is deed of the will, the imagination may be unwilling to stand still before such a boundary-line. This world-will, it seems, must have some quality which we must be able to describe or to characterize. But here all questioning becomes meaningless, not because we do not have enough knowledge, but because such a question negates the presuppositions. An inquiry into the "stuff" of the world can have a meaning only when there are different stuffs which can be discriminated. But when everything is equally will, it cannot have any meaning to find out what this will really is, as there cannot be anything to which it might be referred or with which it might be compared. If there is nothing possible which is different material, a description of the material could not even satisfy any justified logical interest.

We know, then, only the one character of the absolute: it is will. In the beginning there was a deed, but the beginning does not lie in time, as time is only the form-thought of that object world which is created by the primary deed. The deed

is always something entirely united and undifferentiated, something which has lost its immediate life-value when it is decomposed. The analyzing psychologist must separate the will-action into its different successive parts because he conceives the mental states as accompaniments of physical things. The historical life does not know this breaking in pieces, and if we want to understand the primary deed of the over-self, we must start from this real immediate life-experience of the historical personality, not from the products of psychological abstractions. In that over-experience, too, the deed is therefore a realization of purpose, a fulfilment of the desire, a will which is victorious. Now this over-will is to be the totality of the real. Then it cannot find, or grasp, or aim at anything which lies outside itself. The only goal which the will aims to reach through its deed must be the willing of itself. But we know that to reach a goal means that the will maintains its object in a new form, which is a starting-point for new intentions. We saw in every case that the realization through the will meant a transformation into something new which is identical with the old in its content, but which by its new vividness or by its new form allows a new purpose and a new action. The will always reaches out for a goal which represents the foothold for a new will. Hence the fundamental will also can have no other aim than to reach starting-points for new will. The will must therefore incessantly enhance itself in its willing, and yet must remain in every enhancement identical with itself and must fulfil itself. The meaning of the world is accordingly an aiming towards a greater abundance of aiming which yet remains identical with itself. It is a self-unfolding of the will, which must lead to new and ever new volitions which represent the real world, and yet which cannot have any other aim than that of striving. There can be no other world and no other world-purpose. We now have to ask at first how things may be conceived as arising from this fundamental will.

In every will-act of ours the resolving analysis may find the starting-point of the striving, the striving itself, and finally the goal of the striving which becomes realized. They are melted into a perfect unity, and only in this unity and totality have they the meaning of a will-act. The resolution into those three parts belongs to a consideration which does not belong to the experience of the deed as such. The same must hold true for the fundamental will of the over-self. The world as absolute reality is the unresolved unity of this eternal deed. But for this fundamental deed it must also hold true that as soon as the striving is resolved from the totality, it stands opposite the starting-point of the striving and the goal of the striving. The starting-point is that which the will no longer wills when it seeks the goal: the goal is that which the striving has not yet reached. The striving is the movement from the will, which is given up as will and is no longer willed, to the new will which has not yet unfolded itself. In the deed itself the not-yet and the no-longer are one. Their atemporal, mutual relation gives unity and meaning to the deed. But from the standpoint of the detached striving factor of the deed, the no-longer and the not-yet stand separated against each other. Such striving thus becomes itself the relation-point for an opposite pair of directions. This relation-point we call the now. From the standpoint of such now the no-longer becomes the past and the not-yet becomes the future. With the resolution of the striving from the atemporal will-totality the time is posited as a relation between starting-point and goal. The striving distributes itself in this way over separated time-elements, and by that ceases to be the one eternal striving. It resolves itself into an infinite series of striving units.

When the striving separates itself from its content, still a further antithesis is posited. Just because the striving maintains the content in the transition from the past to the future, this content is acknowledged as something independent. It

is now not a part of the striving itself, is therefore outside of the striving effort, and in this way the not-here arises as against the here. The time had the double face; from the now it looks forward and backward. The space at first knows only one opposition, here and without. But that without refers to the whole manifoldness of the simultaneous contents. With every single content the character of the without shades itself and becomes a particular space-direction. In this way arises the endless manifoldness of space-directions as soon as the striving as such detaches itself from the totality of the deed. It has no metaphysical significance that for certain determinations three space-directions are selected from the endlessly many. For the space, too, it holds true that the here for one act may be the without for the other. The here character of the striving then resolves itself again into an unlimited number of separated centres of striving with an unlimited number of here-points. As soon as the striving separates itself from its content in the deed of the over-self, the time-relation and the space-relation of the content are accordingly posited, and with them the unlimited resolution of the striving in independent units. But that leads us to our individual selves. The acts of our I are such detached and endlessly resolved resolutions of the one absolute striving of the over-self. How groups of such self-acts combine themselves to united personalities we followed up when we discussed the existence of beings. We have to return to that when we speak about mankind, but at first we are interested in the other side of the process. With the same act by which the striving in the primary deed resolved itself into striving individual beings, the content of the will has transformed itself into spatial and temporal relations. From the sum of these relations the striving finally elaborates the one space and the one time which embrace all thinkable contents of striving.

The world in space and time therefore has reality only for

the apprehension of the numberless individual selves who have been resolved as striving activities from the over-self. Of course at first it is not a world, but only a manifoldness. But as every single I is part of the striving of the over-self and accordingly manifests its character, this spatial temporal manifold must group itself in accordance with the fundamental tendency of the over-self. We recognized as its fundamental aim that everything which is grasped must be transformed by striving into something new, that in the new the old is to be maintained, and that the old in the new becomes the starting-point for a new striving. This identifying transformation can go on in three directions, and we have studied those three directions most carefully. The individual self manifesting the striving of the over-self must apprehend its space-time world, therefore, as a world of logical knowledge, of æsthetic enjoyment, of ethical estimation. It is the same over-striving that through the individual self performs this threefold upbuilding and which binds these different deeds of the self together in the unity of an individual self.

We saw how the striving of that type which we call knowledge aims to grasp those contents which can be maintained in the transition from one self to another self. That gave us the existence of the things. This striving aims further to maintain the content in the transition from the no-longer to the not-yet, and that gives us the value of the connection of things. The transition from one content to the other which is sought in the fields of existence and connection demands accordingly that the self pass from one I to another I, or from one time to another time, but that the content itself remain unchanged. The content as part of the fundamental deed of the over-self was will, but if the self in its knowledge of the world entirely abstracts from every change of the content, this will-content does not come in question at all in its will-character. It is extinct will, which no longer wills anything else. It is a completed will, which in its completion

goes unchanged into other selves and into other times. The nature which is object of our knowledge of existence and connection is therefore a deed of will which does not will beyond itself, and which cannot unfold itself in its will. It is the world, the parts of which have and maintain only spatial temporal existence. Their will is extinct because the self in its search for knowledge aims only towards maintaining the same content in its transition to other selves and to other times, and therefore only elaborates that which is essential for the maintaining of the content in this particular transition. Nature as such therefore has no will.

On the other hand, in the world of æsthetic enjoyment this transition to other selves and to other times is not in question. The essential factor now is the relation among the various contents. Their will is therefore not at all extinct. Every particular content now must come into the world in its will-character, and the transition from one content to the other can maintain the old in the new only if they will the same and thus resound harmoniously. The beauty and harmony of nature and of art now become living. Finally, in the world of development and realization the will of the things transforms itself into reality. Thus, here too, the will of the content stands in the foreground. The self now seeks the transition not from one will to another will, as in the case of æsthetics, but from the will to fulfilment. But that means it is a transition from a will which aims beyond itself to a will which is completed in itself, and which can therefore enter with a value of existence into new situations and actions.

The three worlds are consequently the necessary products of the one striving achievement of the self. But these three directions of the striving necessarily belong together because together they form the primary deed. We recognized that the primary deed of the over-self demanded first that the will strive towards an enhanced will, further that in this transition to the new the will maintain itself, and third that in this

way it unfold itself. If in this united deed the will as striving separates itself from the will as content, the content became a manifoldness in space-time, and the striving resolved itself into an unlimited number of selves. That which in the original deed was a unity must therefore resolve itself into several parts in every individual self. In the original deed of the over-self that which maintains itself as the content was the will itself. In the deed of the individual self the maintained content has become an object without, and therefore a three-fold possibility arises. The content is followed up without reference to its will in reference to the other selves or to other space and time parts; or secondly, the content is followed up with reference to its will in other wills; or thirdly, the content is followed up in its own will until it fulfils itself. All these three transitions are necessary parts of the united deed in which the will maintains itself because it is will, in which the will agrees with itself because it is one, in which the will fulfils itself because it is a deed. These are the three essential features of every deed. In the over-self they are the one unbroken deed, but as soon as in the over-self the striving as an I detaches itself from the whole and thus creates the numberless selves and the space-time world, this one deed must resolve itself into those three factors. The self, therefore, must have the logical, the æsthetic, and the ethical worlds as three separated worlds which become one only if the selfhood is annulled again and the individual steps back into the over-self. Nature as connection, nature as harmony, and nature as development are therefore only three sides of the one original deed of the over-self. In the world of reality the necessity of the connection, the unity of the harmony, and the progress of the development are reconciled, as all three belong to the free deed of the fundamental will. The individual self alone knows their conflict, which disappears as soon as the conviction eliminates the boundaries of the self and with the self the space-time limitations of the content.

B. — MANKIND

The manifoldness of the selves also appeared different in the logical, in the æsthetic, and in the ethical view of the fellow-world. At one time we saw it in its historical connectedness, the second time in the love and unity of its members, the last time in its self-loyalty and in its progress. But here, too, all the inner contradictions must disappear as soon as the fellow-world is related to the ultimate will of reality. Then only the meaning of mankind becomes significant.

Our experience began with the fact that we find the inner world of our self as against a fellow-world of other selves. They were not perceived things in the outer world, but willing beings whom our will immediately acknowledges. The over-experience which becomes opened to us by our conviction now embeds self and fellow-world together into the eternal will of the over-self. The free deed of the over-self makes the separated selves in their manifoldness arise out of itself. And the will which the selves receive from that over-self posits the necessary conditions for the experiences of the separated personalities. The ultimate over-will in its freedom is therefore not only bearer of the selves, but also bearer of the necessary forms of their worlds, and that means of their worlds of knowledge, of enjoyment, and of estimation. In the elaboration of these experiences which express the will of the over-self the individual selves therefore realize the over-personal goal. The values which the selves acknowledge as common for their worlds of experiences are accordingly manifestations of the one fundamental will, and its self-loyal unfolding becomes the content of the process of mankind.

We must avoid, however, the misleading idea that the selves are in a way secretions or products of the over-self as if they had their reality without the eternal deed of the over-self. The over-self would then be complete and effective in itself without reference to the fact that it produces many sin-

gle selves. No; the selves are in the over-self as the drops in the stream, and the total development of mankind is part of the primary over-will itself. In religion the belief finds a creator who stands as against the self in a beyond into which the personality may enter without being annihilated; in philosophy the conviction seeks an over-self of which the self is a necessary part in an over-experience into which it cannot enter without enlarging itself to the over-self. Religion is philosophy for the I who maintains its selfhood also in the face of the all; philosophy is religion for the I which in its own deed finally grasps the all and through the all gives up the selfhood.

As the drops in the stream! And yet such a metaphor, too, is entirely misleading if it is to say more than that the selves do not live outside the deed of the over-self. It misleads as soon as it suggests that the sum of the drops makes up the stream itself. The sum of the selves and of the experiences of the selves is not at all the totality of the over-self. For the over-self the content of the striving has not entered into the form of the self-experience, as we saw that this latter form is dependent upon the standpoint of the I. The mere accumulation of self-experiences, therefore, could never reach the content of the over-self. In the same way the mere sum of an unlimited series of selves would only bring a repetition of wills which are directed towards self-experience and never that over-will which is directed towards a world-totality. On the other hand, in the self and in the over-self the kind of the will must necessarily be the same. Both can manifest only the will striving to enhance the content in order to make it a new foothold for volition and yet to maintain the old content. As striving, the self is thus equal to the over-self. The over-self which makes up the total ultimate reality was the striving which aims towards its own enhancement and yet maintains itself. Every point reached is accordingly a starting-point for a new will to new goals, and the new goal is again striving.

At every thinkable stage of this timeless eternal deed everything must be possible content of striving and yet striving itself as well. As far as it is considered as content, it takes the temporal spatial form of experience. As far as it is considered as striving, it multiplies itself into the unlimited number of selves, and only in so far as striving and content are experienced as the same, is it the one over-personal world-deed of the absolute.

The question arises why the absolute moves towards the separation of striving and content at all. What is the purpose towards which the will strives when it splits its deed into the will as striving and the will as content? But such a question distorts the process. We have not a temporal succession. It is not as if the deed was at first united action and then at a certain stage of development a bifurcation began by which it divided itself into the aiming of selves and the experienced content. On the contrary, the unity of the world-positing absolute deed continues to be maintained in eternity, and on the other hand, even in the lowest stage of the deed in the midst of the one deed the separation is incessantly performed. While the deed is closed in itself and fulfils itself as the whole in perfect completion, yet in the midst of this whole the will as it wills to grasp itself stands out in opposition to that which it grasps in itself. That is, the striving stands in the midst of the deed in contrast to the goal. We ourselves as selves are that striving in the midst of the absolute deed, and therefore we find the world-experience as in contrast to ourselves. If we could stand outside of the selves, the absolute deed would be closed in itself and the whole would appear to our view as a whole. But as we are the striving in the midst of that whole deed, the will as a content remains something foreign to us. And by this separation that movement sets in which makes us individual selves and the not-self an outer world. For the deed of the over-self accordingly nothing new is added when in the midst of its own definite acts the relation between the

will as subject and as object resolves itself. We grasp it then only from one side, from the side of the will as striving. We are the striving and yet at the same time the whole deed.

But finally we are also parts of the content. If the world-deed is the will which maintains itself, every particle of this world-will must also belong to that which is maintained, that is, to the content of experience. As such, we are bodies, and only through them the personality which enters into the historical mankind becomes completed. We saw how the world-deed narrows itself into the I. As soon as the content of the striving is shaped in the space-time form, the striving itself as starting-point for the directions of time and space must represent a here and now. From this here-now standpoint each self must stand as against the world-experience. This standpoint selects the particular content of experience which can exist for the striving of the individual self. On the other hand, changes in the midst of the space-time world can result only through other space-time changes. The striving of the will can enter into processes of the outer world, therefore, only when some physical causal action coincides with the will. The world of the self thus depends upon the presupposition that a particular will with a particular here and now finds just here and now an organism in which corresponding movements proceed. The striving in the over-self, which by its resolution transforms itself into an unlimited number of possible selves and posits by them the space-time world, can therefore realize from this unlimited series only certain selves as personalities. The conditions for a real self are fulfilled only when the particular will as will and as content possess the same space-time value. But evidently this is not a chance coincidence. The space-time position of the particular I resulted from the particular selection of the things towards which the will took attitude. The will of the I was here and now only in the sense that certain things were past and future, before and behind. But the selection of these things depends

upon the relation to an acting organism. The here and now of the particular will must therefore be given with the body. From the unlimited series of possible selves, accordingly, a self must be realized wherever an acting organism posits by its movements particular relations to its surroundings. The width of this experienced world is accordingly determined by the manifoldness of these organic reactions. The being may be an earthworm or a man of civilization. But by this selecting dependence upon the body the self never becomes an object like the body, but remains a free will which is limited only with regard to its objects. As such a free will it cannot be perceived, but must be acknowledged, and estimated, and all mankind builds itself up by this relation from will to will.

Only when we view mankind in this metaphysical connection do we recognize the ultimate meaning of its inexhaustible activity. We understand that by mankind's striving for the securing and realization of values the will of the eternal over-self maintains and enhances itself. From the standpoint of the individual self we have separated logical and æsthetic and ethical apprehension. Those various values of mankind are now recognized as different sides of the one, united, absolute deed. Every particular aspect emphasizes only particular elements. The knowledge of the fellow-world demanded that we maintain and identify the volitions which started from the same subject; we gained by it the value of existence of the beings. In the historical connection knowledge maintained the will which was directed to the same ends in the transition from man to man. It was a definite identical will which was followed up by such logical consideration. On the other hand, when the æsthetic value was sought, the mutual relation of the various beings was grasped; it was the identification through the harmony of souls, through friendship and love. Finally, when the ethical standpoint was taken, the will in its striving towards the realization, and that

means towards enhancement, was maintained in order to be identified with a new stage and volition and deed. In this way every one of the values gives valid expression to the self-enhancing self-assertion of the will, but no one value represents the totality of this deed. The deed is split as soon as the striving has separated itself from its content, and the all-striving has thus been divided into the unlimited number of single beings. The deed becomes a totality again only when the single beings annul the limitation and grasp their own ultimate reality in the over-personal will of the absolute self.

From this deepest source flows the right understanding of the human task and of the position of the individual in mankind. Only in the certainty of this connection with the over-self do we know on principle that every one of us is unique and cannot be replaced and is necessary for the fulfilment of the world-plan. If we know life merely from the swarming of the day, the one may appear hardly distinguishable from his neighbor. Only a few have anything new to say, and many a man may appear superfluous and accidental. From the standpoint of the whole we understand that this all is a unique drama, in which every volition has its necessary place. Only from the unity of this whole do we know that no self can be repeated in any other world. The world is a living willing activity and not a dead accidental process. Our own deed becomes in that way alone a responsible irreplaceable participation. While our self by its relation to the whole goes over into the eternal, at the same time our self gains eternal and inexhaustible significance. In our own small life-purpose, we now will the great infinite whole. Nobody else can satisfy our will, and nobody else can disburden us from our duty.

This deepest connection also brings man nearer to man. We are unique as selves, but ultimately we are all in the one embracing over-self. Yes, we all are the same over-self and separate ourselves only by our relation to the space-time world which itself arose by the splitting of the primary deed

into striving and content. That is not to be, as it sometimes has been, the way to an ethical doctrine. The sympathy with another, in whose pain we participate because he is ultimately one and the same with us, has no moral significance for our philosophy. Pleasure and pain and accordingly participation in pleasure and sympathy were lying outside of morality for us. But this ultimate unity unites us in our common duty. Even when we examined the spheres of experience we found that the true values must be common to all human beings. We recognized that the evaluating will was the fundamental condition, the "a-priori," of the common world of experience. If we will to build up a world which is not merely a personal dream and accidental chaos, it must be the world of values. Yet only from this relation to the over-self comes the higher sanction of this common will. The aim towards building up the world of values is now no longer merely the necessary will of every being who wills to be acknowledged as a self, but it is a task which precedes the arising of the selves themselves. It is the task which gives any meaning whatever to the selfhood and to the content of experience.

Certainly from the standpoint of experience, we recognized the development and achievement of men, their happiness and their peace, their science and their art, as something absolutely valuable. Yet that meant for us then only that it must be valuable for every possible I. But what new width and significance and dignity come to the history of mankind now that it unveils itself as the unfolding of an eternal will! Every truth and every work of art, every act of justice and every moral victory, every economic progress and every religious inspiration, now becomes a new enhancement of an eternal will. In every coöperation of men who build up values in the family and in the tribe, in the community and in the state, in the widest circle of civilization a continuous growth of the living world-positing energy is manifested. In every fighter for new values, in every leader of mankind, the deepest

world-will strives upward. But when the meaning of the social work towards values becomes metaphysically deepened, at the same time the counter-will which selfishly destroys values must be sharpened in its contrast. To hold the untrue and the ugly, to create the unjust and the immoral, to interfere with the development and to destroy the harmony now means more than a mere opposition to the labor of others. It means metaphysical solitary confinement. The life which raises up pleasure as its purpose now views below and about it an infinite abyss. Such a life has lost the connection with a world-totality. The world-will which bears all existence and gives meaning to reality is on principle annulled by the conscious denial of values. Suddenly everything has become meaningless, purposeless, empty. The I which seeks only its pleasure is banished into eternal solitude.

That must not be misunderstood as if a soul becomes antagonistic to values if it seeks in its action its own self. Only if the pleasure is brought into opposition to the value and if accordingly that which is desired for the self is preferred to that which is absolutely valid is the metaphysical ground destroyed. The strong personality, on the other hand, which, moved by passions, seems to seek itself, seeks the values and only tries to give to the values the stamp of the own particular deed. Just that creates in the world of will ever new evaluation and always enhances anew the deepest energy. Such a powerful will of the self and such self-feeling in the fight against the colorless society pattern, such creation in accordance with the own will is surely not opposed to the world-will. It is a transvaluation. That is meant not in the sense that it demonstrates transitoriness and change in the pure values. No, the values remain unchangeable, but the fulfilment of the evaluation, the content of the evaluated relations, must change in order that the world-will may enhance itself from stage to stage. We saw that value never belonged to anything isolated, but always to a relation, always to an

identification of the separated. The will must progress to new and ever new identifications of the world, inasmuch as the world itself must continually progress and the world must progress because it is will; in every act its reality seeks a new starting-point for a new will. He who destroys in order that he may put the energies of his self into the world-process, he who banishes traditional valuations in order that from his deepest soul he may wrest new values from the world-will and throw them into the becoming of mankind, is eternally right, and the crowd which only wants to enjoy is wrong in contrast to such a great self-asserting individuality. All the energy and all the value of our self thus ultimately originates from the infinite all-will. And yet the reality and the validity of this over-self will originates for eternity from the conviction of our own self.

C. — OVER-SELF

We stand before the last question: What does the inner world in itself become when it is referred to the over-reality? In a certain sense we have answered that question before. When the fellow-world of our experience by its relation to the absolute enlarged itself to mankind as a whole, it necessarily included also our own self. Each of us is a member of mankind, and the meaning of our single self then lies in the part which we take in the upbuilding of the values. Only in so far as we help mankind to create values do we fulfil the task which the absolute bears in itself and which becomes realized by the history of mankind. We are a single small fraction of the totality which appears to logical knowledge as the necessary historical connection, to æsthetic appreciation as community of souls, to ethical estimation as free purposive progress.

But our self was for us not only a chance, single member in the masses; it remains always at the same time the one, closed, inner world. This inner world of the self was torn

by contradictions, too. The logical self-apprehension recognized as the real I the reason with its necessary connection of valuations. The æsthetic self-intuition sought an I which offers the completed unity of happiness. The ethical self-certainty acknowledged an I which realizes itself. Only when the inner world too is recognized as emanation of a deeper will can this apparent contradiction disappear. Then the different values represent merely various aspects of that fundamental reality. The I can find this deeper will only as content of its conviction. In its own acting, it must posit itself as identical with the embracing will which is absolute. In itself it must therefore annul its selfhood to posit itself in unity with the absolute which gives infiniteness. The self enlarges itself into the over-self by its own deed. The limitations of the one-sided aspect then fade away. In the will of the over-self necessary connection, harmonious unity, and self-loyal realization are posited in one and the same deed. The will of the over-self had to maintain itself. By that it had to enhance itself, to realize itself, to progress from stage to stage, and thus harmoniously to fulfil all its willing. In the narrowed apprehension of the I, this will-process resolves itself into the separated values. In the over-self the one fundamental deed embraces necessity and freedom, unity and progress.

Accordingly we find in ourselves the over-self in the blending allness of values, as soon as the boundaries of the self begin to disappear. We must now look from the self towards the over-self, and we shall ultimately glance for the last time from the over-self back to the self. In other words, we will indicate once more the purest meaning of our view of the world in order ultimately to trace once more the life-purposes of the personality. Indeed, the view of the world has become completed for us only now since we have come to understand how the world and mankind and the self are embedded in the deed of the over-self for eternity.

For eternity! We have reached that highest point from

which the meaning of eternity unveils itself. And through it we recognize the deepest aiming of the absolute. The three-fold valuation of connection, unity, and realization has shown itself now as a mere resolving of one united deed which in the over-reality is really a single one. On the other hand, the three contents of the world, outer world, fellow-world, and inner world, presented themselves also as mere separated aspects of this same absolute deed. The resolution into those three different values resulted as soon as in a way we took a cross-section of the world-deed, and the resolution into the three world-contents when we took a longitudinal section, if such metaphors may be allowed. In the absolute over-deed all those separations are again annulled. The I, the fellow-I, and the not-I are in the over-I one and the same; and the logical, the æsthetic, and the ethical valuation form in the over-I one single unfolding will, and accordingly one single deed: the world-deed.

The world is a deed. From here everything becomes illuminated. A deed is the realization of that which is willed. A deed is not only a final action as if it were simply a process. The action is part of the deed only if it corresponds to the will. In every deed that which is willed and that which is achieved are posited as one. As purpose of the will the goal is a not-yet, a future. In view of the achievement the mere willing of the goal has become a no-longer, a past. Only when both are perfectly one do we have a deed. In the deed, therefore, past and future are one, and that alone is the meaning of eternity. The world-deed is eternal in time just as the circle is eternal in space. Nowhere a beginning and nowhere an end in the circle. In the eternity of the fulfilment of the world-deed the over-self does not know a past which is not also future nor a future which is not also past. The world is eternal because in every fibre of its ultimate reality it is nothing but deed, and because every deed posits future and past as a unity.

The world is a deed. A deed is an identification. Now we understand why every will which arose from the depths of the world-will remained fundamentally a striving for identification. Here lies the last ground for form and content of our values. We recognized all our values as such relations of identities, and all striving of the personalities for values was an expression of this demand for finding that which remains identical with itself in the experience. This demand for identification meant at the same time the demand for the self-assertion of the world. This demand is not itself an object of experience. It manifests itself in its deed, and only from the result, from the evaluated world can we recognize this absolute deed. The personality must be impelled by such a deed inasmuch as all our willing and realizing in experience must participate in the deed and will of the eternal absolute. The deed demands that everything remain worthless which does not identify the grasped content in a new experience and which does not in this way remain loyal to its will.

The world is a deed. A deed is a realization, and as realization we recognized the fulfilment of will in a form which demands new will. Realization is therefore enhancement of will. Hence at no stage can the deed of the over-self come to a standstill. And it can never go backward, as every realization must lead to a new will which has all the earlier stages as presuppositions. Every new stage therefore realizes the ultimate meaning of the preceding stages. But just that meant to us progress. In every valuable process the will of the world is enhanced. Yet that does not mean that that which is reached is in itself more valuable than the stage which is left behind. The value always lay only in the relation, in the realization, in the positing as identical. Every single enhancement of the will is therefore absolutely valuable, and nothing can be still more valuable than that which is absolutely valuable. Even the highest stage which the will may reach is always valuable only with reference to the ear-

lier stage. Only the relation is valuable, because it is the fulfilment of the will. The ultimate goal of the world lies at an endless distance. And yet even that furthest final point cannot be more valuable in itself than that which is left behind. Only the movement towards a goal, the maintaining and enhancement, is endlessly valuable.

The world is a deed. Deed means fulfilment and completion. If the world is to be a deed, it must always be complete in itself, and yet its goal was to lie at an infinite distance. There is no contradiction. It is a necessary, inner counterplay of the eternal will. In the infinite lies the last stage of the world, but no stage can belong to this world which does not belong to its will and therefore to its moving from the start. Whatever the world-will may desire, it must be a self-unfolding of the original will. The over-self can never become disloyal to itself. Its unlimited development is given in the law of its own free deed as the curve of geometry is given in the formula of its smallest part. If the over-self would know itself entirely, it would from the beginning be obliged to will the world in its infinity. All becoming is the self-unfolding of this one will. The world is therefore an infinite enhancement of will, and yet a completed deed, as nothing which is not willed can ever be added to this will which maintains itself. With the first positing this endless, infinite, eternal world is perfectly closed, and it is meaningless to ask for a world which lies outside of it.

The world is a deed. The deed in its totality embraces connection and unity and achievement. Only by annulling its totality in separating the not-I from the I the three aspects of the world became resolved, and each became the starting-point of a special world-valuation. Each became the "a-priori" of a particular evaluated world. But just for this reason those separated evaluations can be valid only for the world of experience which resulted from that opposition of I and not-I. For the over-experience, for the ultimate reality

of will, accordingly, the logical, or æsthetic, or ethical standards of valuation must be insufficient. Thus the deed of the over-self can be measured only by the metaphysical value which is the inner unity of those three values of experience. The ultimate reality, therefore, can never be grasped by mere logical knowledge, and every philosophy which is based merely on logical thinking must be impotent on principle. But in the same way such a philosophy cannot be supported merely by æsthetic feeling which seeks the value of unity, or by ethical consciousness which evaluates the realization. Every single effort of such evaluating one-sidedness must bring the absolute which is to bear all experience down into the realm of experience itself. The deed of the over-self would then glide back into individual life. Conviction alone in which the world manifoldness is posited as a unity can grasp the ultimate reality. Only through conviction the over-deed annuls the metaphysical solitude of the self and binds together the I and the not-I in their truth and unity and freedom. The world-will is will towards values. But the created value appears only in the experience of the I as truth, harmony, and goodness. In the ultimate over-personal reality the world is grasped through the metaphysical over-value which creates all those values of experience. Through the conviction of belief in this metaphysical value the I enlarges itself to the over-I which contains in itself the I with the fellow-I and the not-I.

The world is a deed. It is no thing, no content, no mere existence with which the world begins and the parts of which now simply last in indifference. It is no deed-material which hangs together in accidental parts externally and the elements of which continue. The world is a living deed, and the work of this deed is to be performed. From here we understand the task and the meaning of our individual selfhood.

Whoever has proceeded from fluctuating chance volitions to real convictions finds this unswervingly before his soul:

our life has meaning and purpose. We are not embedded helplessly into a blind accidental game which destroys the values of experience, but with our whole life-reality we belong to a world which strives upward. The rigid necessity which forces us has shown itself as a value, too, as a value which our own will is positing in its pure willing towards the goal of the world. Banished is the anxiety that the over-reality may be meaningless, and that our world of experience with all its truth and beauty and goodness may be a useless purposeless upbuilding. In the beyond of the self there works a will towards values which bears our own valuation, and which cannot be sacrificed itself in any infinity.

This life in the world of values is a great affirmation. Prejudiced pessimists think that if all existence is will, life must be intolerable. They say that each will is dissatisfaction with that which is given, and when the will is satisfied all interest is annulled. The world would thus be a pendulum movement between pain and apathy. We now know the opposite. Just because the world and life are unending will, the true life is filled with the greatest possible measure of pure satisfaction. We recognized that the will is not at all displeasure. Only the realization of that which is not willed brings dissatisfaction. The continuous willing as such is not at all a suffering. On the contrary, it is a necessary condition for the joy which floods from the fulfilment. The fulfilment itself, on the other hand, does not annul the will, and therefore does not deprive us of the possibility of new satisfaction. We recognized that fulfilment and realization cannot mean anything else than transition to new starting-points for a new will. As the world is nothing but will, the will always wills only new willing, and every realization is fulfilment just because it secures new volition. He who posits the value bears in himself a joy which necessarily realizes itself in every pulse-beat of life. Will itself becomes an inexhaustible source of satisfaction. No suffering and no disappointment can dry up this eternal source. It

ceases only when the value is destroyed on principle, when the unity with the over-self is accordingly denied, when the world-affirming meaning of life is lost by the own will. He who does not will the value does not fundamentally will his own will, and life itself is therefore sacrificed. What remains is only the phantom of life. "The true life," says Fichte, "lives in the eternal. It is a whole in every instant, the highest life which is possible at all. The phantom life lives in the changing. The phantom life therefore becomes an incessant dying; it lives in dying."

It would be meaningless to hope for more from life than such a fulfilment of the own will. Nothing but fulfilment of the own demand could ever bring any satisfaction at all to us. And this fulfilment does not lie in a far distant life, is not a seeking for an ultimate, perhaps unattainable, goal. Every act offers a totality of value, and in every will through truth and harmony and morality something perfect can be created. That all this is possible makes our life the best and most blessed. Such optimism is now no longer threatened for us by the inner opposition of the values. Those contradictions have been annulled in the over-self. We know that those contradictory valuations are ultimately only different aspects of the fundamental deed which is a unity in itself, and that the conflict is irreconcilable only in the limited experience of the self, not in the ultimate reality. As soon as we grasp the self in the over-self, the parts unite themselves harmoniously in a totality. On the other hand, as soon as the over-self has become the limited self and the original deed therefore resolved into a will towards the separated values, their conflict is necessary. And in this conflict was ultimately lying also the contrast between the will towards the value and the striving against the value, between happiness and suffering, between progress and death, between morality and sin. That our individual life is overshadowed by suffering and disappointment, that error and temptation and non-fulfilment

penetrate into our days, in short that human fate is after all only a human life is therefore posited with the will to be a self.

The mere desire for pleasure and the mere avoiding of pain cannot possibly be the goal of our life if it is to maintain meaning and value at all and is not in its lonely selfishness to detach itself from the world-will. We recognized that fully at every stage of our philosophical inquiry. We saw that the pleasure, too, has its æsthetic place in the inexhaustible value of happiness, but it was the unity of the inner experience which was demanded in such a valuation, not the content of pleasure as such. It is æsthetically valuable to be happy, but it is without ethical value to strive for pleasure, and it is ethically worthless to prefer pleasure to the values of will. The moral task of our life is to realize the absolutely valid pure values by our own deed. In this life-work, we know ourselves as free creators. We are free because our will in the reality of life is not posited as a link in the chain of causal connections. It is meaningless to ask there for its causes. Our will is completely determined by its inner relations and intentions. We do not perceive our will like a thing, but experience it in an incomparable way as an own self-certain striving, as a free realization. And every realization meant to us an enhancement of the free will. On the other hand, the values which we seek in freedom are not given to us, but are demanded from us. They are not experiences, but new creations from the material of experience. This free work of our life is unique; we recognized it as irreplaceable in the only world of the deed of the over-self. And this life-work from birth to death is in every valuable deed a whole, in every realization of values eternal, an eternally valuable part in the infinite atemporal all.

It is eternally valuable because a will maintains itself in its seeking of values and therefore remains loyal to itself. We recognized as a fundamental principle of the pure value that

that which is grasped remains the same in the new form. Outside of us and beside us and in us value belongs only to that which the will grasps as realization of the willed. If we are not loyal to ourselves, we ourselves become worthless and sacrifice ourselves. To remain faithful is therefore the ultimate demand, and to be faithful to ourselves means to realize our will. And to realize means to maintain the old in the new and yet to take the new as starting-point for new volitions. A mere skipping and mere sudden transition from one state into another would never have meaning. To fall asleep wishless as the beggar's child and to awake as the child of the fairy king, without memory, without identification of present and past, is neither progress nor connection nor happiness. The new must have been willed in the old and the old must be grasped in the new, to be valuable. In self-loyalty to enhance our own will by creating that which we willed with our deepest intention, and to help in this way to build up a world of values in which the absolutely valid becomes expression of our personal will — that is the one all-embracing task of our personality.

To upbuild a world of values! That is not attainable for our isolated energies. We can only take part in the common task of mankind. This mankind we recognized as united by its belief in the values, and this unity, too, was no accidental occurrence. We saw that only those whose deepest will posits the forms of the values as necessary can be acknowledged as members of mankind. To unfold his own will in self-faithfulness means therefore for every one to help the upbuilding of the same common world. In this common work the power became enhanced. The history of mankind thus became an endless unfolding of the own will. For mankind, too, it remained true that the pleasure cannot be the goal of the deed. To bring the greatest possible pleasure to the greatest possible masses the wide circuit through the history of civilization would not have been necessary. The realization of pleasure

has hardly been changed and remains indifferent at every stage. To progress in the sense of the self-assertion of the will in will-enhancement remains for mankind, too, the ultimate meaning of duty. In science and art, in love and peace, in industry and state, in morality and law, in religion and philosophy : mankind is to unfold in freedom what is intended as necessary goal of its own will.

Even nature serves this upbuilding of a world of values through history. Nature is willing to become material and tool of the evaluating will. In the progress of economy nature climbs from step to step through richer and richer forms of serviceableness. In its beauty and in its development nature shows its will ; in its causal lawfulness, nature guarantees its loyalty. The total outer world resounds with the will of the beings. But this eternal unity of outer world and fellow-world and inner world in the whole richness of their connections and unities and realizations would never have been possible if they were not all flowing from the same eternal absolute deed of the over-self.

That this over-self is real, and that its will really and unchangeably binds our world of values, and that our loyal life is therefore endlessly valuable, no knowledge can teach us. No knowledge could be sufficient. This certainty is founded on the rock of conviction, and on conviction, therefore, is based every value of truth, of unity, of realization, of completion. But this conviction itself is ultimately our own deed. We cannot leave this deed undone unless we are to sacrifice ourselves, as only through this deed our total world of willing is formed into a unity. But it remains our own deed. In the will towards the unity of our own willing the world-deed is closed, in which every demand is satisfied, every question answered, every striving fulfilled. To be faithful to ourselves in eternity — in such a deed all values of the world are safely harbored.

INDEX

INDEX

- Absolute, 2, 47, 77, 113, 318, 328, 348, 394, 405, 414.
- Absoluteness, 385.
- Achievement, 258, 301, 330.
- Acknowledgment, 24, 38, 88, 110.
- Action, 61, 74, 335, 399.
- Activity, 23.
- Adjustment, 187, 360.
- Æsthetic, 163, 177, 180, 204.
- Æsthetics, 59, 156, 167, 387.
- Affirmation, 159.
- Agreement, 78, 197.
- Animals, 110.
- Anticipation, 72.
- Anti-naturalism, 44.
- Applied Art, 205.
- Appreciation, 17.
- A-priori, 79, 166, 354, 418, 424.
- Art, 168, 187, 204, 307.
- Artist, 171, 212.
- Atemporal, 383, 407.
- Atoms, 11, 126.
- Atonement, 376.
- Attitude, 24, 91, 104, 144.
- Authority, 52.
- Bar, 244.
- Beauty, 40, 165, 204, 249.
- Being, 88.
- Belief, 386.
- Biology, 35, 110.
- Body, 106, 415.
- Books, 227.
- Bust, 212.
- Causal, 10, 128, 140, 144.
- Causality, 126.
- Chaos, 75.
- Choice, 62.
- Chord, 246.
- China, 363.
- Christian, 367, 375, 380.
- Civilization, 80, 165, 257, 279, 317, 373, 386.
- Classification, 132.
- Climax-value, 31.
- Coercion, 321.
- Color, 178, 225, 245.
- Comedy, 236.
- Community, 285, 310, 331.
- Completion, 78, 258.
- Conception, 111, 124.
- Conclusion, 159.
- Conditional, 28.
- Connection, 87, 116, 146.
- Conscience, 196, 331, 341.
- Consciousness, 13, 18, 43, 110.
- Conservation, 78, 128.
- Consistency, 64.
- Content, 221.
- Contradictory, 352.
- Conviction, 392, 425.
- Creation, 359.
- Criminal, 62.
- Dance, 206.
- Darwinism, 264, 283.
- Death, 271, 376.
- Decision, 58, 258.
- Deduction, 161.
- Description, 17, 130.
- Desirability, 31.
- Desires, 29.
- Details, 221.
- Development, 36, 257, 264, 301, 340.
- Devotion, 182, 192.
- Discord, 215.
- Displeasure, 65.
- Dogmatic, 88.
- Drama, 210, 230, 234.
- Economist, 27.
- Economy, 304, 308.

- Education, 298, 317.
 Egotism, 332.
 Egypt, 366.
 Emotion, 363.
 Empirio-criticism, 34.
 Enjoyment, 183, 347.
 Estimation, 267, 303.
 Eternity, 421.
 Ethical, 156, 255, 330.
 Existence, 81, 87, 95, 208, 350.
 Expectation, 127, 209.
 Explanation, 17, 130, 169, 266.

 Fairy-tale, 231.
 Faithfulness, 343.
 Fate, 199.
 Feeling, 66, 172, 250.
 Fellow-will, 105.
 Fellow-world, 92.
 Fetish, 270.
 Fine Arts, 218.
 Force, 131.
 Form, 223, 237.
 Freedom, 145, 283, 372.
 Friendship, 191.
 Fulfilment, 71, 400, 424.
 Future, 407.

 General, 124.
 Generalization, 127.
 God, 266, 356, 359, 371, 379, 385.
 Gratification, 1.
 Growth, 263.
 Greece, 366, 374.

 Happiness, 195, 279, 332, 353, 368.
 Harmony, 183, 345.
 Heaven, 380.
 Hero, 234.
 Historian, 139.
 Historical, 230.
 History, 118, 122, 138, 277, 301, 371.
 Holiness, 347.
 Humanists, 35.

 Idea, 185, 186, 301.
 Idealism, 3, 41, 44, 49, 196, 304, 312, 318.

 Identity, 72, 75, 95, 117, 134, 158, 261, 338, 394, 406, 423.
 Illusions, 2, 364.
 Imagination, 97, 100.
 Immediacy, 23, 42.
 Immoral, 340.
 Immortality, 381.
 Impression, 94.
 Inclination, 320.
 Independence, 76.
 India, 364, 378.
 Individual, 322, 415.
 Individuality, 14, 190, 286, 396.
 Induction, 161.
 Industry, 304.
 Ineffable, 393.
 Influence, 152.
 Intention, 262.
 Introjection, 170.
 Invention, 229, 360.
 Islam, 369, 375.
 Isolation, 181.
 Israel, 367.

 Judgment, 54, 88, 119, 159, 392.

 Knowledge, 38, 87.

 Labor, 311, 314.
 Landscape, 178, 185, 205, 215.
 Language, 111.
 Law (Natural), 122, 132.
 Law (State), 317, 321, 330.
 Lawlessness, 326.
 Life, 11, 42, 229.
 Light, 177, 225.
 Lines, 224.
 Literature, 227.
 Logic, 387.
 Logical, 85, 156, 180, 393, 425.
 Love, 188.
 Loyalty, 63, 192, 429.

 Man, 12, 188.
 Manifoldness, 178, 195.
 Mankind, 412.
 Material, 10.
 Materialistic, 312.

- Meaning, 220, 238.
 Mechanism, 10.
 Melodrama, 236.
 Melody, 246.
 Memory, 96.
 Metaphysics, 48, 156, 167, 345, 356,
 388, 416.
 Miracle, 371.
 Money, 30, 315.
 Moral, 38, 60, 190, 196, 320, 340,
 428.
 Morality, 54, 297, 329, 351.
 Music, 241.

 Nation, 292.
 Naturalism, 41.
 Naturalist, 13, 126.
 Nature, 117, 121, 274, 410, 430.
 Necessity, 50.
 Norms, 52.
 Novel, 215.

 Object, 140.
 Objective, 29.
 Obligation, 46, 341.
 Opposite, 92.
 Organism, 136.
 Ought, 51.
 Over-experience, 395, 399.
 Over-individual, 39.
 Over-personal, 70, 156, 395.
 Over-reality, 318.
 Over-self, 398, 412, 420, 430.
 Over-will, 398.

 Pain, 19, 66.
 Painting, 207, 209, 219.
 Parallelism, 136.
 Past, 142, 407.
 Penalties, 327.
 Perseverance, 129.
 Persia, 365, 373.
 Personality, 27, 69, 92, 122, 297,
 337, 378, 403, 419.
 Persons, 102, 118, 138.
 Philosophy, 5, 227, 318, 352, 386,
 413, 425.
 Phylogenetic, 272.

 Physical, 90.
 Physics, 313.
 Plastic, 209.
 Pleasure, 19, 51, 65, 193, 196, 332,
 428.
 Poem, 212, 230.
 Poet, 227.
 Positivism, 18, 289, 393.
 Postulate, 96, 392.
 Pragmatism, 2, 34, 41, 44.
 Predestination, 368.
 Priests, 373.
 Progress, 262, 270, 277, 281, 293,
 325.
 Pseudo-values, 28.
 Psychical, 15, 90, 135, 168.
 Psychologism, 90.
 Psychology, 4, 16, 89, 101, 134, 147,
 167, 248.
 Psychophysical, 241.
 Psychophysicist, 15.
 Purposes, 27, 265, 426.
 Purposiveness, 269.

 Race, 284.
 Reaction, 67.
 Real, 175.
 Realism, 393.
 Realization, 69, 325, 399, 423.
 Reason, 118, 155.
 Reconstruction, 23.
 Regress, 271.
 Regularities, 128.
 Relations, 99.
 Relative, 30.
 Relativism, 2, 36, 58.
 Religion, 354, 358, 369, 413.
 Religious, 222.
 Renunciation, 364.
 Responsibility, 62.
 Revelation, 370.
 Rhyme, 209, 238.
 Rhythm, 209, 239, 243.

 Salvation, 376, 381, 383.
 Satisfaction, 13, 65, 311, 347, 426.
 Science, 10, 87, 116, 119, 122, 130,
 133, 220.

- Sculptor, 209.
 Self, 90, 104, 296, 334, 337, 382, 395, 412.
 Self-agreement, 165, 204.
 Self-assertion, 78, 349.
 Self-deception, 211.
 Self-loyalty, 342.
 Self-perfection, 211, 357.
 Self-realization, 63, 262, 303, 338.
 Sensations, 43.
 Sensuous, 183, 199.
 Skepticism, 2, 38.
 Social, 52, 304, 323.
 Society, 317, 419.
 Sociologists, 34, 123.
 Sophists, 3, 41.
 Soul, 112.
 Sound, 243.
 Space, 97, 130, 207, 408.
 Spectator, 20.
 Statutes, 320.
 Stimulus, 69.
 Style, 239.
 Subject, 103, 109, 138.
 Suggestion, 93, 106, 108.
 Sympathy, 190.
 System, 78, 80.
 Technical, 313.
 Teleological, 264.
 Theatre, 210, 214.
 Thing, 94, 98, 118.
 Thou-experience, 211.
 Time, 97, 130, 142, 382.
 Tone, 177, 242.
 Totality, 390, 401.
 Transformation, 24.
 Transition, 73.
 Transmigration, 377.
 Transvaluation, 5.
 Truth, 35, 54, 88, 166.
 Understanding, 149.
 Un-equation, 266.
 Unity, 165, 172, 187, 204, 352, 403.
 Unreal, 208, 222, 229, 232, 252, 254.
 Utilitarianism, 53.
 Validity, 56.
 Vitalism, 265.
 Volitions, 150.
 Voluntarism, 17.
 Will, 13, 59, 64, 105, 123, 141, 143, 156, 169, 200, 288, 337, 403, 409, 424.
 Words, 238.
 World, 9, 75, 271, 402.
 World-will, 405.

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